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Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus
p. 34

QUAESTIO III. Utrum solo bono creato utendum sit.

Tertio, ostenso utrum omni creato sit utendum et1 omni alio a Deo, est quaestio, utrum solo bono creato sit utendum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. «Omne bonum aut est finis, aut ad finem»2; sed solo bono, quod est ad finem, est utendum, quia ratio utilis est ducere in finem: ergo cum solum bonum creatum sit ad finem, solo bono creato est utendum.

2. Item, omne bonum aut est creatum, aut increatum. Sed si contingit uti bono increato, contingit illud referre ad aliud: aut ergo ad creatum, aut3 increatum; sed non ad increatum, quia non est nisi unum increatum: ergo ad creatum. Sed sic refertur terminus ad viam et causa ad effectum; sed hoc est abusio, non usus: ergo solo bono creato sive creatura est utendum.

3. Item, Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum4 dividit honestum contra utile: ergo nullum utile honestum vel e converso; sed Deus est honestum per essentiam: ergo Deo non est utendum.

4. Item, videtur quod non solum non sit utendum Deo sive bono increato, sed uti eo semper sit peccatum mortale, quia Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum5 dicit: «Summa perversitas est frui utendis et uti fruendis»; sed qui utitur bono increato, utitur bono fruendo: ergo etc.

Sed contra.

1. Contingit Deo recte servire intuitu mercedis, quia multi sunt boni mercenarii, ut dicit Ambrosius6; sed non contingit Deo servire nisi amando: ergo contingit Deum recte amare intuitu mercedis; sed sic amans utitur Deo, quia refert ad aliud: ergo etc.

2. Item, sic summa bonitas habet se ad amorem, sicut7 summa veritas ad cognitionem; sed contingit veritatem creatam cognoscere clarius sine praeiudicio summae veritatis et sine errore: ergo similiter contingit aliam bonitatem quam summam ardentius diligere sine praeiudicio summae bonitatis et deordinatione: ergo contingit amore ordinato aliud plus diligi quam Deum: ergo contingit Deum diligi propter aliud ordinate et ita uti eo.

3. Item, videtur quod nullum peccatum sit, cum quis utitur Deo propter suam salutem, quia «cuius finis bonus, ipsum bonum»8; sed huius usus bonus est, scilicet nostra salus: ergo usus Dei bonus: ergo non erit peccatum.

4. Item, usus Dei aut est bonus; et sic utendum Deo; aut est malus; et sic Deus malus, quia «cuius usus malus, ipsum malum»9; quod si Deus bonus, et eius usus bonus: ergo Deo est utendum.

Conclusio.

Solo bono creato est utendum, et bono increato uti est abuti.

Respondeo. Dicendum, quod solo bono creato est utendum, quia, si bono increato utimur, semper est abusus, et abusus talis est mortale peccatum propter perversitatem in finem10 cum delectatione, et propter voluntatis inordinationem, quae minus diligit ipsum quo utitur, quam propter quod utitur.

p. 35

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod contingit recte servire Deo intuitu mercedis; dicendum, quod illa merces aut est ipse Deus, sicut dixit Abrahae Genesis decimo quinto11: «Ego merces tua»; et sic intuens mercedem non utitur, quia non refert ad aliud; aut merces illa est aliud, et tunc potest eam quis intueri aut ut causam moventem; et sic est malus mercenarius12; aut ut rationem inducentem; et sic bonus, et hoc modo non utitur.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod clarior cognitio creaturae non praeiudicat Creatori, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia claritas cognitionis non est in nostra potestate, sed ardor affectionis est in nostra potestate; ideo requiritur a nobis, quod istum ordinemus, non illam13. Aliquis tamen actus cognitionis est in nostra potestate, utpote actus fidei, quo si aliquis assentiat veritati primae propter aliud, bene praeiudicat veritati, sicut amare propter aliud, bonitati.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finis usus Dei est bonus; dicendum, quod finis dicitur bonus dupliciter: aut quantum ad substantiam, aut quantum ad intentionem finiendi; et propositio illa intelligitur quantum ad intentionem finiendi, et haec14 consistit in recta ordinatione.

Ad 4. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod illa propositio15 intelligitur de habentibus ordinationem ad finem, sed non de ipso fine. — Vel intelligitur de actu naturali ipsarum rerum et proprio, qui frequentius ab ipsa re elicitur, non de ordinatione in16 finem; et sic non valet propositio ad propositum.

Scholion

I. In conclusione S. Doctor propositionem, quod bono increato uti sit abusus et peccatum, duplici ratione probat, quae sumitur tum ex parte finis ultimi, tum ex parte voluntatis. Ex parte finis ultimi est abusus, quia aversio a fine non fit sine contemptu eius et offensa Dei, uti probatur II Sent. d. 42, a. 2, q. 1, et a. 3, q. 2; ex parte voluntatis propter inordinationem, quia voluntas, quando Deo utitur, in aliquo creato ponit finem; sed finis est melior his quae sunt ad finem (infra d. 29, a. 1, q. 1 in corp.) et «quantum est de se, dicit excessum bonitatis respectu eius, quod est ad finem» (ibid. ad 4). Ex quo patet inordinatio in proposito. Voluntas enim in utendo minus diligit medium quam finem. Ad rem facit illud generalissimum principium Aristotelis, toties a S. Doctore repetitum: Propter quod unumquodque (tale) est, illud magis est. Cfr. etiam hic dub. 6, ubi dicit, quod omnis res sit aut finis, aut medium ad finem, aut perveniens ad finem. — Quoad solut. ad 1, nempe quomodo Deo servire possimus intuitu mercedis, cfr. II Sent. d. 38, a. 1, q. 3 ad 2 et III Sent. d. 27, a. 2, q. 2. — Quoad axioma Cuius finis bonus, ipsum quoque bonum (ad 3), cfr. II Sent. d. 38, a. 1, q. 1.

II. Quoad ipsam quaestionem: Alex. Hal., Summa, p. III, q. 60, m. 3, a. 1 et 2, et p. II, q. 142, m. 2. — Ceteros auctores videsis in Scholio ad praecedentem quaestionem.

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English Translation
p. 34

Question 3. Whether only a created good is to be used.

Third, having shown whether everything created is to be used, and1 everything other than God, the question arises whether only a created good is to be used. And that it is, seems to follow thus.

1. "Every good is either an end or [is ordered] to an end"2; but only a good that is [ordered] to an end is to be used, since the meaning of useful is to lead toward an end: therefore, since only a created good is [ordered] to an end, only a created good is to be used.

2. Again, every good is either created or uncreated. But if one can use the uncreated good, then one can refer it to something else: either to something created or3 to something uncreated; but not to something uncreated, since there is only one uncreated [being]: therefore to something created. But in that case a terminus is referred to the way and a cause to its effect; and this is misuse, not use: therefore only a created good — that is, a creature — is to be used.

3. Again, Augustine in the book On Eighty-Three Questions4 divides the honorable (honestum) against the useful (utile): therefore nothing useful is honorable, or conversely; but God is honorable by essence: therefore God is not to be used.

4. Again, it seems that not only is God, or the uncreated good, not to be used, but that to use him is always mortal sin — for Augustine in the book On Eighty-Three Questions5 says: "The greatest perversity is to enjoy things that are to be used and to use things that are to be enjoyed"; but he who uses the uncreated good uses a good that is to be enjoyed: therefore etc.

On the contrary.

1. One may rightly serve God with an eye to reward, for there are many good hirelings, as Ambrose says6; but one cannot serve God except by loving [him]: therefore one may rightly love God with an eye to reward; but one who so loves uses God, since he refers him to something else: therefore etc.

2. Again, the highest goodness stands to love as7 the highest truth stands to knowledge; but one can know a created truth more clearly without prejudice to the highest truth and without error: therefore, likewise, one can love some goodness other than the highest more ardently without prejudice to the highest goodness and without disorder: therefore one can by an ordered love love something more than God: therefore one can love God for the sake of something else in an ordered way, and thus use him.

3. Again, it seems there is no sin when someone uses God for the sake of his own salvation, because "whose end is good, the thing itself is good"8; but the end of this use is good, namely our salvation: therefore the use of God is good: therefore there will be no sin.

4. Again, the use of God is either good — and so God is to be used — or it is evil, and so God is evil, because "whose use is evil, the thing itself is evil"9; and if God is good, then his use is also good: therefore God is to be used.

Conclusion.

Only a created good is to be used, and to use the uncreated good is to misuse it.

Reply. I answer that only a created good is to be used, because, if we use the uncreated good, it is always misuse, and such misuse is mortal sin, on account of the perversity [of turning] into an end10 with delight, and on account of the will's disorder, which loves that by which it uses less than that on account of which it uses.

p. 35

Reply to 1. To the objection that one may rightly serve God with an eye to reward, it must be said that that reward is either God himself — as was said to Abraham in Genesis 1511: "I am thy reward" — and in that case one who looks to the reward does not use, since he does not refer it to anything else; or that reward is something else, and then one can look to it either as a moving cause — and so one is a bad hireling12 — or as a prompting reason; and in that way one is good, and in this way one does not use [God].

Reply to 2. To the objection that a clearer knowledge of the creature does not prejudice the Creator, therefore etc., it must be said that the two cases are not parallel, because clarity of knowledge is not in our power, but the ardor of affection is in our power; therefore it is required of us that we order the latter, not the former13. Yet some act of knowledge is in our power — namely, the act of faith — by which, if someone assents to the first truth for the sake of something else, he does indeed prejudice the [first] truth, just as to love [something] for the sake of something else [prejudices] goodness.

Reply to 3. To the objection that the end of the use of God is good, it must be said that an end is called good in two ways: either with respect to its substance, or with respect to the intention of bringing [something] to an end (finiendi); and that proposition is understood with respect to the intention of bringing to an end, and this14 consists in right ordering.

Reply to 4. To the last objection, it must be said that that proposition15 is understood of things that have an ordering toward an end, but not of the end itself. — Or it is understood of the natural and proper act of the things themselves, which is most frequently drawn forth from the thing itself, not of [their] being ordered toward16 an end; and in that way the proposition does not hold for the case at hand.

Scholion

I. In the conclusion the Holy Doctor proves the proposition — that to use the uncreated good is misuse and sin — by a twofold reason, drawn both from the side of the ultimate end and from the side of the will. On the side of the ultimate end it is misuse, because turning away from the end does not happen without contempt of it and offense against God, as is proved in II Sent. d. 42, a. 2, q. 1 and a. 3, q. 2; on the side of the will, [it is misuse] on account of disorder, since the will, when it uses God, places its end in something created; but the end is better than the things that are [ordered] to the end (below, d. 29, a. 1, q. 1 in body), and "so far as concerns itself, [the end] expresses an excess of goodness with respect to what is [ordered] to the end" (ibid. ad 4). From this the disorder in the present case is clear. For the will, in using, loves the means less than the end. Here that most general principle of Aristotle, so often repeated by the Holy Doctor, is pertinent: That on account of which each thing is such, [the cause] is itself more so. Cf. also here, dubium 6, where [Bonaventure] says that every thing is either an end, or a means to an end, or something attaining the end. — On the reply ad 1, namely how we may serve God with an eye to reward, cf. II Sent. d. 38, a. 1, q. 3 ad 2, and III Sent. d. 27, a. 2, q. 2. — On the axiom Whose end is good, the thing itself is also good (ad 3), cf. II Sent. d. 38, a. 1, q. 1.

II. On the question itself: Alexander of Hales, Summa, pt. III, q. 60, m. 3, a. 1 and 2, and pt. II, q. 142, m. 2. — For other authors, see the Scholion on the preceding question.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Codd. R et W vel pro et.
    Codd. R and W read vel ("or") in place of et ("and").
  2. Cfr. Arist., Eth. Nic. I, c. 1–7; Magn. Moral. I, c. 3; et Top. III, c. 1, ubi haec divisio diversimode insinuatur.
    Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, chs. 1–7; Magna Moralia I, ch. 3; and Topics III, ch. 1, where this division is indicated in various ways.
  3. Cod. A cum ed. 1 satis bene adiungit ad. Mox Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 4, post unum omittit increatum.
    Cod. A with ed. 1 quite appropriately adds ad ("to"). A little further on, Vat. — against the older mss. and ed. 4 — omits increatum ("uncreated") after unum ("one").
  4. Quaest. 30: Honestum dicitur quod propter se ipsum expetendum est, utile autem quod ad aliud aliquid referendum est. — Mox ex multis codd. ut A F G H I K T U V aa bb ee ff cum ed. 1 posuimus vel pro et. Paulo infra Vat. ante honestum praemittit quid, quod tamen melius cum mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 omittitur, quia Deus est ipsum honestum per essentiam.
    Question 30: "The honorable is what is to be sought for its own sake, but the useful is what is to be referred to something else." — A little later, with many codices (A, F, G, H, I, K, T, U, V, aa, bb, ee, ff) and ed. 1, we have read vel ("or") in place of et ("and"). A little further on, Vat. prefixes quid ("what") before honestum, but it is better omitted (with the mss. and edd. 1, 2, 3), since God is the honorable by essence.
  5. Quaest. 30: Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle atque utendis frui.
    Question 30: "All human perversity — which is also called vice — is to want to use things that are to be enjoyed, and to enjoy things that are to be used."
  6. In Evang. S. Lucae c. 15, ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1748: At vero filius, qui habet Spiritus S. pignus in corde, saecularis mercedis lucella non quaerit, quibus serviat. Haeredes sunt etiam mercenarii, qui ducuntur ad vineam. Bonus mercenarius Petrus etc. — Codex autem, sub n. 507 Bibliothecae Laurentianae Florentiis, membr. in fol. saec. XI, fol. 116 recto, col. 2, ultimam partem sic exhibet: non quaerit, qui ius servat haeredis. Sunt etiam qui conducuntur ad vineam. Bonus etc. Cum quo concordat cod. in Plut. XIV. in fol. saec. XV, libr. VII, c. 35. Lectio istius ed. in verbis et interpunctione errat.
    Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, ch. 15, where according to the Venice edition of 1748 [it reads]: "But the son, who has the pledge of the Holy Spirit in his heart, does not seek the paltry pay of a secular reward for those whom he serves. Even heirs are hirelings, who are led to the vineyard. Peter is a good hireling," etc. — Codex 507 of the Laurentian Library in Florence (parchment, fol., 11th cent., fol. 116 recto, col. 2) gives the last part thus: "does not seek [what is of] him who preserves the right of an heir. There are also those who are hired for the vineyard. A good [hireling]," etc.; with which the codex in Plut. XIV (fol., 15th cent., bk. VII, ch. 35) agrees. The reading of that edition errs in both words and punctuation.
  7. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1, invertendo comparationem, nempe sicut summa bonitas, sic summa veritas, argumentationem, uti ex subnexis patet, perturbat. Mox cod. X post clarius satis bene addit veritate increata. Dein, faventibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, expunximus aliquam, quod Vat. cum recentiori cod. cc praemittit voci aliam. In ultima propositione huius argumenti multi codd. C F G K L R S U V W aa bb cum ed. 1 ante diligi falso repetunt plus.
    Vat., against the mss. and ed. 1, inverts the comparison — reading sicut summa bonitas, sic summa veritas — and thereby disturbs the argument, as what follows makes clear. A little later, cod. X after clarius ("more clearly") rightly adds veritate increata ("than the uncreated truth"). Then, with the older mss. and ed. 1 in our favor, we have struck out aliquam ("some"), which Vat. with the later cod. cc prefixes to the word aliam ("other"). In the last proposition of this argument, many codices (C, F, G, K, L, R, S, U, V, W, aa, bb) with ed. 1 wrongly repeat plus ("more") before diligi ("to be loved").
  8. Boeth., De diff. topicis II. Locus a fine: Cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est. Vide supra q. 1 in corp. Propositio ista derivata esse videtur ex illa Arist., Top. III, c. 1: Cuius finis melior, et ipsum melius. Ad normam codd. et ed. 1 omisimus est et quoque, quod Vat. cum Boethio habet.
    Boethius, On Topical Differences II, near the end: "Whose end is good, the thing itself also is good." See above, q. 1 in body. The proposition seems to derive from Aristotle, Topics III, ch. 1: "Whose end is better, is itself also better." On the model of the codices and ed. 1, we have omitted est and quoque ("is" and "also"), which Vat. — following Boethius — retains.
  9. Boeth., De diff. topicis II. — Codd. F O X addunt post malus particulam et. Immediate post ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus quod loco quia, cod. R autem habet ergo si Deus.
    Boethius, On Topical Differences II. — Codd. F, O, X add the particle et after malus ("evil"). Immediately after, from nearly all the mss. and ed. 1, we have substituted quod in place of quia ("because"), while cod. R has ergo si Deus ("therefore if God").
  10. Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 reiecimus lectionem Vat. aversionem a fine tanquam minus rectam, quia talis abusus non dicit solum simplicem aversionem a fine, sed etiam directam perversionem ipsius finis, quatenus nempe ipse finis convertitur in medium. Cod. O post perversitatem addit intentionis. Cod. R totam propositionem sic exhibet: et abusus talis semper est mortale peccatum, non (forsan omissum: solum) propter perversitatem in finem cum delectatione, sed propter voluntatis etc. Mox maiorem partem codd. ut A C G I K L U V X etc. et ed. 1 secuti, bis pro utimur substituimus utitur, quod grammatice melius est; alii codd. primo loco habent utitur, secundo loco utimur. Propositio ista relativa a S. Doctore adducta, quae immediate refertur ad substantivum voluntatis, continet implicite rationem inordinationis in voluntate hic notatae; sensus enim est: voluntas ordinata minus diligit ipsum quo utitur, i.e. medium, quam propter quod utitur, i.e. finem; atqui in hoc casu habetur contrarium: ergo voluntas est inordinata.
    On the authority of the mss. and ed. 1, we have rejected Vat.'s reading aversionem a fine ("a turning-away from the end") as less correct, because such misuse denotes not merely a simple turning away from the end but also a direct perversion of the end itself, inasmuch as the end itself is turned into a means. Cod. O after perversitatem adds intentionis ("of intention"). Cod. R gives the whole proposition thus: "and such misuse is always a mortal sin, not (perhaps with solum, 'only,' omitted) on account of the perversion into an end with delight, but on account of the will's," etc. A little later, following the greater part of the codices (A, C, G, I, K, L, U, V, X, etc.) and ed. 1, we have twice substituted utitur ("he uses") for utimur ("we use"), which is grammatically better; other codices have utitur in the first place and utimur in the second. This relative clause, introduced by the Holy Doctor and referring directly to the substantive voluntatis ("of the will"), implicitly contains the reason for the disorder in the will here noted: for the sense is that an ordered will loves that by which it uses (i.e., the means) less than that on account of which it uses (i.e., the end); but in this case the contrary obtains — therefore the will is disordered.
  11. Vers. 1. — Paulo ante exhibemus lectionem codd. R V W X Y Z aa bb; alii codd. autem, omisso Deus, ponunt Dominus post Abrahae, a quibus non multum dissidet Vat. legendo: est ipse, sicut Dominus dixit ad Abraam. Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 post utitur expunximus Deo.
    Verse 1. — A little before [this], we give the reading of codd. R, V, W, X, Y, Z, aa, bb; other codices, omitting Deus, place Dominus ("the Lord") after Abrahae, from which Vat. does not differ much, reading: "is himself, as the Lord said to Abram." A little later, on the authority of the older mss. and ed. 1, after utitur we have struck out Deo.
  12. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit et sic utitur.
    Vat., against the authority of the mss. and ed. 1, here adds et sic utitur ("and so he uses [him]").
  13. Vat. post istum addit amorem et post illam adiungit cognitionem, quae tamen auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 tanquam superflua expunximus.
    Vat. after istum ("this one," masc.) adds amorem ("love"), and after illam ("that one," fem.) adds cognitionem ("knowledge"), which we have, however, on the authority of the mss. and ed. 1, struck out as superfluous.
  14. Cod. cc cum ed. 1 hoc. Mox antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 omittunt propositionem, quae habetur in Vat. et cod. cc post ordinatione, scil.: et illo modo non contingit uti Deo, quia non convenit ordinari. — Fusius de hac re tractat S. Doctor II Sent. d. 28 a. 1 q. 1.
    Cod. cc with ed. 1 reads hoc ("this," neut.). A little later, the older codices and ed. 1 omit the sentence found in Vat. and cod. cc after ordinatione, namely: "and in that way one cannot use God, since he is not fit to be ordered." — The Holy Doctor treats this matter more fully in II Sent. d. 28, a. 1, q. 1.
  15. Scilicet: cuius usus bonus, et ipsum bonum. — Vat. cum cod. cc paulo ante post ultimum praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 addit scilicet usus Dei aut est bonus aut malus etc.
    Namely: "whose use is good, the thing itself is [good]." — Vat. with cod. cc a little earlier, after ultimum, against the authority of the older mss. and ed. 1, adds scilicet usus Dei aut est bonus aut malus ("namely, the use of God is either good or evil"), etc.
  16. Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus in loco ad. — De hoc secundo responsionis membro vide supra q. 1 circa principium conclusionis.
    From the mss. and ed. 1 we have substituted in ("in") in place of ad ("to"). — On this second member of the reply, see above, q. 1, near the beginning of the conclusion. ---
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