Dist. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3
Distinctio III — Pars I
De cognitione Creatoris per creaturas, in quibus Trinitatis vestigium apparet.
Cap. I
Nunc restat ostendere, utrum per ea quae facta sunt aliquod Trinitatis vestigium vel indicium exiguum haberi potuerit. De hoc Augustinus in libro sexto de Trinitate ait: «Oportet, ut Creatorem per ea quae facta sunt intellectu conspicientes, Trinitatem intelligamus. Huius enim Trinitatis vestigium in creaturis apparet. Haec enim omnia, quae arte divina facta sunt, et unitatem quandam in se ostendunt et speciem et ordinem. Nam quodque horum creatorum et unum aliquid est, sicut sunt naturae corporum et animarum, et aliqua specie formatur, sicut sunt figurae vel qualitates corporum ac doctrinae vel artes animarum, et ordinem aliquem petit aut tenet, sicut sunt pondera vel collocationes corporum et amores vel delectationes animarum; et ita in creaturis praelucet vestigium Trinitatis. In illa enim Trinitate summa origo est omnium rerum et perfectissima pulcritudo et beatissima delectatio».
«Summa autem origo», ut Augustinus ostendit in libro de Vera Religione, «intelligitur Deus Pater, a quo sunt omnia, a quo Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Perfectissima pulcritudo intelligitur Filius, scilicet veritas Patris, nulla ex parte ei dissimilis, quam cum ipso et in ipso Patre veneramur, quae forma est omnium, quae ab uno facta sunt et ad unum referuntur, quae tamen omnia nec fierent a Patre per Filium neque suis finibus salva essent, nisi Deus summe bonus esset, qui et nulli naturae, quae ab illo bona esset, invidit, et ut in bono ipso maneret, alia quantum vellet, alia quantum posset, dedit; quae bonitas intelligitur Spiritus sanctus, qui est donum Patris et Filii. Quare ipsum donum Dei cum Patre et Filio aeque incommutabile colere et tenere nos convenit. Per considerationem itaque creaturarum unius substantiae Trinitatem intelligimus, scilicet unum Deum Patrem, a quo sumus, et Filium, per quem sumus, et Spiritum sanctum, in quo sumus, scilicet principium, ad quod recurrimus, et formam quam sequimur, et gratiam qua reconciliamur: unum scilicet, quo auctore conditi sumus, et similitudinem eius, per quam ad unitatem reformamur, et pacem, qua Unitati adhaeremus: scilicet Deum, qui dixit: fiat; et Verbum, per quod factum est omne, quod substantialiter et naturaliter est; et Donum benignitatis eius, qua placuit quod ab eo per Verbum factum est et reconciliatum est auctori, ut non interiret».
Ecce ostensum est, qualiter in creaturis aliquatenus imago Trinitatis indicatur; non enim per creaturarum contemplationem sufficiens notitia Trinitatis potest haberi vel potuit sine doctrinae vel interioris inspirationis revelatione. Unde illi antiqui philosophi quasi per umbram et de longinquo viderunt veritatem, deficientes in contuitu Trinitatis, ut magi Pharaonis in tertio signo. Adiuvamur tamen in fide invisibilium per ea, quae facta sunt.
Cap. II
De imagine et similitudine Trinitatis in anima humana.
Nunc vero «ad eam iam perveniamus disputationem, ubi in mente humana, quae novit Deum vel potest nosse, Trinitatis imaginem reperiamus». Ut enim ait Augustinus in decimo quarto libro de Trinitate: «Licet humana mens non sit eius naturae, cuius Deus est, imago tamen illius, quo nihil melius est, ibi quaerenda et invenienda est, quo natura nostra nihil habet melius, id est in mente. In ipsa enim mente, etiam antequam sit particeps Dei, eius imago reperitur; etsi enim, amissa Dei participatione, deformis sit, imago tamen Dei permanet. Eo enim ipso imago Dei est mens, quo capax eius est eiusque particeps esse potest. Iam ergo in ea Trinitatem, quae Deus est, inquiramus. Ecce ergo mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se; hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem, nondum quidem Deum, sed imaginem Dei. Hic enim quaedam apparet trinitas memoriae, intelligentiae et amoris». Haec ergo tria potissimum tractemus, memoriam, intelligentiam, voluntatem».
«Haec igitur tria», ut Augustinus ait in libro decimo de Trinitate, «non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita, nec tres mentes, sed una mens, una essentia. Memoria vero dicitur ad aliquid, et intelligentia et voluntas sive dilectio similiter ad aliquid dicitur; vita vero dicitur ad se ipsam et mens et essentia. Haec igitur tria eo sunt unum, quo una vita, una mens, una essentia; et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula dicuntur, etiam simul, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicuntur. Ea vero tria sunt, quo ad se invicem referuntur».
«Aequalia etiam sunt non solum singula singulis, sed etiam singula omnibus; alioquin non se invicem caperent; se autem invicem capiunt. Capiuntur enim et a singulis singula et a singulis omnia. Memini enim, me habere memoriam et intelligentiam et voluntatem; et intelligo, me intelligere et velle atque meminisse; et volo, me velle et meminisse et intelligere».
«Totamque meam memoriam et intelligentiam et voluntatem simul memini. Quod enim memoriae meae non memini, illud non est in memoria mea; nihil autem tam in memoria est, quam ipsa memoria: totam ergo memini. Item, quidquid intelligo, intelligere me scio, et scio, me velle quidquid volo; quidquid autem scio memini. Totam ergo intelligentiam totamque voluntatem meam memini».
«Similiter, cum haec tria intelligo, tota simul intelligo. Neque enim quidquam intelligibilium est, quod non intelligam, nisi quod ignoro. Quod autem ignoro, nec memini nec volo. Quidquid igitur intelligibilium non intelligo, consequenter etiam nec memini nec volo. Quidquid ergo intelligibilium memini et volo, consequenter intelligo».
«Voluntas etiam mea totam intelligentiam totamque memoriam meam capit, dum utor toto eo quod intelligo et memini. Cum itaque invicem a singulis et omnia et tota capiantur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis et tota singula simul omnibus totis; et haec tria unum, una vita, una mens, una essentia». «Ecce illius summae Unitatis atque Trinitatis, ubi una est essentia et tres personae, imago est humana mens, licet impar».
Mens autem hic pro animo ipso accipitur, ubi est illa imago Trinitatis; «proprie vero mens dicitur», ut ait Augustinus, «non ipsa anima, sed quod in ea est excellentius», qualiter saepe accipitur. Illud etiam sciendum est, quod memoria non solum est absentium et praeteritorum, sed etiam praesentium, ut ait Augustinus in decimo quarto libro de Trinitate, alioquin non se caperet.
Hic attendendum est diligenter, ex quo sensu accipiendum sit quod supra dixit, illa tria, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem esse unum, unam mentem, unam essentiam. Quod utique non videtur esse verum iuxta proprietatem sermonis. Mens enim, id est spiritus rationalis, essentia est spiritualis et incorporea. Illa vero tria naturales proprietates seu vires sunt ipsius mentis et a se invicem differunt, quia memoria non est intelligentia vel voluntas, nec intelligentia voluntas sive amor.
«Et haec tria etiam ad se ipsa referuntur», ut ait Augustinus in nono libro de Trinitate: «Mens enim amare se ipsam vel meminisse non potest, nisi etiam noverit se: nam quomodo amat vel meminit quod nescit»? Miro itaque modo tria ista inseparabilia sunt a semetipsis; et tamen eorum singulum et simul omnia una essentia est, cum et relative dicantur ad invicem.
Sed iam videndum est, quo modo haec tria dicantur una substantia; ideo scilicet, quia in ipsa anima vel mente substantialiter existunt, non sicut accidentia in subiectis, quae possunt adesse et abesse. Unde Augustinus in libro nono de Trinitate ait: «Admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in animo existere substantialiter, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color in corpore, quia etsi relative dicuntur ad invicem, singula tamen substantialiter sunt in sua substantia». Ecce ex quo sensu illa tria dicantur esse unum vel una substantia.
«Quae tria», ut Augustinus ait in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate, «in mente naturaliter divinitus instituta quisquis vivaciter perspicit, et quam magnum sit in ea, unde potest etiam sempiterna immutabilisque natura recoli, conspici, concupisci (reminiscitur enim per memoriam, intuetur per intelligentiam, amplectitur per dilectionem), profecto reperit illius summae Trinitatis imaginem».
Cap. III
De similitudine creantis et creatae trinitatis.
«Verumtamen caveat, ne hanc imaginem ab eadem Trinitate factam ita ei comparet, ut omnino existimet similem, sed potius in qualicumque ista similitudine magnam quoque dissimilitudinem cernat».
«Quod breviter ostendi potest. Homo unus per illa tria meminit, intelligit, diligit, qui nec memoria est nec intelligentia nec dilectio, sed haec habet. Unus ergo homo est, qui habet haec tria, non ipse est haec tria. In illius vero summa simplicitate naturae, quae Deus est, quamvis unus sit Deus, tres tamen personae sunt, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus», et hae tres unus Deus. «Aliud est itaque Trinitatis res ipsa, aliud imago Trinitatis in re alia; propter quam imaginem etiam illud in quo sunt haec tria, imago dicitur, scilicet homo. Sicut imago dicitur et tabula et pictura, quae est in ea; sed tabula nomine imaginis appellatur propter picturam, quae in ea est».
«Rursus ista imago, quae est homo habens illa tria, una persona est. Illa vero Trinitas non una persona est, sed tres personae, Pater Filii et Filius Patris et Spiritus Patris et Filii. Itaque in ista imagine Trinitatis non haec tria unus homo, sed unius hominis sunt. In illa vero summa Trinitate, cuius haec imago est, non unius Dei sunt illa tria, sed unus Deus; et tres sunt illae, non una persona». «Illa enim tria non homo sunt, sed hominis sunt vel in homine sunt. Sed nunquid possumus dicere, Trinitatem sic esse in Deo, ut aliquid Dei sit, nec ipsa sit Deus»? Absit ut hoc credamus. Dicamus ergo, in mente nostra imaginem Trinitatis, sed exiguam et qualemcumque esse, quae summae trinitatis ita gerit similitudinem, ut ex maxima parte sit dissimilis.
Sciendum vero est, quod «haec Trinitas mentis», ut ait Augustinus in decimo quarto libro de Trinitate, «non propterea tantum imago Dei est, quia sui meminit mens et intelligit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intelligere et amare illum, a quo facta est».
Potest etiam alio modo aliisque nominibus distingui trinitas in anima, quae est imago illius summae et ineffabilis Trinitatis. Ut enim ait Augustinus in nono libro de Trinitate: «Mens et notitia eius et amor tria quaedam sunt. Mens enim novit se et amat se; nec amare se potest, nisi etiam noverit se. Duo quaedam sunt mens et notitia eius; item duo quaedam sunt mens et amor eius». «Cum ergo se novit mens et amat se, manet trinitas, scilicet mens, amor et notitia». «Mens autem hic accipitur non pro anima, sed pro eo quod in anima excellentius est». Haec autem tria, cum sint distincta a se invicem, dicuntur tamen esse unum, quia in anima substantialiter existunt.
Et est ipsa mens quasi parens, et notitia eius quasi proles eius. «Mens enim cum se cognoscit, notitiam sui gignit et est sola parens suae notitiae. Tertius est amor, qui de ipsa mente et notitia procedit, dum mens cognoscens se diligit se; non enim posset se diligere, nisi cognosceret se. Amat etiam placitam prolem, id est notitiam suam; et ita amor quidam complexus est parentis et prolis».
«Nec minor est proles parente, dum tantam se novit mens, quanta est; nec minor est amor parente et prole, id est mente et notitia, dum tantum se diligit mens, quantum se novit et quanta est».
«Sunt etiam haec singula in se ipsis, quia et mens amans in amore est, et amor in amantis notitia, et notitia in mente noscente est». Ecce in his tribus qualecumque Trinitatis vestigium apparet.
Mens itaque rationalis considerans haec tria et illam unam essentiam, in qua ista sunt, extendit se ad contemplationem Creatoris et videt unitatem in trinitate et trinitatem in unitate. Intelligit enim, unum esse Deum, unam essentiam, unum principium. Intelligit enim, quia si duo essent, vel uterque insufficiens esset, vel alter superflueret; quia si aliquid deesset uni, quod haberet alter, non esset ibi summa perfectio; si vero nihil uni deesset, quod haberet alter, cum in uno essent omnia, alter superflueret. Intellexit ergo, unum esse Deum, unum omnium auctorem, et vidit, quia absque sapientia non sit, quasi res fatua; et ideo intellexit, eum habere sapientiam, quae ab ipso genita est; et quia sapientiam suam diligit, intellexit etiam, ibi esse amorem.
Cap. IV
De Trinitatis unitate.
«Quapropter iuxta istam considerationem», ut ait Augustinus in libro nono de Trinitate, «credamus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum unum esse Deum, universae creaturae conditorem et rectorem; nec Patrem esse Filium, nec Spiritum sanctum vel Patrem esse vel Filium, sed Trinitatem relatarum ad invicem personarum». Ut enim ait ipse in libro de Fide ad Petrum: «Una est natura sive essentia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, non una persona. Si enim sic esset una persona, sicut est una substantia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, veraciter trinitas non diceretur. Rursus quidem trinitas esset vera, sed unus Deus Trinitas ipsa non esset, si quemadmodum Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus personarum sunt ab invicem proprietate distincti, sic fuissent naturarum quoque diversitate discreti». «Fides autem Patriarcharum, Prophetarum atque Apostolorum unum Deum praedicat esse Trinitatem».
«In illa igitur sancta Trinitate unus est Deus Pater, qui solus essentialiter de se ipso Filium unum genuit; et unus Filius est, qui de uno Patre solus essentialiter natus; et unus Spiritus sanctus, qui solus essentialiter a Patre Filioque procedit. Hoc autem totum non potest una persona, id est, gignere se et nasci de se et procedere de se». Ut enim ait Augustinus in primo libro de Trinitate: «Nulla res est, quae se ipsam gignat, ut sit».
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Distinction III — Part I
On the knowledge of the Creator through creatures, in which a vestige of the Trinity appears.
Chapter I
It now remains to show whether, through the things that have been made, some vestige or however slight indication of the Trinity could be had. On this point Augustine in the sixth book On the Trinity says: "It is right that, beholding the Creator with the intellect through the things that have been made, we should understand the Trinity. For a vestige of this Trinity appears in creatures. For all these things that have been made by divine art both show in themselves a certain unity and form and order. For each of these created things is some one thing — as are the natures of bodies and souls — and is formed by some form, as are the figures or qualities of bodies and the doctrines or arts of souls — and seeks or holds some order, as are the weights or arrangements of bodies and the loves or delights of souls; and thus the vestige of the Trinity shines forth in creatures. For in that Trinity is the supreme origin of all things, and the most perfect beauty, and the most blessed delight."
"The supreme origin," as Augustine shows in the book On True Religion, "is understood as God the Father, from whom are all things, from whom are the Son and the Holy Spirit. The most perfect beauty is understood as the Son — namely, the Truth of the Father, in no respect unlike Him — whom we venerate with and in the Father Himself; and this is the form of all things that were made by the One and are referred to the One, which all things nevertheless would neither be made by the Father through the Son, nor remain within their own limits, if God were not supremely good, who begrudged no nature, insofar as that nature was from Him good, and — that it might remain in the good itself — gave to some as much as they would will, to others as much as they could receive. This goodness is understood as the Holy Spirit, who is the gift of the Father and the Son. For this reason it is fitting for us to worship and hold this Gift of God equally unchangeable with the Father and the Son. Through the consideration of creatures, therefore, we understand the Trinity of one substance — namely one God the Father, from whom we are, and the Son, through whom we are, and the Holy Spirit, in whom we are: that is, the principle to which we return, and the form that we follow, and the grace by which we are reconciled; one, that is, by whose authorship we have been founded, and His likeness, through which we are re-formed unto unity, and peace, by which we cleave to that Unity: namely God, who said fiat, and the Word, through whom was made everything that exists substantially and naturally, and the Gift of His benevolence, by which it pleased Him that what had been made by Him through the Word should also be reconciled to its author, so that it might not perish."
Behold: it has been shown how in creatures an image of the Trinity is in some measure indicated; for through the contemplation of creatures a sufficient knowledge of the Trinity cannot be had — nor could it have been had — without the revelation of teaching or of inner inspiration. Hence those ancient philosophers saw the truth as though through a shadow and from afar, failing in the contemplation of the Trinity, like the magicians of Pharaoh at the third sign. Nevertheless we are assisted in our faith in things invisible through the things that have been made.
Chapter II
On the image and likeness of the Trinity in the human soul.
But now "let us come to that discussion in which, in the human mind — which knows God or can know Him — we may find the image of the Trinity." For as Augustine says in the fourteenth book On the Trinity: "Although the human mind is not of that nature of which God is, yet the image of Him than whom nothing is better must be sought and found there where our nature has nothing better — that is, in the mind. For in the mind itself, even before it becomes a partaker of God, His image is found; for even if, having lost its participation in God, it becomes deformed, yet the image of God remains. For the mind is the image of God precisely insofar as it is capable of Him and can be a partaker of Him. Now then, in it let us seek the Trinity that is God. Behold, the mind remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself; if we discern this, we discern a trinity — not yet God, but the image of God. For here there appears a certain trinity of memory, of understanding, and of love." Let us therefore treat chiefly of these three things: memory, understanding, will."
"These three, then," as Augustine says in the tenth book On the Trinity, "are not three lives but one life, nor three minds but one mind, one essence. Memory is said with reference to something; and understanding and will — or love — are similarly said with reference to something; but life is said with reference to itself, as are mind and essence. These three things, then, are one by that same thing by which they are one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else is said of each individually is also said of them together, not plurally but in the singular. They are, however, three in respect of how they are referred to one another."
"They are equal, too — not only each to each, but each to all; otherwise they would not grasp each other — but they do grasp each other. For they are grasped, both each thing by each and all things by each. For I remember that I have memory, understanding, and will; and I understand that I understand, and will, and remember; and I will that I will, and remember, and understand."
"And I remember my whole memory, my whole understanding, and my whole will at once. For what of my memory I do not remember is not in my memory; but nothing is so much in memory as memory itself; therefore I remember it whole. Likewise, whatever I understand, I know that I understand it; and I know that I will whatever I will; but whatever I know, I remember. Therefore I remember my whole understanding and my whole will."
"Similarly, when I understand these three, I understand them whole together. For there is nothing among intelligible things that I do not understand, except what I am ignorant of. But what I am ignorant of, I neither remember nor will. Therefore whatever of intelligible things I do not understand, I consequently neither remember nor will. And whatever of intelligible things I remember and will, I consequently understand."
"My will, too, grasps my whole understanding and my whole memory, inasmuch as I use the whole of what I understand and remember. Since, therefore, each of them is grasped by each and both as wholes, they are all wholes equal to each whole individually and together to all wholes; and these three are one — one life, one mind, one essence." "Behold: the human mind is the image of that supreme Unity and Trinity in which there is one essence and three persons, though an unequal image."
Mens here is taken for the soul itself, where that image of the Trinity is; "but properly speaking, mens is said," as Augustine says, "not of the soul itself, but of what is more excellent in it" — in which sense it is often taken. It should also be known that memory is not only of things absent and past, but also of things present, as Augustine says in the fourteenth book On the Trinity — otherwise it would not grasp itself.
Here careful attention must be paid to the sense in which what he said above is to be taken — namely that those three, memory, understanding, and will, are one, one mind, one essence. For this does not seem to be true according to the proper sense of the terms. For the mind — that is, the rational spirit — is a spiritual and incorporeal essence. Those three, on the other hand, are natural properties or powers of the mind itself, and they differ from one another: memory is not understanding or will, nor is understanding will or love.
"And these three are also referred to themselves," as Augustine says in the ninth book On the Trinity: "For the mind cannot love itself or remember itself unless it also knows itself — for how does it love or remember what it does not know?" In a wonderful way, therefore, these three are inseparable from themselves; and yet each of them singly and all of them together are one essence, even though they are also said relatively to one another.
But now it must be seen in what sense these three are said to be one substance — namely, because they exist substantially in the soul or mind itself, not as accidents in their subjects, which can be present or absent. Hence Augustine in the ninth book On the Trinity says: "We are reminded, if we can in any way see it, that these exist in the soul substantially, not as in a subject — as color is in a body — because, although they are spoken of relatively to one another, yet each of them is substantially in its own substance." Behold the sense in which those three are said to be one or one substance.
"Whoever vividly perceives these three," as Augustine says in the fifteenth book On the Trinity, "divinely implanted by nature in the mind, and how great that is in the mind by which even the eternal and unchangeable nature can be recalled, beheld, and desired (for it is remembered through memory, gazed upon through understanding, embraced through love) — such a person surely finds the image of that supreme Trinity."
Chapter III
On the likeness between the creating and created trinity.
"Nevertheless let him beware, lest he should so compare this image — which has been made by that same Trinity — to that Trinity, as to consider it altogether like; but rather, in whatever likeness there may be, let him also discern a great unlikeness."
"This can be shown briefly. One human being, through those three, remembers, understands, and loves — and he is neither memory nor understanding nor love, but he has these. There is therefore one human being who has these three; he himself is not these three. But in that supreme simplicity of nature which is God, although there is one God, yet there are three persons — Father and Son and Holy Spirit," and these three are one God. "The reality of the Trinity itself, therefore, is one thing; the image of the Trinity in another thing is another thing. On account of this image the thing in which these three exist is also called an image — namely, the human being. Just as both the panel and the painting that is on it are called an image; but the panel is called by the name of image on account of the painting that is on it."
"Again, this image — which is a human being having those three — is one person. But that Trinity is not one person, but three persons: the Father of the Son, and the Son of the Father, and the Spirit of the Father and of the Son. Thus in this image of the Trinity, these three are not one human being, but of one human being. In that supreme Trinity, however, of which this is the image, those three are not of one God, but are one God; and those three are — not one person." "For those three are not the human being, but are of the human being or in the human being. But can we say that the Trinity is in God in such a way that it is something of God, yet is not itself God?" Far be it from us to believe this. Let us therefore say that there is in our mind an image of the Trinity — but a slight one and of whatever sort — which bears the likeness of the supreme Trinity in such a way that in very great part it is unlike.
It should be known, however, that "this Trinity of the mind," as Augustine says in the fourteenth book On the Trinity, "is the image of God not only because the mind remembers itself and understands and loves itself, but because it can also remember and understand and love Him by whom it was made."
The trinity in the soul — which is the image of that supreme and ineffable Trinity — can also be distinguished in another way and by other names. For as Augustine says in the ninth book On the Trinity: "Mind, and its knowledge, and its love are three things. For the mind knows itself and loves itself; nor can it love itself unless it also knows itself. Two things, then, are the mind and its knowledge; likewise, two things are the mind and its love." "When therefore the mind knows itself and loves itself, a trinity remains — namely the mind, its love, and its knowledge." "Mens here, however, is taken not for the soul, but for what is more excellent in the soul." These three, though they are distinct from one another, are nevertheless said to be one, because they exist substantially in the soul.
And the mind itself is, as it were, the parent, and its knowledge is, as it were, its offspring. "For when the mind knows itself, it begets a knowledge of itself and is alone the parent of its own knowledge. The third is love, which proceeds from the mind and the knowledge, while the mind, knowing itself, loves itself; for it could not love itself unless it knew itself. And it loves also its pleasing offspring — that is, its own knowledge; and so love is a certain embrace of parent and offspring."
"Nor is the offspring less than the parent, for the mind knows itself to be as great as it is; nor is the love less than the parent and the offspring — that is, the mind and the knowledge — for the mind loves itself as much as it knows itself and as much as it is."
"These three also each exist in themselves, because both the mind that loves is in the love, and love is in the knowledge of the one loving, and knowledge is in the mind that knows." Behold, in these three a vestige of the Trinity — of whatever sort — appears.
The rational mind, therefore, considering these three and that one essence in which they exist, extends itself to the contemplation of the Creator and sees unity in trinity and trinity in unity. For it understands that there is one God, one essence, one principle. For it understands that if there were two, either both would be insufficient or one would be superfluous; because if something were lacking to one which the other had, there would not be supreme perfection there; but if nothing were lacking to one of what the other had, then — since all things would be in the one — the other would be superfluous. It therefore understood that there is one God, one author of all things, and it saw that, since He could not be without wisdom (as if a foolish thing), He must therefore have wisdom begotten of Himself; and since He loves His wisdom, it understood also that love is there.
Chapter IV
On the unity of the Trinity.
"Wherefore, according to this consideration," as Augustine says in the ninth book On the Trinity, "let us believe that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, the founder and ruler of the whole creation; and that the Father is not the Son, nor is the Holy Spirit either the Father or the Son, but a Trinity of persons mutually related to one another." For as he himself says in the book On Faith to Peter: "There is one nature or essence of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, not one person. For if there were one person in the same way as there is one substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, a Trinity could not truly be spoken of. And again: a Trinity would indeed be true, but the Trinity itself would not be one God, if — just as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished from one another by the property of persons — they were likewise separated by a diversity of natures." "The faith of the Patriarchs, the Prophets, and the Apostles, however, preaches that the one God is the Trinity."
"In that holy Trinity, therefore, there is one God the Father, who alone essentially begot one Son of Himself; and there is one Son, who alone was essentially born of the one Father; and there is one Holy Spirit, who alone essentially proceeds from the Father and the Son. But none of this can any one person do — that is, beget himself and be born of himself and proceed from himself." For as Augustine says in the first book On the Trinity: "There is no thing that begets itself, that it might exist."
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