Dist. 6, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 6
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Dubium I
In parte ista circa litteram dubitatur de ratione Augustini ad Orosium, quod nec voluntate nec necessitate, quia necessitas in Deo non est etc. Videtur enim sufficiens divisio. Omne enim quod Deus facit, aut facit naturaliter, et sic necessario, aut voluntarie: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod ipse respondet ad intellectum haeretici, et haereticus intelligit de voluntate antecedente et necessitate inevitabilitatis: obiicitur, quod oratio nihilominus in se est multiplex. Sed qui respondet orationi multiplici simpliciter affirmando vel negando, male respondet, secundum quod dicit Philosophus1: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus respondet secundum intellectum haeretici. Quamvis autem oratio in se sit multiplex, quia tamen haereticus in uno sensu eam accipit, iam multiplicitas illa non faceret ad solvendum, quia non procedit secundum illam. Sed distinctio propositionis multiplicis, quando secundum illam multiplicitatem non cadit deceptio, magis est ad ostentationem quam ad veram responsionem.
Dubium II
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: Dicamus, Verbum Dei esse Filium Dei natura, non voluntate. Videtur enim male dicere, quia Pater alio est Deus, alio est Pater, quia deitate est Deus, et paternitate est Pater, ut dicit Augustinus2. Sed Filius est Deus natura deitatis: ergo hac non dicetur Filius, sed ipsa filiatione.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ille ablativus potest construi formaliter; et sic falsa est, quia formaliter alio est Deus, scilicet natura, et alio Filius. Potest iterum construi originaliter et in ratione principii; et sic vera est, et est sensus, quod Filius ortum habet a Patre naturaliter.
Dubium III
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: Acute sane quidam respondit — quia Augustinus commendat istam solutionem, quae non est commendanda, quia multiplicare inconveniens non est solvere.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est solutio ad hominem et est solutio ad orationem; et aliquando melius et utilius est solvere ad hominem quam ad orationem, ut puta, quando respondens est discolus et non vult intelligere veritatem, et quando assistentes sunt simplices et non possunt capere veritatem et subtilitatem. Ideo quia haereticus veritatem respuebat et adversabatur, idcirco adversanti erat adversandum, et tali modo, quo magis privaretur gloria et assistentes fallacia. Ideo commendat istam responsionem Augustinus, quia manifeste opponentem sua quaestione ligavit. Hunc modum respondendi docuit Dominus Matthaei 21, ubi dixit: Baptismus Ioannis de caelo erat, an ex hominibus? etc.3
Item quaeritur, cum non sit responsum ad orationem, quomodo respondendum sit. Videtur enim quod divisio haeretici sit per immediata, quia velle et nolle opponuntur contradictorie, inter quae non cadit medium. Et dicendum ad hoc, quod haereticus quaerit hoc de voluntate accedente sive de antecedente; et tunc neutra pars est vera, nec sunt membra opposita contradictorie, sed contrarie. Nolle enim et velle dicunt actus voluntatis contrarios, inter quos cadit medium. Aliquid enim est, respectu cuius voluntas nec habet rationem causae nec repugnantiae; et ita patet illud.
Dubium IV
Item quaeritur de solutione Magistri. Videtur enim falsum dicere, cum dicit: Scientia Dei et praescientia de bonis et malis est. Dicit enim Glossa super illud Psalmi: Quae ignorabam; interrogabant me4: «Ars nescit vitium»; sed in Deo est ars artium, ergo etc. Si dicas, quod nescit per modum practicum, sed scit per modum speculationis; contra: solum illud scit hoc modo, quod in eo relucet; sed in Deo non relucent mala: ergo etc.
Item, non videtur Magister solvere ad argumentum; multiplicare enim inconveniens non est solvere.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut infra dicetur, Deus cognoscit mala per se ipsum, sicut rectum iudicat de obliquo et lux de tenebra; nec oportet, quod in Deo luceat malum, sed sufficit, quod luceat in eo mali oppositum.
Dubium V
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit in notula: quod sancta Ecclesia anathematizat eos qui dicunt, Deum non generasse consilio. Videtur enim contradicere Damasceno5 dicenti, quod in Deo non est consilium, quia consilium est ignorantis naturae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod consilium dicitur dupliciter: uno modo dicitur consulere accipere consilium; et sic dicit ignorantiam et similiter consilium, dictum ab hoc. Alio modo consulere dicitur dare consilium, et hoc modo dicit scientiam, et hoc potest transferri ad divina. Deus enim nullo modo accipit consilium aliunde. Unde notandum, quod in consilio duo sunt: est ibi cognitio rei occultae, et est ibi dispositio firma. Quoniam ergo in Deo est verissima cognitio occultorum et invariabilitas, ideo recte dicitur, in ipso esse consilium. Unde Gregorius6: «Deus mutat sententiam, sed non consilium».
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Doubts concerning the Master's text
Doubt I
In this part, concerning the text, a doubt is raised about Augustine's reasoning to Orosius — that neither by will nor by necessity, because necessity is not in God, etc. For this division seems sufficient. For everything that God does, He does either naturally (and so necessarily) or voluntarily: therefore, etc. If you say that he himself responds to the heretic's understanding, and the heretic understands of antecedent will and necessity of inevitability — it is objected that the proposition is nevertheless multiple in itself. But one who responds to a multiple proposition by simply affirming or denying responds badly, as the Philosopher says1: therefore, etc.
I respond: It must be said that Augustine responds according to the heretic's understanding. Although the proposition in itself is multiple, yet because the heretic takes it in one sense, that multiplicity now would not avail for solving — because the argument does not proceed according to it. But to distinguish a multiple proposition when no deception falls according to that multiplicity is more for ostentation than for true response.
Doubt II
Likewise, it is asked about what is said: «Let us say that the Word of God is the Son of God by nature, not by will.» For this seems badly said, because the Father is God by one [thing], is Father by another — for He is God by deity and Father by paternity, as Augustine says2. But the Son is God by the nature of deity: therefore by this He will not be called Son, but rather by filiation itself.
I respond: It must be said that the ablative can be construed formally; and so it is false, because formally He is God by one thing — namely nature — and Son by another. Or again it can be construed originally and in the account of principle; and so it is true, and the sense is that the Son has His origin from the Father naturally.
Doubt III
Likewise, it is asked about what is said: «A certain one cleverly responded» — because Augustine commends this solution, which is not to be commended, since to multiply the inconvenient is not to solve.
I respond: It must be said that there is a solution to the man (ad hominem), and a solution to the proposition; and sometimes it is better and more useful to solve to the man than to the proposition — for example, when the respondent is unyielding and unwilling to understand the truth, and when those present are simple and cannot grasp the truth and subtlety. Therefore because the heretic refused and opposed the truth, opposition was due to the opposer in such a way that he might rather be deprived of glory and the bystanders [deprived] of fallacy. Therefore Augustine commends this response, because manifestly he bound his opponent by his own question. The Lord taught this manner of responding in Matthew 21, where He said: «The baptism of John — was it from heaven, or from men?» etc.3
Likewise it is asked, since the response is not to the proposition, how it should be responded to. For the heretic's division seems to be by immediates, because to will and not to will are opposed contradictorily — between which there is no middle. And it must be said that the heretic asks this of accedent will or of antecedent will; and then neither part is true, nor are the members opposed contradictorily but contrarily. For not to will and to will express contrary acts of the will, between which there is a middle. For there is something with respect to which the will has neither the account of cause nor of repugnance; and so that is clear.
Doubt IV
Likewise, it is asked about the Master's solution. For he seems to say something false when he says: «The knowledge and foreknowledge of God is of good things and of evil things.» For the Gloss says, on that of the Psalm: «Things that I knew not; they questioned me»4: «Art knows no fault»; but in God is the art of arts: therefore, etc. If you say that He knows not by way of practice, but knows by way of speculation — on the contrary: He knows in this way only what shines forth in Him; but in God evils do not shine forth: therefore, etc.
Likewise, the Master does not seem to solve the argument; for to multiply the inconvenient is not to solve.
I respond: It must be said that, as will be said below, God knows evils through Himself — as the straight judges of the crooked, and light of darkness. Nor is it necessary that evil shine forth in God; it is enough that the opposite of evil shine forth in Him.
Doubt V
Likewise, it is asked about what he says in the gloss: that «holy Church anathematizes those who say that God did not generate by counsel». For this seems to contradict Damascene5, who says that in God there is no counsel, because counsel belongs to a nature that is ignorant.
I respond: It must be said that counsel is said in two ways: in one way, to take counsel is said as to receive counsel; and so it expresses ignorance — and likewise counsel spoken of in this sense. In another way, to counsel is said as to give counsel, and in this way it expresses knowledge — and this can be transferred to divine things. For God does not in any way receive counsel from elsewhere. Hence it should be noted that in counsel are two things: there is the cognition of a hidden thing, and there is firm disposition. Since therefore in God there is most true cognition of hidden things and invariability, therefore He is rightly said to have counsel. Hence Gregory6: «God changes His sentence, but not His counsel».
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- Aristot., Periherm. II, c. 6 (c. 11): Ad multiplicia simpliciter respondere non est solvere.Aristotle, On Interpretation II, c. 6 (c. 11): «To respond simply to multiple [propositions] is not to solve [them]».
- August., de Trin. VII, c. 6, n. 11: Pater eo Pater est, quo Filium habet; Pater autem nomen relativum, Deus vero substantiale. — De distinctione formaliter / originaliter in praedicatione divina cfr. supra d. 5, a. 2, q. 1, Scholion.Augustine, On the Trinity VII, c. 6, n. 11: «The Father is Father by that by which He has the Son; Father is a relative name, God a substantial one». — On the distinction formally / originally in divine predication, cf. above d. 5, a. 2, q. 1, Scholion.
- Matth. 21, 25: Baptismus Ioannis unde erat? e caelo, an ex hominibus?Matthew 21:25: «The baptism of John, whence was it? From heaven, or from men?»
- Psalm. 34, 11: Quae ignorabam interrogabant me. — Glossa interlinearis (et marginalis Petri Lombardi): Ars nescit vitium, scil. malum. Cfr. etiam August., Enarr. in Ps. 34.Psalm 34 (35):11: «Things that I knew not, they questioned me». — Interlinear gloss (and Peter Lombard's marginal): «Art knows no fault — namely evil». Cf. also Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos 34.
- Damasc., de Fide orthod. II, c. 22: Consilium est inquisitio quaedam cum mentis examinatione adhibita; consultatio autem est nescientis qualiter agendum.Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 22: «Counsel is a certain inquiry with the application of mental examination; deliberation, however, is of one not knowing how to act».
- Greg. Magn., Moral. XVI, c. 10, n. 14 (vel ibid. c. 12): Mutat ergo Deus sententiam, sed non mutat consilium.Gregory the Great, Moralia XVI, c. 10, n. 14 (or ibid. c. 12): «God therefore changes His sentence, but does not change His counsel».