Dist. 6
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 6
Distinctio VI
Utrum Pater voluntate genuerit Filium, an necessitate; et an volens vel nolens sit Deus.
Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum Pater genuerit Filium voluntate, an necessitate. De hoc Orosius ad Augustinum1 ita ait: «Voluntate genuit Pater Filium, vel necessitate? Nec voluntate, nec necessitate, quia necessitas in Deo non est, praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest».
«Quocirca», ut Augustinus ait in decimoquinto libro de Trinitate2, «ridenda est dialectica Eunomii, a quo Eunomiani haeretici orti sunt, qui cum non potuisset intelligere nec credere voluisset, unigenitum Dei Verbum Filium Dei esse natura, id est de substantia Patris genitum, non naturae vel substantiae dixit esse Filium, sed Filium voluntatis Dei, volens asserere accedentem Deo voluntatem, qua gigneret Filium, sicut nos aliquid aliquando volumus, quod antea non volebamus; propter quod mutabilis intelligitur nostra natura, quod absit, ut in Deo esse credamus».
Dicamus ergo, Verbum Dei esse Filium Dei natura, non voluntate, ut docet Augustinus in libro decimoquinto de Trinitate3, ubi quendam catholicum haeretico respondentem commendat dicens: «Acute sane quidam respondit haeretico versutissime interroganti, utrum Deus Filium volens, an nolens genuerit, ut si diceret nolens, absurdissima Dei miseria sequeretur; si autem volens, continuo quod intendebat concluderet, scilicet non naturae esse Filium, sed voluntatis. At ille vigilantissime vicissim quaesivit ab eo, utrum Deus Pater volens, an nolens sit Deus, ut si responderet nolens, sequeretur grandis absurditas et miseria, quam de Deo credere magna est insania; si autem diceret volens, responderetur ei: ergo et ipse voluntate sua Deus est, non natura. Quid ergo restabat, nisi ut obmutesceret, sua interrogatione obligatum insolubili vinculo se videns?»
Ex praedictis docetur, non esse concedendum, quod Deus voluntate vel necessitate, vel volens vel nolens sit Deus; item, quod voluntate vel necessitate, vel volens vel nolens genuerit Filium.
Obiectio: Sed contra hoc opponitur sic: voluntas Dei est natura sive essentia Dei, quia non est aliud Deo esse, aliud velle; et ideo, sicut una est essentia trium personarum, ita et una voluntas. Si ergo Deus natura Deus est, et voluntate Deus est; et si Verbum Dei natura Filius Dei est, et voluntate Filius Dei est.
Refellitur. Hoc autem facile est refellere. Nam et praescientia Dei est natura sive essentia Dei; nec tamen dicitur: Filius est praescientia Patris, vel voluntate Patris est Filius Patris. Unde cum dicitur voluntate vel necessitate, non accipitur hoc ex parte essentiae divinae, sed ex parte modi productionis; et in Deo non est modus productionis per voluntatem, sicut in rebus quae fiunt ex tempore et consilio, sed per naturam, id est per consubstantialem et coaeternam emanationem.
Praedicta tamen verba, quibus prudenter dictum est — nec voluntate, nec necessitate genuit Pater Filium — ita intelligi convenit, ut negetur ille modus voluntatis, qui est cum consilio et praevisione, et ille modus necessitatis, qui est cum coactione vel mutabilitate. Non autem negatur voluntas qua Pater vult habere Filium — haec enim voluntas est ipse Pater — nec negatur necessitas, qua Filius necessario a Patre procedit, id est immutabilitas generationis4.
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Distinction VI
Whether the Father begot the Son by will or by necessity; and whether He is God willingly or unwillingly.
Moreover, it is customarily asked whether the Father begot the Son by will or by necessity. On this Orosius to Augustine1 says thus: "Did the Father beget the Son by will or by necessity? — Neither by will nor by necessity, because necessity is not in God, and the will cannot precede wisdom."
"Wherefore," as Augustine says in the fifteenth book On the Trinity2, "the dialectic of Eunomius is to be laughed at — from whom the Eunomian heretics arose, who, since he could not understand nor was willing to believe that the only-begotten Word of God is the Son of God by nature (that is, begotten of the substance of the Father), said that He is the Son not of nature or of substance but of the will of God — wishing to assert that a will came upon God by which He might beget a Son, just as we sometimes will something that we did not will before; on account of which our nature is understood to be mutable — far be it that we should believe this to be in God."
Let us therefore say that the Word of God is the Son of God by nature, not by will, as Augustine teaches in the fifteenth book On the Trinity3, where he commends a certain Catholic answering a heretic most cleverly interrogating him as to whether God begot the Son willing or unwilling — so that if he said unwilling, a most absurd misery of God would follow; and if willing, he would immediately conclude what he intended, namely that the Son is not of nature but of will. But the Catholic most vigilantly in turn asked him whether God the Father is God willing or unwilling — so that if he answered unwilling, a great absurdity and misery would follow, which to believe about God is great madness; and if he said willing, it would be answered to him: then He Himself is God by His own will, not by nature. "What then remained, but that he should fall silent — seeing himself bound by his own question in an insoluble knot?"
From the preceding it is taught that it is not to be conceded that God is God by will or by necessity, or willing or unwilling; likewise, that He begot the Son by will or by necessity, or willing or unwilling.
Objection. But against this it is objected thus: the will of God is the nature or essence of God, because to be is not other for God than to will; and therefore, just as there is one essence of the three persons, so there is one will. If therefore God is God by nature, He is God by will; and if the Word of God is Son of God by nature, He is Son of God by will.
Refutation. But this is easy to refute. For the foreknowledge of God is also the nature or essence of God; yet it is not said: The Son is the foreknowledge of the Father, or by the will of the Father He is the Son of the Father. Hence when it is said by will or by necessity, this is not taken on the side of the divine essence, but on the side of the mode of production; and in God there is no mode of production through will — as in things which come to be in time and by counsel — but through nature, that is, by a consubstantial and coeternal emanation.
*Yet the aforesaid words, by which it was prudently said — "Neither by will, nor by necessity did the Father beget the Son" — are to be understood so that the mode of will which is with deliberation and foresight is denied, and the mode of necessity which is with coercion or mutability. It is not, however, denied that the Father wills to have a Son — this will is the Father Himself — nor denied that the Son necessarily proceeds from the Father, that is, the immutability of the generation4.
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- Quaest. 65 Dialog. q. 7 (inter opera Augustini). Verba Orosii et responsio Augustini frequentius citantur a scholasticis tractantibus de generatione Filii voluntate vel necessitate.[Augustine and Orosius,] Dialogue Question 65, q. 7 (among the works of Augustine). Orosius's words and Augustine's response are frequently cited by the scholastics treating of the generation of the Son by will or by necessity.
- De Trin. XV, c. 20, n. 38. — De Eunomio et Eunomianis cfr. etiam Augustinus, de Haeresibus c. 54.[Augustine,] On the Trinity XV, c. 20, n. 38. — On Eunomius and the Eunomians cf. also Augustine, On Heresies c. 54.
- Ibidem. — Eandem doctrinam habet Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 4, a. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 2, a. 2; et Summa I, q. 41, a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 10; Petr. de Tar., hic q. 3, a. 2; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2 in fine.Ibidem. — The same doctrine is held by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 4, a. 1; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; and Summa I, q. 41, a. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 10; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2; Denys the Carthusian, here q. 2 in fine.
- Cfr. infra a. 1, qq. 1–3 huius distinctionis, ubi haec controversia inter voluntatem antecedentem et voluntatem concomitantem in divinis fusius exponitur.Cf. below a. 1, qq. 1–3 of this distinction, where this controversy between antecedent will and concomitant will in God is more fully expounded.