Dist. 8
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
Distinctio VIII
De veritate ac proprietate divinae essentiae.
Cap. I
De veritate divinae naturae.
Nunc de veritate sive proprietate, et incommutabilitate atque simplicitate divinae naturae vel1 substantiae sive essentiae agendum est. «Est itaque Deus, ut ait Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate2, sine dubitatione substantia vel, si melius hoc appellatur, essentia, quam Graeci usiam vocant. Sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere dicta est sapientia, et ab eo quod est scire dicta est scientia; ita ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia. Et quis magis est quam ille, qui in Exodi tertio3 dixit famulo suo Moysi: Ego sum qui sum. Et dices filiis Israel: Qui est misit me ad vos». Ipse vere ac proprie dicitur essentia, cuius essentia non novit praeteritum vel futurum. Unde Hieronymus ad Marcellam4 scribens ait: «Deus solus, qui exordium non habet, verae essentiae nomen tenuit, quia in eius comparatione, qui vere est, quia incommutabilis est, quasi non sunt quae mutabilia sunt. De quo enim dicitur fuit, non est; et de quo dicitur erit, nondum est. Deus autem tantum est, qui non novit fuisse vel futurum esse. Solus ergo Deus vere est, cuius essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est».
Explicantur ista verba Hieronymi. Hic diligenter advertendum est, quomodo intelligi debeant illa verba Hieronymi, scilicet: «Deus tantum est et non novit fuisse vel futurum esse», tanquam non possit dici de Deo fuit vel erit, sed tantum est, cum de eo scriptum frequenter reperiamus: fuit ab aeterno, fuit semper, et erit in saecula, et huiusmodi; unde videtur, quia non est tantum dicendum de Deo fuit, vel est, vel erit. Si enim diceretur tantum fuit, putaretur, quod desierit esse; si diceretur tantum est, putaretur, quod non semper fuerit, sed esse coeperit; si tantum diceretur erit, putaretur non esse modo. Dicatur ergo, quia semper fuit, est et erit, ut intelligatur, quia nec coepit nec desiit nec desinit nec desinet esse. De hoc Augustinus super Ioannem5 ita ait: «Cum de sempiterna re proprie dicatur est, secundum nos bene dicitur fuit et erit et est: fuit, quia nunquam desiit; erit, quia nunquam deerit; est, quia semper est: non praeteriit, quasi quod non maneat; non orietur, quasi quod non erat. Cum ergo nostra locutio per tempora varietur, de eo vere dicuntur verba cuiuslibet temporis, qui nullo tempore defuit vel deest vel deerit; et ideo non est mirum, si de Spiritu veritatis Veritas loquens dixit per futurum: Quaecumque audiet loquetur6; audiet, scilicet ab eo a quo procedit. Audire illius est scire, idem etiam esse. A quo ergo est illi essentia, ab illo audientia, id est scientia, quae non est aliud quam essentia. Audiet ergo dixit de eo quod audivit et audit, id est, quod semper scivit, scit et sciet». Ecce hic dicit Augustinus, verba cuiuslibet temporis dici de Deo, sed tamen proprie est. Illud ergo quod Hieronymus dicit, ita intelligendum est: non novit fuisse vel futurum esse, sed tantum esse, id est, cum dicitur de Deo, quod fuit vel erit, non est intelligendum, quod praeterierit vel futurus sit, sed quod existat simpliciter sine aliquo temporali motu. Licet enim verba substantiva diversorum temporum de Deo dicantur, ut fuit, erit, est, erat, non tamen temporales motus tunc distinguunt, scilicet praeteritum vel futurum vel praeteritum imperfectum vel praeteritum perfectum vel praeteritum plus quam perfectum, sed essentiam sive existentiam divinitatis simpliciter insinuant. Deus ergo solus proprie dicitur essentia vel esse; unde Hilarius in septimo libro de Trinitate7 ait: «Esse non est accidens Deo, sed subsistens veritas et manens causa et naturalis generis proprietas».
Cap. II
De incommutabilitate eiusdem.
Dei etiam solius essentia proprie incommutabilis dicitur, quia nec mutatur nec mutari potest. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate8: «Aliae, inquit, essentiae vel substantiae capiunt accidentia, quibus in eis fiat vel magna vel quantacumque mutatio; Deo autem aliquid huiusmodi accidere non potest; et ideo sola substantia vel essentia, quae est Deus, incommutabilis est, cui profecto maxime ac verissime competit esse. Quod enim mutatur non servat ipsum esse; et quod mutari potest, etiam si non mutetur, potest quod fuerat non esse; ideoque illud solum, quod non tantum non mutatur, verum etiam mutari omnino non potest, verissime dicitur esse», id est substantia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Ideoque Apostolus loquens de Deo ait9: Qui solus habet immortalitatem. Ut enim ait Augustinus in libro primo de Trinitate: «Cum anima quodam modo immortalis esse dicatur et sit, non diceret Apostolus: Solus Deus habet immortalitatem, nisi quia vera immortalitas incommutabilitas est, quam nulla potest habere creatura, quoniam solius Creatoris est». Unde Iacobus ait10: Apud quem non est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio. Et David: Mutabis ea, et mutabuntur; tu autem idem ipse es. Ideo Augustinus super Genesim dicit, quod Deus nec per loca nec per tempora movetur, creatura vero per tempora et loca. Et per tempora moveri est per affectiones commutari; Deus autem nec loco nec affectione mutari potest, qui per Prophetam ait11: Ego Deus, et non mutor; qui est immutabilis solus. Unde recte solus dicitur habere immortalitatem. «In omni enim mutabili natura, ut ait Augustinus contra Maximinum12, nonnulla mors est ipsa mutatio, quia facit aliquid in ea non esse, quod erat. Unde et ipsa anima humana, quae ideo dicitur immortalis, quia secundum modum suum nunquam desinit vivere, habet tamen quandam mortem suam; quia si iuste vivebat et peccat, moritur iustitiae; si peccatrix erat et iustificatur, moritur peccato, ut alias eius mutationes taceam, de quibus modo longum est disputare. Et creaturarum natura caelestium mori potuit, quia peccare potuit. Nam et Angeli peccaverunt et daemones facti sunt, quorum est diabolus princeps; et qui non peccaverunt, peccare potuerunt; et cuicumque creaturae rationali praestatur, ut peccare non possit, non est hoc naturae propriae, sed Dei gratiae. Et ideo solus Deus, ut ait Apostolus, habet immortalitatem, qui non cuiusquam gratia, sed natura sua nec potuit nec potest aliqua conversione mutari, nec potuit nec poterit aliqua mutatione peccare». «Proinde, ut ait Augustinus in primo libro de Trinitate, substantiam Dei sine ulla sui commutatione mutabilia facientem et sine ullo suo temporali motu temporalia creantem intueri et nosse, licet sit difficile, oportet». Vere ergo ac proprie incommutabilis est sola Divinitatis essentia, quae sine sui mutatione cunctas condidit naturas.
Cap. III
De simplicitate eiusdem.
Eademque sola proprie ac vere simplex est, ubi nec partium nec accidentium seu quarumlibet formarum ulla est diversitas sive variatio vel multitudo. Ut autem scias, quomodo simplex sit illa substantia, ut te docet Augustinus in sexto libro de Trinitate13, «animadverte primo, quare omnis creatura sit multiplex et nullo modo vere simplex, et primo de corporali, postea de spirituali creatura. Corporalis utique creatura partibus constat, ita ut sit ibi alia pars minor, alia maior, et maius sit totum quam pars quaelibet; et in unoquoque corpore aliud est magnitudo, aliud color, aliud figura. Potest enim, et minuta magnitudine, manere idem color et eadem figura; et colore mutato, manere eadem figura et eadem magnitudo. Ac per hoc multiplex esse convincitur natura corporis, simplex autem nullo modo».
Cap. IV
De corporali et spirituali creatura, quomodo sit multiplex, et non simplex.
«Creatura quoque spiritualis, ut est anima, in comparatione quidem corporis est simplex, sine comparatione vero corporis multiplex est, et non simplex. Quae ideo simplex dicitur respectu corporis, quia mole non diffunditur per spatium loci, sed in unoquoque corpore et in toto tota est et in qualibet eius parte tota est. Et ideo, cum fit aliquid in quavis exigua particula corporis, quod sentiat anima, quamvis non fiat in toto corpore, illa tamen tota sentit, quia totam non latet. Sed tamen nec in ipsa anima vera simplicitas
est. Cum enim aliud sit artificiosum esse, aliud inertem, aliud acutum, aliud memorem, aliud cupiditas, aliud timor, aliud laetitia, aliud tristitia, possintque haec et alia huiusmodi innumerabilia in animae natura inveniri, et alia sine aliis et alia magis, alia minus, manifestum est, non simplicem, sed multiplicem esse naturam. Nihil enim simplex mutabile est; omnis autem creatura mutabilis est»: nulla ergo creatura vere simplex est. «Deus vero, etsi multiplex dicatur, vere tamen et summe simplex est. Dicitur enim magnus, bonus, sapiens, beatus, verus et quidquid aliud non indigne dici videtur, sed eadem magnitudo eius est, quae sapientia. Non enim mole magnus est, sed virtute, et eadem bonitas, quae sapientia et magnitudo et veritas; et non est ibi aliud ipsum beatum esse, et aliud magnum aut sapientem aut verum aut bonum esse aut omnino esse».
Cap. V
Quod Deus, cum sit simplex, tamen multipliciter dicitur.
Hic diligenter notandum est, cum dicat Augustinus, solum Deum vere simplicem esse, cur dicat, eundem multipliciter dici. Sed hoc non propter diversitatem accidentium vel partium dicit, sed propter diversitatem ac multitudinem nominum, quae de Deo dicuntur; quae licet multiplicia sint, unum tamen significant, scilicet divinam naturam. Haec enim non ita accipiuntur, cum de illa incommutabili aeternaque substantia incomparabiliter simpliciore, quam est humanus animus, dicuntur, quemadmodum cum de creaturis dicuntur. Unde Augustinus in sexto libro de Trinitate: «Deo est hoc esse, quod est fortem esse vel sapientem esse vel iustum esse, et si quid de illa simplici multiplicitate vel multiplici simplicitate dixeris, quo substantia eius significetur. Humano autem animo non est hoc esse, quod est fortem esse aut prudentem aut iustum; potest enim esse animus et nullam istarum habere virtutum».
Cap. VI
Quod Dei simplicitas nulli praedicamentorum subiicitur.
Quod autem in natura divina nulla sit accidentium diversitas nullaque penitus mutabilitas, sed perfecta simplicitas, ostendit Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate dicens: «Intelligamus Deum, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesidentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem nihilque patientem. Quisquis Deum ita cogitat, etsi nondum potest omnino invenire quid sit, pie tamen caveat, quantum potest, aliquid de illo sentire, quod non sit». Ecce, si subtiliter intendas, ex his atque praedictis aperitur, illa praedicamenta artis dialecticae Dei naturae minime convenire, quae nullis subiecta est accidentibus.
Cap. VII
Quod Deus abusive dicitur substantia.
Unde nec proprie dicitur substantia, ut Augustinus ostendit in libro septimo de Trinitate14: «Sicut ab eo quod est esse appellatur essentia, ita ab eo quod est subsistere substantiam dicimus, si tamen dignum est, ut Deus dicatur subsistere. Hoc enim de his rebus recte intelligitur, in quibus subiectis sunt ea quae in aliquo subiecto esse dicuntur, sicut in corpore color aut forma. Corpus enim subsistit, et ideo substantia est. Res ergo mutabiles neque simplices proprie dicuntur substantiae. Deus autem, si subsistit, ut substantia proprie dici possit, inest in eo aliquid tanquam in subiecto, et non est simplex. Nefas est autem dicere, ut subsistat Deus et subsit bonitati suae, atque illa bonitas non substantia sit vel potius essentia, neque ipse Deus sit bonitas sua, sed in illo sit tanquam in subiecto. Unde manifestum est, Deum abusive substantiam vocari, ut nomine usitatiori intelligatur essentia, quod vere ac proprie dicitur, ita ut fortasse solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam. Est enim vere solus, quia incommutabilis est».
Cap. VIII
Quod non est in Deo aliquid, quod non sit Deus.
Huius autem essentiae simplicitas ac sinceritas tanta est, quod non est in ea aliquid, quod non sit ipsa; sed idem est habens et quod habetur. Unde Hilarius in septimo libro de Trinitate ait: «Non ex compositis Deus, qui vita est, subsistit, neque qui virtus est, ex infirmis continetur, neque qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur, neque qui spiritus est, ex disparibus formalis est: totum quod in eo est, unum est». Idem in octavo libro de Trinitate: «Non humano modo ex compositis Deus est, ut in eo aliud sit
quod ab eo habetur, et aliud sit ipse qui habeat, sed totum vita est, natura scilicet perfecta et infinita et non ex disparibus constituta, sed vivens ipsa per totum». De hoc eodem Boethius in primo libro de Trinitate ait: «Quocirca hoc vere unum est, in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo aliud praeter id quod est; neque enim subiectum fieri potest». Augustinus quoque in libro de Fide et Symbolo dicit: «In Dei substantia non est aliquid, quod non sit substantia, quasi aliud sit ibi substantia, aliud quod accidat substantiae. Sed quidquid ibi intelligi potest, substantia est. Verum haec dici possunt facile et credi, videri autem nisi puro corde omnino non possunt». Item Augustinus in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate: «Sic habetur in natura uniuscuiusque trium, ut qui habet hoc sit, quod habet, sicut immutabilis simplexque substantia». Unde Isidorus ait: «Deus simplex dicitur, sive non amittendo quod habet, seu quod aliud non est ipse, et aliud quod in ipso est». Et cum tantae simplicitatis atque sinceritatis sit natura divina, est tamen in ea personarum Trinitas. Unde Augustinus in libro undecimo de Civitate Dei ait: «Non propter hoc naturam summi boni simplicem dicimus, quia est Pater in ea solus, aut Filius in ea solus, aut Spiritus sanctus in ea solus, aut quia sola est ista nominum trinitas sine substantia personarum, sicut Sabelliani putaverunt: sed ideo simplex dicitur, quia est hoc quod habet, excepto quod relative quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur, nec est ipsa. Nam utique Pater habet Filium, ad quem relative dicitur, nec tamen ipse est Filius; et Filius habet Patrem, nec tamen ipse est Pater. In quo vero ad semetipsum dicitur, non ad alterum, hoc est quod habet, sicut ad semetipsum dicitur vivus, habendo vitam, et eadem vita ipse est. Propter hoc itaque natura haec dicitur simplex, quod non sit aliud habens, et aliud id quod habet, sicut in ceteris rebus est. Non enim habens liquorem liquor est, nec corpus color, nec anima est sapientia». Ecce, quanta est identitas, quanta est unitas, immutabilitas, simplicitas, puritas divinae substantiae, iuxta infirmitatis nostrae valitudinem assignavimus.
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Distinction VIII
On the truth and property of the divine essence.
Chapter I
On the truth of the divine nature.
We must now treat of the truth — or property — and the unchangeableness and simplicity of the divine nature or1 substance or essence. "God, therefore," as Augustine says in the fifth book On the Trinity2, "is without doubt a substance — or, if this term be preferred, an essence, which the Greeks call ousia. For just as from to be wise is derived wisdom, and from to know is derived knowledge, so from to be is derived essence. And who is more than He who said to His servant Moses in Exodus 33: I am who I am. And you shall say to the sons of Israel: He who is has sent me to you." He is truly and properly called essence whose essence knows no past or future. Whence Jerome, writing to Marcella4, says: "God alone, who has no beginning, has held the name of true essence, because in comparison with Him who truly is (because He is unchangeable), those things that are changeable are as though they were not. For of what is said it was, it is not; and of what is said it will be, it is not yet. But God only is, He who knows no having been or being about to be. God alone therefore truly is, and our being compared to His essence is not."
These words of Jerome are explained. Here careful attention must be paid to how Jerome's words are to be understood — namely: "God only is, and He knows no having been or being about to be" — as though was or will be cannot be said of God, but only is. For we frequently find it written of Him: He was from eternity, He was always, and He will be unto ages, and the like; whence it seems that not only was, or is, or will be is to be said of God. For if was alone were said, it would be thought that He had ceased to be; if is alone were said, it would be thought that He had not always been but had begun to be; if will be alone were said, it would be thought that He does not now exist. Let it therefore be said that He always was, is, and will be, so that it be understood that He neither began nor ceased nor is ceasing nor will cease to be. Augustine, on John5, speaks of this thus: "Although of an eternal reality it is properly said is, according to us it is rightly said was and will be and is: was, because He never ceased; will be, because He will never fail; is, because He always is — He did not pass away, as though He did not remain; He will not arise, as though He did not exist. Since, then, our speech is varied by tenses, words of any tense are truly said of Him who at no time was absent, is absent, or will be absent. And so it is no wonder if, concerning the Spirit of truth, Truth Himself speaking used the future: Whatsoever He shall hear, He will speak6; He shall hear, namely, from Him from whom He proceeds. His hearing is His knowing, and also His being. From whom, then, essence is His, from Him also is His hearing — that is, His knowing, which is nothing other than essence. He shall hear, therefore, He said of that which He has heard and hears — that is, which He always knew, knows, and will know." Behold, here Augustine says that words of any tense are said of God, yet is is the proper one. Therefore what Jerome says is to be understood thus: He knows no having been or being about to be, but only being — that is, when it is said of God that He was or will be, it is not to be understood that He has passed away or will come to be, but that He simply exists without any temporal motion. For although substantive verbs of different tenses are said of God — such as was, will be, is, had been — they do not thereby distinguish temporal motions (that is, past or future, or imperfect past, or perfect past, or pluperfect past), but simply indicate the essence or existence of the Godhead. Therefore God alone is properly called essence or being. Whence Hilary, in the seventh book On the Trinity7, says: "To be is not an accident in God, but is subsisting truth and abiding cause and the property of a natural kind."
Chapter II
On His unchangeableness.
The essence of God alone is properly called unchangeable, because it neither is changed nor can be changed. Whence Augustine in the fifth book On the Trinity8: "Other essences or substances," he says, "admit accidents by which either great or some degree of change takes place in them; but nothing of this sort can befall God. Therefore that substance or essence alone which is God is unchangeable, to whom assuredly it most of all and most truly belongs to be. For what is changed does not preserve its own being; and what can be changed, even if it is not changed, is able not to be what it was. And therefore that alone which not only is not changed, but cannot at all be changed, is most truly said to be" — that is, the substance of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. And so the Apostle, speaking of God, says9: Who alone has immortality. For, as Augustine says in the first book On the Trinity: "Although the soul is said and is in a certain way immortal, the Apostle would not say: God alone has immortality, except that true immortality is unchangeableness, which no creature can have, since it belongs to the Creator alone." Whence James says10: With whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration. And David: You shall change them, and they shall be changed; but You are the selfsame. Therefore Augustine, on Genesis, says that God is moved neither through places nor through times, but the creature through times and places. And to be moved through times is to be changed by affections; but God can be changed neither by place nor by affection, He who through the Prophet says11: I am God, and I change not — who alone is unchangeable. Whence rightly He alone is said to have immortality. "For in every changeable nature," as Augustine says Against Maximinus12, "change itself is a kind of death, because it makes something in it not to be what it was. Whence also the human soul, which is called immortal because in its own mode it never ceases to live, nevertheless has a certain death of its own: for if it was living justly and then sins, it dies to justice; if it was a sinner and is justified, it dies to sin — not to mention its other changes, about which it would now take long to discuss. And the nature of the heavenly creatures was able to die, because it was able to sin. For indeed angels sinned and became demons, of whom the devil is prince; and those who did not sin could have sinned; and to whatever rational creature it is granted that it cannot sin, this is not of its own nature but of God's grace. And so God alone, as the Apostle says, has immortality, who neither by anyone's grace but by His own nature neither could nor can be changed by any alteration, nor could nor will be able to sin by any mutation." "Accordingly, as Augustine says in the first book On the Trinity, it is right — though difficult — to behold and know the substance of God, making changeable things without any change of His own, and creating temporal things without any temporal motion of His own." Truly and properly, therefore, the essence of the Godhead alone is unchangeable, which founded all natures without any change of Himself.
Chapter III
On His simplicity.
And the same essence alone is properly and truly simple, in which there is no diversity or variation or multitude — neither of parts, nor of accidents, nor of any forms whatever. That you may know, however, how that substance is simple, Augustine teaches you in the sixth book On the Trinity13: "Consider first why every creature is manifold and in no way truly simple — and first of the corporeal, afterward of the spiritual creature. A corporeal creature certainly consists of parts, so that there one part is smaller, another larger, and the whole is greater than any part; and in every body magnitude is one thing, color another, shape another. For the magnitude can be diminished while the same color and the same shape remain; and with color changed, the same shape and the same magnitude may remain. And by this the nature of body is shown to be manifold, and in no way simple."
Chapter IV
On the corporeal and spiritual creature: how it is manifold, and not simple.
"The spiritual creature also, such as the soul, is indeed simple in comparison with body; but without the comparison of body it is manifold and not simple. It is called simple with respect to body because it is not diffused by mass through spatial extension, but is whole in every body and in the whole, and whole in any part whatever. And therefore, when anything is done in any tiny particle of the body that the soul perceives, although it is not done in the whole body, yet the soul wholly perceives it, because it is not hid from the whole. But nevertheless neither is there in the soul itself true simplicity.
For since to be artistic is one thing, to be dull another, to be sharp another, to be retentive another; since desire is one thing, fear another, joy another, sadness another; and since these and other innumerable such things can be found in the nature of the soul, and some without others, and some more, others less — it is manifest that that nature is not simple but manifold. For nothing that is simple is changeable; but every creature is changeable." No creature, therefore, is truly simple. "But God, even though He be called manifold, is nevertheless truly and supremely simple. For He is called great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatever else it seems not unworthy to say of Him; but His magnitude is the same as His wisdom. For He is great not in mass but in power; and the same is His goodness as is His wisdom and magnitude and truth; and to be blessed is not in Him one thing and to be great or wise or true or good or to be at all another."
Chapter V
That God, though He is simple, is nevertheless called manifoldly.
Here it must be carefully noted: when Augustine says that God alone is truly simple, why does he say that the same is called manifoldly? But he says this not on account of a diversity of accidents or parts, but on account of the diversity and multitude of names that are said of God — which, though manifold, yet signify one thing, namely the divine nature. For these are not so received when said of that unchangeable and eternal substance, incomparably simpler than the human mind, as they are when said of creatures. Whence Augustine in the sixth book On the Trinity: "For God, to be is the same as to be strong or to be wise or to be just, and whatever you may say of that simple multiplicity or manifold simplicity by which His substance is signified. But for the human mind, to be is not the same as to be strong or prudent or just; for the mind can be, and have none of these virtues."
Chapter VI
That the divine simplicity is subject to none of the predicaments.
That, however, in the divine nature there is no diversity of accidents and no mutability whatever, but perfect simplicity, Augustine shows in the fifth book On the Trinity, saying: "Let us understand God, as best we can — good without quality, great without quantity, Creator without indigence, presiding without position, containing all things without habit, everywhere whole without place, everlasting without time, making changeable things without any change of Himself, and suffering nothing. Whoever so thinks of God, although he cannot yet altogether discover what He is, let him nevertheless piously beware, as far as he can, of feeling anything of Him that He is not." Behold — if you attend subtly — from these and from what has already been said, it is evident that those predicaments of the art of dialectic in no way befit the nature of God, which is subject to no accidents.
Chapter VII
That God is called a substance only by a certain abuse of language.
Whence neither is He properly called a substance, as Augustine shows in the seventh book On the Trinity14: "Just as from to be (esse) essence is named, so from to subsist (subsistere) we speak of substance — if indeed it is worthy that God be said to subsist. For this is rightly understood of those things in which, as subjects, there inhere those things which are said to be in some subject — as color or shape in body. For body subsists, and therefore is a substance. Things that are changeable and not simple, therefore, are not properly called substances. But if God subsists, so that He can properly be called a substance, there is something in Him as in a subject, and He is not simple. Yet it is unlawful to say that God subsists and is subject to His own goodness, and that that goodness is not a substance, or rather an essence, or that God Himself is not His own goodness, but that it is in Him as in a subject. Whence it is manifest that God is called a substance by a certain abuse of language, so that by a more customary name the essence may be understood — which is said truly and properly; so much so that perhaps God alone ought to be called essence. For He alone truly is, because He is unchangeable."
Chapter VIII
That there is not in God anything that is not God.
Such, moreover, is the simplicity and sincerity of this essence that there is not in it anything that is not it itself; but the one that has and that which is had are the same. Whence Hilary in the seventh book On the Trinity says: "God, who is life, does not subsist from composite things; nor is He who is power held together out of weak things; nor is He who is light put together out of obscurities; nor is He who is spirit formed out of disparate elements: all that is in Him is one." The same in the eighth book On the Trinity: "It is not in a human manner that God is from composite elements, such that in Him that which He has is one thing
and He Himself who has is another; but the whole is life — a nature, namely, perfect and infinite, not constituted of disparate things, but itself living through the whole." On this same matter Boethius in the first book On the Trinity says: "Wherefore this is truly one, in which there is no number, nothing in it other than that which it is; nor indeed can it become a subject." Augustine also in the book On Faith and the Creed says: "In the substance of God there is nothing which is not substance, as though substance were one thing there and something accidental to substance another. But whatever can be understood there is substance. True, these things can easily be said and believed, but they cannot be seen at all except with a pure heart." Again Augustine in the fifteenth book On the Trinity: "Thus it is held in the nature of each of the three: that what has is what it has — as an unchangeable and simple substance." Whence Isidore says: "God is called simple either because He does not lose what He has, or because He Himself is not one thing and what is in Him another." And since the divine nature is of such great simplicity and sincerity, yet there is in it a Trinity of persons. Whence Augustine in the eleventh book On the City of God says: "We do not on this account call the nature of the highest good simple — that the Father alone is in it, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, or that there is merely that trinity of names without a substance of persons, as the Sabellians supposed; but it is called simple because it is what it has, except that each person is said relatively to another, and is not that other. For the Father has the Son, to whom He is said relatively, yet He Himself is not the Son; and the Son has the Father, yet He Himself is not the Father. But in what He is said to Himself, and not to another, there He is what He has — just as to Himself He is called living by having life, and that life is the very same as Himself. On this account, then, this nature is called simple: because He is not one thing that has, and another thing which He has, as is the case in other things. For one who has a liquid is not the liquid, nor is a body its color, nor is the soul its wisdom." Behold, how great is the identity, how great the unity, immutability, simplicity, purity of the divine substance — we have assigned it according to the measure of our frailty.
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- Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 3, 8 sive pro vel.The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and editions 1, 3, 8, reads sive ("or") in place of vel.
- August., de Trin. V, c. 2, n. 3. Cfr. etiam de Civ. Dei XII, c. 2.Augustine, On the Trinity V, c. 2, n. 3. Cf. also On the City of God XII, c. 2.
- Exod. 3, v. 14, ubi Vulgata: Ego sum qui sum. Ait: Sic dices etc. Immediate ante, Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 5, 6, 8 omittit Moysi.Exodus 3:14, where the Vulgate reads: I am who I am. He said: Thus shall you say etc. Just before, the Vatican edition — against the manuscripts and editions 1, 5, 6, 8 — omits Moysi.
- Edd. 6, 7, 8 ad Damasum. Attamen neutro in loco haec sententia ad verbum invenitur, sed apud Isidorum Etymolog. VII, c. 1, n. 10–13, ubi in ed. Migne (Patr. Lat. tom. 82) recte observatur locum istum potius conflatum esse ex Augustini et Gregorii variis locis, et primam partem, scil. usque ad non sint, sumtam esse ex August. de Civ. Dei VIII, c. 11. Vide etiam Rabanum, Comment. in Exod. I, c. 6. In ipso textu Vat. cum cod. A et edd. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 tenet loco tenuit, et mox cum edd. 1, 4, 7 quasi non sint pro quasi non sunt.Editions 6, 7, 8 read to Damasus. In fact this sentence is not found verbatim in either place; it occurs rather in Isidore, Etymologies VII, c. 1, nn. 10–13, where in Migne's edition (Patrologia Latina vol. 82) it is correctly observed that the passage is compiled from various loci of Augustine and Gregory — the first part, down to non sint, being drawn from Augustine, On the City of God VIII, c. 11. See also Rabanus, Commentary on Exodus I, c. 6. In the text itself, the Vatican edition with codex A and editions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 reads tenet in place of tenuit, and shortly after — with editions 1, 4, 7 — quasi non sint in place of quasi non sunt.
- August., Tract. in Ioann. 99, n. 4–5; est tamen aliqua differentia verborum in principio.Augustine, Tractates on John 99, nn. 4–5; there is however some verbal difference at the beginning.
- Ioan. 16, 13. Codd. B C D E est loco etiam; cod. A etiam est.John 16:13. Codices B, C, D, E read est in place of etiam; codex A reads etiam est.
- Hilar., de Trin. VII, n. 11. Paulo ante, Vat., dempta ed. 1, addit suae post existentiam.Hilary, On the Trinity VII, n. 11. A little earlier, the Vatican edition — except edition 1 — adds suae after existentiam.
- August., de Trin. V, c. 2, n. 3. In quo textu post non servat ipsum, contra originale, codd. et ed. 1, Vat. cum aliis edd. addit verum.Augustine, On the Trinity V, c. 2, n. 3. In this text, after non servat ipsum, the Vatican edition with other editions — against the original, the manuscripts, and edition 1 — adds verum.
- I Tim. 6, 16; idem textus infra bis occurrit.1 Timothy 6:16; the same text recurs twice below.
- Iac. 1, 17. Sola Vat. Apud Deum. Sequens textus est Psalm. 101, 28.James 1:17. The Vatican edition alone reads Apud Deum. The following citation is Psalm 101:28 (102:27 Heb.).
- Malach. 3, 6. Vulgata: Ego Dominus etc.Malachi 3:6. The Vulgate reads I am the Lord etc.
- August., contra Maximinum II, c. 12, n. 1.Augustine, Against Maximinus II, c. 12, n. 1.
- August., de Trin. VI, c. 6, n. 8. Quae sequuntur sumta sunt ex cc. 6 et 7. Circa finem huius textus, post eadem bonitas, Vat. — contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7 — adiicit eius est. Denique nonnullae edd. aliud sapientem aliud pro aut sapientem aut.Augustine, On the Trinity VI, c. 6, n. 8. What follows is drawn from cc. 6 and 7. Near the end of this text, after eadem bonitas, the Vatican edition — against the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 7 — adds eius est. Finally, some editions read aliud sapientem aliud in place of aut sapientem aut.
- August., de Trin. VII, c. 4, in fine, et c. 5, in principio. In textu, ante subiectis, Vat. et edd. 5, 9 addunt ut; edd. 1, 6, 8 hic et paulo infra ante subiecto adiciunt ut in, contra originale, codd. et ceteras edd. Deinde edd. praeter fidem codd. et originalis post Res ponunt vero pro ergo.Augustine, On the Trinity VII, c. 4, at the end, and c. 5, at the beginning. In the text, before subiectis, the Vatican edition and editions 5, 9 add ut; editions 1, 6, 8 here and a little below, before subiecto, add ut in, against the original, the manuscripts, and the other editions. Then the editions, against the manuscripts and the original, place vero in place of ergo after Res.