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Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 2

Textus Latinus
p. 50

Articulus Unicus

De unitate divinae essentiae et pluralitate personarum.

Quaestio I

Utrum sit unus tantum Deus.

Circa primum, quod in Deo sit ponere essentiae sive naturae unitatem, videtur ratione ostensiva, triplici habita suppositione, quam oportet poni, tum propter eius simplicitatem, tum propter communem animi conceptionem, quae est, quod Deus est quo maius excogitari non potest, tum ratione status, qui non est nisi in summo et primo.

1. Suppositio prima est, quod Deus est simplicissimus. Ex hac arguitur1, quod cum nullo alio diverso possit communicare aliquid2, quia, si communicat, et differt: ergo non secundum idem; ergo est ibi compositio. Si nihil potest communicare, ergo nec deitatem nec entitatem; ergo si sunt duo dii, cum unus sit ens, alter non est ens, si unus est Deus, alter non est Deus: ergo si duo sunt dii, non sunt duo dii.

2. Item, secunda suppositio est, quod Deus est omnipotentissimus3. Ex hac arguitur: igitur poterit facere, quod omnis alia potentia a sua nihil possit: ergo si sunt duo dii diversi in natura, hoc potest facere unus de altero, quod alter nihil possit, et e converso. Sed cui potest potentia auferri, non est Deus: ergo si sunt duo dii, nullus est Deus.

3. Item, tertia suppositio est, quod Deus est simpliciter summum4. Ex hac arguitur: ergo omnia sunt infra ipsum: ergo omnia alia ab ipso et ad ipsum. Si ergo sunt duo dii, unus est infra alterum, et e converso; unus est ab alio secundum naturam diversam, et e converso; unus ad alterum, et e converso; sed quod est infra aliud in natura et ab alio et ad aliud, non est Deus: ergo etc.

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4. Item, hoc potest probari per deductionem ad impossibile. Si sunt duo dii, aut unus est ubi alius, aut non. Si unus ubi alter: ergo unus in altero, cum sint eodem modo essendi: ergo unus est alteri materialis: ergo alter non est Deus. Si unus non est ubi alter: ergo uterque limitatus, ergo neuter infinitus.

5. Item, si plures sunt dii boni5, aut unus intelligit alterum, aut non. Si non: ergo uterque est ignorans. Si intelligit: aut ergo per praesentiam, aut per speciem, aut per se ipsum ut per illius exemplar6. Si per praesentiam: ergo unus in altero, ergo Deus illabitur Deo et perficit Deum; si per speciem: ergo compositus; si per exemplar: ergo unus est exemplar alterius, ergo et principium.

6. Item, si sunt duo dii diversi, quorum uterque est summum bonum; aut unus diligit alterum, ut diligendus est, aut non. Si sic, cum uterque sit summum bonum, uterque est diligendus amore fruitionis: ergo uterque fruitur altero; sed qui fruitur alio bono a se, illo indiget: ergo unus indiget alio: ergo uterque est indigens, ergo neuter Deus.

Sed contra:

1. Plus potest Deus facere, quam intellectus noster possit cogitare. Sed intellectus humanus, utpote gentium7, intelligit plures deos omnipotentes: ergo Deus potest hoc facere. Sed quidquid potest esse in divina natura, est ibi, quia aeterna8: ergo etc.

2. Item, plura bona sunt meliora paucioribus; sed plures dii sunt plura bona: ergo melius aliquid erunt duo quam unus. Sed secundum Anselmum9 omne, quod melius est, circa Deum est ponendum: ergo est ponere plures deos.

3. Item, quorum diversa est operatio, diversa est virtus et diversa est natura10; sed operatio trium personarum est diversa, quia apparitio in columba fuit solius Spiritus sancti, et solus Filius assumpsit humanam naturam: ergo sunt diversi in substantia: ergo sunt plures dii.

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4. Item, magna potentia est, quae potest magnum, et maior, quae maius, et maxima, quae maximum; sed Deus super omnia est summe potens: ergo potest producere summum11; sed hoc est Deus: ergo cum «in aeternis sit idem esse et posse», ergo etc.

Conclusio

Plures esse deos est impossibile, immo si recte intelligatur, quid sit Deus, non est intelligibile.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod impossibile est esse plures deos, et si recte accipiatur significatum huius nominis Deus, non solum est impossibile, sed etiam non intelligibile. Deus enim dicit simpliciter summum et in re et in opinione cogitantis. Quia in re, ideo omnia ab ipso et in ipso et ad ipsum, et in ipso omnino est status12; ideo impossibile est intelligere, salvo hoc intellectu, quod aliquid sibi parificetur aliud ab ipso. Item, nihil maius Deo cogitari potest nec etiam aequale, quia summum in opinione. Ideo impossibile et non intelligibile est ponere plures deos.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de gentibus; dicendum, quod non fuit intellectus, sed fictio13; praeterea non intelligebant Deum secundum nobilitatem divinam: ideo non valet.

Et ad illud: plus potest Deus facere etc.; dicendum, quod duplex est intellectus, scilicet rationalis et phantasticus. De primo verum est, sed de secundo non; quia multa possumus cogitare secundum phantasiam, quae Deus non potest facere, quia non convenit illi, «in quo inconveniens est impossibile»14.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plura bona sunt meliora paucioribus; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in bono creato et finito, quod ratione suae finitatis recipit bonitatis augmentum per additionem alterius boni; non autem habet veritatem in bono infinito, quia, quantumcumque addas bonum infinitum infinito, semper ego intelligo de bonitate tantum in uno, quantum tu15 in pluribus.

3. Ad aliud quod obiicitur de diversitate operationum; dicendum, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus in omni operatione conveniunt, sed in relatione differunt. Unde in incarnatione est operatio productionis illius naturae et est unio; in primo conveniunt tres personae, in secundo non. — Similiter in columba est columbae formatio et eius significatio16; in primo conveniunt, in secundo non. Exemplum Augustini17 de Trinitate est, quod ad formationem huius nominis memoria concurrit memoria, intelligentia et voluntas; tamen hoc nomen memoria significat alteram potentiarum; simili modo est in proposito.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magna potentia etc.; dicendum, quod producere aliquem18 est tripliciter: vel de se ipso, vel de aliquo creato, vel de nihilo. De se ipso potest Deus producere summum simpliciter, sed ille non erit alius in natura propter naturae simplicitatem. De alio vel de nihilo non potest producere summum simpliciter, sed in genere, non propter defectum potentiae agentis, sed propter defectum creaturae, quam necesse est esse limitatam; et ita non potest producere alium Deum.

Scholion

I. Argumentum primum in fundam. diffusius proponitur ab Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 14. m. 2. et a Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. — Contra secundum argumentum, sumptum ex omnipotentia, Scot. (I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3.) movet difficultatem, quia ipse contra communem sententiam supponit, Dei omnipotentiam non nisi ex fide certo sciri posse.

II. Contra doctrinam in solut. ad 2. traditam opponit Durand. (I. Sent. d. 44. q. 3.), quod Deus et mundus simul sint maius bonum quam Deus solus. Sed haec assertio merito ab omnibus theologis classicis ut falsa reprobatur; cfr. infra d. 43. q. 2. fundam. 5; Itiner. mentis c. 5. — In solut. ad 3. quoad propositionem: «In primo conveniunt tres personae, in secundo (scil. unione) non», notandum est, quod unio in duplici sensu accipi potest, vel ut actio unitiva, vel ut relatio unionis. Illa est communis tribus Trinitatis personis, haec vero spectat ad solam Filii personam; et de hac loquitur hic S. Doctor.

III. Unitas Dei definita est a Concilio Lateranensi IV, c. 1 Firmiter, nec non a Vaticano, Const. de Fide, tit. de Deo creatore.

Plura circa hanc quaestionem S. Bonav. docet infra d. 4. q. 3; d. 23. a. 2. q. 3; II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.

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English Translation

Single Article

On the unity of the divine essence and the plurality of persons.

Question I

Whether there is only one God.

Concerning the first — that the unity of essence or nature is to be posited in God — it seems demonstrable by reason, given a threefold supposition that must be made: first on account of his simplicity; second, on account of the common conception of the mind, which is that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived; and third, on account of the principle of rest, which exists only in the highest and first.

1. The first supposition is that God is most simple. From this it is argued1 that he cannot share anything2 with any other thing that is diverse from himself — because if he shares, he also differs; therefore not according to the same respect; therefore there would be composition. If he can share nothing, then neither deity nor entity; therefore if there are two gods, since one is a being the other is not a being, and if one is God the other is not God: therefore if there are two gods, there are not two gods.

2. Likewise, the second supposition is that God is most omnipotent3. From this it is argued: therefore he could bring it about that every power other than his own could do nothing. Therefore, if there are two gods diverse in nature, one could bring it about with respect to the other that the other could do nothing, and conversely. But that from which power can be taken away is not God. Therefore, if there are two gods, neither is God.

3. Likewise, the third supposition is that God is simply supreme4. From this it is argued: therefore all things are below him; therefore all other things are from him and toward him. If, then, there are two gods, one is below the other, and conversely; one is from the other according to a diverse nature, and conversely; one is toward the other, and conversely. But that which is below another in nature, and from another and toward another, is not God: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, this can be proved by reduction to the impossible. If there are two gods, either one is where the other is, or not. If one is where the other is, then one is in the other, since they have the same mode of being; therefore one is matter to the other; therefore the other is not God. If one is not where the other is, then each is limited, and therefore neither is infinite.

5. Likewise, if there are several good5 gods, either one understands the other or not. If not, then each is ignorant. If one does understand, then either through presence, or through a species, or through himself as through the exemplar of the other6. If through presence, then one is in the other, and so God flows into God and perfects God; if through a species, then he is composite; if through an exemplar, then one is the exemplar of the other, and therefore its principle as well.

6. Likewise, if there are two diverse gods, each of whom is the highest good, then either one loves the other as he ought to be loved, or not. If so — since each is the highest good, each ought to be loved with the love of enjoyment; therefore each enjoys the other. But one who enjoys another good besides himself is in need of that good; therefore one is in need of the other; therefore each is in need, and therefore neither is God.

On the contrary:

1. God can do more than our intellect can think. But the human intellect — specifically that of the pagans7 — understands a plurality of omnipotent gods. Therefore God can bring this about. But whatever can be in the divine nature is there, since it is eternal8: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, more goods are better than fewer; but many gods would be more goods; therefore two would be something better than one. But according to Anselm9, everything that is better is to be attributed to God. Therefore a plurality of gods is to be posited.

3. Likewise, of those whose operation is diverse, the power is diverse and the nature is diverse10. But the operation of the three persons is diverse, since the appearing in the dove was of the Holy Spirit alone, and the Son alone assumed human nature. Therefore they are diverse in substance; therefore there are many gods.

4. Likewise, great is the power that can produce something great, and greater the power that can produce something greater, and greatest the power that can produce the greatest11; but God, above all things, is supremely powerful. Therefore he can produce the supreme. But this is God. Therefore, since «in eternal things being and being able are the same», therefore, etc.

Conclusion

That there are several gods is impossible; indeed, if it is rightly understood what God is, it is not even conceivable.

I respond: It must be said that it is impossible for there to be several gods, and if the signification of this name God is correctly understood, it is not only impossible but not even intelligible. For God signifies the simply supreme both in reality and in the estimation of the one thinking. Because he is supreme in reality, all things are from him and in him and toward him, and in him rest is altogether12; therefore it is impossible — while preserving this understanding — to understand that anything other than him be equal to him. Likewise, nothing greater than God can be conceived, nor even anything equal, because he is the supreme in estimation. Therefore it is impossible and unintelligible to posit several gods.

1. To the objection, then, concerning the pagans: it must be said that this was not an act of understanding but of fiction13; furthermore, they were not understanding God according to the divine dignity: therefore the objection does not hold.

And to the argument that God can do more etc.: it must be said that understanding is twofold, namely rational and phantasmatic. In the first sense it is true; but not in the second. For we can imagine many things through the phantasy which God cannot bring about, because it does not belong to him, «in whom what is unfitting is impossible»14.

2. To the objection that more goods are better than fewer: it must be said that this holds in the case of created and finite good, which by reason of its finitude admits an increase of goodness through the addition of another good; but it does not hold in the case of infinite good, because however much infinite good you add to infinite good, I always understand there to be as much goodness in one as you15 in many.

3. To the other objection concerning the diversity of operations: it must be said that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit agree in every operation, but differ in relation. Hence in the Incarnation there is both the operation of producing that nature and the union; in the first the three persons agree, in the second they do not. — Similarly, in the dove there is the formation of the dove and its signification16; in the first they agree, in the second they do not. Augustine's example in On the Trinity17 is that for the formation of the word memoria, memory, understanding, and will all concur; yet this word memoria signifies only one of the powers. The case is similar in the matter at hand.

4. To the objection that great is the power etc.: it must be said that to produce someone18 is threefold — either from oneself, or from something created, or from nothing. From himself God can produce the simply supreme, but the one produced will not be another in nature, on account of the simplicity of the nature. From something or from nothing he cannot produce the simply supreme, but only the supreme within a genus — not on account of any defect of the acting power, but on account of the defect of the creature, which must necessarily be limited; and therefore he cannot produce another God.

Scholion

I. The first argument in the fundamenta is set forth more expansively by Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. 1, q. 14, m. 2, and by Richard of Mediavilla, I Sent., d. 2, q. 3. — Against the second argument, drawn from omnipotence, Scotus (I Sent., d. 2, q. 3) raises a difficulty, because he, against the common teaching, supposes that God's omnipotence cannot be known with certainty except from faith.

II. Against the doctrine handed down in the response to objection 2, Durandus (I Sent., d. 44, q. 3) objects that God and the world together would be a greater good than God alone. But this assertion is rightly rejected by all the classical theologians as false; cf. below, d. 43, q. 2, fundam. 5; Itinerarium mentis, ch. 5. — In the response to objection 3, regarding the proposition «In the first the three persons agree, in the second (namely, the union) they do not», it must be noted that union can be taken in two senses — either as the uniting action or as the relation of union. The former is common to the three persons of the Trinity; the latter pertains to the person of the Son alone, and it is of this latter that the Holy Doctor here speaks.

III. The unity of God was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, ch. 1 Firmiter, and also by the Vatican, Constitution on the Faith, title On God the Creator.

St. Bonaventure teaches more concerning this question below at d. 4, q. 3; d. 23, a. 2, q. 3; and II Sent., d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Communicare hic significat convenire cum aliquo in aliqua re. — Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 hic omittit aliquid et mox, ponendo sunt loco secundum, vim argumenti elidit. Deinde codd. X Y Z legunt unum pro idem. — Cfr. Aristot., Metaph. X, text. 12 (ed. Paris. IX, c. 3).
    Communicare here means «to have something in common with another, to agree with another in some respect». — The Vatican ed., against the codices and ed. 1, here omits aliquid and then, by putting sunt in place of secundum, weakens the force of the argument. Next, codd. X Y Z read unum for idem. — Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 12 (ed. Paris. IX, ch. 3).
  2. Argumentum hoc a S. Doctore paucis exhibitum sic explicari potest. Primo: si Deus est simplex, non potest habere aliquid commune cum alio Deo, qui supponitur esse. Probatur: si unus Deus aliquid haberet commune cum alio sive si communicaret in aliquo, v. g. in deitate, cum alio, deberet etiam differre, ut sit alius Deus; cum idem secundum idem nequeat cum alio simul communicare seu convenire et differre: ergo alio convenirent, alio differrent seu distinguerentur: ergo uterque esset compositus. Secundo: si autem nihil habent commune: ergo nec deitatem nec entitatem; ex quo sequitur absurdum in littera notatum.
    This argument, set forth in a few words by the Holy Doctor, can be explained as follows. First: if God is simple, he cannot have anything in common with another God supposed to exist. Proof: if one God had anything in common with the other — that is, if one God shared with the other in anything, e.g., in deity — he would also have to differ, so that he is another God. Since the same thing cannot at the same time agree with and differ from another in the same respect, it follows that they would agree in one thing and differ in another, and so each would be composite. Second: but if they have nothing in common, then they have neither deity nor entity in common, from which the absurdity noted in the text follows.
  3. Plures codd. ut A C G L O R S U etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 omnipotentissimum. Paulo infra post duo ex cod. T adiecimus certe supplendum Dii.
    Several codd. (A C G L O R S U etc.), with edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, read omnipotentissimum. A little below, after duo, on the authority of cod. T, we have added Dii, which was certainly to be supplied.
  4. Ad normam multorum mss. (A C G L O R S T U W aa bb cc ff) et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, in place of summus we have put summum. Fide plurimorum codd. cum ed. 1 expunximus est, quod Vat. hic addit.
    On the pattern of many manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, we have replaced summus with summum. On the witness of most codices together with ed. 1, we have deleted est, which the Vatican ed. here adds.
  5. Codd. O Y Z omittunt boni, quae lectio magis placeret, si maiore numero codd. fulciretur.
    Codd. O Y Z omit boni ("good"), a reading which would be preferable if it were supported by a larger number of codices.
  6. Adiecimus ex cod. I ut per illius exemplar, quae verba ultimum disiunctionis membrum exprimunt clarius necnon formam totius argumenti reddunt perfectiorem, quia infra omnes codd. ponunt per exemplar, sed a secunda manu scriptum.
    We have added ut per illius exemplar from cod. I, words which express the last member of the disjunction more clearly and render the form of the whole argument more perfect, since below all codd. have per exemplar, but written in a second hand.
  7. Codd. F aa bb gentilium.
    Codd. F aa bb read gentilium ("of the Gentiles") instead of gentium.
  8. Aristot., Phys. III, text. 32: Posse enim ab ipso esse ad nihilo differt in perpetuis. — Idem textus recurrit infra in arg. 4.
    Aristotle, Physics III, text 32: «For being-able differs in no way from being itself when it comes to eternal things». — The same text recurs below in argument 4.
  9. Monolog. c. 15: Sicut nefas est putare, quod substantia summae naturae sit aliquid, quo melius sit aliquo modo non-ipsum: sic necesse est, ut sit quidquid omnino melius est, quam non-ipsum. Illa enim sola est, qua penitus nihil est melius; et quae melior est omnibus, quae non sunt quod est ipsa. Cfr. etiam Proslog. c. 8. Convenit Aristot., Metaph. XII, text. 39 (ed. Paris. XI, c. 7): Dicimus itaque, Deum sempiternum optimumque vivens esse, quare vita et aevum continuum et aeternum Deo inest, hoc enim est Deus. Cfr. et Boeth., III de Consol. Prosa 10.
    Anselm, Monologion, ch. 15: «Just as it is impious to suppose that the substance of the supreme nature is anything of which, in any way, that which is not it would be better, so it is necessary that it be whatever is absolutely better than that which is not it. For it alone is that than which nothing at all is better, and which is better than all things that are not what it itself is». Cf. also Proslogion, ch. 8. In agreement is Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, text 39 (ed. Paris. XI, ch. 7): «We say, then, that God is an eternal and most excellent living being, so that life and continuous and eternal duration belong to God, for this is God». Cf. also Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy III, prose 10.
  10. Averroes, Metaph. XII, text. 26: Activa diversificantur in potentia et actu per diversitatem formarum et materiarum. Boeth., III de Consol. Prosa 11 exhibits the converse of this proposition: Eadem namque substantia est eorum, quorum naturaliter non est diversus effectus. Both propositions rest on the axiom operari sequitur esse, or idem est principium essendi et operandi. — In the conclusion of this argument cod. O has natura for substantia. — B. Albert., S., p. 1, tract. 6, q. 29, m. 1, a. 1 sets forth the same argument, then adds: Et haec fuit fortior obiectio Arianorum et Nestorianorum et Eutychianorum et Paulisamosalenorum.
    Averroes, Metaphysics XII, text 26: «Active things are diversified in potency and act through the diversity of forms and matters». Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy III, prose 11 gives the converse of this proposition: «For the substance of those things is the same whose natural effect is not diverse». Both propositions rest on the axiom operation follows being, or the principle of being and of operating is the same. — In the conclusion of this argument cod. O reads natura for substantia. — Bl. Albert the Great (Summa, p. 1, tract. 6, q. 29, m. 1, a. 1) gives the same argument and then adds: «And this was the strongest objection of the Arians, Nestorians, Eutychians, and Paulianists».
  11. Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc contra omnes antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 indebite adiungit bonum.
    The Vatican ed., together with the more recent cod. cc, against all the older codices and ed. 1, unjustifiably adds bonum.
  12. Respicitur illud ad Rom. 11, 36: Quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. Sensus est: a Deo omnia procedunt, in Deo omnia conservantur, ad Deum omnia referuntur. Cfr. infra d. 36. dub. 4. — In ipso omnino est status, i. e. Deus est principium, ultra quod in resolvendo seu causas quaerendo nullo modo possumus transire. — Paulo infra ed. 1 ei loco sibi.
    This refers to Rom. 11:36: For from him and through him and in him are all things. The sense is: from God all things proceed, in God all things are preserved, to God all things are referred. Cf. below, d. 36, dub. 4. — In him is rest altogether, i.e., God is the principle beyond which, in the resolution (or seeking of causes), we can in no way pass. — A little below, ed. 1 reads ei for sibi.
  13. Cod. U non male: fictio potius; non enim intelligebant. Cod. T veritatem pro nobilitatem.
    Cod. U reads, not badly: rather a fiction, for they were not understanding. Cod. T reads veritatem for nobilitatem.
  14. Anselm., I Cur Deus homo, c. 20: Sed hoc est praestitutum, quia quamlibet (quodlibet) parvum inconveniens in Deo impossibile est. — Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 post inconveniens addit minimum. Paulo ante cod. I phantastica loco secundum phantasiam.
    Anselm, Cur Deus homo I, ch. 20: «But this is laid down: that however small an unfittingness in God is impossible». — The Vatican ed., against the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, after inconveniens adds minimum. A little earlier, cod. I reads phantastica in place of secundum phantasiam.
  15. Ex plurimis antiquioribus mss. (A C F G H K L O P S T etc.) adiecimus tu. Paulo ante codd. S X post bonum omittunt infinitum; lectio haud spernenda.
    From the majority of the older manuscripts (A C F G H K L O P S T etc.) we have added tu ("you"). A little earlier, codd. S X omit infinitum after bonum, a reading not to be despised.
  16. Sic plures codd. ut K R X Y Z ff cum ed. 1; alii sunt dubiae lectionis; codd. I aa figuratio; sed Vat. cum aliquibus codd. significatio.
    Thus several codd. (K R X Y Z ff) with ed. 1; others are of uncertain reading; codd. I aa read figuratio; but the Vatican ed., with some codd., reads significatio.
  17. Libr. IV de Trin. c. 21. n. 30: Quemadmodum cum memoriam meam et intellectum et voluntatem nomino, singula quidem nomina ad res singulas referuntur, sed tamen ab omnibus tribus singula facta sunt etc. Sensus est: ad formationem vocabuli memoria omnes tres animi potentiae active concurrunt, tamen significatio eiusdem refertur ad unam solam potentiam.
    [Augustine] De Trinitate IV, ch. 21, n. 30: «Just as when I name my memory, understanding, and will, the individual names refer to individual things, but nevertheless each is made by all three together», etc. The sense is: for the formation of the word memoria all three powers of the soul actively concur, but the signification of the same word is referred to one power alone.
  18. Fide plurimorum mss. (A C F G H L O R S T U Z etc.) et ed. 1 substituimus aliquem pro aliquid. Agitur enim de productione Dei, et in subnexis habetur genus masculinum ille, quod refertur ad summum simpliciter absque dubio pro eodem genere sumendum, scil. summum aliquem etc. Cod. H Deum producere aliquem.
    On the authority of most manuscripts (A C F G H L O R S T U Z etc.) and ed. 1, we have substituted aliquem ("someone") for aliquid ("something"). For the matter is the production of God, and in the following there is the masculine gender ille, which refers to summum simpliciter and without doubt is to be taken in the same gender — namely, summum aliquem etc. Cod. H reads Deum producere aliquem. ---
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