← Back to Distinction 2

Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 2

Textus Latinus
p. 52

Quaestio II

Utrum in Deo ponenda sit personarum pluralitas.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit ponere in Deo personarum pluralitatem. Et quod sic, ostenditur supponendo de Deo quatuor: primum est, quod in ipso sit summa beatitudo; secundum est, summa perfectio; tertium est, summa simplicitas; quartum est, summa primitas.

1. Ex prima suppositione arguitur sic: si1 est ibi summa beatitudo; sed ubicumque est summa beatitudo, est summa bonitas, summa caritas et summa iucunditas. Sed si est summa bonitas, cum bonitatis sit summe se communicare2, et hoc est maxime in producendo ex se aequalem et dando esse suum: ergo etc. Si summa caritas, cum caritas non sit amor privatus, sed ad alterum: ergo requirit pluralitatem. Item, si summa iucunditas, cum «nullius boni sine socio sit iucunda possessio»3, ergo ad summam iucunditatem requiritur societas et ita pluralitas.

2. Item, ex secunda suppositione sic: si est ibi summa perfectio; sed «perfectionis est producere talem, qualis ipse est in natura»4: ergo necesse est, ibi esse multiplicationem; sed hoc non potest esse secundum aliam essentiam: ergo oportet, quod sit secundum aliam personam sive suppositum.

p. 53

3. Item, ex tertia suppositione sic: si est ibi summa simplicitas; sed simplicitatis est, quod aliqua natura sit in pluribus, ut patet in universali, sed ex defectu simplicitatis est, quod numeretur in illis5: ergo si in Deo est simplicitas in nullo deficiens, erit in pluribus non numerata essentia: ergo etc.

4. Item, ex quarta suppositione sic: si est ibi summa primitas; sed quanto aliquid prius, tanto fecundius est et aliorum principium6: ergo sicut essentia divina, quia prima, est principium aliarum essentiarum, sic persona Patris, cum sit prima, quia a nullo, est principium et habet7 fecunditatem respectu personarum; sed fecunditas in Deo respectu Dei non potest esse nisi actui coniuncta: ergo necesse est, plures esse personas.

Sed contra:

1. Videtur, quod ex eisdem suppositionibus posset argui contrarium, et ita destruuntur rationes et conclusio8. Si enim ibi est summa beatitudo, cum beatum per essentiam sibi soli sufficiat ad beatitudinem: ergo non est necesse ponere aliam personam ad beatitudinem sive iucunditatem.

2. Item, contra secundam suppositionem sic obiicitur9: si est ibi summa perfectio: ergo aeque plene et perfecte est essentia in una persona et in pluribus. Si ergo ultra perfectionem additio est superflua, pluralitas est superflua; et si hoc, cum in divinis nihil sit superfluum, pluralitas non est10 in divinis.

3. Item, contra tertiam rationem sic: si est ibi summa simplicitas, cum pluralitas opponatur simplicitati, et «opposita non possunt esse circa idem»11: ergo si Deus est unus et in eo est simplicitas, non ergo pluralitas, cum per omnia sit simplex.

4. Item, contra quartam suppositionem sic: si ibi est summa primitas; ergo cum status sit in primo principio, et status est in unitate: ergo primitas non ponit pluralitatem, sed unitatem: ergo videtur, quod una tantum sit persona.

p. 54

Conclusio

Personarum pluralitatem esse in divinis et fides docet et rationes congruentiae ostendunt.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in divinis est ponere personarum pluralitatem, sicut fides dicit et rationes praedictae ostendunt, si quis sine contradictione consideret. Nam ratione simplicitatis essentia est communicabilis et potens esse in pluribus. Ratione primitatis persona nata est ex se aliam producere; et voco hic primitatem innascibilitatem, ratione cuius, ut dicit antiqua opinio, est fontalis plenitudo in Patre ad omnem emanationem; et hoc infra patebit. Ratione perfectionis ad hoc est apta et prompta; ratione beatitudinis et caritatis voluntaria. Quibus conditionibus positis, necesse est ponere personarum pluralitatem.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod beatum per essentiam sibi soli sufficit, ergo non indiget etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, quod non indiget; nec ponitur alius propter indigentiam neque tanquam beatificans, sed in beatitudine communicans.

2. Similiter ad illud quod obiicitur, quod deitas aeque plene est in uno et in pluribus12; dicendum, quod etsi sit aeque plene, non tamen ita plene declaratur. Et praeterea, eo ipso quo plene est in Patre, redundat in alias personas redundantia perfectionis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pluralitas repugnat simplicitati; dicendum, quod est quaedam pluralitas per additionem; et haec repugnat; quaedam per originem; et haec non addit nec componit nec repugnat simplicitati, sed potius solitudini; et sic est in divinis, ut infra patebit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in primo est status; dicendum, quod sicut in essentiis una est essentia prima, a qua sunt aliae et ad quam, sic et in personis est una persona, a qua sunt aliae et ad quam; et in illa est status originis, quia illa a nullo, et haec est persona Patris. Unde Augustinus13 illi personae appropriat unitatem, dicens: «In Patre unitas» etc.

---

English Translation

Question II

Whether a plurality of persons is to be posited in God.

Second, it is asked whether a plurality of persons is to be posited in God. And that it is so is shown by positing four things concerning God: the first is that in him there is supreme beatitude; the second, supreme perfection; the third, supreme simplicity; the fourth, supreme primacy.

1. From the first supposition the argument runs thus: if1 there is supreme beatitude there — and wherever there is supreme beatitude, there is supreme goodness, supreme charity, and supreme joy — then since it belongs to goodness to communicate itself in the highest way2, and this happens most of all in producing from itself an equal and giving it its own being: therefore, etc. If there is supreme charity, since charity is not a private love but a love directed to another: therefore it requires plurality. Likewise, if there is supreme joy, since «there is no joyful possession of any good without a companion»3, then fellowship is required for supreme joy — and thus plurality.

2. Likewise, from the second supposition thus: if there is supreme perfection there — but «it belongs to perfection to produce another such as itself in nature»4 — then it is necessary that there be multiplication there; but this cannot be according to another essence; therefore it must be according to another person or supposit.

3. Likewise, from the third supposition thus: if there is supreme simplicity there — but it belongs to simplicity that a nature be in many, as is evident in the universal, while it belongs to a defect of simplicity that the nature be numbered in those many5 — then if in God there is a simplicity deficient in nothing, the essence will be in many without being numbered: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, from the fourth supposition thus: if there is supreme primacy there — but the more prior something is, the more fruitful it is, and the more it is a principle of others6 — then just as the divine essence, being first, is the principle of other essences, so the person of the Father, since he is first (because from no one), is a principle and has7 fruitfulness with respect to the persons; but fruitfulness in God with respect to God cannot exist except conjoined to act; therefore it is necessary that there be several persons.

On the contrary:

1. It seems that from the same suppositions the contrary could be argued, and thus the arguments and the conclusion8 are undermined. For if there is supreme beatitude there, since what is blessed through its essence suffices to itself alone for beatitude, then it is not necessary to posit another person for beatitude or joy.

2. Likewise, against the second supposition it is objected9: if there is supreme perfection there, then the essence is equally fully and perfectly present in one person and in many. If, then, any addition beyond perfection is superfluous, plurality is superfluous; and if so — since in divine things nothing is superfluous — plurality does not10 exist in divine things.

3. Likewise, against the third reason: if there is supreme simplicity there, then since plurality is opposed to simplicity, and «opposites cannot obtain with respect to the same thing»11, if God is one and in him there is simplicity, then there is no plurality — since he is simple through and through.

4. Likewise, against the fourth supposition: if there is supreme primacy there, then since rest is in the first principle and rest is in unity, primacy does not posit plurality but unity; therefore it seems that there is only one person.

Conclusion

That there is a plurality of persons in divine things is both taught by faith and shown by reasons of congruence.

I respond: It must be said that in divine things a plurality of persons is to be posited, as faith declares and the foregoing arguments show, if one considers them without contradiction. For by reason of simplicity, the essence is communicable and able to be in many. By reason of primacy, a person is naturally fit to produce another from itself; and I here call primacy innascibility, by reason of which — as the ancient opinion holds — there is fontal fullness in the Father for every emanation (and this will be clear below). By reason of perfection, it is apt and ready for this; by reason of beatitude and charity, voluntarily so. When these conditions are in place, it is necessary to posit a plurality of persons.

1. To the contrary objection that what is blessed through its essence suffices to itself alone, and therefore has no need etc.: it must be said that it is true that the Father has no need; nor is another person posited on account of need, nor as one who beatifies, but as one sharing in beatitude.

2. Similarly, to the objection that the deity is equally fully in one as in many12: it must be said that although it is equally fully present, it is nevertheless not so fully declared. And moreover, by the very fact that it is fully in the Father, it overflows into the other persons by the overflow of perfection.

3. To the objection that plurality is incompatible with simplicity: it must be said that there is a certain plurality by addition — and this is incompatible with simplicity; and a certain plurality by origin — which neither adds nor composes, nor is incompatible with simplicity, but rather with solitude. And so it is in divine things, as will be clear below.

4. To the objection that in the first there is rest: it must be said that just as among essences there is one first essence, from which the others are and to which they are ordered, so too among persons there is one person from which the others are and to which they are ordered; and in that person is the rest of origin, because that person is from no one — and this is the person of the Father. Hence Augustine13 appropriates unity to that person, saying: «In the Father, unity», etc.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit Vat. hic et in aliis tribus arg. particulam si.
    Against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, the Vatican edition here and in the other three arguments omits the particle si.
  2. Vat. bonitatis summae sit se communicare, sed minus apte et contra auctoritatem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3; melius sane foret, si lectio Vat. et mss. inveniretur coniuncta, ita ut legeretur: bonitatis summae sit summe se communicare. Hanc lectionem confirmant verba Richardi, hic a. 2. q. 1: ad summam bonitatem pertinet se summe communicare. — Haec ratio fundatur in ista propositione ex Dionys., de Cael. Hierarch. c. 4. et de Div. Nom. c. 4. sumta: Bonum est diffusivum sui.
    The Vatican ed. reads bonitatis summae sit se communicare, but less fittingly and against the authority of the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3. It would surely be better if the Vatican reading and that of the manuscripts were combined, so that the reading would be: bonitatis summae sit summe se communicare («it belongs to supreme goodness supremely to communicate itself»). This reading is confirmed by the words of Richard [of Mediavilla], here a. 2, q. 1: «ad summam bonitatem pertinet se summe communicare». — This reason rests on the proposition taken from Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, and On the Divine Names, ch. 4: «The good is self-diffusive» (Bonum est diffusivum sui).
  3. Seneca, I. Epist. ad Lucilium, epist. 6.
    Seneca, Epistles to Lucilius I, ep. 6.
  4. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34 (c. 4). — In principio huius et sequentis argumenti Vat. omittit particulam Item et post suppositione addit arguitur; sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.
    Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 34 (ch. 4). — At the beginning of this and the following argument, the Vatican ed. omits the particle Item and after suppositione adds arguitur; but the manuscripts and ed. 1 stand against this.
  5. Aristot., VIII. Metaph. text. 45 (VI, c. 13): «Hoc enim dicitur universale, quod pluribus inesse natum est.» Et I. Poster. c. 20 (c. 24): «Quantocumque utique magis secundum partes (seu particularis) est, in infinita cadit; universale autem in simplex et in finem.» — Mox Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 nihilo pro nullo et est pro erit.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 45 (VI, c. 13): «For that is called universal which is fit to exist in many». And Posterior Analytics I, c. 20 (c. 24): «The more something is according to parts (i.e., particular), the more it falls into infinity; but the universal falls into the simple and the end». — Immediately after, the Vatican ed., against the older codices and ed. 1, reads nihilo for nullo and est for erit.
  6. Cfr. libr. de Causis, prop. 1 et 17. — Cod. K nobilius vel fecundius.
    Cf. the Liber de Causis, props. 1 and 17. — Cod. K reads nobilius vel fecundius («more noble or more fruitful»).
  7. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1, interpunctione mutata, ponit a nullo est principio, habet; quae lectio vim dictis detrahit.
    The Vatican ed., against the manuscripts and ed. 1, with the punctuation changed, reads a nullo est principio, habet; this reading weakens the force of the statement.
  8. Maior pars codd. ut A F G H L O T V W X Y Z etc. cum ed. 1 refragatur Vat. ponenti conclusiones iam positae, et quidem iure, cum tantum una omnium rationum positarum sit conclusio. Aliqui mss. ut C S (A T a prima manu) etc. convictio loco conclusio. Cod. R omittit et conclusio. Paulo post auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. beatum substituimus loco beatus; idem infra in solutione huius obiectionis recurrit.
    The majority of the codices (A F G H L O T V W X Y Z etc.), with ed. 1, oppose the Vatican ed., which reads conclusiones iam positae ("the conclusions already set forth"), and rightly so, since there is only one conclusion for all the arguments set forth. Some manuscripts (C S, and A T in the first hand) read convictio for conclusio. Cod. R omits et conclusio. A little below, on the authority of the manuscripts and of the first six editions, we have substituted beatum for beatus; the same recurs below in the response to this objection.
  9. Cod. cc arguitur. Paulo post Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, aeque plena et perfecta... ut in pluribus. Si autem ultra.
    Cod. cc reads arguitur. A little later, the Vatican ed., against the older manuscripts and ed. 1, reads aeque plena et perfecta... ut in pluribus. Si autem ultra.
  10. Ex mss. et sex primis edd. substituimus est pro erit.
    On the witness of the manuscripts and the first six editions, we have substituted est for erit.
  11. Aristot., II. Elench. c. 5 (c. 25) et XI. Metaph. c. 4 (X, c. 5). — Paulo ante cod. X sibi constans habet suppositionem pro rationem.
    Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations II, c. 5 (c. 25), and Metaphysics XI, c. 4 (X, c. 5). — A little earlier, cod. X, consistent with itself, reads suppositionem for rationem.
  12. Vat. hic, sicuti supra, contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 aeque plena et perfecta est in uno ut in pluribus, licet ipsa in sequentibus semper adhibeat adverbium plene.
    The Vatican ed. here, as above, against the older codices and ed. 1, reads aeque plena et perfecta est in uno ut in pluribus, although in what follows it always uses the adverb plene.
  13. Libr. I. de Doctr. christ. c. 5. n. 5: «In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu S. unitatis aequalitatisque concordia.»
    [Augustine] On Christian Doctrine I, ch. 5, n. 5: «In the Father, unity; in the Son, equality; in the Holy Spirit, the concord of unity and equality». ---
← Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 1Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 3→