Bonaventure

Dub. I

In parte ista circa litteram primo est dubitatio de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod purgatissimis mentibus cernitur. Videtur enim male dicere, quia nulla mens, dum est in via, purgatissima est, sed tantum in patria.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod mens ad hoc quod Deum contempletur perfecte, indiget purgari quoad intellectum et affectum; ideo dicit per iustitiam fidei, id est per fidem, quae facit iustum in opere et per se purgat intellectum, sed iustitia affectum. Utriusque autem purgationis triplex est gradus. Nam intellectus purgatus est, cum abstrahitur a sensibilibus speciebus; purgatior, cum mundatur a phantasticis imaginibus; purgatissimus, cum a philosophicis¹ rationibus. Gradus purgationis affectus sunt isti: purgatus est affectus, cum mundatur a culpa; purgatior, cum a sequela; purgatissimus, ab occasione²; et in hoc statu idoneus est contemplari.

Dub. II

Item opponitur de hoc quod dicit: Mentis humanae acies invalida in tam excellenti luce non figitur etc. Videtur enim, quod etiam³ mundata non figatur ibi, quia quantumcumque mundetur, adhuc excedit lux illa improportionabiliter aciem mentis: ergo si propter sui excellentiam non potest videri a non habente fidem, nec etiam ab habente.

Respondeo: Differt dicere considerari et figi et comprehendi. Considerari potest a mente immunda; sed figi in illa non potest nisi mens pura; comprehendere non potest nisi immensa⁴.

Ratio autem, quare non potest figi, est duplex: una, quia est supra intellectum, et ideo intellectus in ea non figitur, nisi habeat gluten affectus, sed statim recidit⁵; alia ratio, quia oculus sanus est illi luci proportionabilis qualitative, etsi non quantitative; sed oculus infirmus sive lippus utroque modo est improportionabilis, et ideo non figitur.

Dub. III

Item obiicitur de hoc verbo Ambrosii: Deus et Dominus nomen est naturae et nomen potestatis, quia dicit Damascenus⁶, quod hoc nomen Deus imponitur ab operatione, unde dicitur ab aithein, quod est ardere, vel a theein, quod est fovere, vel a theasthai, quod est videre.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de hoc nomine, et consimilibus est loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad id cui imponitur; et sic est nomen naturae, quia ei imponitur quod⁷ est summa natura; aut quantum ad id a quo imponitur; et sic est nomen operationis, quia imponitur ab operatione.

Dub. IV

Item quaeritur de hac circumlocutione: Ego sum qui sum, utrum hoc nomen Ego sum etc. sit nomen essentiae, vel personae. Et quod personae, videtur, quia pronomen demonstrativum certam significat personam. Et iterum, loqui est actus personae. Si forte dicas, quod ego, quia significat originem, stat pro persona Patris; sum, quia significat actum egredientem, pro persona Filii; qui, relativum utrumque nectens, stat pro persona Spiritus sancti; hoc nihil est, quia pro eodem stat relativum et antecedens.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illud nomen qui est, et Ego sum qui sum est nomen essentiae proprie: hoc enim est quaedam circumlocutio, significans entitatem in omnimoda perfectione et absolutione, et hoc est nomen proprium divinae substantiae. Et quod obiicitur, quod pronomen significat certam personam; dicendum, quod persona ibi dicitur certum suppositum Verbi, et hoc est substantia et natura⁸.

Dub. V

Item quaeritur de hac auctoritate: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, utrum imago stet ibi pro essentia aut pro persona.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, secundum quod Sancti hic accipiunt, imago et similitudo dicit essentiam et relationem⁹. Importat enim imago unitatem cum distinctione, et similitudo similiter propter intrinsecam relationem. Et ideo in hoc nomine imago et similitudo quantum ad aliquid suae significationis notatur unitas essentiae, quantum ad aliquid notatur pluralitas personarum. Et ideo aliter exponit Augustinus, aliter exponit Hilarius¹⁰. Augustinus considerat partem significati, scilicet essentiae unitatem; sed Hilarius totum. Unde dicit, quod nomine imaginis et similitudinis simul intelligitur unitas et pluralitas. Similiter Augustinus in hoc quod est faciamus et nostram, considerat solum consignificatum; et ideo pluralitatem. Hilarius vero considerat significatum et consignificatum, et ideo in utroque dicit intelligi pluralitatem et unitatem.

Dub. VI

Item Hilarius dicit: Neque diversitatem duobus admisceri alterius ad alterum similitudo permittit.

Sed contra: Similitudo est rerum differentium eadem qualitas: ergo similitudo compatitur secum differentiam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est similitudo secundum accidens, et similitudo secundum substantiam. Et haec est duplex, secundum totum et

secundum partem. Similitudo secundum accidens, vel secundum partem substantiae admittit diversitatem; sed non similitudo secundum totum. Et quoniam in divina essentia est summa simplicitas, ideo non potest esse similitudo secundum accidens neque secundum partem; et ideo similitudo non compatitur diversitatem naturae.

Dub. VII

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit Magister: Significavit, nomine consortii non poni aliquid, sed removeri, quia ex hoc videtur, quod omnis numeralis dictio secundum ipsum nihil ponit, sed tantum privat; sed hoc videtur falsum. Cum enim in divinis sit vera pluralitas personarum, non tantum privative, sed etiam positive videntur¹¹ dici.

Respondeo: Haec fuit positio Magistri, quae communiter non tenetur, quia non habet veritatem, sicut infra melius patebit¹². Tamen Magister excusatur, quia dixit, quod non ponunt aliquid nomina numeralia, quia important numerum, qui non est proprie in divinis. Numerus enim causatur ex unitatum aggregatione et distinctione; et distinctio unitatum fit tripliciter: continui divisione, formarum disparatione¹³, gradu sive ordine. Quoniam igitur in divinis non est aggregatio nec talis distinctio, ideo nec numerus proprie.

Dub. VIII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: In principio creavit Deus, quare magis hoc nomen Deus stet sive supponat pro persona Patris quam pro persona Filii, et quomodo Trinitas intelligatur ex hoc.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dicendum, quod¹⁴ octo modis insinuatur nobis personarum pluralitas in Scriptura.

Primo modo significatione; Matthaei ultimo¹⁵: In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti.

Secundo modo consignificatione: Genesis in principio, ubi nos habemus Deus, Hebraei habent Heloym, quod est nominativus pluralis huius singularis Hel.

Tertio modo suppositione, ut cum dicitur: Deus genuit Deum; Proverbiorum octavo¹⁶: Ante omnes colles generavit me Dominus.

Quarto modo appropriatione, ut ibi¹⁷: In principio creavit Deus etc. Deus enim ibi Patri appropriatur et Principium Filio.

Quinto modo iteratione, ut Isaiae sexto¹⁸: Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus, Dominus Deus Sabaoth.

Sexto modo ordine verborum; Psalmus¹⁹: Benedicat nos Deus, Deus noster, benedicat nos Deus.

Septimo modo connotatione in actu missionis, ut cum dicitur ad Galatas quarto²⁰: Misit Deus etc.

Octavo modo apparitione, sicut apparuerunt Abrahae tres viri; Genesis decimo octavo²¹.

Dub. IX

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit: Ille etiam maximus Prophetarum, quia super illud Matthaei decimo septimo²²: Apparuerunt illis Moyses et Elias, dicit Glossa: «Elias fuit maximus Prophetarum»; non ergo David.

Respondeo: Spiritus prophetiae, in maiori abundantia datus, prophetam Domini facit excellentiorem. Potest ergo dupliciter dari in maiori abundantia: aut quia ad plura, aut quia ad altiora. Eliae datus est ad plura, quia ad futurorum praevisionem et miraculorum operationem; sed David ad altiora, quia, sicut patet ex eius prophetia, plura vidit et²³ clarius, quia prophetia intellectuali.

Dub. X

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit: Dominus possedit me; quia possessio est rei inferioris, ordo

rei posterioris, conceptio similiter sonat in sexus fragilitatem et partus similiter; quae non conveniunt divinis.

Respondeo: Sapientia describitur per comparationem ad effectus et per comparationem ad principium. Et quoniam per comparationem ad effectus habet in se thesaurum infinitum in numerositate, et habet ordinem in discretione, ideo describitur per verbum possidendi et ordinandi²⁴. Per comparationem ad suum principium emanat emanatione intrinseca in eo, quod est de substantia emanantis; ideo describitur per verbum conceptionis et parturitionis.

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Doubt I

In this part, concerning the text, the first doubt arises about what the Master says — namely that God is discerned by most purified minds. For it seems ill said, because no mind while it is on the way (in via) is most purified, but only in the homeland (in patria).

I respond: It must be said that for a mind to contemplate God perfectly, it needs to be purified with respect to both its intellect and its affection; and therefore the Master says through the righteousness of faith — that is, through faith, which makes one righteous in deed and purifies the intellect, while righteousness purifies the affection. Of each purification there is a threefold grade. For the intellect is purified when it is abstracted from sensible species; more purified when it is cleansed of phantasmatic images; most purified when it is freed from philosophical¹ reasonings. The grades of the purification of affection are these: affection is purified when it is cleansed from guilt; more purified when from the aftermath (of sin); most purified when from its very occasion²; and in this state it is fit to contemplate.

Doubt II

Likewise, it is objected about what he says: The feeble gaze of the human mind is not fixed in so excellent a light etc. For it seems that even³ a purified gaze is not fixed there, because however much it be cleansed, that light still immeasurably exceeds the gaze of the mind: therefore, if on account of its excellence it cannot be seen by one without faith, neither can it be seen by one who has faith.

I respond: There is a difference between saying to consider, to be fixed, and to comprehend. An unclean mind can consider; but it cannot be fixed in that light unless the mind be pure; it cannot comprehend unless the mind be unmeasured⁴. The reason why it cannot be fixed is twofold: one, because it is above the intellect, and therefore the intellect is not fixed upon it unless it has the glue of affection — yet even so it quickly falls back⁵; another, because a sound eye is proportionate to that light qualitatively, even if not quantitatively, but a weak or bleary eye is disproportionate in both ways, and therefore is not fixed.

Doubt III

Likewise, an objection is raised about this saying of Ambrose: «God» and «Lord» is the name of nature and the name of power, because Damascene⁶ says that this name Deus is imposed from an operation — whence it is said to come from aithein, which is "to burn", or from theein, which is "to warm", or from theasthai, which is "to see".

I respond: It must be said that concerning this name, and similar names, there are two ways to speak: either with respect to that to which the name is imposed — and in this way it is a name of nature, because it is imposed on that which⁷ is the supreme nature — or with respect to that from which it is imposed, and in this way it is a name of operation, because it is imposed from an operation.

Doubt IV

Likewise, a question is raised about this circumlocution: Ego sum qui sum ("I am who am") — whether this name Ego sum etc. is a name of essence or of a person. That it is of a person seems to be the case, because a demonstrative pronoun signifies a definite person. And again, speaking is an act of a person. If perhaps you say that ego ("I"), because it signifies origin, stands for the person of the Father; sum ("am"), because it signifies the act of going forth, for the person of the Son; qui ("who"), relative, binding both together, stands for the person of the Holy Spirit — this is nothing, because the relative and the antecedent stand for the same thing.

I respond: It must be said that this name qui est ("he who is"), and Ego sum qui sum, is properly a name of essence; for this is a certain circumlocution, signifying being in every mode of perfection and absoluteness, and this is the proper name of the divine substance. And to the objection that a pronoun signifies a definite person, it must be said that person here means a definite supposit of the Word, and this is substance and nature⁸.

Doubt V

Likewise, a question is raised about this authority: Let us make man to our image and likeness — whether image there stands for essence or for person.

I respond: It must be said that, according to the way the Saints understand it here, image and likeness signify essence and relation⁹. For image imports unity together with distinction, and likeness similarly on account of an intrinsic relation. And therefore in this name image and likeness, with respect to one element of its signification, the unity of essence is noted; with respect to another element, the plurality of persons is noted. And therefore Augustine expounds it one way, and Hilary another¹⁰. Augustine considers a part of the signification — namely the unity of essence; but Hilary considers the whole. Hence Hilary says that by the name image and likeness unity and plurality are understood together. Similarly, Augustine in the words let us make and our considers only the consignified, and therefore plurality. Hilary, however, considers both the signified and the consignified, and therefore says that in both plurality and unity are understood.

Doubt VI

Likewise, Hilary says: «Nor does likeness admit of diversity being mixed together in the otherness of one to another.»

On the contrary: Likeness is the same quality of things that differ: therefore likeness is compatible with difference.

I respond: It must be said that there is a likeness according to accident, and a likeness according to substance. And this latter is twofold: according to the whole and according to a part. A likeness according to accident, or according to a part of the substance, admits diversity; but a likeness according to the whole does not. And since in the divine essence there is supreme simplicity, there cannot be a likeness according to accident nor according to a part; and therefore likeness does not admit diversity of nature.

Doubt VII

Likewise, an objection is raised about what the Master says: He signified that by the name of partnership something is not posited but removed — because from this it seems that, according to the Master, every numerical expression posits nothing but only negates; but this seems false. For since in divine things there is a true plurality of persons, they seem to be spoken of not only privatively but also positively¹¹.

I respond: This was the Master's position, which is not commonly held, because it does not have truth, as will more clearly appear below¹². Nevertheless, the Master is excused, because he said that numerical names posit nothing because they import number, which is not properly in divine things. For number is caused by the aggregation and distinction of units; and the distinction of units comes about in three ways: by division of the continuous, by disparity of forms¹³, and by grade or order. Since therefore in divine things there is neither aggregation nor such distinction, there is accordingly no number properly speaking.

Doubt VIII

Likewise, a question is raised about what he says: In the beginning God created — why this name Deus stands or supposes for the person of the Father rather than for the person of the Son, and how the Trinity is understood from this.

I respond: To this it must be said that¹⁴ the plurality of persons is indicated to us in Scripture in eight ways.

In the first way by signification; Matthew, last chapter¹⁵: In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

In the second way by co-signification: Genesis at the beginning, where we have God, but the Hebrews have Heloym, which is the nominative plural of the singular Hel.

In the third way by supposition, as when it is said: God begot God; in Proverbs 8¹⁶: Before all hills the Lord begot me.

In the fourth way by appropriation, as in that: In the beginning God created etc.¹⁷ — for God there is appropriated to the Father, and Principle to the Son.

In the fifth way by iteration, as in Isaiah 6¹⁸: Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of hosts.

In the sixth way by order of words; the Psalm¹⁹: May God bless us, our God; may God bless us.

In the seventh way by connotation in the act of mission, as when it is said in Galatians 4²⁰: God sent etc.

In the eighth way by apparition, as the three men appeared to Abraham; Genesis 18²¹.

Doubt IX

Likewise, an objection is raised about what he says: That greatest of the Prophets — because, on that passage of Matthew 17²²: Moses and Elijah appeared to them, the Gloss says: «Elijah was the greatest of the Prophets»; therefore not David.

I respond: The spirit of prophecy, given in greater abundance, makes a prophet of the Lord more excellent. It can therefore be given in greater abundance in two ways: either because it extends to more things or because it extends to higher things. To Elijah it was given with respect to more things, namely foreknowledge of future events and the working of miracles; but to David with respect to higher things, because — as is clear from his prophecy — he saw more and²³ more clearly, since his was an intellectual prophecy.

Doubt X

Likewise, an objection is raised about what he says: The Lord possessed me — because possession is of an inferior thing, ordering is of a posterior thing, conception similarly sounds of the fragility of the female sex, and bringing forth likewise; none of which are fitting to divine things.

I respond: Wisdom is described by comparison to her effects and by comparison to her principle. And since by comparison to her effects she has in herself an inexhaustible treasury of multitude and has order in her distinction, she is therefore described by the verb of possessing and ordering²⁴. By comparison to her principle she emanates by an intrinsic emanation, in that she is of the substance of the one who emanates; and therefore she is described by the verb of conception and parturition.

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