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Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 2

Textus Latinus
p. 56

Quaestio IV

Utrum tres tantum sint divinae personae.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere trinitatem. Et quod non, immo magis dualitatem, ostenditur sic.

1. Pater totum quod potest, dat Filio1; sed qui dat totum quod potest, non potest amplius dare: ergo nec aliam personam producere, cum illud sit dare.

2. Item, Pater generat Filium tanquam Verbum per omnia aequale et per omnia dicens et exprimens ipsum; sed multiplicatio personarum est ad declarationem virtutis: ergo videtur, quod superfluat alium producere.

3. Item, ostenditur quod ibi debeat esse quaternitas per rationem emanationis. Quia enim Filius emanat per generationem, non per processionem, ideo, quamvis non generet, tamen spirando producit; eadem ratione videtur, quod Spiritus sanctus, quamvis non producat spirando, possit generare sive generet, cum non generetur.

4. Item, cum in divinis sit duplex modus producendi2, scilicet unus per modum naturae, alius per modum voluntatis, et ibi debeat esse completa ratio productionis, videtur etiam, quod ibi debeat esse modus producendi tertius per modum artis. Et si sic, erit ibi ponere quartam personam secundum hunc modum producendi.

Sed contra: Quod sit ibi trinitas tantum, ostenditur ex suppositionibus superius factis, quia in illa Trinitate est3 beatitudo, perfectio, simplicitas, primitas.

1. Ex prima suppositione ostenditur sic: si est ibi summa beatitudo: ergo summa concordia; ergo est summa germanitas, summa caritas. Sed si essent plures quam tres, non esset ibi summa germanitas; si pauciores, non esset ibi summa caritas: ergo sunt tres tantum. Probatio minoris. Si est ibi quarta persona, aut procedit ab una, aut a duabus, aut a tribus. Si ab una vel4 duabus tantum, tunc non perfecte et aequaliter convenit cum omnibus; si autem a tribus, tunc duae personae intermediae magis conveniunt ad invicem quam cum extremis, quia producuntur et producunt; et ita non est ibi perfectus nexus. — Item, si essent pauciores quam tres, non esset ibi perfecta caritas, quia perfectus amor et est liberalis et est communis: quia liberalis, ideo tendit in5 alterum; quia communis, ideo vult illum diligi ab altero et diligere alterum sicut se et a se: ergo est ibi dilectio et condilectio; hoc autem non potest esse minus quam in tribus.

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2. Ex secunda suppositione sic: si est ibi summa perfectio: ergo persona producens perfecte producit et quantum ad modum producendi, et quantum ad eum qui producitur. Sed non reperitur nisi duplex modus producendi nobilis; «omne enim agens aut agit per modum naturae, aut per modum voluntatis», sicut vult Philosophus6; ergo his duobus modis et tantum his producit; sed persona producta quolibet istorum modorum est perfectissima: ergo si ultra perfectionem omne quod est superfluit, et quod est citra deficit, necesse est, esse tantum duas personas emanantes et non plures nec pauciores, et unam, a qua emanant: ergo tantum tres.

3. Item, ex tertia sic: si est ibi summa simplicitas, Pater totum dat cuilibet: ergo procedentes sive emanantes non distinguuntur penes ea quae accipiunt7, sed penes modum accipiendi vel emanandi; sed duo tantum sunt modi emanandi: ergo non possunt esse nisi duae personae emanantes et tertia producens: ergo etc.

4. Item, ex quarta sic: si ratione primitatis est ibi summa fecunditas, nulla persona potest producere aliquo genere producendi, quo producitur, quia respectu illius non est prior: ergo cum duae personae emanent secundum duos modos emanandi, impossibile est, quod his modis producant, et non sunt alii modi: ergo non possunt producere aliam personam: ergo sunt tantum tres.

Conclusio

Tres tantum esse personas divinas, et fides catholica docet, et ratio suadet.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut fides catholica dicit, ponere est tantum tres personas, non plures nec pauciores. Et ad hoc sumitur ratio necessitatis et congruitatis.

Ratio utique necessitatis, quare non possunt esse pauciores quam tres, est summa beatitudo et summa perfectio. Nam summa beatitudo exigit dilectionem et condilectionem; summa perfectio duplicem emanationem, scilicet naturae et liberalitatis; et ad hoc ad minus exiguntur tres personae. — Item, ratio necessitatis, quare non possunt esse plures, est summa simplicitas, quae non patitur personas distingui nisi secundum modos emanandi; et iterum principalis fecunditas, quae non permittit personam producere aliquo genere emanationis, nisi secundum rationem intelligendi sit prior illo. Unde prima persona, quia est innascibilis et inspirabilis, generat et spirat; secunda, quia inspirabilis, sed genita, non generat, sed spirat; tertia vero persona, quia spiratur et procedit a generante, nec generat nec spirat. Et ideo impossibile est, esse plures quam tres.

Ratio congruitatis sumitur ex sufficientia combinationum et ex perfectione numeri ternarii.

Ex sufficientia combinationum, quia cum «amor sit in omnibus personis», ut dicit Richardus, et non sit nisi triplex amor, videlicet «gratuitus et debitus et ex utroque permixtus», tantum erunt tres personae: una, quae tantum dat, in qua est amor gratuitus; alia, quae tantum accipit, in qua est amor debitus; et media, quae dat et accipit, in qua est amor permixtus ex utroque. — Item, alio modo possunt combinari secundum rationem originis; et huiusmodi combinationis sufficientia in tribus consistit. Nam contingit intelligere personam, quae est principium personae et non est principiatum, et rursum personam, quae est principiatum et non principium personae, et tertio modo personam, quae est principiatum et principium. Quartus autem modus, quod nec sit principium nec principiatum, est omnino impossibilis et non intelligibilis.

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Ratio congruitatis ex parte numeri est, quia numerus iste, scilicet ternarius, habet primam8 perfectionem et summam, sive consideretur in se, sive in quantitate continua, sive in creatura.

In se habet primam perfectionem, quoniam ternarius primus numerus est, qui constat ex omnibus partibus suis, scilicet unitate et dualitate, quae simul iunctae faciunt tria. Senarius autem dicitur primus perfectorum, quia constat ex omnibus partibus suis aliquotis, scilicet tribus, duobus et uno. — Item, summa perfectio est in eo, quia unitas, quae est principium et completio omnis numeri, reflexa supra se reduplicatione perfecta, qualis in solido quadrato, triplicatur secundum rationem, remanens una secundum veritatem; ut si dicatur: semel unum semel. Et istud est valde simile Trinitati increatae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Pater dat Filio totum quod potest; dicendum, quod verum est, sed non dat9 omni modo, quo potest. Et ideo in illatione est accidens: «non potest amplius dare, ergo nec aliam personam producere», quia hoc non est dare amplius, sed alio modo.

2. Similiter sequens patet, quia Filius non omni modo declarat, quia, etsi secundum rationem naturae, non tamen secundum liberalitatem voluntatis, nisi in quantum ex ipso Verbo procedit Spiritus.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Spiritus sanctus debet generare; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia persona Filii praecedit spirationem, ideo habet rationem primitatis; persona Spiritus sancti sequitur generationem, et ideo non generat, quia non est innascibilis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de tertio modo emanandi, scilicet de arte; dicendum, quod ars non habet fecunditatem ad emanandum sive ad producendum nisi per voluntatem; et ideo modus ille non debet distingui a modo producendi10 per modum liberalitatis sive voluntatis.

Vel aliter et melius. Modus producendi per artem convenit cum modo producendi per naturam in hoc, quod utrobique producitur simile. Differt autem, quia in productione naturali producitur similis in substantia et natura, alius in persona; in productione autem artis producitur simile secundum rationem formae exemplaris, dissimile vero in substantia et natura. Talis autem modus producendi est incompossibilis11 divinae essentiae, quae non compatitur diversitatem essentiarum.

Scholion

I. Quae hic de proprietatibus numerorum dicuntur, occurrunt etiam Hexaem. Serm. 4, nec non in illa Expositione Psalmorum (Psal. 129), quae inter Opera S. Bonav. impressa, sed auctori suo Michaeli Meldensi, Archiepiscopo Senonensi († 1199), a P. Fidele a Fanna (Ratio novae collectionis p. 180 seqq.) vindicata est. Haec antiquam doctrinam exhibent mathematicorum Graecorum, ut Euclidis (Elementa IX. 36), quos sequuntur S. Augustinus (Gen. ad lit. IV. c. 2), S. Isidorus (Etymol. III. c. 3. n. 11; de Arithmet. I. c. 20), aliique innumeri cum Petro Bungo (de Numerorum Mysteriis, Paris. 1617. p. 456) et Stephano Brulefero (Comment. in hanc quaest.).

1. Partes aliquotae sive aliquantae alicuius numeri ab antiquis dicebantur illae, quae aliquoties sumptae reddunt praecise suum totum. Ita 5 et 2 sunt partes aliquotae numeri 10. Pars non aliquota est illa, quae aliquoties sumpta non potest reddere totum aliquem numerum, ut 3 respectu numeri 10. 2. Numerus perfectus secundum antiquos est ille, qui constat ex suis partibus aliquotis, simul sumptis; et in hoc sensu numerus ternarius est primus perfectus, quia constat ex parte aliquota (1) et non aliquota (2), quae simul iuncta faciunt tria. Dicitur primus numerus perfectus, quia binarius, licet constet ex suis partibus simul sumptis, i. e. duabus unitatibus, non dicitur numerus perfectus, quia unum proprie non dicebatur numerus.

3. Aliquis numerus potest super se reflecti duobus modis, vel imperfecte, quando semel ducitur in se ipsum (ut 2 × 2 = 4), et tunc efficitur numerus quadratus, sed non solidus; vel perfecte, quando bis ducitur in se ipsum (ut 2 × 2 × 2 = 8), et haec reduplicatio perfecta reddit quadratum solidum.

II. His praesuppositis, patet triplex propositio S. Doctoris.

1. Numerus ternarius in se consideratus habet primam et summam perfectionem: primam quidem, quia est primus numerus constans ex omnibus suis partibus per additionem simul sumptis; summam vero, quia unum triplicatum manet unum (1 × 1 × 1 = 1).

2. Consideratus ut in quantitate continua, i. e. in quantum applicatur ad quantitatem, habet primam perfectionem, «quia omnis quantitas habet principium, medium et ultimum; summam vero, quia perfectio quantitatis continuae consistit in trina dimensione, scil. longitudine, latitudine et altitudine», ut habetur in textu.

3. Consideratus ut in qualibet creatura, iterum habet primam et summam perfectionem: primam quidem, quia in qualibet etiam minima creatura invenitur trinitas vestigii (unum, verum, bonum); summam vero, quia in angelica et humana natura invenitur trinitas imaginis, praesertim quando nobilissima pars animae est reformata vel imperfecte per deiformitatem gratiae, vel perfecte per deiformitatem gloriae. De hoc cfr. infra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. et p. II. per totam, et II. Sent. d. 16. per totam.

III. De tota quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 45. m. 7. — Scot., hic q. 5 et 7, et Report. hic q. 8. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 10. q. 1. a. 5; S. I. q. 30. a. 2. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 10. a. 12. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 10. princ. 2. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6.

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English Translation

Question IV

Whether there are only three divine persons.

Fourth and finally, it is asked whether a trinity is to be posited in the divine persons. And that this is not so — but rather a duality — is shown thus:

1. The Father gives to the Son all that he can1; but one who gives all that he can give cannot give any more: therefore neither can he produce another person, since that would be a giving.

2. Likewise, the Father begets the Son as a Word, in all things equal to himself and in all things saying and expressing himself; but the multiplication of persons is for the declaration of power: therefore it seems superfluous to produce another.

3. Likewise, it is shown that there ought to be a quaternity there, by an argument from emanation. For since the Son emanates by generation and not by procession, therefore, even though he does not generate, he nonetheless produces by spirating; by the same reasoning it seems that the Holy Spirit, even though he does not produce by spirating, could generate or does generate, since he is not generated.

4. Likewise, since in divine things there is a twofold mode of producing2 — one by way of nature, and the other by way of will — and since there ought to be a complete account of production there, it seems also that there ought to be a third mode of producing, by way of art. And if so, a fourth person would have to be posited according to this mode of producing.

On the contrary: That there is only a trinity there is shown from the suppositions made above, because in that Trinity there is3 beatitude, perfection, simplicity, and primacy.

1. From the first supposition it is shown thus: if there is supreme beatitude there, then there is supreme concord; therefore supreme kindredship, supreme charity. But if there were more than three, there would not be supreme kindredship; if fewer, there would not be supreme charity: therefore there are only three. Proof of the minor: if there is a fourth person there, it proceeds either from one, from two, or from three. If from one or4 from two only, then it does not agree perfectly and equally with all; but if from three, then the two intermediate persons agree more with one another than with the extremes — because they are both produced and produce — and thus there is not a perfect bond there. — Likewise, if there were fewer than three, there would not be perfect charity, because perfect love is both generous and shared: because it is generous, it tends toward5 another; because it is shared, it wills that the beloved be loved by another, and that the other be loved as itself and by itself: therefore there is love and co-love; but this cannot exist with fewer than three.

2. From the second supposition thus: if there is supreme perfection there, then the producing person produces perfectly both with respect to the mode of producing and with respect to the one produced. But there is found only a twofold noble mode of producing; «for every agent acts either by way of nature or by way of will», as the Philosopher holds6. Therefore it produces by these two modes and only by these; but the person produced by either of these modes is most perfect: therefore, since everything beyond perfection is superfluous and what is below it is deficient, it is necessary that there be only two persons emanating and no more nor fewer, and one from whom they emanate: therefore, only three.

3. Likewise, from the third thus: if there is supreme simplicity there, the Father gives the whole to each: therefore those proceeding or emanating are not distinguished according to what they receive7, but according to the mode of receiving or emanating; but there are only two modes of emanating: therefore there can be only two persons emanating and a third producing: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, from the fourth thus: if by reason of primacy there is supreme fruitfulness there, no person can produce by any kind of producing by which it itself is produced, because with respect to that it is not prior: therefore, since two persons emanate according to the two modes of emanating, it is impossible that they produce by these modes, and there are no other modes: therefore they cannot produce another person: therefore there are only three.

Conclusion

That there are only three divine persons is both taught by the Catholic faith and persuaded by reason.

I respond: It must be said that, as the Catholic faith declares, one must posit only three persons — neither more nor fewer. And for this there is taken a reason of necessity and a reason of congruence.

The reason of necessity why there cannot be fewer than three is supreme beatitude and supreme perfection. For supreme beatitude demands love and co-love; supreme perfection demands a twofold emanation — namely of nature and of liberality — and for this at least three persons are required. — Likewise, the reason of necessity why there cannot be more is supreme simplicity, which does not allow the persons to be distinguished except by the modes of emanating; and again principal fruitfulness, which does not permit a person to produce by any kind of emanation unless he is prior to the one produced according to the account of understanding. Hence the first person, because he is unborn and unspirable, both generates and spirates; the second, because he is unspirable but begotten, does not generate but spirates; the third person, because he is spirated and proceeds from one who generates, neither generates nor spirates. And therefore it is impossible that there be more than three.

The reason of congruence is taken from the sufficiency of combinations and from the perfection of the ternary number.

From the sufficiency of combinations, because since, as Richard says, «love is in all the persons», and there are only three kinds of love — namely, gratuitous, owed, and mixed of both — there will be only three persons: one who only gives, in whom there is gratuitous love; another who only receives, in whom there is owed love; and a middle one, who both gives and receives, in whom there is the love mixed of both. — Likewise, in another way they can be combined according to the account of origin; and the sufficiency of this kind of combination consists in three. For one can understand a person who is a principle of a person and is not a principiate, and again a person who is a principiate and is not a principle of a person, and in a third mode a person who is both principiate and principle. But a fourth mode — that one be neither principle nor principiate — is altogether impossible and unintelligible.

The reason of congruence from number is that this number — namely, the ternary — has the first8 perfection and the supreme, whether it is considered in itself, or in continuous quantity, or in a creature.

In itself it has the first perfection, because the ternary is the first number that consists of all its parts — namely, unity and duality, which joined together make three. But the senary (six) is called the first of the perfect numbers, because it consists of all its aliquot parts — namely, three, two, and one. — Likewise, the supreme perfection is in it, because unity, which is the principle and completion of every number, when reflected upon itself by perfect reduplication — such as occurs in a solid square — is tripled in the account of reason, while remaining one in reality; as if one should say: once one once (semel unum semel). And this is very like the uncreated Trinity.

1. To the objection, then, that the Father gives to the Son everything he can: it must be said that this is true, but he does not give9 in every mode in which he can. And so in the inference there is the fallacy of accident: «he cannot give more, therefore he cannot produce another person either»; for this is not to give more, but to give in another mode.

2. Similarly, the following objection is clear, because the Son does not declare [the Father] in every mode; for although he does so according to the account of nature, nevertheless he does not do so according to the liberality of the will, except insofar as from the Word himself the Spirit proceeds.

3. To the objection that the Holy Spirit ought to generate: it must be said that it is not similar, because the person of the Son precedes spiration, and therefore has the account of primacy; the person of the Holy Spirit follows generation, and therefore does not generate, because he is not unborn.

4. To the objection about a third mode of emanating — namely, by way of art: it must be said that art has no fruitfulness for emanating or producing except through the will; and therefore that mode is not to be distinguished from the mode of producing10 by way of liberality or will.

Or — differently and better — the mode of producing by art agrees with the mode of producing by nature in this: that in both cases something similar is produced. But it differs, because in natural production what is produced is similar in substance and nature, but another in person; in the production of art, however, what is produced is similar according to the account of the exemplary form, but dissimilar in substance and nature. But such a mode of producing is incompossible11 with the divine essence, which does not suffer a diversity of essences.

Scholion

I. What is said here about the properties of numbers recurs also in Hexaëmeron, Sermon 4, and in that Exposition of the Psalms (Ps. 129) which, though printed among the works of St. Bonaventure, has been vindicated for its proper author Michael of Meaux, Archbishop of Sens († 1199) by Fr. Fidelis a Fanna (Ratio novae collectionis, p. 180 ff.). These pages exhibit the ancient doctrine of the Greek mathematicians — such as Euclid (Elements IX, 36), followed by St. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. IV, 2), St. Isidore (Etymol. III.3.11; de Arithmet. I.20), and innumerable others, together with Pietro Bungo (On the Mysteries of Numbers, Paris 1617, p. 456) and Stephen Brulefer (Commentary on this question).

1. Aliquot or aliquant parts of some number were called by the ancients those parts which, taken a certain number of times, give back exactly the whole. Thus 5 and 2 are aliquot parts of 10. A non-aliquot part is one which, taken a certain number of times, cannot give back any whole number — such as 3 with respect to 10.

2. A perfect number, according to the ancients, is one which consists of its aliquot parts taken together; and in this sense the ternary number is the first perfect number, because it consists of an aliquot part (1) and a non-aliquot part (2), which joined together make three. It is called the first perfect number because the binary, although it consists of its parts taken together — that is, two units — is not called a perfect number, since one was not properly called a number.

3. A number can be reflected upon itself in two ways: either imperfectly, when it is multiplied by itself once (as 2 × 2 = 4), and this yields a square number but not a solid one; or perfectly, when it is multiplied by itself twice (as 2 × 2 × 2 = 8), and this perfect reduplication yields a solid cube.

II. With these things presupposed, the threefold proposition of the Holy Doctor is clear.

1. The ternary number considered in itself has the first and supreme perfection: the first indeed, because it is the first number consisting of all its parts taken together by addition; the supreme because one tripled remains one (1 × 1 × 1 = 1).

2. Considered as being in continuous quantity — that is, insofar as it is applied to quantity — it has the first perfection, «because every quantity has a beginning, a middle, and an end; and the supreme perfection because the perfection of continuous quantity consists in threefold dimension, namely length, width, and height», as is stated in the text.

3. Considered as being in any creature whatsoever, it again has the first and supreme perfection: the first because in any creature, even the smallest, is found a trinity of vestige (one, true, good); the supreme because in the angelic and human nature is found the trinity of image — especially when the noblest part of the soul has been reformed either imperfectly by the deiformity of grace, or perfectly by the deiformity of glory. On this, see below d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, and p. II throughout; and II Sent. d. 16 throughout.

III. On the whole question: Alex. Hal., Summa, p. I, q. 45, m. 7. — Scot., here q. 5 and 7, and Report., here q. 8. — S. Thom., I Sent. d. 10, q. 1, a. 5; S. I, q. 30, a. 2. — B. Albert, I Sent. d. 10, a. 12. — Aegid. R., I Sent. d. 10, princ. 2, q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., here, q. 6.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Ioan. 16, 13 (recte 16, 15): Omnia quaecumque habet Pater mea sunt.
    John 16:13 [recte 16:15]: «All things whatsoever the Father has are mine».
  2. Plurimi codd. (A C G I K L M O R S Z etc.) minus recte et non sibi constantes procedendi. Paulo infra post artis ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 restituimus particulam Et.
    Many codices (A C G I K L M O R S Z etc.) less correctly and inconsistently with themselves read procedendi. A little below, after artis, on the witness of the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, we have restored the particle Et.
  3. Codd. X cc et ed. 1 hic addunt et.
    Codd. X, cc, and ed. 1 here add et.
  4. Plures mss. cum ed. 1 repetunt hic a.
    Several manuscripts, with ed. 1, here repeat a.
  5. Vat., adversantibus mss. et ed. 1, ad loco in et paulo post alium pro illum; deinde, contrariantibus insuper edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 post altero legendo sicut a se et vult diligere, omittit postea et a se; quae lectio gracilior quidem est, sed sensum nimis coarctare videtur, eo quod non contineat unum visionis respectu triplicis mutuae dilectionis. Elliptica constructio textus nostri illud membrum satis indicat. Sensus enim propositionis hic est: ideo Pater vult, quod Filius diligatur a Spiritu sancto, et diligat Spiritum sanctum, sicut vult, quod ipse, scilicet Pater, diligatur ab utroque et a se diligatur uterque.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads ad for in, and a little later alium for illum; then, against edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, after altero reading sicut a se et vult diligere, it afterwards omits et a se; this reading is indeed more graceful, but seems to constrict the sense too much, because it does not contain the one vision with respect to the threefold mutual love. The elliptical construction of our text indicates that member sufficiently. For the sense of the proposition is: Therefore the Father wills that the Son be loved by the Holy Spirit, and love the Holy Spirit — just as he wills that he himself, namely the Father, be loved by both, and that each be loved by himself.
  6. Libr. II Phys. text. 49 (c. 3), ubi dicit, quod eorum quae fiunt propter finem alia quidem secundum propositum fiunt, alia vero non... sunt autem propter hoc (i. e. finem) quaecumque ab intellectu utique aguntur et quaecumque a natura. Cfr. III Ethic. c. de Voluntario, et I Magnor. Moral. c. de Spontaneo et seqq.
    Aristotle, Physics II, text 49 (c. 3), where he says that of those things which come about for the sake of an end, «some come about according to deliberate choice, and others not»... «but those things are for the sake of this [the end] which are brought about by understanding, and whatever come about by nature». Cf. Nicomachean Ethics III, chap. on the Voluntary, and Great Ethics I, chap. on the Spontaneous and following.
  7. Cod. Z addit vel relationum. Pro horum maiore intelligentia notentur haec B. Albert. verba: Dicunt quidam modernorum, quod relatio est medium entis et non entis, eo quod ipsa est ratio rei et non res etc. (I. Sent. d. 26. a. 10.) — Paulo post Cod. R in unitate loco cum unitate.
    Cod. Z adds vel relationum ("or of the relations"). For a greater understanding of these matters, let these words of Bl. Albert be noted: «Some of the moderns say that a relation is a middle between being and non-being, in that it is the account of a thing and not a thing itself, etc.» (I Sent. d. 26. a. 10). — A little later, Cod. R reads in unitate for cum unitate.
  8. Praeferimus lectionem cod. Z summam pro perfectam utpote praecedentibus correspondentem. Cod. T penes et cod. V per loco secundum; deinde ope omnium mss. et edd. 2, 3 substituimus deiformatam pro deiformem. Cod. R, omissa praepositione secundum, post deiformatam addit in qua, ita ut trinitatem imaginis referatur ad superius positum contingit reperire; plures alii codd. ut A C G K O H S huic lectioni in tantum favent, in quantum omittunt praepositionem secundum.
    We prefer the reading of cod. Z, summam in place of perfectam, as corresponding to what precedes. Cod. T reads penes and cod. V per in place of secundum; then, with the help of all the manuscripts and edd. 2, 3, we substitute deiformatam for deiformem. Cod. R, omitting the preposition secundum, after deiformatam adds in qua, so that trinitatem imaginis refers to the earlier contingit reperire; several other codices (A C G K O H S) favor this reading to the extent that they omit the preposition secundum.
  9. Plurimi codd. non ita bene omittunt dat. Paulo post quando S. Doctor dicit accidens, intellige fallaciam accidentis, de qua Aristot., I Elench. c. 4 (c. 5): «Ex accidente quidem paralogismi sunt, cum quidvis postulatum fuerit aeque rei atque accidenti inesse. Quoniam enim multa eidem accidunt, non est necesse, omnibus praedicatis et subiecto, de quo illa praedicantur, haec omnia inesse; nam alioquin omnia erunt eadem». — Hoc loco a re ad modum rei falso concluditur.
    Most of the codices, not so well, omit dat. A little later, when the Holy Doctor says accidens, understand the fallacy of accident, of which Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations I, ch. 4 (c. 5): «There are paralogisms from accident when whatever is posited is claimed to belong equally to the thing and to the accident. For since many things happen to the same subject, it is not necessary that all of these belong to all the predicates and to the subject of which they are predicated; for otherwise all things will be the same». — In this passage there is a false inference from the thing to the mode of the thing.
  10. Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 removimus hic a Vat. additum obiectio per hoc. Paulo infra post rationem codd. Y ee addunt originis et perfectionem, cum quibus concordant codd. G H N X in eo tantum divergentes, quod codd. H N omittant et, cuius loco cod. G habet seu, cod. X vero declaret. — De differentia utriusque modi procedendi cfr. infra d. 13. q. 3.
    On the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have removed here the Vatican addition obiectio per hoc. A little below, after rationem, codd. Y ee add originis et perfectionem, with which codd. G H N X agree, diverging only in that codd. H N omit et — in whose place cod. G has seu, and cod. X has declaret. — On the difference between the two modes of proceeding, see below d. 13, q. 3.
  11. Sequimur cod. Y loco procedendi ponendo producendi, quod et praecedentibus et sequentibus magis conforme est, licet sensus in utraque lectione sit idem. — Cod. O simile, qui et cum codd. C Y post natura adiungit et. Paulo infra plures codd. ut A F G K T etc. cum ed. 1 dissimilis loco dissimile. Mox ex plurimis mss. ut A D F G H K N T etc. et ed. 1 substituimus incompossibilis pro impossibilis.
    We follow cod. Y in reading producendi for procedendi, which is more conformable to both what precedes and what follows, although the sense in both readings is the same. — Cod. O reads simile, and together with codd. C Y adds et after natura. A little below, several codd. (A F G K T etc.), with ed. 1, read dissimilis for dissimile. Finally, on the witness of most of the manuscripts (A D F G H K N T etc.) and of ed. 1, we have substituted incompossibilis for impossibilis. ---
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