Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio I

Utrum ratio imaginis attendatur in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate.

Quod autem in omnibus simul sit, videtur:

1. Ad rationem enim imaginis requiritur expressa conformatio in distinctione; sed distinctio in divinis attenditur quantum ad tres personas: ergo maxime¹ in imagine creata attenditur quantum ad tres potentias.

2. Item, ratio imaginis consistit in perfecta capacitate, quia secundum Augustinum² «eo est mens imago, quo potest esse capax et particeps Dei»; sed Deus non capitur ab anima plene nisi ametur, neque amatur nisi intelligatur, nec intelligitur nisi praesens ad animam habeatur; sed primum est per voluntatem, secundum per intelligentiam, tertium per memoriam: ergo etc.

3. Item, notitia sive intelligentia appropriatur Filio, voluntas Spiritui sancto: ergo aut truncata et diminuta erit assignatio imaginis, aut necesse est ponere potentiam respondentem Patri.

Sed contra:

1. Ad esse imaginis requiritur repraesentatio in distinctione originis et ordinis; sed in istis potentiis non est talis distinctio, quia simul sunt cum anima concreatae, nec una est³ ab alia nec una post aliam: ergo in istis non est reperire rationem imaginis.

2. Item, imago est repraesentatio secundum exteriorem dispositionem, ut patet⁴; sed istae tres potentiae sunt intimae ipsi animae: ergo in ipsis non est ratio imaginis.

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3. Item, quod specialiter memoria non sit de ratione imaginis, videtur, quia imago cum sit animae essentialis et secundum potentiam rationalem sit in ipsa, memoria vero, ut dicit Philosophus⁵, est sensibilium, quia est in brutis; unde differt a reminiscentia, quia reminiscentia non est in brutis: ergo videtur quod memoria non pertineat ad imaginem. Praeterea, sive⁶ memoria sit sensibilium sive intelligibilium, concernit differentiam temporis, quia est acceptio praesens de praeteritis; sed imago abstrahit a conditionibus sensibilibus et temporibus: ergo etc.

4. Item, imago attenditur in his quae sunt nata recipere imaginem reformationis sive similitudinis; sed imago illa consistit in tribus virtutibus theologicis, quarum nulla est in memoria: ergo etc.

5. Item, quod voluntas non sit de integritate imaginis, videtur, quia dicitur in libro de Spiritu et anima⁷: «Imago est in potentia cognoscendi, similitudo est in potentia diligendi»; sed voluntas non pertinet ad potentiam cognitivam: ergo etc.

6. Item, omnis potentia, quae est de imagine, debet aliis aequari, quia ad rationem imaginis requiritur aequalitas; sed voluntas non aequatur aliis, quia multa intelligimus, quae non volumus: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod non attenditur aequalitas respectu obiectorum, sed respectu actuum, ut sit sensus: quaecumque⁸ intelligo, volo me intelligere, adhuc non est verum, quia multorum meminimus, quae nollemus.

Conclusio

Ratio imaginis attenditur in his tribus potentiis, memoria, intellectu et voluntate, cum comparatione ad unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister recitat⁹, imago attenditur in his tribus potentiis, tamen in comparatione ad unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum, in quibus est distinctio et ordo et origo unius ab altero per modum quendam disponendi. Nam retentio speciei disponit ad intelligendum et intelligentia ad amandum, si quod intelligitur est bonum¹⁰.

1. Et per hoc patet solutio ad illud quod obiicitur: in istis potentiis non est distinctio per originem: ergo etc.

2. Ad illud¹¹ quod obiicitur, quod imago attenditur secundum exteriorem dispositionem; dicendum, quod est imago rei corporalis et sensibilis; et haec, quia offert se cognitioni per exteriora, habet imaginem repraesentantem secundum exteriorem dispositionem. Est iterum imago rei spiritualis, quae est intima cuilibet rei, et quae cognoscitur secundum quod virtus recolligitur ad intima; et haec¹² habet imaginem repraesentantem quantum ad intimas dispositiones.

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3. Ad illud¹³ quod obiicitur, quod memoria est sensibilium; dicendum, quod memoria accipitur tripliciter: uno modo prout est receptiva et retentiva sensibilium et praeteritorum; alio modo prout est retentiva praeteritorum, sive sensibilium sive intelligibilium; et tertio modo prout est retentiva specierum, abstrahendo ab omni differentia temporis, utpote specierum innatarum. Et hoc tertio modo est pars imaginis; sed obiectio currit de aliis primis duobus modis. Primo modo memoria sequitur sensum, secundo modo sequitur ipsam intelligentiam et voluntatem, tertio modo antecedit et respondet Patri.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod memoria non reformatur; dicendum, quod immo memoria reformatur et quantum ad statum viae et quantum ad statum patriae: in primo per spem; et hoc patet per expositionem Augustini super illud verbum Matthaei vigesimo secundo¹⁴: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde, «id est, intellectu sine errore, ex tota anima, id est, voluntate sine contradictione, ex tota mente, id est, memoria sine oblivione». In secundo statu reformatur quantum ad tentionem; unde Bernardus¹⁵ dicit, quod «Deus est futurus intelligentiae plenitudo lucis, voluntati multitudo pacis, memoriae continuatio aeternitatis». Nec est¹⁶ inconveniens, quod memoria, quamvis sit prima, reformetur per dotem ultimam; quia ordo reformationis et deformationis incipit a posteriori, ordo autem informationis¹⁷ incipit a superiori: ideo a voluntate incipit reformatio et tendit usque in memoriam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago est in potentia cognoscendi; dicendum, quod similitudo dicit quid gratuitum, et ideo dicitur esse per appropriationem in voluntate sive in dilectione. Imago vero non dicit gratuitum, et¹⁸ ideo dicitur esse in potentia cognoscendi.

Vel aliter de imagine: quia in Filio est propria¹⁹ imago, et Filio appropriatur intelligentia, quae est in potentia cognitiva; ideo dicitur imago esse in potentia cognoscendi.

6. Ad illud²⁰: Voluntas non aequatur intelligentiae; dicendum, quod voluntas, prout communiter accipitur ad velle et nolle, quorum utrumque est actus voluntatis, bene aequatur, secundum quod dicitur uti esse commune ad utrumque, sicut dicit Augustinus²¹ et habetur in littera²², quod voluntas capit alia, dum utor etc. Quidquid enim recordamur vel intelligimus, in facultatem voluntatis accipimus ad eligendum vel ad respuendum; et istud est, secundum quod dicit actum communem voluntatis; sed secundum actum specialem, qui est velle tantum, non aequatur; et de isto opponitur, quia²³ sic velle non comprehendit totam voluntatem, sicut meminisse totam memoriam et intelligere totam intelligentiam.

Scholion

I. In responsione duplex est propositio. Prima est ipsa conclusio principalis, quae dicit, quod imago summae Trinitatis consistit in dictis tribus animae potentiis, quatenus includunt et unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum secundorum. Secunda propositio, quae illam explicat et probat, est haec: sicut in divinis personis est et distinctio et ordo et origo, ita etiam in actibus harum potentiarum haec tria inveniuntur. Nam actus earum realiter distinguuntur; porro memoriae actus sive retentio speciei disponit ad intelligendum et intelligentia ad amandum. Unde ex memoria quasi procedit actus intellectus, et ex memoria et intellectu amor.

Triplex illa distinctio memoriae (in solut. ad 3.) invenitur etiam apud Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. et Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1.

II. In solut. ad 4. dicitur cum sententia tunc communi, quod memoria reformatur in statu viae per spem, in statu gloriae per tentionem. Rationem, cur spes attribuatur memoriae, S. Doctor exhibet II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., scil. «quia habent conformitatem in actu, qui est tenere». — Verba ibidem posita: «Ordo reformationis et deformationis incipit a posteriori» hunc sensum habent: deformatio imaginis per culpam et reformatio per gratiam incipit a voluntate, quae in ordine potentiarum est ultima sive posterior, quia actus voluntatis praesupponit actum intellectus, et hic actum memoriae, si memoria sumitur in tertio sensu, immediate antea explicato. In hoc sensu memoria est prior et intimior et per consequens superior. Nam «in anima humana idem est intimum et supremum» (II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2.). In ordine vero formationis sive informationis hae tres potentiae constituunt ipsam vitam spiritualem quasi per modum formae informantis; et sic memoria est prima potentia, et in hoc sensu informatio incipit ab ipsa. Pro explicatione cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 5. praesertim ad 4. — Ad obiect. 5. duplex datur responsio; de prima cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

III. Quoad rationem imaginis vide infra d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. et Schol. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. et 4; II. Sent. d. 16; S. I. q. 93. praesertim a. 5. 6. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 6. et 7. — Scot., hic q. 9. et Report. hic q. 7. — Albert., hic a. 19; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. supp. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 40. q. 7. n. 16. — Durand., hic. p. II. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 8. — Biel, hic q. 10.

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English Translation

Question I

Whether the account of the image is found in memory, understanding, and will.

That it is simultaneously in all of them seems evident:

1. For the account of an image requires express conformation in distinction; but the distinction in God is observed with respect to the three persons: therefore most of all¹ in a created image it is to be observed with respect to three powers.

2. Likewise, the account of image consists in perfect capacity, because according to Augustine² «the mind is an image precisely insofar as it can be capable of God and a partaker of Him»; but God is not fully grasped by the soul unless He is loved, and He is not loved unless He is understood, and He is not understood unless He is held present to the soul; but the first is through the will, the second through the understanding, the third through the memory: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, knowledge or understanding is appropriated to the Son, will to the Holy Spirit: therefore either the assignment of the image will be truncated and diminished, or it is necessary to posit a power corresponding to the Father.

On the contrary:

1. For the being of the image, representation is required in distinction of origin and order; but in these powers there is no such distinction, because they are concreated simultaneously with the soul — neither is one³ from another, nor one after another: therefore in them the account of image is not to be found.

2. Likewise, the image is representation according to external disposition, as is evident⁴; but these three powers are most interior to the soul itself: therefore in them there is no account of image.

3. Likewise, that memory in particular does not belong to the account of image seems evident, because the image, since it is essential to the soul and is in it according to the rational power, is in it as rational; but memory, as the Philosopher says⁵, is of sensible things — since it is also in brutes; hence it differs from reminiscence, because reminiscence is not in brutes: therefore it seems that memory does not pertain to the image. Furthermore, whether⁶ memory concerns sensibles or intelligibles, it concerns temporal differences, since it involves a present reception of past things; but the image abstracts from sensible conditions and from times: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the image is found in those things that are naturally suited to receive the image of reformation or likeness; but that image consists in the three theological virtues, none of which is in memory: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, that will does not belong to the integrity of the image seems evident, because it is said in the book On the Spirit and the Soul⁷: «The image is in the power of knowing; likeness is in the power of loving»; but the will does not belong to the cognitive power: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, every power that belongs to the image must be equal to the others, because equality is required for the account of image; but the will is not equal to the others, because we understand many things that we do not will: therefore, etc. If you say that equality is not found with respect to objects but with respect to acts — so that the sense is: whatever⁸ I understand, I will to understand — even so this is not true, because we remember many things that we would rather not.

Conclusion

The account of image is found in these three powers — memory, intellect, and will — together with comparison to the unity of essence and the plurality of acts.

I respond: It must be said that, as Augustine says and the Master relates⁹, the image is found in these three powers — but in comparison to the unity of essence and the plurality of acts, in which there is distinction and order and an origin of one from another by a certain mode of disposing. For the retention of a species disposes one toward understanding, and understanding disposes one toward loving, if what is understood is good¹⁰.

1. And from this the solution to the objection that in these powers there is no distinction by origin is clear.

2. To the objection¹¹ that the image is found according to external disposition: it must be said that there is an image of a corporeal and sensible thing — and this, since it offers itself to cognition through external features, has an image that represents according to external disposition. There is also an image of a spiritual thing, which is most interior to each thing and is known according as the power is gathered back to interior things; and this¹² has an image that represents with respect to interior dispositions.

3. To the objection¹³ that memory concerns sensible things: it must be said that memory is taken in three ways — in one way as receptive and retentive of sensible and past things; in another way as retentive of past things, whether sensible or intelligible; and in a third way as retentive of species, abstracting from every temporal difference — namely of innate species. And in this third way it is part of the image; but the objection runs against the other first two ways. In the first way memory follows sense; in the second way it follows understanding and will; in the third way it precedes and corresponds to the Father.

4. To the objection that memory is not reformed: it must be said that, on the contrary, memory is reformed both with respect to the state of the way and with respect to the state of the homeland — in the first by hope; and this is clear through Augustine's exposition on that word of Matthew twenty-two¹⁴: «You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart» — that is, with intellect without error; «with your whole soul» — that is, with will without contradiction; «with your whole mind» — that is, with memory without forgetfulness. In the second state it is reformed with respect to retention; hence Bernard¹⁵ says that «God will be for the understanding a fullness of light, for the will a multitude of peace, for memory a continuity of eternity». Nor is it¹⁶ incongruous that memory, though it is first, should be reformed through the last gift; because the order of reformation and deformation begins from the later, while the order of formation¹⁷ begins from the higher — and therefore reformation begins from the will and extends to memory.

5. To the objection that the image is in the power of knowing: it must be said that likeness denotes something gratuitous, and is therefore said to be in the will or in love through appropriation. The image, however, does not denote what is gratuitous, and¹⁸ is therefore said to be in the power of knowing.

Or alternatively, concerning the image: because the proper¹⁹ image is in the Son, and understanding — which is in the cognitive power — is appropriated to the Son, the image is therefore said to be in the power of knowing.

6. To the objection²⁰ that the will is not equal to the understanding: it must be said that the will, as it is taken commonly for willing and not-willing — both of which are acts of the will — is well equalized, insofar as to use is said to be common to both, as Augustine says²¹ and as is held in the text²²: that the will grasps other things «while I use», etc. For whatever we remember or understand, we take into the capacity of the will for choosing or rejecting; and this is according to what it denotes as the common act of the will. But according to the special act, which is willing alone, it is not equalized; and the objection runs concerning this, because²³ willing in this sense does not comprehend the whole will, just as remembering comprehends the whole memory and understanding the whole understanding.

Scholion

I. In the response there is a twofold proposition. The first is the principal conclusion itself, which says that the image of the highest Trinity consists in the three aforementioned powers of the soul, insofar as they include both the unity of essence and the plurality of second acts. The second proposition, which explains and proves the first, is this: just as in the divine persons there is distinction, order, and origin, so too in the acts of these powers these three are found. For their acts are really distinguished; furthermore, the act of memory — or the retention of a species — disposes one toward understanding, and understanding toward loving. Hence from memory there proceeds, as it were, the act of intellect, and from memory and intellect [there proceeds] love.

That threefold distinction of memory (in the reply to 3) is also found in Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 7, and Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 5, a. 1.

II. In the reply to 4 it is said, with the then common opinion, that memory is reformed in the state of the way by hope, and in the state of glory by retention. The reason why hope is attributed to memory, the Holy Doctor sets forth in II Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 3 in corp., namely «because they have a conformity in the act which is to hold». — The words placed there, «The order of reformation and deformation begins from the later», have this sense: the deformation of the image through fault, and its reformation through grace, begins from the will, which in the order of powers is last or posterior, because the act of will presupposes the act of intellect, and the latter presupposes the act of memory (if memory is taken in the third sense just explained). In this sense, memory is prior and more interior, and consequently superior. For «in the human soul the innermost is the same as the highest» (II Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 2). In the order of formation or information, these three powers constitute the spiritual life itself, as it were by way of an informing form; and in this way memory is the first power, and in this sense information begins from it. For explanation cf. II Sent. d. 26, a. 1, q. 5, especially ad 4. — To objection 5 two responses are given; on the first cf. II Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.

III. On the account of the image see below d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, and its Scholion. — St. Thomas, here qq. 3 and 4; II Sent. d. 16; Summa I, q. 93, especially aa. 5–6. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 62, m. 5, aa. 6–7. — Scotus, here q. 9 and Reportatio here q. 7. — Albert, here a. 19; Summa p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, a. 2, supp. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 5, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here p. II, a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 2 princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 40, q. 7, n. 16. — Durandus, here p. II, q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 8. — Biel, here q. 10.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vat., obnitentibus mss., necessario. — De variis imaginis definitionibus, in quibus hoc argumentum et plura sequentia fundantur, cfr. d. 31, p. II, q. 1 et 2, ac ibid. dub. 2 et 3.
The Vatican ed., against the mss., reads necessario («necessarily»). — On the various definitions of an image, on which this argument and several of those following are founded, cf. d. 31, p. II, qq. 1 and 2, and ibid. dub. 2 and 3.
Libr. XIV de Trin. c. 8, n. 11. Vide supra d. III in lit. Magistri, c. 2 circa initium. — Paulo infra post praesens ope mss. posuimus ad loco apud.
[Augustine,] On the Trinity XIV, c. 8, n. 11. See above d. III in the text of the Master, c. 2 near the beginning. — A little below, after praesens, with the help of the mss. we have put ad in place of apud.
Plures codd. ut A B I P Q T X etc. hic repetunt est.
Several codd. (A B I P Q T X etc.) here repeat est.
Codd. I X Y «in imagine hominis picti patet». Immediate post cod. I igitur si loco sed.
Codd. I X Y read «it is clear in the image of a painted man». Immediately after, cod. I has igitur si («therefore if») in place of sed.
Libr. de Memoria et Reminisc. c. 1 et 2 (in aliis edd. c. 2 et 4). — Paulo infra post brutis Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit unde differt usque ad a brutis, ac mox habet pertinet loco pertineat. Paulo ante codd. N Z connaturalis pro essentialis.
[Aristotle,] On Memory and Reminiscence cc. 1–2 (in other editions cc. 2 and 4). — A little later, after brutis, the Vatican ed., without any authority of the mss. or ed. 1, omits unde differt as far as a brutis, and soon after has pertinet for pertineat. A little earlier, codd. N Z read connaturalis for essentialis.
Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 cum loco sive, et in fine argumenti temporalibus pro temporibus.
The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, reads cum for sive, and at the end of the argument temporalibus for temporibus.
Cap. 39: Anima rationalis et intellectus facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, ut factorem suum pro imagine cognoscat, et pro similitudine diligat. Ex imagine namque Dei habet rationem et ex similitudine caritatem.
[On the Spirit and the Soul,] c. 39: «The rational soul and intellect were made to the image and likeness of God, so that it might know its Maker after the image, and love Him after the likeness. For from the image of God it has reason, and from the likeness it has charity».
Vat. contra plurimos codd. ut A C F G H I K T etc. et ed. 1 quidquid.
The Vatican ed., against most codd. (A C F G H I K T etc.) and ed. 1, reads quidquid («whatever»).
Hic c. 2. — Paulo post Vat. cum loco tamen in, sed minus signanter et contra mss. et ed. 1.
Here, c. 2. — A little later the Vatican ed. reads cum in place of tamen in, but less precisely and against the mss. and ed. 1.
Corruptam lectionem Vat. arrundum secundum quod intelligitur esse bonum emendavimus ope mss. et ed. 1.
We have corrected the corrupt reading of the Vatican ed. — arrundum secundum quod intelligitur esse bonum — with the help of the mss. and ed. 1.
Plures codd. ut A T etc. et ed. 1 aliud loco illud.
Several codd. (A T etc.) and ed. 1 read aliud («another») for illud.
Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 haec. Paulo ante post virtus in cod. A additur intelligibiliter.
We have restored haec from the mss. and ed. 1. A little earlier, after virtus, cod. A adds intelligibiliter.
Ope antiquorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus a Vat. additum ergo. Paulo infra post sensibilium cod. 0 omittit et, moxque cod. M loco retentiva ponit receptiva.
With the help of the older mss. and ed. 1 we have expunged ergo, which the Vatican ed. had added. A little later, after sensibilium, cod. 0 omits et, and soon after cod. M puts receptiva for retentiva.
Vers. 37. Expositionem huius loci, non solum a S. Bonaventura, sed etiam a S. Thoma (III Sent. d. 27 expos. textus) Augustino adscriptam, non potuimus invenire in ipsius operibus. S. Thomas in Catena aurea (Matth. 22, 37) eam attribuit Glossae interlineari, in qua sic legitur: Ex toto corde, id est intellectu, ut nullam in confessione divinitatis relinquas errori locum; in tota anima, id est voluntate, ut nihil ei contrarium velis; in tota mente, nihil reminiscens quo minus de eo sentias. — Tam in libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 35, quam in libr. de Diligendo Deo, c. 2 — qui inter opera S. Augustini recensebantur — simpliciter dicitur: Id est ex toto intellectu tuo et ex tota voluntate tua et ex tota memoria tua.
[Matthew 22,] v. 37. The exposition of this passage — which both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas (III Sent. d. 27, expos. textus) ascribe to Augustine — we have not been able to find in his works. St. Thomas in the Catena aurea (Matt. 22:37) attributes it to the Glossa interlinearis, where we read: «With your whole heart — that is, with intellect, so that you leave no place for error in the confession of the divinity; with your whole soul — that is, with will, so that you wish nothing contrary to Him; with your whole mind, remembering nothing by which you might have a lesser sense of Him». — Both in the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 35, and in the book On Loving God, c. 2 — which were reckoned among Augustine's works — it is simply said: «That is, with your whole intellect and with your whole will and with your whole memory».
In Cant. Cant. Serm. II, n. 5. — Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 quia loco quod.
[Bernard,] Sermons on the Song of Songs II, n. 5. — The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, reads quia for quod.
Ope mss. et ed. 1 delevimus etiam. Paulo post cod. T prior loco prima.
With the help of the mss. and ed. 1 we have deleted etiam. A little later cod. T reads prior in place of prima.
Vat. formationis, sed obest auctoritas mss. et ed. 1, qui etiam paulo post omittunt reformatio, quod tamen claritatis gratia non expunximus. Vide plura infra in Scholio ad hanc quaestionem.
The Vatican ed. reads formationis («of formation»), but the authority of the mss. and ed. 1 opposes this. The same witnesses a little later also omit reformatio, which nevertheless we have not deleted, for the sake of clarity. See more below in the Scholion on this question.
Fide mss. restituimus particulam et.
On the witness of the mss. we have restored the particle et.
Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 prima. Cod. R quia enim in Filio proprie est imago. Mox codd. P Q cognitiva loco cognoscendi.
The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, reads prima («first»). Cod. R reads quia enim in Filio proprie est imago («for because in the Son properly is the image»). Next, codd. P Q read cognitiva for cognoscendi.
Plures codd. ut X V hic addunt quod, alii ut B I aa bb quod obiicitur quod.
Several codd. (X V) here add quod, others (B I aa bb) quod obiicitur quod.
Hic c. 2, circa medium, iuxta quem textum et ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus hoc loco illam in alia, scilicet intelligentiam et memoriam. — Mox multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt particulam enim.
Here [in Augustine], c. 2 near the middle, according to which text, and with the help of the older mss. and ed. 1, we have here changed illam to alia — namely intelligentiam and memoriam. — Next, many codd. with ed. 1 omit the particle enim.
Cfr. supra d. 1, a. 1, q. 1.
Cf. above d. 1, a. 1, q. 1.
Ita mss. cum ed. 1, licet aliqui loco quia minus bene habeant quod, sed Vat.: De isto est oppositio, quo modo sic.
So the mss. with ed. 1, although some less well read quod instead of quia; but the Vatican ed. reads: De isto est oppositio, quo modo sic.

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