← Back to Distinction 3

Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
p. 75

Quaestio IV

Utrum trinitas personarum cum unitate essentiae naturaliter per creaturas cognosci possit.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, quid sit de Deo cognoscibile per creaturas. Et dicit Apostolus1, quod sempiterna virtus et divinitas. Et quaeritur, utrum per creaturas possit cognosci personarum pluralitas. Et videtur quod sic:

1. Quia philosophi non habuerunt cognitionem de Deo nisi per creaturas, et cognoverunt Trinitatem: ergo etc. Minor patet per Augustinum de Civitate Dei2: «Philosophi tripartitam dicunt esse philosophiam», in qua est cognitio Trinitatis.

2. Item, magi defecerunt in tertio signo, Exodi octavo; et exponitur, quod defecerunt in cognitione tertiae personae; aut ergo quantum ad propria aut quantum ad appropriata. Non quantum ad appropriata, quia bonitas maxime nobis relucet in creatura: ergo quantum ad propria: ergo saltem duas personas cognoverunt.

3. Item, hoc idem3 videtur per rationem: quia vestigium, cum dicat distinctionem, est ratio cognoscendi Deum distinctive sive in distinctione; sed non est in Deo nisi distinctio personarum: ergo per vestigium potuerunt cognoscere distinctionem personarum.

4. Item, per imaginem est cognitio Trinitatis quantum ad ordinem, distinctionem et aequalitatem; sed cognitio per imaginem est cognitio per creaturam: ergo per creaturam potuerunt cognoscere Trinitatem.

5. Item, difficilior est cognitio proprietatum occultarum creaturae quam cognitio pluralitatis personarum, quia illa non capitur nisi a magnis et subtilibus, haec autem capitur etiam4 a rudibus et insipientibus: ergo si potuerunt per proprietates creaturarum visibiles pervenire ad invisibiles, multo fortius ad cognoscendum, personas esse plures. Et hoc est quod dicitur Sapientiae decimo tertio5: Si enim tantum potuerunt scire, ut possent saeculum aestimare, quomodo huius Dominum non facilius invenerunt?

Contra:

1. Cognitio Trinitatis est cognitio fidei; sed cognitio fidei est6 de his quae sunt supra rationem; et quae sunt supra rationem non possunt cognosci per creaturas: ergo etc.

2. Item, non est nisi duobus modis7 de Deo cognoscere per creaturam, aut affirmando quod est in creatura vel simile, aut removendo; sed Trinitas non cognoscitur per remotionem, sed per positionem; sed in nulla creatura invenitur pluralitas suppositorum cum unitate essentiae: ergo etc.

3. Item, lex scripta est super8 legem naturae, sive liber sacrae Scripturae super librum mundanae creaturae; sed nullus fide carens per sacram Scripturam venit in cognitionem pluralitatis personarum: ergo multo minus per librum mundanae creaturae.

p. 76

Conclusio

Trinitas personarum non est cognoscibilis per creaturas, sed tantum trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet unitas, veritas, bonitas.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod pluralitas personarum cum unitate essentiae est proprium divinae naturae solius, cuius simile nec reperitur in creatura nec potest reperiri nec rationabiliter cogitari: ideo nullo modo trinitas personarum est cognoscibilis per creaturam, rationabiliter ascendendo a creatura in Deum. Sed licet non habeat omnino simile, habet tamen aliquo modo quod creditur9 simile in creatura. Unde dico, quod philosophi nunquam per rationem cognoverunt personarum trinitatem nec etiam10 pluralitatem, nisi haberent aliquem habitum fidei, sicut habent aliqui haeretici; unde quae dixerunt, aut locuti sunt non intelligentes, aut fidei radio illustrati.

Est alia trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet unitatis, veritatis et bonitatis11, et hanc cognoverunt, quia habet simile.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod per tripartitam philosophiam cognoverunt philosophi Trinitatem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod per illud et per alia venerunt in12 cognitionem appropriatorum, credentes vero in cognitionem utriusque trinitatis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de tertio signo, dicitur et bene, quia sapientes ideo dicuntur defecisse in tertio signo, quia defecerunt in cognitione effectus potissimi13 bonitatis, scilicet redemptionis.

3. Ad aliud dicendum, quod vestigium dicit distinctionem proprietatum essentialium, et huic respondet trinitas appropriatorum, non propriorum sive personarum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de imagine, dicendum, quod est cognoscere animam secundum id quod est; et cognitio ista est rationis; vel secundum14 quod imago; et cognitio ista est solius fidei.

p. 77

5. Ad illud quod ultimo15 obiicitur, quod difficilius est cognoscere mundum; dicendum, quod istud intelligitur, supposito divino adminiculo; simpliciter autem loquendo falsum est. Citius enim disponeretur homo ad fidem, quam acquireret16 cognitionem philosophiae. Intellectus tamen noster plus potest in cognitionem rerum mundanarum quam Trinitatis; quia illa est supra rationem, et contrarium eius videt in sensu; et ideo indiget nova elevatione, utpote cognitione per infusionem.

Scholion

I. Quoad propositionem in corp., quae attribuit haereticis aliquem habitum fidei, sciendum, quod duplex distinguitur habitus fidei, scil. infusus et acquisitus, et hic est ordinis naturalis. Acquisitum habitum vel ipsi haeretici formales habere possunt.

Recte dicitur in solut. ad 4, quod cognitio imaginis sit solius fidei. Imago enim, in quantum imago, dicit respectum ad id cuius est imago. Nullus autem respectus potest cognosci nisi cognito utroque extremo. Licet igitur cognoscatur fundamentum relationis in anima, i. e. imago materialiter intellecta, tamen non cognoscitur formaliter ut imago, quamdiu alter terminus relationis non cognoscitur, nempe tres personae divinae.

II. S. Bonav., Breviloq. p. I. c. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 1. a. 3. — Scot., Quodlib. q. 14. — S. Thom., hic. q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 32. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 18; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 43. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic. q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 22. q. 4. n. 25. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

---

English Translation

Question IV

Whether the trinity of persons together with the unity of essence can be known naturally through creatures.

Fourth and finally, it is asked what is knowable about God through creatures. The Apostle1 says that «eternal power and divinity» can be known. And it is asked whether the plurality of persons can be known through creatures. And it seems that it can:

1. Because the philosophers had no knowledge of God except through creatures, and they knew the Trinity: therefore, etc. The minor premise is clear from Augustine in the City of God2: «The philosophers say that philosophy is threefold» — in which there is knowledge of the Trinity.

2. Likewise, the magicians failed at the third sign, in Exodus eight; and it is interpreted that they failed in the knowledge of the third person — either with respect to proper attributes or with respect to appropriated attributes. Not with respect to appropriated attributes, because goodness shines forth for us most evidently in creatures: therefore it was with respect to proper attributes: therefore they knew at least two persons.

3. Likewise, this same point3 seems evident by reason: because the vestige, since it expresses distinction, is a principle for knowing God distinctively or in distinction; but in God there is no distinction except the distinction of persons: therefore through the vestige they were able to know the distinction of persons.

4. Likewise, through the image there is knowledge of the Trinity with respect to order, distinction, and equality; but knowledge through the image is knowledge through creatures: therefore through creatures they were able to know the Trinity.

5. Likewise, knowledge of the hidden properties of creatures is more difficult than knowledge of the plurality of persons, because the former is grasped only by the great and subtle, while the latter is grasped even4 by the simple and unlearned: therefore if through the visible properties of creatures they were able to arrive at the invisible ones, much more were they able to arrive at the knowledge that persons are multiple. And this is what is said in Wisdom thirteen5: «For if they were able to know so much as to evaluate the world, how did they not more easily find its Lord?»

On the contrary:

1. Knowledge of the Trinity is knowledge of faith; but knowledge of faith concerns6 things that are above reason; and what is above reason cannot be known through creatures: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, there are only two ways7 of knowing something about God through creatures — either by affirming what is in the creature or something like it, or by removing; but the Trinity is not known by removal but by positing; but in no creature is there found a plurality of supposits together with unity of essence: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, written law is above8 the law of nature, and the book of sacred Scripture is above the book of worldly creation; but no one lacking faith comes to knowledge of the plurality of persons through sacred Scripture: therefore much less through the book of worldly creation.

Conclusion

The trinity of persons is not knowable through creatures, but only the trinity of appropriated attributes — namely unity, truth, and goodness.

I respond: It must be said that the plurality of persons together with the unity of essence is the exclusive property of the divine nature, of which no likeness is or can be found in creatures, nor can it be rationally conceived; and therefore the trinity of persons is in no way knowable through creatures by rationally ascending from creatures to God. But although it has no likeness at all, it does have in creatures something that is believed9 to be a likeness in some way. Hence I say that the philosophers never knew the trinity of persons through reason, nor even10 their plurality, unless they had some habitual disposition of faith, as some heretics have; hence what they said, they either said without understanding, or they said it illumined by a ray of faith.

There is another trinity — that of appropriated attributes, namely unity, truth, and goodness11 — and this they did know, because it has a likeness.

1. To the objection, therefore, that through threefold philosophy the philosophers knew the Trinity: it must be said that it is true that through that and through other things they arrived at12 knowledge of the appropriated attributes; but believers arrived through it at knowledge of both trinities.

2. To the objection concerning the third sign: it is well said that the wise men are said to have failed at the third sign because they failed in the knowledge of the most powerful effect13 of goodness — namely redemption.

3. To the other objection: it must be said that the vestige expresses the distinction of essential properties, and to this corresponds the trinity of appropriated attributes — not the trinity of proper attributes or persons.

4. To the objection concerning the image: it must be said that the soul can be known either according to what it is — and this knowledge belongs to reason — or according to14 what it is as an image — and this knowledge belongs to faith alone.

5. To the last15 objection — that knowledge of the world is more difficult: it must be said that this is to be understood on the supposition of divine assistance; but speaking absolutely it is false. For a human being would be disposed to faith more quickly than he would acquire16 knowledge of philosophy. Our intellect, however, has greater capacity for knowledge of worldly things than of the Trinity — because the Trinity is above reason, and the intellect sees the contrary of it in sense experience; and therefore it requires a new elevation, namely knowledge through infusion.

Scholion

I. As to the proposition in the body, which attributes some habitus fidei («habit of faith») to heretics, it should be known that two kinds of habit of faith are distinguished — namely, the infused and the acquired — and the latter is of the natural order. Even formal heretics themselves can have an acquired habit [of faith].

Rightly it is said in the reply to 4 that knowledge of the image belongs to faith alone. For an image, insofar as it is an image, expresses a reference to that of which it is an image. But no relation can be known unless both extremes are known. Although, therefore, the foundation of the relation in the soul — i.e., the image materially understood — may be known, nevertheless it is not known formally as an image so long as the other term of the relation is not known, namely, the three divine persons.

II. St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium p. I, c. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 2, m. 1, a. 3. — Scotus, Quodlibeta q. 14. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; Summa I, q. 32, a. 1. — Blessed Albert, here a. 18; Summa p. I, tr. 3, q. 43, m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1 princ. q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 22, q. 4, n. 25. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 4.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Rom. 1, 20.
    Romans 1:20.
  2. Libr. XI, c. 25: Hinc philosophi sapientiae disciplinam tripartitam esse voluerunt. — Ex cod. U adiungimus glossema dicta Augustini exponens: cui haec sunt adscribenda, nisi creatori omnium creaturarum, datori intelligentiae, amorum inspiratori (ex August. loc. cit.)? Unde vult dicere, quod naturalis philosophia est de his quae pertinent ad conditionem naturae; rationalis de his quae pertinent ad rationem et intelligentiam; moralis de his quae pertinent ad amorem. Ideo naturalis adscribitur auctori Patri, rationalis sapientiae Filio, moralis amori seu bonitati Spiritus sancti.
    [Augustine, City of God,] book XI, c. 25: «Hence the philosophers have wished that the discipline of wisdom be tripartite». — From cod. U we add a gloss expounding Augustine's saying: «To whom are these to be ascribed, if not to the Creator of all creatures, the giver of intelligence, the inspirer of loves?» (from Augustine, loc. cit.). Hence it is meant that natural philosophy concerns what pertains to the condition of nature; rational philosophy concerns what pertains to reason and intelligence; moral philosophy concerns what pertains to love. Therefore natural philosophy is ascribed to the Author, the Father; rational philosophy to the Wisdom, the Son; moral philosophy to the Love or Goodness, the Holy Spirit.
  3. Vat., reluctantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omittit idem, pro quo cod. Z habet ipsum.
    The Vatican ed., against the mss. and the first six editions, omits idem, for which cod. Z has ipsum.
  4. Faventibus mss. et ed. 1, addidimus etiam, quod Vat. minus bene omittit. Mox cod. R post si adiungit philosophi, ac plurimi codd. ut A F G H I K S T Y etc. post creaturarum addunt rerum, in qua lectione creaturarum falso positum est loco creatarum.
    With the support of the mss. and ed. 1, we have added etiam, which the Vatican ed. less well omits. Next, cod. R after si adds philosophi, and most codd. (A F G H I K S T Y etc.) after creaturarum add rerum, in which reading creaturarum is wrongly placed for creatarum.
  5. Vers. 9, ubi Vat. post scire ponit quod poterant saeculum mensurare, quomodo.
    [Wisdom 13,] v. 9, where the Vatican ed. after scire puts quod poterant saeculum mensurare, quomodo («that they could measure the world, how»).
  6. Ed. 1 hic repetit cognitio. — De hoc argumento cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 1, §. 2.
    Ed. 1 here repeats cognitio. — On this argument, cf. Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 1, §. 2.
  7. Cod. K satis bene adiungit aliquid, cod. X verum ponit loco de Deo. Mox plurimi codd. ut A C F G H I L O S T U X etc. vel simile vel removendo, pro quo Vat. aut simile aut removendo; sequimur codd. quoad primam partem ponendo vel simile, et Vat. quoad secundam retinendo aut removendo, quia in hac lectione membra divisionis et subdivisionis clarius exhibentur. Cod. Y omittit vel et ed. 1 loco vel ponit ut ante simile. — De hoc argumento vide Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 2.
    Cod. K suitably adds aliquid («something»); cod. X puts verum («true») in place of de Deo («about God»). Next, most codd. (A C F G H I L O S T U X etc.) read vel simile vel removendo («either something like [it] or by removing»), for which the Vatican ed. has aut simile aut removendo. For the first part we follow the codd. with vel simile, and for the second we retain the Vatican ed.'s aut removendo, because in this reading the members of the division and subdivision are more clearly set forth. Cod. Y omits vel, and ed. 1 in place of vel puts ut before simile. — On this argument see Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 2.
  8. Plures codd. ut B S bb et ed. 1 hic et paulo post supra.
    Several codd. (B S bb) and ed. 1 read supra («above») here and a little later.
  9. Ed. 1 ad. Cod. R paulo post loco quod habet et, ac cod. T cernitur pro creditur.
    Ed. 1 reads ad. Cod. R a little later reads et for quod, and cod. T cernitur («is discerned») for creditur («is believed»).
  10. Desideratur in Vat. etiam, quod tamen in mss. et ed. 1 habetur. Paulo post Vat. unde qui dixerunt hanc Trinitatem aut; omnes codd. cum ed. 1 in eo conveniunt, quod omittant hanc Trinitatem, dissentiunt tamen inter se, quod alii cum Vat. habeant qui dixerunt, cod. I qui hoc dixerunt, alii ut 0 T etc. quae dixerunt, quos sequimur; ed. 1 tandem legit qui aliquid inde dixerunt.
    Etiam is missing in the Vatican ed., although it is found in the mss. and ed. 1. A little later the Vatican ed. reads unde qui dixerunt hanc Trinitatem aut; all codd. with ed. 1 agree in omitting hanc Trinitatem, but differ among themselves: some with the Vatican ed. have qui dixerunt («who said»), cod. I qui hoc dixerunt («who said this»), others (0 T etc.) quae dixerunt («[the things] which they said»), which we follow; ed. 1 finally reads qui aliquid inde dixerunt («who said something from that»).
  11. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 minus apte veritas, unitas et bonitas, et paulo post habent.
    The Vatican ed., against the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, less aptly reads veritas, unitas et bonitas, and a little later habent.
  12. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 ad.
    The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, reads ad.
  13. Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene potissime. Mox cod. 0 ante redemptionis praemittit incarnationis et.
    The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, less well reads potissime («most especially») [for potissimi]. Next, cod. 0 before redemptionis prefixes incarnationis et («of the incarnation and»).
  14. Vat. contra plurimos codd. minus bene addit id.
    The Vatican ed., against most codd., less well adds id.
  15. Ope mss. substituimus ultimo pro ulterius, et immediate post adiunximus quod.
    With the help of the mss. we have substituted ultimo («last») for ulterius («further»), and immediately after have added quod.
  16. Cod. Y quam ad acquirendam; lectio haud spernenda.
    Cod. Y reads quam ad acquirendam («than to acquire»); a reading not to be despised.
← Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1→