Bonaventure

Quaestio III

Utrum memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint idem in essentia cum anima.

Tertio loco quaeritur de comparatione istarum potentiarum ad animam sive ad subiectum, utrum videlicet sint idem in essentia cum anima. Et videtur quod sic:

1. Augustinus dicit in decimo de Trinitate: «Haec tria, memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens, una vita, una essentia, ac per hoc una substantia».

2. Item, Bernardus super Cantica: «Tria quaedam in anima intueor, memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, et haec tria ipsam». Si tu dicas, quod hoc dicitur per causam; hoc nihil est, quia Augustinus de Spiritu et anima dicit, quod anima «est quaedam sua, ut potentiae, et quaedam non sua, ut virtutes»; quod si per causam esset dictum, utrumque posset dici.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur velle dicere Philosophus, quia idem dicit esse principium essendi et operandi: ergo cum principium essendi sit ipsa forma substantialis, principium operandi erit ipsa; sed principium operandi est potentia: ergo potentia est principium essendi; sed non est principium essendi nisi forma substantialis in homine: ergo potentia et forma substantialis sunt idem in substantia.

4. Item, ratione ostenditur: Sicut materia prima nata est recipere omnia per veritatem, sic anima secundum similitudinem; sed potentia materiae primae respectu formarum suscipiendarum non differt per essentiam ab ipsa: ergo similiter videtur, quod potentia animae. Probatio: si enim per essentiam differret, aut esset substantia, aut accidens. Non accidens, quia antecedit omnem formam et omne accidens; si substantia, aut ergo materia, aut forma. Praeterea, si differret, illius esset materia capax.

5. Item, forma accidentalis non est simplicior forma substantiali; sed potentia operandi non differt a forma accidentali, utpote potentia calefaciendi non differt per essentiam a caliditate, nec potentia illuminandi ab ipsa luce: ergo similiter videtur, quod nec potentia animae ab ipsa anima.

6. Item, quod est accidens, nulli substantiae est substantiale; sed potentiae istae sunt substantiales: ergo animae non sunt accidentia: ergo sunt substantia; constat quod non alia quam anima. Probatio minoris: quia anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis in homine non dicit diversitatem substantiarum, sed potentiarum: ergo constat, quod in homine istae differentiae: vegetabile, sensibile, rationale, accipiuntur a potentiis; sed huiusmodi differentiae sunt substantiales: ergo et potentiae: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate assignat differentiam imaginis creatae ad Trinitatem illam, scilicet increatam, quia in illa Trinitate est habens id quod habetur, hic autem habens non est id quod habetur: ergo si anima habet tres potentias, ergo essentialiter non est illae.

2. Item, Dionysius dicit, quod in quolibet creato differunt haec tria: substantia, virtus et operatio: ergo et in anima differunt substantia et potentiae.

3. Item, Boethius: «In quolibet creato differunt quo est et quod est, sive quid est et esse: ergo similiter, immo multo fortius, quod potest et quo potest.

4. Item, rationibus ostenditur sic: quae differunt genere, differunt essentia, et unum de altero non praedicatur essentialiter; sed potentiae et anima sunt huiusmodi, quia anima est in genere substantiae, sed potentiae eius sunt in secunda specie qualitatis, scilicet naturalis potentiae vel impotentiae: ergo etc.

5. Item, illa quorum unum est extra alterum, differunt essentialiter et substantialiter; sed virtus egreditur substantiam, quia operatur in obiectum, quod est extra; sed impossibile est, quod operetur ubi non est; si ergo virtus est ubi operatur, et operatur extra substantiam cuiuslibet: ergo egreditur extra substantiam: ergo etc.

6. Item, ad hoc est alia ratio, quia si eadem per essentiam essent anima et potentiae, ergo unum non multiplicaretur nisi secundum multiplicationem alterius; et sic, cum una tantum sit anima, haberet tantum unam potentiam; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Potentiae animae sunt substantiales et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima; non sunt tamen cum ipsa omnino idem per essentiam.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod potentia naturalis dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, prout dicit modum existendi naturalis potentiae in subiecto, secundum quem dicitur subiectum facile vel difficile ad aliquid agendum; et sic naturalis potentia dicit modum qualitatis et est generaliter in secunda specie qualitatis, ut patet, cum dicitur cursor et pugillator, quorum utrumque dicit facilitatem, quae consequitur modum existendi potentiae gradiendi vel resistendi sive agendi in subiecto. Alio modo potentia naturalis dicitur potentia naturaliter egrediens a subiecto. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter. Nam aliqua potentia egreditur a substantia cum accidente, ut potentia calefaciendi a forma ignis cum caliditate; et talis potentia est accidens animae et reducitur in genus qualitatis. Alia potentia egreditur a substantia absque accidente, sicut potentia intelligendi ab anima; et talis potentia non habet naturam accidentis, quia non perficitur nec completur per aliquod genus accidentis; tamen non est omnino idem cum forma, a qua egreditur, quia est aliquid de eius complemento, non de eius essentia.

Et ideo dicendum, quod potentiae animae non sunt idem quod ipsa anima per essentiam, quia aliquid sunt de eius complemento; nec tamen differunt ab ipsa sicut accidens a subiecto, quia non sunt in genere accidentis; sed sunt in eodem genere cum ipsa per reductionem, sicut completivum cum eo quod est completum.

1. Ad primum ergo quod obiicitur de Augustino; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur secundum communem modum loquendi, quo haec tria dicuntur esse una essentia, quia substantialiter existunt in anima.

2. Ad illud de Bernardo; dicendum similiter, quia dicit haec tria esse animam, quia sunt de complemento ipsius, non de essentia.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est principium essendi et operandi; dicendum, quod verum est de principio remoto, sed de proximo est impossibile. Nam si idem omnino esset principium proximum, tunc idem esset in re esse et operari. Similiter, si idem esset principium proximum, cum res semper habeat esse, semper haberet operari. Quoniam igitur forma dicit proximum et immediatum principium essendi, potentia vero proximum et immediatum principium operandi, patet quod impossibile est esse omnino idem.

4. Ad aliud quod obiicitur de potentia materiae, dicendum, quod potentia materiae respectu formarum est duplex: est enim potentia materiae ad formas, et potentia formae in materia ad operandum. Potentia materiae ad formas nullam ponit differentiam, sed omnino est idem; et de hac dicit Augustinus, quod potentia et id cuius est potentia non differunt. Potentia vero formae ad operandum, quae est potentia materiae iam sub forma constitutae, in qua scilicet agens potest cogitari habere perfectum esse, ut sunt potentiae in anima, in quibus attenditur imago; et hoc est minimo modo substantiale sive essentiale; tamen non transit in aliud genus: ideo anima dicitur suae potentiae.

Question III

Whether memory, understanding, and will are the same in essence as the soul.

In the third place it is asked concerning the comparison of these powers to the soul or to their subject — namely, whether they are the same in essence as the soul. And it seems that they are:

1. Augustine says in the tenth book On the Trinity¹: "These three — memory, understanding, and will — are one mind, one life, one essence, and by this one substance."

2. Likewise, Bernard, on the Canticle²: "I behold certain three things in the soul — memory, understanding, and will — and these three are itself [the soul]." If you say that this is spoken by way of cause, this is nothing — since Augustine in On the Spirit and the Soul³ says that the soul "has some things that are its own (as powers) and some not its own (as virtues)"; for if it were spoken by way of cause, both could be said [in the same sense].

3. Likewise, the Philosopher seems to wish to say the same thing, since he says the principle of being and of operating is the same⁴: therefore, since the principle of being is the substantial form itself, the principle of operating will be the same; but the principle of operating is a power: therefore a power is the principle of being; but nothing is the principle of being in a man except the substantial form: therefore power and substantial form are the same in substance.

4. Likewise, by reason it is shown: just as prime matter is naturally apt to receive all things through truth, so the soul by similitude; but the power of prime matter with respect to receiving forms does not differ essentially from matter: therefore likewise it seems that the power of the soul [does not differ essentially from the soul]. Proof: for if it did differ essentially, it would be either a substance or an accident. Not an accident, since it antecedes every form and every accident; if a substance, then either matter or form. Further, if it did differ, matter would be capable of receiving it.

5. Likewise, an accidental form is not simpler than a substantial form; but the power of operating does not differ from an accidental form — for the power of heating does not differ essentially from heat, nor the power of illumining from light itself: therefore likewise it seems that the power of the soul does not differ from the soul itself.

6. Likewise, what is an accident is substantial to no substance; but these powers are substantial: therefore they are not accidents of the soul: therefore they are substance — and clearly not other than the soul. Proof of the minor: since rational, sensible, and vegetable in man do not signify a diversity of substances but of powers — therefore it is plain that in man these differences (vegetable, sensible, rational) are taken from the powers; but such differences are substantial: therefore the powers are too: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine in the fifteenth book On the Trinity⁵ assigns the difference of the created image to that [uncreated] Trinity: because in that Trinity the having is the had, but here the having is not the had: therefore if the soul has three powers, then essentially it is not [identical with] them.

2. Likewise, Dionysius says that in every created thing these three differ: substance, power, and operation⁶: therefore in the soul also substance and powers differ.

3. Likewise, Boethius: in every created thing quo est and quod est (or quid est and esse) differ: therefore likewise — indeed much more strongly — quod potest and quo potest.

4. Likewise, by reasons it is shown thus: those things which differ in genus differ in essence, and one is not predicated essentially of another; but the powers and the soul are of this sort, since the soul is in the genus of substance, but its powers are in the second species of quality — namely, natural power or impotency: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, those things of which one is outside the other differ essentially and substantially; but a power goes forth from substance, since it operates on an external object; but it is impossible for it to operate where it is not; if therefore the power is where it operates, and it operates outside the substance of each thing: therefore it goes outside the substance: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, there is another reason: for if the soul and its powers were the same in essence, then one would not be multiplied except according to the multiplication of the other; and so, since the soul is only one, it would have only one power; but this is false: therefore etc.

Conclusion

The powers of the soul are substantial and are in the same genus as the soul by reduction; yet they are not wholly the same as the soul in essence.

I respond: For understanding what has been said, it must be noted that natural power is said in two ways.

In one way, inasmuch as it signifies the mode of existing of a natural power in a subject, according to which the subject is said to be easy or difficult in doing something; and thus natural power signifies a mode of quality, and falls generally in the second species of quality — as is plain when one says runner and boxer, each of which signifies a facility which follows upon the mode of existing of the power of walking or resisting or acting in the subject.

In another way, natural power means a power naturally going forth from a subject. And this can be of two kinds. For some power goes forth from a substance with an accident — as the power of heating from the form of fire together with heat; and such a power is an accident of the soul and is reduced to the genus of quality. Another power goes forth from a substance without an accident — as the power of understanding from the soul; and such a power does not have the nature of an accident, since it is neither perfected nor completed by any genus of accident; nevertheless it is not wholly the same as the form from which it goes forth, because it is something of its completion, not of its essence.

And therefore it must be said that the powers of the soul are not the same as the soul itself in essence — since they are something of its completion; nor yet do they differ from it as an accident from a subject, since they are not in the genus of accident; but they are in the same genus as the soul by reduction — as the completive with that which is complete.

To the arguments:

1. To the first objection from Augustine; it must be said that Augustine speaks according to the common mode of speaking, by which these three are said to be one essence, because they exist substantially in the soul.

2. To the objection from Bernard; it must be said likewise, since he says these three are the soul because they are of its completion, not of its essence.

3. To the objection that the principle of being and of operating is the same; it must be said that this is true of the remote principle, but of the proximate it is impossible. For if the proximate principle were wholly the same, then to be and to operate would be the same in reality. Likewise, if the proximate principle were the same, then since a thing always has being, it would always be operating. Since, therefore, form signifies the proximate and immediate principle of being, and power signifies the proximate and immediate principle of operating, it is plain that it is impossible for them to be wholly the same.

4. To the objection about the power of matter; it must be said that the power of matter with respect to forms is twofold: there is the power of matter to forms, and the power of form in matter to operate. The power of matter to forms posits no difference but is wholly the same; and of this Augustine says that a power and that whose power it is do not differ. But the power of form to operate — which is the power of matter already constituted under a form, in which, namely, the agent can be thought to have its perfect being (as are the powers in the soul, in which the image is seen) — this is substantial or essential in the lowest degree; yet it does not pass into another genus: and therefore the soul is said [to be] its own powers.

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