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Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
p. 88

Articulus II

De secunda assignatione imaginis.

Consequenter est quaestio de secunda assignatione imaginis per mentem, notitiam et amorem. Et1 circa hanc quaeruntur tria.

Primum est de istis absolute, utrum videlicet imago attendatur in istis2 ut in potentiis, aut in habitibus, aut in potentiis simul et habitibus, aut in substantia et habitibus.

Secundum est de istis in comparatione ad invicem.

Tertium, utrum haec trinitas imaginis ducat necessario in cognitionem Trinitatis quantum ad personas.

Quaestio I

Utrum imago attendatur in mente, notitia et amore ut in potentiis, aut ut in habitibus, aut in utrisque simul, aut secundum substantiam et habitus.

Circa primum sic proceditur.

1. Ostenditur primo, quod non in his ut in potentiis attendatur imago, quia praedicta assignatio fuit in potentiis: ergo si haec etiam esset in potentiis, non esset nisi inculcatio verborum.

Praeterea, notitia et amor non dicunt potentiam, sed habitus, licet mens possit dicere potentiam: ergo praedicta tria non possunt poni sub ratione potentiarum.

2. Item ostenditur, quod non dicunt habitus, quia Augustinus3 dicit in imaginis assignatione et approbatione: «Mens novit se, diligit se»; sed nullius habitus est se nosse nec amare: ergo etc.

Item, si mens stat pro habitu, quaero, pro quo habitu? Si pro habitu memoriae, de quo magis videtur, quia non est alium dare; sed actus huius habitus est meminisse, non alius; sed Augustinus4 assignat menti hos actus, scilicet nosse et amare: ergo etc.

3. Item ostenditur, quod non5 in potentiis et habitibus. Cum enim potentiae sint tres, et habitus tres, tunc non esset ternarius, sed senarius.

4. Item quaero, pro qua potentia stat ibi mens? Aut enim stat pro omnibus, aut pro duabus, aut pro una. Si pro omnibus, tunc non est ibi trinitas; si pro duabus, tunc est ibi quaternitas, cum duo sint habitus; si pro una, non potest habere istos duos actus6, nosse et amare: ergo non sumitur trinitas secundum habitus et potentias simul.

Ad confirmationem oppositionis:

1. Item ostenditur, quod non secundum animae substantiam et habitus7. Cum enim habitus cognoscendi et amandi consequantur ipsam substantiam tempore, et substantia etiam possit esse sine his, ratio autem imaginis sit ipsi animae perpetua et inseparabilis et concreata: ergo non est in habitibus et substantia simul.

2. Item, si substantia connumeratur habitibus, cum8 habitus sint tres, et substantia una: ergo erit ibi quaternitas. Si tu dicas, quod non differt notitia, secundum quod est habitus intelligentiae et memoriae; contra: habitus sunt dispositiones potentiarum; cum ergo sint tres potentiae, erunt tres habitus.

3. Item, Magister dicit in littera9, quod mens accipitur non pro animae substantia, sed pro eo quod est in ea eminentius.

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Conclusio

In hac secunda assignatione imaginis, quae est mens, notitia, amor, trinitas attenditur quantum ad substantiam animae et quantum ad duos habitus notitiae et amoris.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod differt secundum quosdam assignatio haec a praecedenti, quia prior fuit in potentiis, haec est in habitibus. Et respondent obiectionibus per distinctionem mentis. Mens enim secundum quadruplicem modum accipiendi diversificatur. Dicitur enim uno modo a mene, quod est luna sive defectus: et sic dicitur de tota animae substantia propter transmutationes, quas habet10. Secundo modo dicitur a metiendo; et sic stat pro iudicativa vi, et sic accipit eam Damascenus11, ponens ipsam in potentiis cognitivis. Tertio modo dicitur ab eminendo; et sic stat pro superiori parte rationis, et sic accipit eam Augustinus frequenter12. Quarto modo dicitur a meminisse; et sic stat pro memoria et quantum ad actum et quantum ad habitum13. Dicunt ergo, quod in assignatione huius trinitatis mens stat pro habitu memoriae; sed in adaptatione, cum dicit Augustinus14: «Mens novit se et diligit», stat pro potentia memorandi.

Sed istud non videtur convenienter dictum, quia adaptatio debet respondere assignationi. Et praeterea, cum actus proprius mentis, ut stat pro memoria, sit meminisse, ille15 deberet tangi; sed Augustinus in hac assignatione nunquam facit mentionem nisi de duobus actibus, scilicet nosse et amare, qui non sunt memoriae, sed aliarum potentiarum.

Respondendum igitur, quod trinitas illa non est in potentiis; quia amor et notitia non dicunt potentias16; nec in habitibus, quia mens non potest stare pro habitu, cum ipsa accipiatur ut agens; nec potest esse in potentiis et habitibus, quia mens non potest stare pro una potentia, cum assignentur ei actus duarum potentiarum; nec potest similiter17 stare pro pluribus potentiis, quia non esset trinitas.

Restat ergo, quod necesse est ponere, quod trinitas ista attendatur quantum ad substantiam animae, ratione mentis se noscentis et amantis, et quantum ad habitus, ratione notitiae et amoris; et sic est trinitas, cum substantia sit una, et habitus sint duo.

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Differt ergo haec assignatio a praecedenti: quia praecedens fuit per uniformitatem in potentiis per comparationem ad habitus et18 actus, sed haec est in substantia et habitibus. Differt iterum in hoc, quia praecedens fuit per conversionem animae ad Deum, haec est per conversionem animae supra se; et pluribus modis non attenditur imago in homine, ut supra dictum fuit19. Differt etiam, quia praecedens assignatio imaginis magis est propria et conveniens quam haec. Nam proprie loquendo, imago consistit in unitate essentiae et trinitate potentiarum, secundum quas anima nata est ab illa summa Trinitate sigillari imagine similitudinis, quae consistit in gratia et20 virtutibus theologicis. Unde Augustinus hanc21 assignationem primo ponit investigando, ut per hanc deveniat ad illam, in qua finit speculationem suam.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod habitus non sunt coaevi etc.; dicendum, quod triplex est habitus. Quendam enim habitum habet animae potentia ab acquisitione, quendam ab innata dispositione, tertium habet a sui ipsius origine. Hoc autem patet, quia habitus est quo potentia facilis est in actum; potentia autem his tribus modis est facilis, verbi gratia, affectus noster habet facilitatem ad diligendum bonum alienum per acquisitam dispositionem; ad amandum vero bonum suum22 per innatam; ad amandum vero se ipsum per suam praesentiam. Similiter, cum intellectus noster semper sit sibi praesens, semper est habilis sibi ad se cognoscendum. Et sic patet illud quod obiicitur de coaevitate; nam quoad tales habitus est bene coaevitas.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tres debent23 esse habitus secundum tres potentias; dicendum, quod in hac trinitate non cadit nec habet locum habitus memoriae, quia attenditur24 in ipsa anima secundum quod convertitur supra se: et ideo ipsa animae substantia tenet locum memoriae, et ipsa praesentia et oblatio, qua anima offert se semper suae intelligentiae, tenet locum habitus et actus memoriae. Et ita patet, quod ibi cadunt tantum habitus duarum potentiarum; et ideo est ibi trinitas.

3. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de verbo Magistri; dicendum, quod intelligitur non pro animae substantia tota25; quod si aliter intelligatur, non habet veritatem verbum Magistri. Quod patet per Augustinum, qui occasione huius imaginis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam habere cognitionem sui innatam, quae est cognitio26 suae substantiae. Et praeterea, nihil unum in anima cognoscit et diligit nisi substantia: ergo si mens staret pro una potentia, non haberet illos duos actus, scilicet nosse et amare.

Scholion

I. De hac quaestione audiendus est ipse S. Doctor, qui in anecdoto primo Prologo ad II Sententiarum (cuius initium iam dedimus in Prolegomenis c. 1, §. 2) dicit: «Fortassis autem alicui videbitur, me declinasse a positionibus Magistri Sententiarum maxime in duobus: in hoc scilicet, quod cum Magister parte secunda distinctionis tertiae in secunda assignatione trinitatis, quam dicit consistere in mente, notitia et amore, dicat, mentem accipi non pro anima, sed pro superiori portione, a me dictum reperitur, mentem ibi pro substantia animae stare. Rursus, cum Magister dicat d. 7, quod potentia generandi communis est tribus personis, utpote nomen significans essentiam, magis illi opinioni adhaesi, quae dicit, potentiam generandi dictam esse propter relationem. Sed si quis recte inspiciat, in neutro praedictorum inveniet me nec a positione Magistri nec a veritatis tramite declinasse. Nam quando dixi, in illa trinitatis assignatione mentem accipi pro animae substantia ratione superioris partis, hoc ideo dictum est, quia, si mens staret ibi pro superiori portione, cum illa sit animae potentia, et non sit unius potentiae nosse et amare, sicut videbitur infra (cfr. II Sent. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1), iam non esset ibi trinitas, sed quaternitas. Iterum, potentiae proprie non est agere, sed substantiae per potentiam; et ideo, si proprie et vere loquitur Augustinus, cum dicit, mens novit etc., mens ibi supponit animae substantiam. Et hoc iterum innuit Augustinus, cum postea occasione huius trinitatis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam nosse se ipsam. Postremo, cum illi habitus notitiae et amoris sint omnino consubstantiales, non addunt novam essentiam super potentiam, sed se ipsis potentiae sunt habiles, et ita non possunt ipsis potentiis communicari sive cum superiori parte rationis. Et propterea non negat Magister, quod mens non accipiatur pro ipsa anima, sed quod non accipiatur pro tota anima secundum omnes potentias, sed pro ipsa substantia ratione superioris portionis. In hoc igitur Magistro non contradixi, sed potius verbum eius iuxta veritatis regulam, ut aestimo, explicavi».

II. Verba in 2 fund., quod «nullius habitus est se nosse nec amare», sic intelliguntur: se intelligere et amare non sunt actus alicuius habitus acquisiti, sed potentiae animae concreatae et consubstantialis, licet ad hos actus etiam habitus dispositive concurrere possint. Unde etiam B. Albertus (hic a. 36) de eodem textu Augustini dicit: «Habitus non est nosse se et amare se, sed potius habentis habitum secundum ipsum habitum vel per ipsum habitum est nosse se et amare se». Item Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 7, a. 1) ait: «Ad cognoscendum vero se ipsam mens nullo habitu utitur». Cfr. etiam Bonav. hic q. 2, ad 4.

III. In solut. ad 1 triplex habitus distinguitur, scil. ab acquisitione, ab innata dispositione, a sui ipsius origine. Differentia secundi et tertii in hoc consistit, quod secundus habitus non est proprie animae concreatus et coaevus, licet dispositio ad hunc habitum sit concreata et coaeva. Sic anima cognoscit et diligit ex innata dispositione proprium bonum (commodum). Tertius vero habitus, quo anima se ipsam cognoscit et diligit, est proprie ipsi concreatus; cfr. II Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — In eadem solut. tangitur quaestio, quo sensu intellectus noster semper se intelligat. Doctrina Seraphici de hoc omnino concordat cum S. Thom. (hic q. 4, a. 5; Summa I, q. 93, a. 7, ad 4), Scot. (II Sent. d. 3, q. 8, n. 13), et Richard. (hic a. 2, q. 2). Hi negant, animam actualem sui intellectionem habere, praesertim talem qua se discernat ab aliis; concedunt tamen, quod propter praesentiam obiecti «nihil deficit actui primo… ad quem debet sequi actus secundus, qui est intellectio. Et forte propter hoc dicit frequenter Augustinus, quod anima novit semper se, propter istam propinquitatem ad actum noscendi, ubi nulla est imperfectio in actu primo. Hoc autem modo anima non semper novit lapidem» etc. (Scot. loc. cit.). Alii tamen doctores, ut Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 5, a. 3) et Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 4, q. 7) docent, animam semper se nosse et amare, non tantum habitualiter, sed etiam actualiter, quin tamen advertat hos intimos actus. Cfr. etiam Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 12), qui in hac quaestione anceps haeret.

IV. De ipsa conclusione: Alex. Hal., Summa p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 6, §§. 1. — Scot., hic q. 9; Report. q. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 5; Summa I, q. 93, a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 36; Summa p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, a. 2, p. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6, a. 1, et q. 7, a. unic. — Aegid. R., hic 2 princ. q. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3, q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 10.

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English Translation

Article II

On the second assignment of the image.

A question follows concerning the second assignment of the image through mind, knowledge, and love. And1 concerning this three things are asked.

First is about these2 absolutely — namely whether the image is found in them as in powers, or in habits, or in powers and habits together, or in substance and habits.

Second is about these in comparison to one another.

Third, whether this trinity of the image necessarily leads to knowledge of the Trinity with respect to the persons.

Question I

Whether the image is found in mind, knowledge, and love as in powers, or as in habits, or in both together, or according to substance and habits.

On the first point the procedure is as follows:

1. It is shown, first, that the image is not to be found in these as in powers — because the preceding assignment was in the powers: therefore if this one too were in the powers, it would be nothing but a repetition of words.

Furthermore, knowledge and love do not denote a power but habits, though mind can denote a power: therefore the three aforementioned cannot be placed under the account of powers.

2. Likewise, it is shown that they do not denote habits, because Augustine3 says in the assignment and approval of the image: «The mind knows itself, loves itself»; but it belongs to no habit to know itself or to love itself: therefore, etc.

Likewise, if mind stands for a habit, I ask, for which habit? If for the habit of memory — which seems most likely, since no other can be given — but the act of this habit is to remember, not otherwise; yet Augustine4 assigns to mind these acts, namely knowing and loving: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, it is shown that it is not5 in powers and habits. For since the powers are three and the habits are three, there would then be not a ternary but a sextuple.

4. Likewise, I ask: for which power does mind there stand? For either it stands for all, or for two, or for one. If for all, then there is no trinity there; if for two, then there is a quaternity there, since there are two habits; if for one, it cannot have these two acts6, knowing and loving: therefore the trinity is not taken according to habits and powers together.

In confirmation of the opposition:

1. Likewise, it is shown that it is not according to the substance of the soul and habits7. For since the habits of knowing and loving follow the substance itself in time, and the substance can also be without them, but the account of the image is perpetual, inseparable, and concreated to the soul itself: therefore it is not in habits and substance together.

2. Likewise, if substance is counted together with8 the habits — since the habits are three and the substance is one — then there would be a quaternity. If you say that knowledge does not differ according as it is a habit of understanding and of memory — on the contrary: habits are dispositions of powers; since therefore there are three powers, there will be three habits.

3. Likewise, the Master says in the text9 that mind is taken not for the substance of the soul but for what is more eminent in it.

Conclusion

In this second assignment of the image — which is mind, knowledge, love — the trinity is found with respect to the substance of the soul and with respect to two habits of knowledge and love.

I respond: It must be said that this assignment differs from the preceding one, according to some, because the prior was in the powers, while this one is in the habits. And they respond to the objections through a distinction of mind. For mind is diversified according to four modes of reception. It is said in one way from mene, which means moon or deficiency — and in this sense it is said of the whole substance of the soul on account of the changes it undergoes10. In a second way it is said from metiendo («measuring») — and in this sense it stands for the judging power, and this is how Damascene11 takes it, placing it among the cognitive powers. In a third way it is said from eminendo («excelling») — and in this sense it stands for the superior part of reason, and this is how Augustine frequently12 takes it. In a fourth way it is said from meminisse («remembering») — and in this sense it stands for memory both with respect to act and with respect to habit13. They say therefore that in the assignment of this trinity mind stands for the habit of memory; but in the application, when Augustine says14 «the mind knows itself and loves itself», it stands for the power of remembering.

But this does not seem fittingly said, because the application ought to correspond to the assignment. And moreover, since the proper act of mind, as it stands for memory, is to remember, that act15 ought to be mentioned; but Augustine in this assignment never makes mention of any except two acts — namely to know and to love — which are not of memory but of other powers.

It must therefore be responded that that trinity is not in the powers — because love and knowledge do not denote powers16; nor in habits — because mind cannot stand for a habit, since it is taken as agent; nor can it be in powers and habits, because mind cannot stand for one power, since the acts of two powers are assigned to it; nor likewise17 can it stand for several powers, because then there would be no trinity.

It remains, therefore, that one must necessarily hold that this trinity is found with respect to the substance of the soul — by reason of the mind knowing and loving itself — and with respect to habits — by reason of knowledge and love; and so there is a trinity, since the substance is one and the habits are two.

This assignment, then, differs from the preceding: because the preceding was through uniformity in the powers with comparison to habits and18 acts, while this one is in substance and habits. It differs further in this, that the preceding was through the conversion of the soul toward God, while this one is through the conversion of the soul upon itself; and the image is not found in the human being in many modes, as was said above19. It differs also because the preceding assignment of the image is more proper and fitting than this one. For properly speaking, the image consists in the unity of essence and the trinity of powers, according to which the soul is naturally suited to be sealed by that supreme Trinity with the image of likeness — which consists in grace and20 the theological virtues. Hence Augustine places this21 assignment first in his investigation, in order through it to arrive at that one in which he ends his speculation.

1. To the objection, therefore, that habits are not coeval, etc.: it must be said that habit is threefold. For a power of the soul has a certain habit from acquisition, a certain one from innate disposition, and a third from its own origin. And this is clear, because a habit is that by which a power is made ready for act; but a power is ready in these three ways — for example, our affective power has facility for loving another's good through acquired disposition, as through virtue; for loving its own22 good through innate disposition; and for loving itself through its own presence. Similarly, since our intellect is always present to itself, it is always disposed toward knowing itself. And so the objection concerning coevity is resolved — for with respect to such habits, coevity holds well.

2. To the objection that there ought23 to be three habits corresponding to three powers: it must be said that in this trinity there is no place for a habit of memory, because it is found24 in the soul itself according as it is converted upon itself — and therefore the very substance of the soul takes the place of memory, and the very presence and offering by which the soul always presents itself to its own understanding takes the place of the habit and act of memory. And so it is clear that only the habits of two powers fall there; and therefore there is a trinity.

3. To the last objection concerning the Master's word: it must be said that mind there is understood not for the whole substance of the soul25; for if it were understood otherwise, the Master's word would not be true. This is clear through Augustine, who, on the occasion of this image, throughout almost the entire tenth book On the Trinity shows that the soul has an innate knowledge of itself, which is the knowledge26 of its own substance. And furthermore, nothing in the soul knows and loves except the substance: therefore if mind were to stand for one power, it would not have those two acts, namely knowing and loving.

Scholion

I. On this question we must listen to the Holy Doctor himself, who in the unpublished first Prologue to the II Sentences (whose beginning we have already given in our Prolegomena c. 1, §. 2) says: «Perhaps, however, it may seem to someone that I have departed from the positions of the Master of the Sentences especially in two places: namely, where — while the Master in the second part of the third distinction, in the second assignment of the trinity (which he says consists in mind, knowledge, and love), says that mind is taken not for the soul but for the superior portion — I am found to have said that mind there stands for the substance of the soul. Again, whereas the Master says in d. 7 that the power of generating is common to the three persons, as being a name signifying essence, I have rather adhered to the opinion which says that the power of generating is so called on account of relation. But if anyone looks rightly, he will find that in neither of these have I departed from the Master's position nor from the path of truth. For when I said that in that assignment of the trinity mind is taken for the substance of the soul by reason of the superior part, it was said for this reason: that if mind there stood for the superior portion, since that is a power of the soul, and since knowing and loving do not belong to a single power (as will be seen below; cf. II Sent. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1) — then there would not be a trinity but a quaternity there. Again, to act does not properly belong to a power but to the substance through the power; and therefore, if Augustine speaks properly and truly when he says «the mind knows», etc., mind there stands in for the substance of the soul. And Augustine hints at this again when afterward, on the occasion of this trinity, throughout almost the entire tenth book On the Trinity he shows that the soul knows itself. Finally, since those habits of knowledge and love are wholly consubstantial, they do not add a new essence upon the power, but the powers are fit by themselves — and so they cannot be communicated to the powers themselves or to the superior part of reason. And for that reason the Master does not deny that mind is taken for the soul itself, but that it is taken not for the whole soul according to all its powers, but for the substance itself by reason of the superior portion. In this, then, I have not contradicted the Master, but rather, as I reckon, have explained his word according to the rule of truth».

II. The words in fundament 2 — that «it belongs to no habit to know itself or love itself» — are understood thus: to understand itself and to love itself are not the acts of any acquired habit, but of a power of the soul concreated and consubstantial — though habits can also dispositively concur in these acts. Hence Blessed Albert (here a. 36) says of the same text of Augustine: «A habit is not to know itself and to love itself, but rather — of the one having the habit, according to the habit or through the habit, it is to know itself and to love itself». Likewise Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 7, a. 1) says: «For knowing itself the mind uses no habit». Cf. also Bonaventure, here q. 2, ad 4.

III. In the reply to 1, three kinds of habit are distinguished, namely, from acquisition, from innate disposition, from one's own origin. The difference between the second and the third consists in this, that the second habit is not properly concreated and coeval with the soul, although the disposition to this habit is concreated and coeval. So the soul knows and loves its own good (the advantageous) from an innate disposition. But the third habit, by which the soul knows and loves itself, is properly concreated with it; cf. II Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — In the same reply is touched the question in what sense our intellect always understands itself. The doctrine of the Seraphic on this entirely agrees with St. Thomas (here q. 4, a. 5; Summa I, q. 93, a. 7, ad 4), Scotus (II Sent. d. 3, q. 8, n. 13), and Richard (here a. 2, q. 2). These deny that the soul has actual self-intellection, especially such that it discerns itself from other things; they concede, however, that on account of the presence of the object «nothing is lacking to the first act… to which there must follow a second act, which is intellection. And perhaps on this account Augustine frequently says that the soul always knows itself, because of this proximity to the act of knowing, where there is no imperfection in the first act. In this manner, however, the soul does not always know a stone» etc. (Scotus, loc. cit.). Other doctors, however — such as Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 5, a. 3) and Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 4, q. 7) — teach that the soul always knows and loves itself, not only habitually but also actually, though without attending to these innermost acts. Cf. also Denys the Carthusian (here q. 12), who hangs undecided on this question.

IV. On the conclusion itself: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 6, §§. 1. — Scotus, here q. 9; Reportatio q. 7. — St. Thomas, here q. 5; Summa I, q. 93, a. 6. — Blessed Albert, here a. 36; Summa p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, a. 2, p. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 6, a. 1, and q. 7, a. unic. — Giles of Rome, here 2 princ. q. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3, q. 1. — Biel, here q. 10.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. omittit Et, sed contra mss. et ed. 1. Paulo infra post Tertium ed. 1 addit est.
    The Vatican ed. omits Et, but against the mss. and ed. 1. A little later, after Tertium, ed. 1 adds est.
  2. Scilicet memoria, intellectus et voluntas, de qua supra in a. 1. — Mox substituimus ex mss. haec loco hic.
    Namely memory, intellect, and will, treated above in a. 1. — Next, we have substituted haec for hic from the mss.
  3. Textum Augustini vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3, circa medium. — Vat. paulo ante loco dicunt habitus ponit ut in habitibus, et paulo post omittit et approbatione, sed contra mss. et ed. 1. — Mox ex cod. X cum ed. 1 post est supplevimus, rei veritate exigente, se.
    See Augustine's text above in the Master's text, c. 3, near the middle. — The Vatican ed., a little earlier, in place of dicunt habitus puts ut in habitibus, and a little later omits et approbatione, but against the mss. and ed. 1. — Next, from cod. X with ed. 1, after est we have supplied se, as the truth of the matter requires.
  4. Verba Augustini inveniuntur supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3, circa medium. — Paulo supra post meminisse auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 expunximus et, quod Vat. addit.
    Augustine's words are found above in the Master's text, c. 3, near the middle. — A little earlier, after meminisse, on the authority of the mss. and edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, we have expunged et, which the Vatican ed. adds.
  5. Vat., obnitentibus mss. et sex primis edd., addit ut.
    The Vatican ed., against the mss. and the first six editions, adds ut.
  6. Codd. X Y addunt scilicet.
    Codd. X Y add scilicet («namely»).
  7. Ita codd. et sex primae edd. contra Vat., quae habet Contra. Ostenditur, quod non ut in substantia et habitibus simul, et paulo post sequantur pro consequantur.
    So the codd. and first six editions, against the Vatican ed., which reads Contra. Ostenditur, quod non ut in substantia et habitibus simul, and a little later sequantur for consequantur.
  8. Substituimus ope mss. et ed. 1 hic cum loco et, ac paulo infra intelligentiae pro intellectivae.
    With the help of the mss. and ed. 1, we have here substituted cum for et, and a little below intelligentiae for intellectivae.
  9. Cap. 3, circa medium, quem tamen textum plurimi mss. cum sex primis edd. hic mutarunt, pro anima ponendo animae substantia tota; codd. vero T X animae substantia, quos sequimur, quia eorum lectio correspondet sensui obiicientium. Cfr. Scholion.
    [Master of the Sentences,] c. 3, near the middle; yet most mss. with the first six editions have here altered this text, putting animae substantia tota in place of anima; but codd. T X read animae substantia, which we follow, because their reading corresponds to the sense of the objectors. Cf. the Scholion.
  10. De hac mentis acceptione vide libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 11.
    On this reception of mind see the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 11.
  11. Libr. II de Fide orthod. c. 22: Vires in cognitione positae sunt mens, cogitatio, opinio, sensus. Et singula perpendens de mente dicit: quod verum est iudicat (considerat, discernit; sive, ut refert Alex. Hal., Summa p. II, q. 69, in princ.: mens a metiendo dicitur).
    [John of Damascus,] On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 22: «The powers placed in cognition are mind, cogitation, opinion, sense». And weighing each in turn, he says of the mind: «it judges what is true» (considers, discerns; or, as Alexander of Hales reports, Summa p. II, q. 69, in princ.: «mind is so called from measuring»).
  12. Cfr. Enarratio in Psalm. 3, n. 3; XV de Trin. c. 7, n. 11. Vide etiam libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 11 et 34. Consentit Isidor., XI Etymolog. c. 1.
    Cf. [Augustine,] Enarratio in Psalmum 3, n. 3; On the Trinity XV, c. 7, n. 11. See also the book On the Spirit and the Soul, cc. 11 and 34. Isidore agrees, Etymologies XI, c. 1.
  13. Cfr. Isidor., loc. cit. et libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 34. — De his quatuor etymologiis, quae ex more illius aetatis iudicari debent, vide Alex. Hal., Summa p. IV, q. 12, m. 1, a. 2, circa finem (in aliis edd. q. 55).
    Cf. Isidore, loc. cit., and the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 34. — On these four etymologies, which are to be judged according to the custom of that age, see Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV, q. 12, m. 1, a. 2, near the end (in other editions q. 55).
  14. Codd. sunt inter se divisi; plures siquidem ut G O T bb habent Augustinus, quos sequimur, alii vero ut A C L S Z etc. ecce; omnes tamen contra Vat. dicit loco dicitur. Ed. 1 dicit Magister et Augustinus: ecce mens.
    The codd. are divided among themselves: many (G O T bb) have Augustinus, which we follow; others (A C L S Z etc.) ecce; yet all, against the Vatican ed., have dicit in place of dicitur. Ed. 1 reads dicit Magister et Augustinus: ecce mens.
  15. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 ibi pro ille.
    The Vatican ed., against the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, reads ibi for ille.
  16. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 minus bene dicuntur potentiae.
    The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, less well reads dicuntur potentiae.
  17. Plures codd. ut A F G H K T Y bb simul pro similiter.
    Several codd. (A F G H K T Y bb) read simul («together») for similiter («likewise»).
  18. Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, repetit hic ad. Paulo infra post Differt ex pluribus codd. ut H P Q X Z ee posuimus iterum loco etiam.
    The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, here repeats ad. A little later, after Differt, from several codd. (H P Q X Z ee) we have placed iterum in place of etiam.
  19. Hic a. 1, q. 2, in corp.
    Here [above] a. 1, q. 2, in corp.
  20. Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 indebite omittit gratia et. Nam distinguitur gratia sanctificans a virtutibus.
    The Vatican ed., without any authority of the mss. or ed. 1, improperly omits gratia et. For sanctifying grace is distinguished from the virtues.
  21. Vide IX de Trin. c. 2, n. 2, et ibid. X, c. 11, n. 17; XIV, ac XV, c. 3, n. 5 seqq. — Sub vocabulo hanc intellige secundam assignationem.
    See [Augustine,] On the Trinity IX, c. 2, n. 2; and ibid. X, c. 11, n. 17; XIV, and XV, c. 3, n. 5 ff. — Under the word hanc («this»), understand the second assignment.
  22. Codd. L O summum loco suum; sed non bene. — Cod. T post sibi addit ipsi, et paulo infra incongrue cum aliquibus mss. omittit intellectus noster.
    Codd. L O read summum («highest») for suum («its own»); but not well. — Cod. T after sibi adds ipsi, and a little below, with some mss., incongruously omits intellectus noster.
  23. Ope mss. et ed. 1 substituimus debent pro dicuntur.
    With the help of the mss. and ed. 1, we have substituted debent for dicuntur.
  24. Supple: trinitas.
    Supply trinitas («trinity»).
  25. Cod. Z addit sed parte superiori scilicet; ed. 1 autem: sed supple pro conversione animae ad Deum vel reflexione ad sui considerationem ad Deum.
    Cod. Z adds sed parte superiori scilicet («but [by] the superior part, namely»); ed. 1 has: sed supple pro conversione animae ad Deum vel reflexione ad sui considerationem ad Deum («but supply this with respect to the conversion of the soul toward God, or its reflection upon considering itself in relation to God»).
  26. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 agnitio; et immediate post propterea loco praeterea, sed falso.
    The Vatican ed., against the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, reads agnitio («recognition»); and immediately after, propterea in place of praeterea, but wrongly.
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