Dist. 3, Part 2, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3
Dubia circa litteram Partis II
Dubium I
In parte ista circa litteram quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Imago Dei permanet. Contra: Psalmus: Domine in civitate imaginem ipsorum ad nihilum rediges.
Respondeo: Imago dicitur dupliciter: quantum ad substantiale esse; et haec respicit trinitatem potentiarum et ordinem et aequalitatem, et sic semper permanet; alio modo prout supra esse addit bene esse, ut decorem et honorem; et haec potest perdi, quia homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit.
Dubium II
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Memoria vero dicitur ad aliquid etc.; ergo memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt in praedicamento relationis.
Item quaeritur, quare mens dicitur magis ad se quam memoria vel intelligentia?
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dici ad aliquid est dupliciter: vel proprie et per se, sicut pater et filius, vel ratione alicuius annexi, quia habet respectum annexum et inclinationem; et sic memoria dicitur ad aliquid, quia innatum habet respectum ad memoriale, similiter intelligentia ad intelligibile et voluntas ad volibile; et haec obiecta ad invicem habent respectum. Et sic patet obiectio.
Ad illud quod quaeritur de mente, dicendum, quod mens dicitur ab actu essentiali. Propterea est intelligendum, quod quo est dat animae esse generalissimum, et sic dicitur essentia; vel inquantum dat esse generale, et sic dicitur vita, quia anima est in genere viventium; aut inquantum dat esse spirituale, et sic mens. Mens enim non dicitur nisi quod vivit vita intellectiva. — Vel anima in se dicitur essentia, ut actus corporis vita, ut perfectibilis a Deo mens.
Dubium III
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod tres personae non sunt unius Dei; quia videtur dicere falsum, quia, si sunt unius essentiae; sed essentia est Deus; ergo sunt unius Dei. Si dicas, quod non sequitur; ego quaero, quare non conceditur, quod tres personae sunt unius Dei? Si propter hoc, quod obliquus notat diversitatem; ergo cum essentia non sit diversa a persona, non potest dici: tres personae sunt unius essentiae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod genitivus aliquando construitur in ratione possessionis, ut si dicatur: bos Petri vel Ioannis; aliquando ex vi declarationis essentiae, ut mulier egregiae formae; aliquando intransitive, ut creatura salis. Intransitive construitur generale cum speciali; et sic potest dici: substantia vel persona Dei; ex vi declarationis essentiae, nomen importans formam per modum formae; et sic dicuntur tres personae unius essentiae. Quia ergo, quando dicitur: tres personae sunt unius Dei, Deus non significat nec per modum formae nec per modum specificantis, ideo intelligitur per modum possidentis vel principiantis: et ideo simpliciter est falsa.
Dubium IV
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod ex maxima parte est dissimilis. Videtur enim quod imago est similitudo expressa: ergo si maxime est dissimilis, non est imago.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est expressio simpliciter, vel in genere. Si ergo loquamur de expressione simpliciter, sic dico, quod anima rationalis non est valde similis Deo; si autem loquamur in genere creaturae, quia tantum accedit, quantum potest natura creata, sic dicitur valde similis et expressa similitudo Dei.
Dubium V
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si duo essent, vel uterque insufficiens esset, vel alter superflueret; quia secundum viam istam monstrari posset, quod non sit nisi una persona.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in personis non potest esse superfluitas, quia in eis est una sufficientia; unde si una esset superflua, et omnes. Sed non potest ibi esse aliqua insufficientia, quia nihil plus habent tres quam una. Sed si essent duae essentiae, duae essent sufficientiae, si quaelibet per se esset sufficiens; si autem altera cum altera, quaelibet esset insufficiens: et ita patet, quod non est simile de duabus essentiis, sicut de duabus personis.
Dubium VI
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod intellexit, Deum habere sapientiam, quae ab ipso genita est, quia intellexit, eum non esse rem fatuam; ergo videtur secundum hoc, quod Pater sit sapiens sapientia genita.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista consequentia non est intelligenda immediate, scilicet: quia non est res fatua, ergo habet sapientiam genitam. Sed hoc intelligendum est sic: Deus est substantia spiritualis: ergo est nata cognoscere: ergo si non habet sapientiam, est res fatua; sed non est res fatua: ergo habet sapientiam; sed non est sapientia sine verbo, et non est verbum, nisi procedat a mente et ita generetur: ergo a primo, si habet sapientiam, necesse est, sapientiam esse genitam. Et omnes istas consequentias oportet intelligere immediate.
---
Doubts concerning the text of Part II
Doubt I
In this part, concerning the text, a question arises about what he says: "The image of God remains". Against this, the Psalm1: "O Lord, in your city you shall reduce their image to nothing."
I respond: Image is said in two ways: (a) as regards substantial being — and this concerns the trinity of powers, their order, and their equality, and in this sense it always remains; (b) as it adds well-being above being — such as beauty and honor; and this can be lost, for "man, when he was in honor, did not understand."
Doubt II
Likewise, a question arises about what he says: "But memory is said relative to something" etc.; therefore memory, understanding, and will are in the predicament of relation.
Likewise it is asked: why is mind said rather to itself than memory or understanding?
I respond: It must be said that to be said relative to something is of two kinds: either properly and per se (as father and son); or by reason of something annexed, since it has an annexed relation and inclination. In this second way memory is said relative to something, since it has an innate relation to the memorable; likewise understanding to the intelligible and will to the willable; and these objects have relation to one another. And thus the objection is clear.
As for what is asked about the mind, it must be said that mind is named from its essential act. Wherefore it must be understood that quo est (that by which something is) gives the soul its most general being, and thus it is called essence; or inasmuch as it gives general being, it is called life, since the soul is in the genus of living things; or inasmuch as it gives spiritual being, it is called mind. For mind is predicated only of that which lives an intellective life. — Or, the soul is called essence in itself; as act of the body, life; as perfectible by God, mind.
Doubt III
Likewise a question arises about what he says: that "the three persons are not of one God". For this seems to speak falsely: because if they are of one essence — but the essence is God — therefore they are of one God. If you say that it does not follow, I ask: why is it not conceded that the three persons are of one God? If on the ground that the oblique [genitive] notes diversity — then since the essence is not diverse from the person, one cannot say "the three persons are of one essence" either.
I respond: It must be said that the genitive is sometimes construed as indicating possession, as when one says "the ox of Peter or John"; sometimes by force of declaring the essence, as "a woman of surpassing form"; sometimes intransitively, as "the creature of salt". The intransitive construction joins the general with the specific; and thus one can say "the substance of God" or "the person of God." The construction by force of declaring the essence uses a name signifying form in the mode of form; and thus the three persons are said to be of one essence. Since, therefore, when it is said "the three persons are of one God," the word God does not signify in the mode of form nor in the mode of specifying, it is understood in the mode of possessing or principle-of-origin: and therefore it is simply false.
Doubt IV
Likewise a question arises about what he says: "It is dissimilar in the greatest part". For it seems that an image is an express likeness: therefore if it is maximally dissimilar, it is not an image.
I respond: It must be said that expression is either simpliciter or within a genus. If we speak of expression simpliciter, then I say that the rational soul is not very similar to God; but if we speak within the genus of creature — since it approaches as much as created nature can — thus it is called very similar and an express likeness of God.
Doubt V
Likewise a question arises about what he says: "If there were two [essences], either each would be insufficient or one would be superfluous"; for by this way it could be shown that there is only one person.
I respond: It must be said that in the persons there can be no superfluity, since in them there is one sufficiency; whence if one were superfluous, all would be. Nor can there be any insufficiency there, since the three do not have anything more than the one. But if there were two essences, there would be two sufficiencies, if each were sufficient per se; and if one were sufficient only with the other, each would be insufficient. And thus it is clear that the case of two essences is not like the case of two persons.
Doubt VI
Likewise a question arises about what he says: that "he understood that God has wisdom which is begotten of Him", since he understood that God is not a foolish thing; therefore it seems from this that the Father is wise by begotten wisdom.
I respond: It must be said that this consequence is not to be understood immediately — namely: "because He is not a foolish thing, therefore He has begotten wisdom". But it is to be understood thus: God is a spiritual substance: therefore He is apt to know: therefore if He does not have wisdom, He is a foolish thing; but He is not foolish: therefore He has wisdom. But there is no wisdom without a word; and there is no word unless it proceed from the mind and thus be generated: therefore from the first [premise], if He has wisdom, it is necessary that wisdom be begotten. And all these consequences must be understood immediately.
---
- Psalm. 72, 20 (Vulg.): Domine, in civitate tua imaginem ipsorum ad nihilum rediges. — Verbum civitate hic accipitur in sensu metaphorico, scilicet pro iudicio sive providentia.Psalm 72:20 (Vulgate, 73:20 Heb.): "O Lord, in your city you shall reduce their image to nothing." — The word "city" is here taken metaphorically, namely for judgment or providence.
- Cfr. Psalm. 48, 13 et 21 (Vulg.): Homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit. Textus saepe citatus a S. Bonaventura pro amissione imaginis Dei in statu peccati.Cf. Psalm 48:13 and 21 (Vulgate, 49:12, 20 Heb.): "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand." The text is often cited by St. Bonaventure for the loss of the image of God in the state of sin.
- De triplici distinctione essentia / vita / mens cfr. August., X de Trin. c. 10, n. 13, ubi mens proprie dicitur de anima rationali prout habet actum intellectivum. Cfr. etiam Dionys., de Divinis Nominibus c. 4.On the threefold distinction essence / life / mind, cf. Augustine, On the Trinity X, c. 10, n. 13, where mind is properly said of the rational soul insofar as it has an intellective act. Cf. also Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4.
- De constructione genitivi triplici — possessionis, declarationis essentiae, intransitiva — cfr. Prisciani Institutiones Grammaticae XVII, et Alanus ab Insulis, Regulae theologicae reg. 22. Tertium modum (genitivum intransitivum) Scholastici saepe applicant ad theologica, ut hic de relatione personae ad essentiam.On the threefold construction of the genitive — of possession, of declaring the essence, and intransitive — cf. Priscian, Institutes of Grammar XVII, and Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, reg. 22. The Scholastics often apply the third mode (the intransitive genitive) to theological matters, as here concerning the relation of person to essence.