Dist. 3, Part 1, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Dubium I
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram de rationibus illis, quas ponit Magister quantum ad rationem probandi et vim inferendi, quia videntur omnes vel non valere vel dubium supponere.
Prima namque ratio talis est. Qui potest quod nulla creatura potest, est supra omnem creaturam; sed qui fecit mundum istum, fecit quod nulla potest creatura: ergo non est creatura, sed super omnem creaturam. Et incipit haec ratio ibi: Nam sicut ait Ambrosius, ut Deus etc. In ista ratione videtur supponi duplex dubium, videlicet quod mundus iste sit factus, et quod creatura ipsum non possit facere, quorum utrumque est valde dubium.
Secunda ratio est haec. Qui fecit corporalia et spiritus mutabiles, est super omnia corporalia et mutabilia: ergo est spirituale et immutabile. Hic similiter videtur supponi dubium, quod Deus fecerit spiritus. Et iterum, non sequitur ex hoc, quod si fecit mutabilia, quod sit immutabilis, immo potius videtur sequi oppositum, scilicet quod sit mutabilis.
Tertia ratio haec est. Qui fecit bona et meliora, est optimus; sed Deus fecit corporalia, quae sunt bona, et spiritualia, quae sunt meliora: ergo Deus est optimus. Haec similiter ratio videtur nullam habere apparentiam, quia tunc similiter quilibet artifex, qui facit bona et meliora, esset optimus, quod falsum est.
Quarta ratio haec est. Qui fecit pulcra et pulcriora, est ipsa pulcritudo sive species, et hoc est speciosissimum; sed videmus, corporalia esse speciosa, et spiritualia esse speciosiora: ergo qui fecit haec, est speciosissimus. Similiter videtur, quod nec ratio praedicta valeat propter praedictam instantiam.
Item quaeritur de differentia istarum rationum, et quomodo distinguuntur. Si dicas, sicut dicunt aliqui, quod sunt quatuor penes quatuor genera causarum, hoc nihil est, quia genus causae materialis non cadit in Deo. Si dicas, quod penes modos cognoscendi; contra: non sunt nisi tres, scilicet in ratione causae, ablationis et excellentiae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod omnes istae rationes ad hoc, ut probent et inferant, supponunt aliquod certum. Prima enim ratio supponit, quod productio rei de nihilo non potest esse nisi a potentia infinita. Hoc supposito, cum certum sit, nullam creaturam habere potentiam infinitam, sequitur, quod ex proprio cognoscitur Deus omnipotens, immensus.
— In aliis tribus rationibus supponitur status, sicut in tota philosophia supponitur status in causis; et ideo omne mutabile reducitur ad immutabile, quia in mutabili non est status in genere efficientis nisi in movente non moto: omne enim quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Similiter bonum et melius reducuntur ad optimum, quia non est status in genere finis nisi in optimo. Similiter pulcrum et pulcrius ad pulcherrimum, quia non est status in genere speciei et formae, nisi in eo quod est ipsa species per essentiam.
Ad illud quod quaeritur de distinctione rationum, ex dictis iam patet responsio. Non enim possunt distingui penes genus causarum tantum, nec penes modos cognoscendi tantum, sed penes utrumque. Prima enim ratio sumitur secundum rationem causae; aliae sumuntur penes rationem causae et excellentiae, quia considerant ordinem et distinguuntur secundum ordinem in triplici genere causae, efficientis sive moventis, finientis et exemplaris.
Dubium II
Item quaeritur de hoc quod postea dicit Magister, quod ex perpetuitate intelligitur Conditor aeternus. Nihil enim valet: effectus est perpetuus, ergo efficiens est aeternus.
Item quaeritur similiter de hoc quod dicit: Ex magnitudine omnipotens. Nihil enim valet: fecit magna, ergo est omnipotens vel potest facere omnia.
Respondeo: Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod tantum est quaedam persuasio per signum, non necessaria argumentatio. Dicunt enim, quod omnipotentia et aeternitas, cum sint infinitae, non possunt sufficienter probari per creaturas, quae sunt finitae. — Aliter tamen potest dici, quod quamvis non sequatur in quolibet efficiente, tamen necessario sequitur in efficiente sive perpetuante primo. Impossibile enim est, quod creatura habeat esse et magnum esse et hoc totum ab aliquo, qui non possit in totum; et qua ratione in hoc totum, et in quodlibet. Similiter, si est primum perpetuans, est omnino in actu et nihil in potentia; et si hoc, cum possit facere durare aliud in infinitum, ipsum est actu infinitum duratione: ergo aeternum.
Dubium III
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Omnia quae arte divina condita sunt, unitatem quandam in se ostendunt et speciem et ordinem. Videtur enim primo dicere falsum, quia si hoc, cum haec tria condita sint, tunc habent unitatem, speciem et ordinem, et sic de aliis: ergo si est stare, tunc aliqua condita sunt, quae haec non habent.
Item videtur male enumerare, quia Augustinus ponit ista tria: modum, speciem et ordinem, et haec alia: unitatem, veritatem et bonitatem. Quaeritur ergo de diversis modis enumerandi, unde veniant.
Respondeo: Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod hoc intelligitur de creaturis perfectis, vel si de omnibus, tunc illa tria non dicunt conditiones in re creata, sed in exemplari increato. — Potest tamen dici, quod in primis intentionibus et generalibus est reflexio et ideo status, nec est ultra procedendum.
Ad illud quod quaeritur de enumeratione illorum trium, quod non videtur conveniens; dicendum, quod res creata habet tripliciter considerari: aut in se, aut in comparatione ad alias creaturas, aut in comparatione ad causam primam. Et secundum hos omnes modos contingit reperire trinitatem dupliciter.
Si enim consideretur quantum in se vel quantum ad se, hoc est, aut quantum ad substantiam principiorum; et sic est illa trinitas: materia, forma, compositio, quae ponitur in libro de Regula fidei; aut quantum ad habitudines; et sic est illa, Sapientiae undecimo: Omnia in numero, pondere et mensura disposuisti. In numero enim intelligitur principiorum distinctio, in pondere propria ipsorum inclinatio, in mensura eorum ad invicem proportio.
Item, si consideretur una creatura in comparatione ad alias creaturas, hoc potest esse aut in quantum agit actione naturali; et sic sumitur illa trinitas Dionysii: substantia, virtus et operatio; aut in quantum agit actione spirituali; et sic illa Augustini, de octoginta tribus Quaestionibus: «quo constat, quo congruit, quo discernitur», et ultimum refertur ad animam.
Si autem considerentur in comparatione ad Deum, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut in quantum referuntur tantum; et sic est illa, modus, species et ordo; aut in quantum referuntur et assimilantur; et sic est illa, unitas, veritas et bonitas.
Quoniam ergo vestigium attenditur in comparatione ad Deum proprie, ideo in his ultimis conditionibus proprie accipitur vestigium. Et quia magna est inter istas comparationes convenientia, ideo Magister miscet haec ad invicem propter multam convenientiam et correspondentiam; quia unitas respondet modo, qui respicit Deum ut causam efficientem; veritas speciei, quae respicit ipsum ut exemplar; bonitas ordini, qui respicit Deum ut finem.
Dubium IV
Item quaeritur de hoc quod appropriat veritatem Filio dicens: Perfectissima pulcritudo intelligitur Filius, scilicet veritas Patris. Sed contra Augustinus in Soliloquio: «Veritas est id quod est»; sed ens nulli personae appropriatur: ergo nec veritas.
Item videtur male appropriare ordinem Spiritui sancto, quia in praecedenti capitulo dicit, quod ex ordine intelligitur sapiens; sed sapientia appropriatur Filio: ergo et ordo.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod veritas potest dupliciter considerari, sicut et color. Nam uno modo color consideratur secundum id in quo est; et sic definitur in libro de Sensu et sensato: «Color est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato». Alio modo in comparatione ad visum, quem movet; et sic definitur in libro de Anima: «Color est motivum visus secundum actum lucidi».
Similiter veritas potest considerari in comparatione ad id in quo est; et sic verum est id quod est; alio modo per comparationem ad intellectum, quem movet; et sic veritas, ut dicit Philosophus in secundo Metaphysicae, «est finis intelligentiae speculativae». Secundum primum modum dicit Anselmus: «Veritas Patris est essentia Patris». Quantum ad secundum modum dicit Hilarius, quod «veritas est declarativum esse». Et quoniam Filius procedit ut Verbum, cui appropriatur ratio declarandi, ideo appropriatur ei ratio exemplaris, et per consequens ratio veritatis secundo modo veritatis. Definitio vero Augustini accipit eam primo modo.
Ad illud quod obiicitur de ordine; dicendum, quod est ordo rerum in universo; et hic appropriatur sapientiae; et est ordo rerum in finem; et hic appropriatur bonitati; et sic patet, quod non est contrarietas.
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Doubts concerning the Master's text
Doubt I
In this part there are doubts concerning the text with respect to those arguments which the Master puts forward — regarding the probative force and the inferential strength of each — because they all seem either to have no validity or to assume what is doubtful.
The first argument is as follows. One who can do what no creature can is above every creature; but the one who made this world did what no creature can do: therefore He is not a creature but is above every creature. And this argument begins at: "For as Ambrose says, so that God," etc. In this argument there seem to be assumed two doubtful things — namely that this world was made, and that a creature could not make it — both of which are highly doubtful.
The second argument is this. One who made corporeal things and mutable spirits is above all corporeal and mutable things: therefore He is spiritual and immutable. Here similarly a doubtful thing seems to be assumed — that God made spirits. And again, it does not follow from this: if He made mutable things, that He is immutable — on the contrary, it seems rather that the opposite follows, namely that He is mutable.
The third argument is this. One who made good things and better things is the best; but God made corporeal things, which are good, and spiritual things, which are better: therefore God is the best. This argument similarly seems to have no apparent validity, because then similarly any craftsman who makes good and better things would be the best — which is false.
The fourth argument is this. One who made beautiful things and more beautiful things is beauty itself or form, and this is the most beautiful; but we see that corporeal things are beautiful and spiritual things are more beautiful: therefore the one who made these is the most beautiful. Similarly it seems that the argument just stated does not hold, for the objection raised above.
And a question arises concerning the distinction among these arguments, and how they are differentiated. If you say, as some say, that they are four in number corresponding to the four genera of causes, this amounts to nothing, because the genus of material cause does not apply to God. If you say that they are distinguished by modes of knowing — on the contrary: there are only three such modes, namely the way of causation, the way of removal, and the way of eminence.
I respond: It must be said that all these arguments, in order to prove and infer, presuppose something certain. For the first argument presupposes that the production of things from nothing can only be by an infinite power. This being supposed, since it is certain that no creature has infinite power, it follows that the act of producing things from nothing belongs to one who is above every creature. And thus from this act, as from something proper to Him, God is known as omnipotent and immense.
— In the other three arguments, rest (status) is presupposed, just as in all of philosophy rest is presupposed in causes; and therefore every mutable thing is reduced to the immutable, because in mutable things there is no rest in the genus of efficient causation except in the unmoved mover — for everything that is moved is moved by another. Similarly, good and better are reduced to the best, because there is no rest in the genus of final causation except in the best. Similarly, beautiful and more beautiful are reduced to the most beautiful, because there is no rest in the genus of form and species except in that which is species itself through its essence.
To the question raised about the distinction among the arguments — from what has been said the response is already clear. For they cannot be distinguished solely by genus of causes, nor solely by modes of knowing, but by both together. The first argument is taken according to the account of causation; the others are taken according to the account of causation and of eminence, because they consider order and are distinguished according to order in the threefold genus of cause — efficient or moving, final, and exemplary.
Doubt II
Likewise, a question is raised concerning what the Master subsequently says: that from perpetuity the eternal Creator is understood. For the following inference has no validity: the effect is perpetual, therefore the efficient cause is eternal.
Likewise, a similar question is raised concerning what he says: from magnitude, the omnipotent one. For the following has no validity: He made great things, therefore He is omnipotent or can do all things.
I respond: To this some say that it is merely a kind of persuasion through a sign, not a necessary argumentation. For they say that omnipotence and eternity, since they are infinite, cannot be sufficiently proved through creatures, which are finite. — In another way, however, it can be said that although this inference does not hold in the case of just any efficient cause, it does necessarily hold in the case of the first efficient or perpetuating cause. For it is impossible that a creature should have being and great being — and all of this from some source — without that source being able to account for the whole; and by the same account as it accounts for this whole, it accounts for anything whatsoever. Similarly, if it is the first perpetuating cause, it is altogether in act and nothing in potency; and if this is so — since it can cause another to endure infinitely — it is itself actually infinite in duration: therefore eternal.
Doubt III
Likewise, a question is raised concerning what he says: "All things that have been founded by divine art show in themselves a certain unity and form and order." For it seems first of all that this is false, because if so — since these three things are themselves founded things — then they have unity, form, and order, and so with the others: therefore if there is to be a stopping point, then some founded things exist that do not have these.
Likewise, it seems that the enumeration is faulty, because Augustine posits these three: mode, form, and order — and these others: unity, truth, and goodness. The question therefore is where the different modes of enumeration come from.
I respond: To this some say that this is to be understood of perfect creatures; or if it applies to all creatures, then those three denote conditions not in the created thing but in the uncreated exemplar. — It can nonetheless be said that in the primary and most general intentions there is reflexivity and therefore rest, and no further proceeding is needed.
To the question raised about the enumeration of those three things — that it does not seem appropriate: it must be said that a created thing can be considered in three ways — either in itself, or in comparison to other creatures, or in comparison to the first cause. And according to all these modes it is possible to find a trinity in two ways.
For if it is considered with respect to itself or in relation to itself — either with respect to the substance of its principles, and in this way there is that trinity: matter, form, and composition, which is posited in the book On the Rule of Faith; or with respect to their relations, and in this way there is that trinity from Wisdom eleven: "You have ordered all things in number, weight, and measure." For in number is understood the distinction of principles, in weight their proper inclination, in measure their proportion to one another.
Likewise, if one creature is considered in comparison to other creatures, this can be done either insofar as it acts by natural action — and in this way the trinity of Dionysius is taken: substance, power, and operation; or insofar as it acts by spiritual action — and in this way that of Augustine from the eighty-three Questions: "that by which it subsists, that by which it agrees, that by which it is distinguished" — and this last is referred to the soul.
But if creatures are considered in comparison to God, this can be done in two ways: either insofar as they are only referred to God — and in this way there is that trinity: mode, form, and order; or insofar as they are referred to God and made like Him — and in this way there is that trinity: unity, truth, and goodness.
Since therefore the vestige is found properly in comparison to God, it is in these last conditions that the vestige is properly taken. And because there is great agreement among these comparisons, the Master mixes them together on account of the great fittingness and correspondence among them: because unity corresponds to mode, which regards God as efficient cause; truth to form (species), which regards Him as exemplar; goodness to order, which regards God as end.
Doubt IV
Likewise, a question is raised concerning what he says when he appropriates truth to the Son, saying: "Most perfect beauty is understood as the Son, namely the truth of the Father." But on the contrary, Augustine in the Soliloquy: "Truth is that which is"; but being is not appropriated to any particular person: therefore neither is truth.
Likewise, it seems that he wrongly appropriates order to the Holy Spirit, because in the preceding chapter he says that from order one understands the wise one; but wisdom is appropriated to the Son: therefore order too.
I respond: It must be said that truth can be considered in two ways, just as color can. For in one way color is considered with respect to that in which it exists — and in this way it is defined in the book On Sense and the Sensed: "Color is the limit of the transparent in a bounded body." In another way it is considered in comparison to the sight that it moves — and in this way it is defined in the book On the Soul: "Color is that which moves sight in accordance with the act of the transparent."
Similarly, truth can be considered in comparison to that in which it exists — and in this way what is true is "that which is"; in another way through comparison to the intellect that it moves — and in this way truth, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the Metaphysics, "is the end of speculative understanding." According to the first mode, Anselm says: "The truth of the Father is the essence of the Father." With respect to the second mode, Hilary says that "truth is the declarative of being." And since the Son proceeds as the Word — to whom the account of declaring is appropriated — the account of exemplar is therefore appropriated to Him, and consequently the account of truth in the second mode of truth. Augustine's definition, however, takes it in the first mode.
To the objection concerning order: it must be said that there is an order of things in the universe — and this is appropriated to wisdom; and there is an order of things toward an end — and this is appropriated to goodness; and so it is clear that there is no contradiction.
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