Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 4
Articulus Unicus
De comparatione nominis Deus ad generationem et de eius consignificatione et suppositione.
Quaestio I
Utrum haec locutio: Deus genuit Deum, sit concedenda.
Circa primum, quod haec locutio Deus genuit Deum sit concedenda:
1. Videtur per hoc quod dicitur in Symbolo: Deum de Deo; sed hoc non est nisi per generationem1: ergo Deus generatur de Deo: ergo ista locutio est concedenda: Deus genuit Deum.
2. Item, generatio est respectu similis in natura, unde «homo generat hominem»2; unde si in divinis est generatio, producitur similis in natura: ergo cum Pater sit Deus, non generat nisi Deum: ergo haec est vera: Deus generat Deum.
3. Item, quidquid habet Filius, aut habet a se, aut ab alio; sed habet deitatem, et non a se, quia sic esset ingenitus: ergo habet ab alio; sed non habet nisi per generationem, et3 non habet deitatem nisi ab habente deitatem, et habens deitatem est Deus: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Hoc nomen Deus significat essentiam sive substantiam, cum sit terminus substantialis4; sed haec non conceditur, immo est falsa: essentia generat essentiam: ergo similiter et ista: Deus genuit Deum.
2. Item, hoc nomen Deus aut supponit pro omni persona, aut determinate pro aliqua. Si determinate pro aliqua: ergo restringitur eius significatio5 ab aliquo, nec est dare, quod ab alio nisi ab hoc verbo genuit vel generat. Sed regula est, quod terminus, positus in praedicato, non restringit terminum a parte subiecti ratione significationis: ergo stat pro omni persona. Non ergo videtur locutio vera, secundum quod accipitur pro persona Filii: ergo etc.
3. Item, iste terminus Deus, quantum est de se, supponit pro qualibet persona6; sed si genuit restringeret significationem termini, tunc significatio restringeretur ad personam generantem: ergo ipsa locutio redderetur falsa.
4. Item, contradictorie opposita sunt vera de quolibet sub disiunctione, quia de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio7: ergo si Deus genuit Deum, aut Deum qui est Pater, aut Deum qui non est Pater. Si Deum qui est Pater, ergo genitus est generans; si Deum qui non est Pater: sed quod implicatur contingit simpliciter inferri, ut si dicatur: homo qui non currit, disputat, ergo homo non currit: ergo similiter, si genuit Deum qui non est Pater, Deus non est Pater; sed si non est Pater, non generat: ergo etc.
Conclusio
Locutio «Deus genuit Deum», salva essentiae unitate, concedenda est, quod quatuor regulis probatur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedicta locutio, salva essentiae unitate, recipitur tam a magistris quam a Sanctis. Ad cuius intelligentiam quatuor regulae sunt notandae.
Prima est, quod nomen abstractum imponitur formae et a forma, ut albedo imponitur ipsi albedini8 et a forma albedinis; nomen vero concretum imponitur a forma, sed non formae, sed supposito: ut album imponitur a forma albedinis, sed non formae, sed supposito, ut alicui rei albae, homini vel cygno9.
Secunda regula est, quod terminus habens multitudinem suppositorum, sine distributione acceptus, stat pro quolibet suppositorum, et locutio redditur vera, si verificetur in uno.
Tertia regula est, quod terminus positus a parte subiecti restringitur ratione praedicati quantum ad suppositionem, non tamen quantum ad significationem.
Quarta regula est ista, quod relativum refert antecedens sub eodem modo supponendi, sub quo antecedens praecessit ipsum relativum, nisi faciat relationem simplicem.
1. Ex prima regula patet responsio ad primum. Cum enim iste terminus Deus sit concretus, etsi10 imponatur a forma essentiali, scilicet deitate, tamen imponitur personae sive supposito, sicut album imponitur ab albedine rei albae; et ideo supponit pro persona, cum sit terminus concretus11. Et sic haec locutio Deus genuit Deum est vera, quia verificatur pro persona Patris et Filii.
2. Ex secunda regula patet responsio ad secundum: quia Deus stat pro qualibet persona, sed verificatur12 in una sola — persona Patris generantis et persona Filii geniti — et sic locutio est vera.
3. Ex tertia regula patet solutio13 ad tertium: genuit restringit Deus quantum ad suppositionem (non ad significationem), ita ut stet pro Patre; et similiter Deum14 in praedicato stat pro Filio. Significatio termini manet communis.
4. Ex quarta regula patet responsio ad quartum: disiunctio aut Deum qui est Pater, aut Deum qui non est Pater non habet locum eodem modo in divinis, ubi unio essentiae et distinctio personarum coexistunt15. Per distinctionem ex parte praedicati solvitur in dubio II.
I. In gratiam lectorum, qui in antiqua logica minus sunt exercitati, iuvat hic ponere explicationem aliquorum vocabulorum, quae in hac quaestione et alibi in hoc opere saepe occurrunt. Sumtae sunt hae et aliae multae alibi in notis positae explicationes magna ex parte ex Summulis Petri Hispani, quae tempore S. Bonaventurae in manibus scholarium erant. Postquam Petrus multa de rebus philosophicis et medicina scripsit, a. 1275 electus est in Summum Pontificem et assumpsit nomen Ioannis XXI. Mortuus est 16 Maii 1277. Plura videri possunt in quovis libro de logica scholastica tractante.
1. Aliud est significatio, aliud suppositio alicuius termini. Significatio est repraesentatio rei per vocem, et convenit omnibus vocabulis tam substantivis quam reliquis, sive in propositione, sive extra propositionem.
Suppositio, ut vult Petrus Hisp., tract. de Suppositione, «est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo», intellige, de quo vel de quibus huiusmodi terminus in aliqua propositione verificatur; v. g. terminus homo potest supponere vel pro homine in communi, ut in propositione: homo est species; vel pro suis inferioribus sub hac specie comprehensis, v. g. homo currit. Suppositionum alia est communis, alia discreta; illa fit per terminum communem, ut homo est mortalis; haec per terminum discretum (concretum), ut Socrates, vel per communem sed determinatum per pronomen demonstrativum, ut iste homo.
Aliae divisiones suppositionis apud S. Bonav. occurrentes sunt: suppositio simplex et personalis. Illa est acceptio termini communis pro re universali significata per ipsum terminum communem, ut cum dicitur: homo est species; animal est genus. Tunc terminus homo supponit pro homine in communi, et non pro quolibet inferiore; unde non licet facere descensum, uti dicunt, sic arguendo: homo est species; ergo aliquis homo est species. Personalis vero suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro suis inferioribus, ut cum dicitur: homo currit; hic iste terminus homo supponit pro suis inferioribus. — Personalium suppositionum alia est determinata, alia est confusa. Determinata est acceptio termini communis indefinite sumpti, vel cum signo particulari, ut homo currit, vel aliquis homo currit; et dicitur determinata, quia licet in utraque istarum propositionum ille terminus homo supponat pro omni homine tam currente quam non currente, tamen uno solo homine currente, propositio est vera; et quia aliud est supponere et aliud locutionem veram vel falsam esse pro aliquo, igitur in praedictis iste terminus homo supponit pro omni homine currente et non currente, licet reddat locutionem veram pro uno solo currente… Confusa suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro pluribus, mediante signo universali, ut cum dicitur: omnis homo est animal; quia supponit terminus homo pro quolibet suo supposito. Ita Petrus Hisp.; alii quoad confusam et determinatam suppositionem rem paulo aliter explicant.
2. Distributio est acceptio termini communis pro suis significatis, sive est multiplicatio termini communis virtute alicuius signi universalis; v. g. in propositione omnis homo currit, terminus homo distribuitur (sive confunditur) pro omnibus hominibus virtute illius vocabuli omnis, quod signum distributivum appellatur.
3. Restrictio est coarctatio termini communis a maiore suppositione sive extensione ad minorem; sic homo albus non significat omnes homines, sed partem eorum.
4. Reddere locutionem veram significat, quod in propositione, in qua subiectum supponit pro pluribus disiunctive, sensus redditur verus per hoc, quod in uno saltem supposito verificatur; v. g. propositio homo currit redditur vera, currente uno qualicumque. Unde reddere locutionem veram differt a restrictione termini ad unum, ut bene dicit S. Bonav. hic ad 2.
II. His suppositis, quatuor regulae logicales in corp. positae earumque applicatio in solutione obiectorum facile intelliguntur. Sic verba (ad 2): «quia si addatur distributio, confundet illum terminum pro omnibus», hunc sensum habent: si additur signum omnis termino homo, tunc confundet i. e. distribuet illum terminum, ita ut verificetur de omnibus hominibus; si vero terminus homo restringitur per albus, tunc non «confunderet nisi pro albis hominibus». — Pro intelligentia applicationis quartae regulae est notandum, quod est duplex relatio pronominis relativi ad suum nomen, scil. relatio simplex vel personalis. Per relationem simplicem pronomen relativum (qui, quae, quod) non refertur ad idem numero antecedens sive ad idem suppositum; bene vero per relationem personalem. Exemplum: «Mulier damnavit, quae salvavit»; hic relativum quae habet relationem simplicem, non personalem, quia alia mulierum persona damnavit, nempe Eva, alia salvavit, scil. SS. Virgo Maria. Unde S. Doctor recte concludit, quod in illata obiectione est figura dictionis, i. e. fallacia figurae dictionis, quia terminus sumitur sub diversa suppositione. De hoc plura vide dub. 3 huius dist.; Alex. Hal. p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, §. 4; Richard. a Med. hic q. 4.
III. Contra applicationem tertiae regulae ad Deum moverunt subtilem difficultatem Durand. (hic q. 2), Aureolus, Brulifer (hoc loco) aliique posteriores Scholastici. Negant enim, quod Deus sit proprie terminus singularis, cum aliquo modo sit etiam terminus communis, quod etiam S. Bonav. (infra q. 4) concedit. Inde concludunt, propositionem Deus non generat Deum posse concedi. Probatiores vero theologi, ut S. Thomas (S. I, q. 39, a. 4, ad 3), Richard. (hic q. 1) aliique cum nostro Seraphico (hic ad 3) locutionem hanc recte improbant. Cfr. Caietanus ad loc. S. Thomae cit.
IV. Quoad quaestionis solutionem omnes antiqui conveniunt. Cfr. S. Bonav. infra d. 9, q. 1. — Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 30, m. 3, a. 2, §§. 1, 4. — Scot., hic q. 1, ad 1. — S. Thom., hic qq. 1, 2; S. I, q. 39, a. 4. — B. Albert., hic aa. 6, 7; de hac et seqq. qq., S. p. I, tr. 43, q. 51. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2, a. 1 et 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 2 princ. q. unica. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seqq. qq., S. a. 54, q. 3. — Durand., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. 4.
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Single Article
On the comparison of the name «God» to generation, and on its consignification and supposition.
Question I
Whether this expression should be conceded: God begot God.
On the first point: that the expression «God begot God» is to be conceded —
1. It seems so through what is said in the Creed: God from God; but this is only through generation1: therefore God is generated from God: therefore this expression is to be conceded: «God begot God».
2. Likewise, generation is with respect to a likeness in nature — whence «man begets man»2 — so if in God there is generation, what is produced is a likeness in nature: therefore since the Father is God, He begets only God: therefore this is true: «God begets God».
3. Likewise, whatever the Son has, He has either from Himself or from another; but He has divinity, and not from Himself — for then He would be unbegotten — therefore He has it from another; but He has it only through generation, and3 He has divinity only from one who has divinity, and the one who has divinity is God: therefore, etc.
On the contrary:
1. The name God signifies essence or substance, since it is a substantial term4; but essence begets essence is not conceded — indeed, it is false; therefore likewise God begot God.
2. Likewise, the name God either supposits for every person, or determinately for some one. If determinately for some one, then its signification5 is restricted by something — and there is nothing that could restrict it except the verb begot or generates. But the rule is that a term placed in the predicate does not restrict the term on the side of the subject with respect to its signification: therefore it stands for every person. Therefore the expression does not seem true, according as it is taken for the person of the Son: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, this term God, so far as it depends on itself, supposits equally well6 for the Son as for the Father: therefore, since it belongs to the Son not to generate, just as it belongs to the Father to generate, then if this is true — «God generates» for the Father — by the same reasoning this too: «God does not generate» for the Son; if, then, this is not conceded, neither is the first.
4. Likewise, contradictorily opposed [propositions] are true of anything under disjunction, because of anything there is either affirmation or negation7: therefore if God begot God, then either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then the begotten is the begetter; if God who is not the Father — but what is implied can be simply inferred, as when it is said «the man who is not running is disputing; therefore the man is not running»: therefore likewise, if He begot God who is not the Father, God is not the Father; but if He is not the Father, He does not generate: therefore, etc.
Conclusion
The expression «God begot God», with the unity of essence preserved, is to be conceded — which is proved by four rules.
I respond: It must be said that the aforementioned expression, with the unity of essence preserved, is accepted by masters and saints alike. For understanding it, four rules must be noted.
The first is that an abstract name is imposed on a form and from a form — as whiteness is imposed on the whiteness itself8 and from the form of whiteness; but a concrete name is imposed from a form, yet not upon the form but upon the supposit — as white is imposed from the form of whiteness, yet not on the form, but on the supposit, on some white thing — a man or a swan9.
The second rule is that a term having a plurality of supposits, taken without distribution, stands for that [supposit] for which it renders the expression true — as when it is said «man is running», the expression is true for the one running, if there is someone running.
The third rule is that to a term having a non-multipliable form it makes no difference to prepose or to postpose the negation. Hence it makes no difference to say: «Peter is not running» and «not Peter is running».
The fourth rule is that a relative refers [back to] its antecedent under the same mode of supposition under which the antecedent preceded the relative — unless it makes a simple relation.
1. From the first rule is clear the response to the first. For since this term God is concrete, although10 it is imposed from the essential form — namely deity — it is nevertheless imposed on a person or supposit, just as white is imposed from whiteness on a white thing; and therefore it supposits and renders the expression true for a person, not for the form11. But the name essence or deity is abstract, and therefore it is imposed on a form and from a form — as whiteness — and so it signifies and supposits for the essence. And therefore this is false: «essence begets essence», because generation is not of form, but of supposit; but this is true: «God begot God», for a person.
2. From the second rule is clear the response to the second. Although the signification of the term is not restricted, yet it stands for that [supposit] for which the expression is true12 — as man is running for Peter or John, if for that one the expression is true; nor is it restricted to him. And this is clear, because if a distribution were added, it would confound that term for all; but if it were restricted, it would not confound except for those to which the restriction extended. Hence it is one thing for a term to be restricted to one, and another thing for it to render the expression true for one.
3. From the third rule is clear the solution13 to the third. For although this is true for the Father — «God generates God» — nevertheless this — «God does not generate God»14 — is not true for the Son. For since the term God expresses a form that is not multipliable, it makes no difference to prepose or to postpose the negation to it; and therefore — as the preposed negation wholly removes the predicate from the subject — so also the postposed negation totally removes the predicate from this term God, when it is said: «God does not generate», because it removes it from every supposit. And therefore it has a different mode of suppositing in the affirmative than in the negative: because in the affirmative the expression was true for the Father; but in the negative there can be no truth, because the negation totally removes that predicate.
4. From the fourth rule is clear the fourth. For since a relative wholly has the supposition of its antecedent, and this term God in the predicate supposits for God-as-begotten, the relative refers for him. And so the sense is: God begot God — who [as] God begotten is [either] the Father or not the Father — and this is true for the negative, nor is it licit to infer «therefore God is not the Father»; because the supposition is changed — indeed there is here a figure of speech (figure of diction)15.
I. For the benefit of readers who are less exercised in the old logic, it is helpful here to set out an explanation of certain terms that occur frequently in this question and elsewhere in this work. These and many other explanations given in notes elsewhere are taken in large part from the Summulae of Peter of Spain, which in St. Bonaventure's time were in the hands of scholars. After Peter had written many things on philosophical matters and medicine, he was in 1275 elected Supreme Pontiff and took the name John XXI. He died on 16 May 1277. Further details can be found in any book treating scholastic logic.
1. One thing is the signification, another the supposition of a term. Signification is the representation of a thing by a spoken word, and applies to all words — substantives and otherwise — whether in a proposition or outside one.
Supposition, as Peter of Spain holds (tract de Suppositione), «is the taking of a substantive term for something» — understand: for that (or those) of which the term is verified in some proposition; e.g., the term man can supposit either for man in general (as in the proposition man is a species) or for its inferiors comprised under this species (e.g. man runs). Of suppositions, one is common, another discrete: the former is made by a common term (man is mortal), the latter by a discrete (concrete) term such as Socrates, or by a common term made determinate by a demonstrative pronoun, such as this man.
Other divisions of supposition that occur in St. Bonaventure are: simple and personal supposition. Simple supposition is the taking of a common term for the universal thing signified by that common term — as when it is said man is a species, animal is a genus. Then man supposits for man-in-general, and not for any inferior; hence, one cannot descend by arguing thus: «man is a species; therefore some man is a species». Personal supposition, on the other hand, is the taking of a common term for its inferiors, as when it is said man runs; here man supposits for its inferiors. — Of personal suppositions one is determinate, another confused. Determinate supposition is the taking of a common term indefinitely, or with a particular sign — e.g. man runs, or some man runs; and it is called determinate because, although in each of these propositions the term man supposits for every man, whether running or not, yet with only one man running the proposition is true; and because to supposit is one thing and for an expression to be true or false for something is another, it follows that in the above cases the term man supposits for every man running and not running, although it renders the expression true for one single runner… Confused supposition is the taking of a common term for several, by means of a universal sign — as when it is said every man is an animal: for man supposits for every one of its supposits. So Peter of Spain; others explain the matter of confused and determinate supposition a little differently.
2. Distribution is the taking of a common term for all its significates — or the multiplication of a common term by virtue of some universal sign; e.g. in the proposition every man runs, the term man is distributed (or confused) for all men by virtue of the word every, which is called a distributive sign.
3. Restriction is the narrowing of a common term from a greater supposition or extension to a smaller one; thus white man does not signify all men but a part of them.
4. To render an expression true means that in a proposition, in which the subject supposits for many disjunctively, the sense is rendered true by the fact that in at least one supposit it is verified; e.g. the proposition man runs is rendered true when any one man at all is running. Hence to render an expression true differs from restriction of a term to one — as St. Bonaventure rightly says here, ad 2.
II. With these things presupposed, the four logical rules set out in the body, and their application in the solution of the objections, are easily understood. Thus the words (ad 2): «because if a distribution were added, it would confound that term for all», have this sense: if the sign every is added to the term man, then it would confound — i.e. distribute — that term, so that it is verified of all men; if on the other hand the term man is restricted by white, then it would «confound only for white men». — For understanding the application of the fourth rule, it should be noted that there is a twofold relation of the relative pronoun to its antecedent, namely simple or personal. Through simple relation the relative pronoun (qui, quae, quod) does not refer to the same numerical antecedent or to the same supposit — but well so through personal relation. Example: «The woman damned, who saved»; here the relative quae has a simple, not a personal, relation — because one woman (namely Eve) damned, another saved (namely the Blessed Virgin Mary). Hence the Holy Doctor rightly concludes that in the introduced objection there is a figure of speech (figure of diction) — a fallacy of the figure of diction — because the term is taken under diverse suppositions. On this see further dub. 3 of this distinction; Alexander of Hales, p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, §. 4; Richard of Middleton, here q. 4.
III. Against the application of the third rule to God, Durandus (here q. 2), Aureolus, Brulifer (at this passage) and other later Scholastics have raised a subtle difficulty. For they deny that God is properly a singular term, since it is in some manner also a common term — which St. Bonaventure himself (below q. 4) concedes. From this they conclude that the proposition God does not generate God can be conceded. But the more reliable theologians — such as St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 39, a. 4, ad 3), Richard (here q. 1), and others, together with our Seraphic (here ad 3) — rightly reject this expression. Cf. Cajetan on the cited place of St. Thomas.
IV. On the solution of the question, all the ancients agree. Cf. St. Bonaventure below d. 9, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 30, m. 3, a. 2, §§. 1, 4. — Scotus, here q. 1, ad 1. — St. Thomas, here qq. 1, 2; Summa I, q. 39, a. 4. — Blessed Albert, here aa. 6, 7; on this and the following questions, Summa p. I, tr. 43, q. 51. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, aa. 1 and 3. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 1. — Giles of Rome, on this and the next question, here 2 princ. q. unica. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following questions, Summa a. 54, q. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following questions, here q. 2. — Denys the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here q. 2. — Biel, on this and the next question, here q. 4.
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- Ex mss. et ed. 1 posuimus generationem loco gignitionem.From the mss. and ed. 1 we have put generationem («generation») in place of gignitionem.
- Aristot., VII Metaph. text. 28 (VI, 8): In quibusdam etenim etiam manifestum est, quod generans tale est, quale quod generatur… homo namque hominem generat. Cfr. II de Anima, text. 34 (c. 4).Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 28 (VI, 8): «For in some things it is even manifest that the generator is such as that which is generated… for a man begets a man». Cf. On the Soul II, text 34 (c. 4).
- Multi codd. ut A F G I K T etc. cum sex primis edd. sed loco et. Cod. R hanc propositionem ita exhibet: per generationem vel ab habente deitatem, sed habens.Many codd. (A F G I K T etc.) with the first six editions read sed for et. Cod. R presents this proposition thus: per generationem vel ab habente deitatem, sed habens.
- De significatione et suppositione huius nominis Deus, in quibus haec et seqq. obiectiones fundantur, vide infra q. 4. — In fine argumenti plures codd. ut A F G I K T etc. cum ed. 1 generat pro genuit.On the signification and supposition of this name God, on which this and the following objections are founded, see below q. 4. — At the end of the argument several codd. (A F G I K T etc.) with ed. 1 read generat for genuit.
- Codd. D H O (T ff in marg.) suppositio, quod et infra in responsione ad hanc obiectionem fere omnes codd. et sex primae edd. habent pro significatio; cod. I significatio vel suppositio. Sed vide regulam paulo infra ex Petr. Hisp. allatam. Mox multi codd. et ed. 1 non loco nec; cod. R sed non. Dein post significationis cod. X addit sed consignificationis, quod concordat cum regulae istius explicatione proposita a Petro Hispano, Summula, tract. de Restrictione: Nihil positum a parte praedicati potest restringere terminum communem positum a parte subiecti quoad principalem eius significationem, ut homo est albus… Dico autem, quoad principalem eius significationem, quia praedicatum restringit subiectum quoad consignificationem, quae est genus, v. g. masculinum.Codd. D H O (T ff in margin) read suppositio, and this reading is found in nearly all the codd. and the first six editions below in the reply to this objection, in place of significatio; cod. I reads significatio vel suppositio. But see the rule adduced a little below from Peter of Spain. Next, many codd. and ed. 1 read non for nec; cod. R sed non. Then after significationis cod. X adds sed consignificationis, which agrees with the explanation of this rule given by Peter of Spain, Summula, tract de Restrictione: «Nothing placed on the side of the predicate can restrict a common term placed on the side of the subject as regards its principal signification», as in homo est albus… «I say as regards its principal signification because the predicate restricts the subject with regard to consignification — which is gender, e.g. the masculine».
- Aliqui codd. ut T Z cum ed. 1 addunt et. Paulo infra post sicut codd. H Y omittunt et. Mox cod. Y ergo si haec est vera pro Patre, sic illa erit vera pro Filio, scilicet Deus non generat; si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, nec prima. Codd. aa bb circa finem argumenti: sed haec non conceditur, ergo nec prima; ed. 1 nec prima debet concedi; cod. Z si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, pariter nec illa conceditur pro Patre. — Plures codd. ut A C F I L M R S U ff hoc tertium argumentum omittunt, sed indebite, sicut patet ex responsione infra posita; cod. 0 vero illud praecedenti argumento circa finem post omni persona interserit sub hac forma: Item, si haec est vera: Deus generat Deum, pro persona Patris, multo fortius haec erit vera: Deus non generat Deum, pro persona Filii et Spiritus sancti; ergo a destructione consequentis, si haec nullo modo est concedenda, nec ista. Non ergo etc. Eadem fere verba exhibet cod. Z in fine huius tertii argumenti.Some codd. (T Z) with ed. 1 add et. A little later, after sicut, codd. H Y omit et. Next, cod. Y: «therefore if this is true for the Father, so that will be true for the Son, namely God does not generate; if, then, this is not conceded for the Son, neither the first». Codd. aa bb near the end of the argument: «but this is not conceded, therefore neither the first»; ed. 1: «neither should the first be conceded»; cod. Z: «if, then, this is not conceded for the Son, likewise that is not conceded for the Father». — Several codd. (A C F I L M R S U ff) omit this third argument, but unduly, as is clear from the response given below; cod. 0 inserts it in the preceding argument, near the end, after omni persona, in this form: Likewise, if this is true — God generates God — for the person of the Father, much more strongly will this be true — God does not generate God — for the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit; therefore, by destruction of the consequent, if this is in no way to be conceded, neither is that. Therefore, etc. Cod. Z gives nearly the same words at the end of this third argument.
- Cfr. Aristot., I Periherm. c. 6 et II c. 3, ubi agit de affirmatione, negatione et contradictione; et VI Topic. c. 3 circa medium (c. 6), ubi dicit: Nam de omni aut affirmatio, aut negatio vera est; et tandem IV Metaph. text. 15 (III, 4): De omni affirmatio, aut negatio.Cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation I, c. 6, and II, c. 3, where he treats of affirmation, negation, and contradiction; and Topics VI, c. 3 near the middle (c. 6), where he says: «For of anything, either the affirmation or the negation is true»; and finally Metaphysics IV, text 15 (III, 4): «Of anything, either the affirmation or the negation».
- Plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. omittunt ipsi albedini et, sed male, uti ex contextu patet.Most codd. with the first six editions omit ipsi albedini et, but badly, as is clear from the context.
- Praedictarum regularum prima insinuatur ab Aristot., VII Metaph. text. 21 et 27 ac IX Metaph. text. 12 (VI, c. 6, 8 et VIII, c. 7); secunda habetur in Petri Hisp. Summula, tract. de Suppos. et Distrib.; tertia in opusculo, quod etiam Petro Hisp. attribuitur, scil. Parvorum Logicalium, tract. de Negat. et Affirm. c. 1; quarta in eiusdem Summula, tract. de Relatione.The first of the aforesaid rules is intimated by Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, texts 21 and 27, and IX, text 12 (VI, cc. 6 and 8, and VIII, c. 7); the second is found in Peter of Spain's Summula, tract de Suppos. and de Distrib.; the third in the opusculum also attributed to Peter of Spain, namely Parvorum Logicalium, tract de Negat. et Affirm. c. 1; the fourth in his Summula, tract de Relatione.
- Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus etsi loco et. Mox cod. X post deitate habet non tamen imponitur formae, sed personae.From most mss. and ed. 1 we have substituted etsi for et. Next, cod. X after deitate has non tamen imponitur formae, sed personae.
- Ex illo generali principio: Actiones sunt suppositorum.From that general principle: «Actions belong to supposits».
- Id est, facit supponere. — Paulo ante cod. R subiectum pro illum.That is, it makes [the term] supposit. — A little earlier, cod. R reads subiectum in place of illum.
- Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus responsio in solutio et paulo post non multiplicabilem in immultiplicabilem.From the older mss. and ed. 1 we have changed responsio to solutio, and a little later non multiplicabilem to immultiplicabilem.
- Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 Deus. Paulo ante cod. K: modo negativo relativum non habeat suppositionem aliam a posito antecedente.From the mss. and ed. 1 we have supplied Deus. A little earlier, cod. K: «in the negative mode the relative does not have a supposition other than the posited antecedent».
- Cod. K addit sicut hic: Deus genitus non est Pater: ergo Deus non est Pater.Cod. K here adds: «God begotten is not the Father; therefore God is not the Father».