← Back to Distinction 4

Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 4

Textus Latinus
p. 99

QUAESTIO II. Utrum admitti possit haec locutio: Deus generat alium Deum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum unitas essentiae admittat hanc: Deus generat alium Deum. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Anselmus de Processione Spiritus sancti1: «Cum dicimus Deum de Deo, non intelligimus alium Deum, sed eundem de se ipso».

2. Item, si genuit alium Deum — sed ubi est unus et alius, ibi sunt duo: ergo si genuit alium, sunt duo dii.

3. Item, alius dicit alietatem in generali; ergo cum generale specificetur per adiunctum, hoc nomen Deus specificat ipsum; sed si specificat, specificat ratione formae: ergo notatur alietas in forma: ergo non est admittenda talis locutio, cum non sit ibi alietas in forma.

Sed contra.

1. Generatio importat distinctionem2; sed distinctio alietatem aliquam: ergo et generatio; ergo si haec est vera: Deus genuit Deum, et haec per consequens: Deus distinguitur a Deo, vel genuit alium Deum. Si dicas, quod non sequatur, quia generare importat distinctionem ut modum, sed distingui vel esse alium ut rem; contra: ad

p. 100

consequentiam ut modum sequitur consecutio ut res; unde si haec est vera: si homo est, animal est3, ad hominem sequitur animal. Et praeterea, constat quod distinctio generationis non tantum est a parte intelligentis, verum etiam a parte rei: ergo illi distinctioni ut exercitae respondet distinctio realis.

2. Item, affirmativa est falsa: Deus genitus est Deus generans; ergo negativa est vera: Deus genitus non est Deus generans. Sed sicut affirmativa significat identitatem, ita negativa diversitatem: ergo sicut Deum generantem et genitum contingit ad invicem comparari mediante negatione, ita mediante alietate: ergo haec est vera: Deus genuit alium Deum.

3. Item, Pater sive Deus genuit alium; haec est vera, constat: ergo aut alium Deum, aut alium non Deum; sed non alium non Deum: ergo etc.

4. Item, alius est terminus masculini generis4; sed terminus masculini generis stat pro persona in partitivis terminis: ergo alius dicit alietatem personalem; sed haec est vera: Deus genuit Deum alium in persona; ergo simpliciter est vera haec: Deus genuit alium Deum.

Conclusio.

In stricto verborum sensu falsa est locutio: Deus genuit alium Deum.

Respondeo. Dicendum, quod haec consuevit distingui: Deus genuit alium Deum, quia alius potest teneri adiective; et sic ponit alietatem circa formam istius termini Deus, et sic locutio est falsa; potest etiam teneri substantive5, ut substantivetur; et tunc est appositiva constructio, sicut animal homo, et est sensus hoc modo: Deus genuit alium Deum, id est, genuit alium qui est Deus; et in hoc sensu est locutio vera.

Sed licet ista distinctio in locutionibus theologicis propter quendam proprium modum loquendi locum habeat, tamen quantum esset de virtute6 sermonis, non esset distinguenda; quia adiectivum adiunctum substantivo, ut homo albus, non dicitur substantivari, nec appositiva constructio dicitur ibi esse7, maxime cum illa sit minus communis respectu magis communis. Unde cum hoc nomen alius sit adiectivum habens substantivum coniunctum, in praedicta locutione ponit alietatem circa ipsum ratione suppositi et formae.

Et propterea, si velimus artificialiter8 procedere, iudicanda est talis locutio falsa. Propter hoc ad intelligentiam dictae locutionis notanda est regula communis: non habet locum9 distinctio, ubi non est ex diversis causis unio — verbi gratia, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus uniuntur in hoc nomine Deus, non ex diversis causis sive ratione diversorum, sed ratione unius deitatis sive essentiae. Unio ex diversis causis est, ut in homine uniuntur Petrus et Ioannes ratione diversarum humanitatum, quia alia est humanitas Petri, et alia Ioannis.

Et iuxta hanc regulam ab oppositis10 est alia regula accipienda: non habet locum omnimoda unio, ubi est simul cum unione distinctio, ut Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus uniuntur in una deitate sive essentia, sed distinctionem habent ratione pluralitatis personarum.

Secundum hoc est attendendum, quod in divinis quaedam vocabula important distinctionem solum, quaedam omnimodam unionem, quaedam medio modo. Quoniam igitur Deus generans et Deus genitus, etsi sint personaliter distincti, tamen in deitate uniuntur ex eadem causa, quia una deitate: ideo non recipiuntur11 nomina importantia simpliciter distinctionem. Ideo haec non admittitur: Deus distinguitur a Deo; similiter: Deus genuit alium Deum. Item, ratione distinctionis non recipiuntur vocabula omnimodam importantia unionem in supposito et forma: unde haec non recipitur: Deus genuit se. Sed illa quae medio modo se habent, recipiuntur, quale est hoc verbum generat, quia dicit distinctionem in persona cum12 unitate essentiae. Similiter haec conceditur: Pater generat alterum se. Unde Augustinus ad Maximinum13: «Pater genuit alterum se»; et similiter super Ioannem: «Pater mittens Filium misit alterum se». Et ex hoc est, quod non sequitur ad verbum simpliciter importans distinctionem; et sic patet primum.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur de negatione, bene concedo, quod est alietas; sed tamen non sequitur, quod possit dici alietas in essentia sive forma deitatis. Unde non sequitur: genitus est alius a generante, ergo14 alius Deus, quia mutatur suppositio huius termini Deus.

p. 101

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio: aut alium Deum, aut alium non Deum; dico, quod non sufficienter dividit; quia non est contradictio, nisi accipiatur negatio respectu totius. In hac enim: genuit alium Deum, duo dicuntur, scilicet quod Deus15 Deum, et quod alium in deitate: et ideo ad hoc, quod sumatur contradictio, necesse est, quod feratur supra totum. Unde sicut non valet, demonstrato monacho nigro qui est albus per naturam: iste aut est albus monachus, aut albus non monachus, quia utraque falsa; similiter intelligendum est in proposito. Nec valet: est Deus et est alius: ergo est Deus alius; immo est ibi accidens, sicut hic: est bonus et est citharoedus: ergo est bonus citharoedus16.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, dicendum, quod alius, quamvis sit masculini generis, tamen quia ponit rem circa substantivum17, ab illo trahit suppositionem; et ideo non tenetur personaliter, nisi secundum quod substantivatur, sicut et hoc nomen unus; unde sicut si dicatur unus Deus, unus dicit unitatem substantialem, ita si dicatur alius Deus, alius dicit alietatem substantialem. Et ratio huius venit non tantum quia adiectivum, sed quia generale, quod specificatur per adiunctum.

Scholion

I. Distinctionem in principio responsionis positam — quod alius hic possit teneri vel adiective vel substantive (nempe ut appositio) — S. Doctor improbat, cum sit regula grammaticorum, quod adiectivum, si immediate sibi coniunctum habet substantivum, non potest accipi ut substantivum sive ut appositio. Si autem alius est adiectivum, tunc valet regula logicae, quod alius, quando immediate ad suum subiectivum ponitur, importat [alietatem] circa suum substantivum tum ratione suppositi, tum ratione formae. Consequenter in casu nostro hic terminus importaret diversitatem in Deitate.

II. In conclusione et solutione obiectorum principales doctores conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 2. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. I, q. 31, a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.

---

English Translation
p. 99

Question 2. Whether this expression can be admitted: God generates another God.

Second, it is asked whether the unity of essence admits this: God generates another God. And it seems that it does not.

1. Anselm, On the Procession of the Holy Spirit1: "When we say God from God, we do not understand another God, but the same [God] from himself."

2. Again, if he generated another God — but where there is one and another, there are two: therefore if he generated another, there are two gods.

3. Again, another (alius) expresses otherness in general; therefore, since the general is specified by what is attached, the name God specifies it; but if it specifies, it specifies by reason of form: therefore otherness is marked in the form: therefore such an expression is not to be admitted, since there is no otherness in form.

On the contrary.

1. Generation imports distinction2; but distinction imports some otherness: therefore so does generation; therefore if this is true — God generated God — then by consequence this is also true: God is distinguished from God, or he generated another God. If you say that it does not follow, because to generate imports distinction as a mode but to be distinguished or to be another [imports it] as a thing; against [this]: upon

p. 100

a consequence [taken] as a mode there follows a consecution [taken] as a thing — whence if this is true: if a man exists, an animal exists3, from the [existing] man there follows the animal. Moreover, it is clear that the distinction of generation is not only on the side of the one understanding it, but also on the side of the thing: therefore to that distinction, as actually exercised, there corresponds a real distinction.

2. Again, the affirmative is false: God begotten is God begetting; therefore the negative is true: God begotten is not God begetting. But just as the affirmative signifies identity, so the negative signifies diversity: therefore, just as God begetting and [God] begotten can be compared to each other by means of a negation, so too by means of otherness: therefore this is true: God generated another God.

3. Again, the Father — that is, God — generated another; this is true, it is clear: therefore either another God, or another not-God; but not another not-God: therefore etc.

4. Again, another (alius) is a term of the masculine gender4; but a term of the masculine gender stands for a person in partitive terms: therefore another expresses personal otherness; but this is true: God generated another God in person; therefore this is simply true: God generated another God.

Conclusion.

In the strict sense of the words, this expression is false: God generated another God.

Reply. I answer that this expression is customarily distinguished: God generated another God — because another can be taken adjectivally, and thus it places otherness around the form of this term God, and in that case the expression is false; or it can also be taken substantively5, so as to be substantivized, and then it is an appositive construction, like animal-man — and the sense is thus: God generated another [who is] God, that is, he generated another who is God; and in this sense the expression is true.

But although this distinction has a place in theological expressions on account of a certain proper mode of speaking, nevertheless, so far as concerns the force6 of the discourse, it ought not to be drawn; since an adjective attached to a substantive — as white man — is not said to be substantivized, nor is an appositive construction said to obtain there7, especially since such [a construction] is less common with respect to what is more common. Whence, since this term another is an adjective having a substantive joined to it, in the aforesaid expression it places otherness around it [the substantive] both by reason of supposit and by reason of form.

And therefore, if we wish to proceed artificially8 — i.e. by the rules of the [liberal] arts — such an expression is to be judged false. On this account, for understanding the said expression, a common rule is to be noted: distinction has no place9 where there is not union from diverse causes. For example, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are united in the name God not from diverse causes, or by reason of diverse [things], but by reason of one deity, i.e. essence. Union from diverse causes obtains, as [when] in "man" Peter and John are united by reason of diverse humanities, since the humanity of Peter is one, and of John another.

And alongside this rule, taken from opposites10, another rule is to be received: total union has no place where, together with union, there is distinction — as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are united in one deity or essence, but have distinction by reason of the plurality of persons.

According to this, it is to be noted that in divine [matters] certain terms import distinction only, certain ones total union, and certain ones [stand] in a middle mode. Since, therefore, God begetting and God begotten, although they are personally distinct, are nonetheless united in deity from the same cause — namely by one deity — therefore terms importing distinction simply are not received11. For this reason this is not admitted: God is distinguished from God; and likewise: God generated another God. Again, by reason of distinction, terms importing total union in supposit and form are not received: whence this is not received: God generated himself. But those [terms] which stand in a middle mode are received — such as the verb to generate, because it expresses distinction in person together with12 unity of essence. Likewise this is conceded: the Father generates another himself. Whence Augustine to Maximinus13: "The Father generated another himself"; and likewise on John: "The Father, sending the Son, sent another himself." And from this it is the case that [a thing] does not follow upon a word simply importing distinction; and so the first [objection] is clear.

Reply to 2. To the second objection concerning negation, I readily grant that there is otherness; yet it does not follow that otherness can be said to obtain in the essence or form of deity. Whence it does not follow: the begotten is other than the begetter, therefore14 he is another God, because the supposition of this term God shifts.

p. 101

Reply to 3. To the objection made third — either another God, or another not-God — I say that the division is not sufficient, because there is no contradiction unless the negation is taken with respect to the whole. For in this [expression] — he generated another God — two things are said, namely that God15 [generated] God, and that [the begotten is] another in deity; and therefore, in order that a contradiction may be reached, it is necessary that [the negation] be carried over the whole. Whence, just as — when a black monk who is white by nature is pointed out — this does not hold: he is either a white monk, or a white not-monk, since both are false, so is it to be understood in the case at hand. Nor does this hold: he is God and he is another: therefore he is another God — indeed, there is an accident [fallacy] there, as here: he is good and he is a citharist: therefore he is a good citharist16.

Reply to 4. To the last objection, it must be said that another (alius), although it is of the masculine gender, nevertheless — because it places a thing around the substantive17 — draws its supposition from it; and therefore it is not taken personally, except insofar as it is substantivized, as is also the term one. Whence, just as, if one says one God, one expresses substantial unity, so if one says another God, another expresses substantial otherness. And the reason for this comes not only from its being an adjective, but from its being a general [term] which is specified by what is attached [to it].

Scholion

I. The Holy Doctor rejects the distinction set out at the beginning of the Reply — namely, that another here could be taken either adjectivally or substantively (i.e., as an apposition) — since the rule of the grammarians is that an adjective, if it has a substantive immediately joined to it, cannot be taken as a substantive or as an apposition. If, then, another is an adjective, the rule of logic holds: another, when placed immediately adjacent to its subject, imports [otherness] around its substantive both by reason of supposit and by reason of form. Consequently, in our case this term would import diversity in [the] Deity.

II. On the conclusion and on the solution of the objections, the principal doctors agree: Alexander of Hales, Summa pt. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 2. — Scotus, here q. 1. — Thomas Aquinas, here a. 3; Summa theologiae I, q. 31, a. 2. — Albert the Great, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 24: Nam cum dicimus Deum de Deo, Filium de Patre, non alium intelligimus Deum de Deo alio, sed eundem ipsum Deum de eodem ipso Deo. — Codd. cum Vat. falso ponunt in Proslogio.
    Ch. 24: "For when we say God from God, Son from Father, we do not understand another God [coming] from another God, but the same very God from the same very God." — The codices, along with Vat., wrongly cite [this passage as being] in the Proslogion.
  2. Nam ut ait Arist., De Anima II, text. 47 (c. 4): Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum. — De propositione minore Arist., Metaph. XIV, c. 3 (XIII, c. 1): Alterum (contrarium est) eidem, et aliud ipsi (αὐτῷ). — In hac propositione minore Vat. et loco sed, obstantibus mss. et ed. 1.
    For, as Aristotle says, On the Soul II, text 47 (ch. 4): "Nothing generates itself." — On the minor proposition, Aristotle, Metaphysics XIV, ch. 3 (XIII, ch. 1): "The other (is contrary) to the same, and the another [is contrary] to it itself (autō)." — In this minor proposition, Vat. reads et ("and") in place of sed ("but"), against the mss. and ed. 1.
  3. Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum etiam; cod. 1 autem addit similiter haec est vera. Cod. O post homo est addit ergo. — Plura de hac consequentia vide apud Boeth., de Syllogismo hypothetico.
    On the authority of the mss. and ed. 1, we have struck out etiam ("also") here added; but cod. 1 adds similiter haec est vera ("likewise this is true"). Cod. O after homo est ("man exists") adds ergo ("therefore"). — For more on this consequence, see Boethius, On the Hypothetical Syllogism.
  4. Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene qui loco sed terminus masculini generis; et circa finem argumenti similiter loco simpliciter.
    Vat., against the older mss. and ed. 1, less well reads qui in place of sed terminus masculini generis ("but a term of the masculine gender"); and near the end of the argument, similiter ("likewise") in place of simpliciter ("simply").
  5. Ed. 1 sic ut. Cod. R et si substantivetur tunc.
    Ed. 1 reads sic ut ("thus, as"). Cod. R reads et si substantivetur tunc ("and if it is substantivized, then").
  6. Aliqui codd. ut R cc veritate, et paulo infra plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. iunctum pro adiunctum.
    Some codices, such as R and cc, read veritate ("the truth") [in place of virtute, "the force"]; and a little further on, very many codices with ed. 1 — against Vat. — read iunctum ("joined") in place of adiunctum ("attached").
  7. Sensus est: maxime cum appositiva constructio fiat coniunctione termini minus communis cum magis communi.
    The sense is: especially since an appositive construction comes about through the joining of a less common term with a more common one.
  8. Hoc est, stricte secundum regulas artium, scilicet grammaticae et logicae.
    That is, strictly according to the rules of the [liberal] arts — namely, of grammar and of logic.
  9. Codd. cum primis sex edd. omittunt omnimoda, quod a Vat. termino distinctio praefigitur.
    The codices, with the first six editions, omit omnimoda ("of every kind"), which Vat. prefixes to the term distinctio ("distinction").
  10. Vat. praeter fidem codd. et ed. 1 opposito.
    Vat., against the fidelity of the codices and ed. 1, reads opposito ("from the opposite" — singular).
  11. Fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus recipiuntur loco recipiunt. Paulo infra multi codd. omittunt similiter.
    On the fidelity of the mss. and ed. 1, we have substituted recipiuntur (passive, "are received") in place of recipiunt (active, "they receive"). A little further on, many codices omit similiter ("likewise").
  12. Cod. X distinctionem personarum in.
    Cod. X reads distinctionem personarum in ("a distinction of persons in").
  13. Vide in lit. Magistri, c. 2 in fine; et super Ioannem, c. 3, Tract. 14, n. 11: Pater mittens Filium se alterum misit.
    See the text of the Master [Peter Lombard], ch. 2 at the end; and [Augustine] on John, ch. 3, Tractate 14, n. 11: "The Father, sending the Son, sent himself as another."
  14. Codd. M X addunt est.
    Codd. M, X add est ("is").
  15. Cod. R addit genuit.
    Cod. R adds genuit ("[he] generated").
  16. Exemplum sumtum est ex Arist., Periherm. II, c. 2 (c. 11), ubi secundum translationem Boethii habetur: si citharoedus est et bonus, est et citharoedus bonus, licet aliae translationes ponunt coriarius (σκυτεύς) pro citharoedus. — De hac fallacia accidentis vide supra d. 2, q. 1 ad 1.
    The example is taken from Aristotle, On Interpretation II, ch. 2 (ch. 11), where according to Boethius's translation it reads: "if he is a citharist and [is] good, he is also a good citharist"; although other translations give coriarius ("leather-worker," skuteus) in place of citharoedus ("citharist"). — On this fallacy of accident, see above, d. 2, q. 1 ad 1.
  17. Vat. hic subiectum loco substantivum, et paulo infra post substantivatur ponit Sicut ergo, cum dicitur unus Deus, hoc nomen unus dicit unitatem, sed contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1.
    Vat. here reads subiectum ("subject") in place of substantivum ("substantive"); and a little further on, after substantivatur, Vat. inserts Sicut ergo, cum dicitur unus Deus, hoc nomen unus dicit unitatem ("Just as, therefore, when one God is said, this name one expresses unity") — but against the older codices and ed. 1. ---
Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 1Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 3