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Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 4

Textus Latinus
p. 103

Quaestio IV

Utrum hoc nomen «Deus» de se supponat personam vel naturam.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur de suppositione huius nominis Deus. Et quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen Deus de se supponat personam vel naturam. Et quod personam, videtur:

1. Per illud Ambrosii super Benedicat nos Deus Deus noster, benedicat nos Deus1, Ambrosius: «Trina Dei confessio Trinitatem indicat personarum»; ergo cum Deus sit ibi sine adiuncto, de se supponit personam.

2. Item, ratione obiicitur sic: Hoc nomen homo proprie2 supponit pro omni eo, cui inest humanitas: ergo a simili et hoc nomen Deus pro omni eo, cui inest deitas; sed hoc est persona: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc nomen Deus significat deitatem in concretione; sed non nisi in concretione ad suppositum, quod est persona; sed terminus concretus proprie supponit pro eo, respectu cuius importat formam, ut album magis proprie supponit pro re alba quam pro forma: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Sicut se habet homo ad hominem in supposito, ita Deus ad Deum3; sed homo proprie supponit pro natura humana communi, non pro persona: ergo similiter Deus pro natura divina.

2. Item, quia iste terminus homo proprie4 supponit pro persona nulla, sed pro communi, ita et iste terminus Deus.

3. Item, terminus, qui proprie supponit personam, addito sibi termino partitivo, stat solum pro uno, ut cum dicitur: unus homo currit: ergo similiter, cum dicitur unus Deus: ergo haec est simpliciter falsa: unus Deus est Pater et Filius.

Conclusio

Nomen «Deus», cum habeat naturam et termini communis et termini singularis, potest proprie supponere tam naturam quam personam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hic consuevit esse duplex opinio.

Una quidem est, quod hoc nomen Deus significat proprie naturam et supponit personam, aliquando unam5, ut cum dicitur: Deus generat, aliquando duas, ut cum dicitur: Deus spirat, aliquando tres, ut cum dicitur: Deus est Trinitas. Et ratio huius est, ut dicunt, quia cum habeat multa supposita, habet naturam termini communis; terminus autem communis supponit pro suis inferioribus.

Altera vero opinio est, quod Deus proprie supponit pro natura communi, non pro persona.

p. 104

Tertia media sententia, cui favet S. Doctor, tenet quod6 Deus proprie supponit tam naturam quam personam. Tamen rationes ad utramque partem concludunt verum suo modo. Hoc autem non potest in alio7 termino inveniri, et ideo nec consimilis modus supponendi. Ratio est, quod Deus habet naturam et termini communis (quia habet tria supposita) et termini singularis sive discreti (quia significat unam naturam incommunicabiliter possessam a tribus).

Scholion

I. De differentia inter significationem et suppositionem cfr. Scholion hic ad q. 1. Terminus discretus, de quo loquitur S. Bonav., idem est ac terminus singularis et significat aliquod incommunicabile. Unde «terminus singularis idem significat et supponit» (S. Thom. S. I. q. 39. a. 4.). Terminus vero communis non oportet semper supponere pro eo quod per se significat, v. g. in propositione: homo currit, non supponit homo pro natura communi humana, sed pro aliquo indeterminato individuo.

II. Licet antiqui doctores de hac quaestione diversis modis loquantur, in re tamen parum dissentire videntur. S. Bonav. praefert tertiam sententiam, quae mediam viam tenet. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 3. — Scot., hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. I. q. 39. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Question IV

Whether the name «God» of itself supposits for a person or for the nature.

Fourth and last, a question is asked concerning the supposition of this name God. And it is asked whether this name God of itself supposits for a person or for the nature. And that it supposits for a person seems evident:

1. Through that statement of Ambrose on May God, our God, bless us; may God bless us1: «The threefold confession of God indicates the Trinity of persons»; therefore, since God stands there without any adjunct, of itself it supposits for a person.

2. Likewise, it is objected by reason thus: this name man properly2 supposits for everything in which humanity inheres: therefore, by a similar reasoning, this name God [supposits] for everything in which deity inheres; but this is a person: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, this name God signifies deity in concretion; but only in concretion to a supposit, which is a person; but a concrete term properly supposits for that with respect to which it imports the form — as white more properly supposits for a white thing than for the form: therefore, etc.

On the contrary:

1. As man stands to man-in-a-supposit, so God [stands] to God3; but man properly supposits for the common human nature, not for a person: therefore, likewise, God for the divine nature.

2. Likewise, because this term man properly4 supposits for no person but for what is common, so too this term God.

3. Likewise, a term that properly supposits for a person, when a partitive term is added to it, stands for one only — as when it is said one man is running: therefore, likewise, when it is said one God: therefore this is simply false: «one God is the Father and the Son».

Conclusion

Since the name «God» has the nature both of a common term and of a singular term, it can properly supposit both for the nature and for a person.

I respond: It must be said that here there have been customarily two opinions.

The first is that this name God properly signifies the nature and supposits for a person — sometimes for one5, as when it is said «God generates»; sometimes for two, as when it is said «God spirates»; sometimes for three, as when it is said «God is Trinity». And the reason for this, they say, is that, since it has many supposits, it has the nature of a common term; and a common term supposits for its inferiors.

The other opinion is that God properly supposits for the common nature, not for a person.

A third, middle opinion — which the Holy Doctor favors — holds that6 God properly supposits both for the nature and for a person. Yet the reasons on both sides conclude truly in their own way. But this cannot be found in any other7 term, and therefore neither can any similar mode of suppositing. The reason is that God has the nature both of a common term (because it has three supposits) and of a singular or discrete term (because it signifies one nature incommunicably possessed by three).

Scholion

I. On the difference between signification and supposition, cf. the Scholion here at q. 1. A discrete term, of which St. Bonaventure speaks, is the same as a singular term, and signifies something incommunicable. Hence «the singular term signifies and supposits for the same thing» (St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 39, a. 4). A common term, however, need not always supposit for that which it signifies per se — e.g. in the proposition man runs, man does not supposit for the common human nature, but for some indeterminate individual.

II. Although the ancient doctors speak of this question in diverse ways, in substance they seem to disagree little. St. Bonaventure prefers the third opinion, which holds the middle way. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 3. — Scotus, here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here a. 4; Summa I, q. 39, a. 4. — Blessed Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Psalm. 66, 7–8. — Verba, quae hic a S. Doctore attribuuntur S. Ambrosio, eidem etiam a Magistro supra d. II, c. 4 adscribuntur. In ipsis verbis Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 professio loco confessio.
    Psalm 66 (67), vv. 7–8. — The words here attributed by the Holy Doctor to St. Ambrose are also ascribed to him by the Master above at d. II, c. 4. In the words themselves the Vatican ed., against the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, reads professio («profession») for confessio («confession»).
  2. Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus proprie. Paulo ante plures codd. cum ed. 1 ostenditur pro obiicitur.
    From the mss. and ed. 1 we have supplied proprie. A little earlier, several codd. with ed. 1 read ostenditur for obiicitur.
  3. Priscian., XVII Grammat. c. 2: Substantiam enim significat loco nominis positum pronomen, et personam verbo sibi adiuncto congruam indicat.
    Priscian, Institutes of Grammar XVII, c. 2: «For a pronoun placed in the place of a noun signifies substance, and indicates the person congruent with the verb joined to it».
  4. Vat. hic omittit proprie, et paulo post habet dicamus loco dicatur, sed obest auctoritas mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican ed. here omits proprie, and a little later has dicamus for dicatur, but against the authority of the mss. and ed. 1.
  5. Plerique codd. ut A C F G I K L O R X Z una. Paulo infra Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 solverunt; aliqui tamen codd. ut K P Q X legunt solvuntur.
    Most codd. (A C F G I K L O R X Z) read una. A little later the Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, reads solverunt; some codd. (K P Q X) read solvuntur.
  6. Ita fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1, in quorum lectione quod refertur ad paulo supra positum dicere utrumque. Vat. loco quod ponit ideo, cuius lectionis sensus explicatur codice Z et ideo dico quod proprie. Paulo infra codd. O bb Unde pro Tamen.
    So nearly all the codd. with ed. 1, in whose reading quod refers back to dicere utrumque a little above. The Vatican ed. puts ideo in place of quod; the sense of this reading is explained in cod. Z by reading dico quod proprie. A little later codd. O bb read Unde for Tamen.
  7. Cfr. Aristot., X Metaph. text. 12 (IX, c. 3): Omne etenim, quodcumque sit ens, aut idem aut diversum.
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 12 (IX, c. 3): «For whatever is a being is either the same or diverse».
Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 3Dist. 4, Dubia