← Back to Distinction 4

Dist. 4, Dubia

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 4

Textus Latinus
p. 105

Dubia circa litteram Magistri

Dubium I

In parte ista circa litteram quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine; quia cum praepositio de notet transitionem et ita1 diversitatem et2 distinctionem, videtur quod pari ratione et ab aequipollenti istae sunt verae: Deus est alius a Deo, Deus distinguitur a Deo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dupliciter est importare distinctionem sive diversitatem, scilicet ut modum vel ut rem, vel ut exercitam vel ut conceptam. Quoniam igitur praepositiones important distinctionem ut exercitam, et distinctio est in divinis quantum ad supposita, de facit terminum stare pro diversis suppositis. Quoniam ergo circa id ponit modum, circa quod exercet distinctionem, et tales sunt personae: ideo est vera locutio. Quia vero hoc nomen alius importat distinctionem ut conceptam, similiter hoc verbum distinguere: ideo simpliciter ponit distinctionem circa terminum ratione suae formae; ideo sunt falsae.

Dubium II

Item quaeritur de responsione, quam ponit Magister, ibi: Quod vero additur: Ergo genuit se Deum etc., quia Magister solvit interimendo conclusionem et videtur non recte solvere. Cum enim idem et diversum sufficienter dividant3 ens, videtur necessario sequi: genuit Deum: ergo se, vel alium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister sustinendo primam et interimendo conclusionem innuit, conclusionem non sequi ex praemissis: et quod non sequatur, ostendit ferendo instantiam4 contra illud disiunctum.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod idem et diversum immediate dividunt ens; dicendum, quod simpliciter loquendo falsum est. Nam pars nec est eadem toti omnino nec simpliciter diversa. Habet tamen veritatem secundum idem. Unde: si non est idem alii, est diversum, verum est secundum illud, secundum quod non5 est idem. Filius autem non est idem Patri in persona, et ideo in persona alius; nec tamen sequitur: alius Deus, quia significatur alietas in essentia.

Dubium III

Item quaeritur de hac distinctione, quam ponit Magister de hoc praedicato Deus Pater, quod potest esse constructio appositiva et immediata, vel mediata6. Primo enim videtur, quod ista distinctio non sit intelligibilis, quoniam quae ex eadem parte intransitive construuntur, videntur solum immediate construi. Item videtur, quod non solvat, quia recta solutio est, cuius dantem oppositum non contingit solvere7; sed ista distinctione remota, adhuc manet sophisma, si loco eius quod est Deus Pater, solum ponatur Pater: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod distinctio Magistri bona est et secundum artem. Nam sicut vult Priscianus8, inter adiectivum et substantivum intelligitur media copula est vel quod est ens. Et quoniam hoc quod est est sive quod est Pater potest teneri implicative; et sic restringitur et tenet locum appositivae constructionis et aequivalet uni termino: ideo dicitur, quod potest teneri sive construi immediate; et sic Deus Pater non est aliud quam ipse Pater. Vel ipsum relativum potest intelligi relative, et ita in quadam distantia; et tunc non restringitur, et sensus est: Deus Pater, id est Deus, qui est Pater; quod tantum valet est Deus, et ille est Pater. Haec autem solutio Magistri solvit quidem sophisma quantum ad unam deceptionem, et ideo est bona. Sed rursus cadit ibi alia deceptio de relativo, et ideo adhuc oportet solvere, non ad illam deceptionem, sed ad aliam. Ideo Praepositivus9 solvit ad hoc argumentum alio modo: ergo Deum qui est Pater, vel qui non est Pater, et dicit, quod non sequitur, nec sunt contradictoriae, quia suppositio huius relativi non est eadem. In affirmativa enim supponit pro Deo genito, quia non confunditur10; in negativa vero simpliciter. Unde sicut hae non contradicunt, sed ambae sunt falsae: Nullus homo est Petrus, Ioannes est Petrus, ita dicit in proposito, quia negatio confundit. Unde istae duae ambae sunt falsae: Deus Filius est Pater, Deus non est Pater.

Et ideo moderni aliter solvunt distinguendo, quod hoc relativum qui potest facere relationem simplicem vel personalem. Si simplicem, affirmativa vera est, negativa falsa; si personalem, e converso negativa vera, affirmativa falsa. Quod patet, quia haec est falsa: persona Filii est Pater, et haec est vera: persona Filii non est Pater.

p. 106

Dubium IV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod unus Deus est tres personae. Sed contra: Quaecumque praedicantur de uno et eodem, praedicantur de se invicem: ergo si unus Deus est Pater et Filius: ergo Pater est Filius. Si tu dicas, quod verum est, quando praedicantur de uno singulari, sed non est verum, quando praedicantur de uno communi; contra: nihil subiicitur duobus in unica11 suppositione, quamvis sit commune ad illa. Unde haec est falsa: homo est Socrates et Plato: ergo similiter in proposito.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut patet, de suppositione huius nominis Deus secus est quam de suppositione alicuius alterius termini. Quia enim habet naturam termini communis et discreti, ideo si sequitur: Deus est Pater et Filius: ergo Deus Pater est Filius, vel e converso. Similiter nec licet inferre ex hoc, quod Pater sit Filius. Et notandum, quod talis praedicatio est per identitatem12: ideo suppositum de termino formali vere praedicatur.

Dubium V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod Magister dicit: Unum solum Deum verum esse Trinitatem; quia videtur esse contra illud quod dicit inferius13, scilicet quod trinitas est nomen collectivum, unus et solus nomen partitivum et discretivum: ergo sicut haec est falsa: unus solus homo est omnis homo, ita et haec.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc nomen trinitas est collectivum personarum; unus autem et solus, addita huic termino Deus14, non dicunt discretionem personae, sed naturae ab aliis. Unde unus hic non opponitur tribus, sed pluribus naturis sive diis; et solus non opponitur simul existentibus cum eo, sed contradistinctis in natura.

Dubium VI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Satis est christiano rerum creatarum causam etc. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quoniam aut dicit satis quantum ad fidem; et sic est falsum, quia multa alia oportet credere; aut satis quantum ad scientiam; et illud similiter est falsum, quia nunquam scitur ex hoc causa rei sufficienter.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod intelligitur satis quantum ad scientiam, non quamlibet, sed necessariam ad salutem.

Dubium VII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Pater genuit alterum se. Videtur enim male coniungere illa duo, quia se dicit omnimodam identitatem, et alterum diversitatem, et ita sunt opposita, et ita opposita implicantur. Si dicas, quod unum diminuit de altero, quaero: quid et de quo?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod oppositio directa intelligitur semper circa idem. Quoniam ergo in divinis simul est identitas in natura et alietas in supposito, et hoc sine oppositione; ideo nomen identitatis et alietatis in sermone iunguntur sine oppositione, immo ad singularis modi expressionem.

Dubium VIII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Pater, ut haberet Filium, non minuit se, quia videtur dicere falsum; quia illud argumentum valet: quicumque generat unum filium, ut non possit amplius generare, minuitur eius potentia; sed sic est in Patre: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illud verum est, si generare alterum sit potentiae; sed quod, uno genito, possit alterum generare, dicit imperfectionem potentiae in generando, quia ex hoc ostenditur, quod non totum dedit uni.

Dubium IX

p. 107

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: De se alterum se genuit, sed non alterum Deum, sed alteram personam, utrum dicatur magis proprie alterum vel alium; et videtur quod alterum, quia minorem dicit diversitatem, quia Socrates dicitur alter a se; sed in divinis minima est diversitas. Sed contra: differentiae accidentales faciunt dici alterum15; sed in divinis nullum est accidens: ergo non debet dici alterum.

Item videtur, quod neutrum bene dicatur. Si enim differentiae substantiales faciunt dici aliud, et accidentales alterum, cum neutrum cadat in divinis, neutrum videtur esse dicendum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quia Pater differt a Filio et in supposito et in proprietate, ideo potest dici alius, et potest dici alter. Sed quoniam proprietas illa non accidit personae, ideo magis proprie dicitur alius. Et quia alius respicit suppositum, aliud essentiam: ideo, etsi recipiatur ibi alius in masculino, non tamen aliud in neutro.

---

English Translation

Doubts concerning the Master's text

Doubt I

In this part, concerning the text, a question is asked about what [the Master] says: God from God, light from light; because since the preposition from (de) denotes a transition and thus1 diversity and2 distinction, it seems that by the same reasoning and by equipollence these are true: «God is another from God», «God is distinguished from God».

I respond: It must be said that there are two ways of importing distinction or diversity — namely, as a mode or as a thing, or as exercised or as conceived. Since therefore prepositions import distinction as exercised, and the distinction in God is with respect to supposits, from (de) makes the term stand for diverse supposits. Since, therefore, it places the mode in respect of that about which it exercises distinction — and such [supposits] are the persons — the expression is true. But because this name another (alius) imports distinction as conceived, and likewise the verb to distinguish: therefore [these] simply place distinction about the term by reason of its form — and so [those propositions] are false.

Doubt II

Likewise, a question is asked about the response which the Master places [in the text], at: «As to what is added: ‹Therefore He begot Himself as God› etc.», because the Master solves [the objection] by denying the conclusion, and it seems he does not solve it rightly. For since the same and the diverse sufficiently divide3 being, it seems to follow necessarily: He begot God; therefore [He begot] Himself, or another.

I respond: It must be said that the Master, by sustaining the first [premise] and denying the conclusion, intimates that the conclusion does not follow from the premises; and that it does not follow, he shows by bringing an instance4 against that disjunction.

To the objection that the same and the diverse divide being immediately: it must be said that, speaking simply, this is false. For a part is neither altogether the same as the whole nor simply diverse from it. It has truth, however, with respect to the same. Hence: «if [a thing] is not the same as another, it is diverse» is true with respect to that in which it is not5 the same. But the Son is not the same as the Father in person, and therefore in person [He is] another; yet it does not follow another God, because that would signify alterity in essence.

Doubt III

Likewise, a question is asked concerning the distinction which the Master places of this predicate God the Father, that it can be an appositive and immediate construction, or a mediate one6. For first, it seems that this distinction is not intelligible — since those [terms] which are intransitively construed on the same side seem only to be construed immediately. Again, it seems that it does not solve [the problem], because a right solution is one whose opposite cannot be solved by the one giving it7; but with this distinction removed, the sophism still remains, if instead of God the Father only the Father is placed: therefore, etc.

I respond: It must be said that the Master's distinction is good and according to [grammatical] art. For, as Priscian holds8, between an adjective and a substantive there is understood a copula is or which is being. And since that which is is — or that which is Father — can be taken implicatively; and thus it is restricted and takes the place of an appositive construction and is equivalent to a single term: therefore it is said that it can be taken or construed immediately; and thus God the Father is nothing other than the Father Himself. Or the relative itself can be understood relatively, and thus in a certain distance; and then it is not restricted, and the sense is: God the Father = God, who is the Father — which is as much as to say [there] is God, and He is the Father. This solution of the Master does solve the sophism as regards one deception, and therefore it is good. But another deception falls there again — concerning the relative — and therefore it is still necessary to solve [it], not regarding that deception, but another. Therefore Prepositivus9 solves this argument in another way: therefore God who is the Father, or who is not the Father; and he says that it does not follow, nor are they contradictory, because the supposition of this relative is not the same. For in the affirmative it supposits for God-as-begotten, because it is not confused10; but in the negative simpliciter. Hence, just as these are not contradictories but both are false — No man is Peter, John is Peter — so he says in the matter at hand, because negation confuses. Hence these two are both false: God the Son is the Father, God is not the Father.

And therefore the moderns solve it otherwise by distinguishing: this relative who can make a simple or a personal relation. If simple, the affirmative is true, the negative false; if personal, conversely the negative true, the affirmative false. This is clear, because this is false — the person of the Son is the Father — and this is true — the person of the Son is not the Father.

Doubt IV

Likewise, a question is asked about what [the Master] says: that one God is three persons. But on the contrary: Whatever are predicated of one and the same thing are predicated of each other: therefore, if one God is the Father and the Son, therefore the Father is the Son. If you say that this is true when they are predicated of one singular thing, but is not true when they are predicated of one common thing — on the contrary: nothing is subjected to two in a single11 supposition, even though it be common to them. Hence this is false: man is Socrates and Plato: therefore, likewise, in the matter at hand.

I respond: It must be said that, as is clear, concerning the supposition of this name God, it is otherwise than concerning the supposition of any other term. For because it has the nature both of a common and a discrete term, therefore [it does] not [follow that] if God is the Father and the Son, therefore God the Father is the Son, or conversely. Likewise, it is not licit to infer from this that the Father is the Son. And it should be noted that such a predication is by identity12: therefore the supposit is truly predicated of the formal term.

Doubt V

Likewise, a question is asked about what the Master says: that one only true God is Trinity; because this seems to be against what he says below13 — namely that trinity is a collective name, one and only are partitive and discretive names: therefore, just as this is false — one only man is every man — so is this.

I respond: It must be said that this name trinity is collective of persons; but one and only, when added to this term God14, do not express distinction of person, but [distinction] of the nature from others. Hence one here is not opposed to three, but to many natures or gods; and only is not opposed to [persons] existing together with Him, but to [those] contra-distinguished in nature.

Doubt VI

Likewise, a question is asked about what [the Master] says: It is sufficient for a Christian [to hold the Creator as] cause of created things etc. For it seems to say what is false, because either he says sufficient with respect to faith — and thus it is false, because many other things must be believed — or sufficient with respect to knowledge; and that likewise is false, because the cause of a thing is never known sufficiently from this [alone].

I respond: It must be said that it is understood sufficient with respect to knowledge — not any and every knowledge, but that necessary for salvation.

Doubt VII

Likewise, a question is asked about what [the Master] says: that the Father begot another Himself (alterum se). For he seems to join those two badly, because self expresses every kind of identity, and another diversity, and so they are opposites — and so opposites are implied. If you say that one diminishes from the other, I ask: what and from what?

I respond: It must be said that direct opposition is always understood about the same [thing]. Since, therefore, in God there is at the same time identity in nature and alterity in supposit — and this without opposition — therefore the names of identity and alterity are joined in speech without opposition, indeed for expressing a singular mode.

Doubt VIII

Likewise, a question is asked about what [the Master] says: The Father, in having a Son, did not diminish Himself, because it seems to say what is false: because this argument holds — whoever begets one son in such a way that he cannot generate further has his power diminished; but this is so in the Father: therefore, etc.

I respond: It must be said that this is true, if to generate another belongs to the power; but the fact that, one having been begotten, one could beget another, indicates imperfection of the power in generating — because from this it is shown that he did not give the whole to one.

Doubt IX

Likewise, a question is asked about what [the Master] says: He begot from Himself another Himself — not another God, but another person, whether it is more properly said alterum or alium. And it seems alterum, because it expresses a lesser diversity — for Socrates is said to be alter a se («other than himself»); but in God the diversity is minimal. But on the contrary: accidental differences cause [something] to be called alterum15; but in God there is no accident: therefore alterum should not be said.

Likewise, it seems that neither can be said well. For if substantial differences cause [something] to be called aliud and accidental ones alterum, since neither falls in God, neither seems to be said.

I respond: It must be said that, because the Father differs from the Son both in supposit and in property, therefore He can be called alius and also alter. But since that property is not an accident of the person, therefore He is more properly called alius. And because alius regards the supposit, aliud the essence: therefore although alius in the masculine is received there, nevertheless not aliud in the neuter.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 repetit Vat. hic ita. Pro maiore intelligentia et explicatione huius dubii cfr. q. 1 et 2 huius distinctionis. — Quoad praepositionem de vide infra d. 5, a. 1, q. 2.
    Against the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, the Vatican ed. here repeats ita. For a fuller understanding and explanation of this doubt cf. qq. 1 and 2 of this distinction. — On the preposition de see below d. 5, a. 1, q. 2.
  2. In mss. et edd. excidit particula de, quam contextus requirit.
    In the mss. and editions the particle de has fallen out, which the context requires.
  3. Aristot., X Metaph. text. 12 (IX, c. 3): Omne etenim, quodcumque sit ens, aut idem aut diversum.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 12 (IX, c. 3): «For everything whatsoever that is a being is either the same or diverse».
  4. Vide Aristot., II Prior. c. 26 (c. 28) de Instantia.
    See Aristotle, Prior Analytics II, c. 26 (c. 28) on Instance.
  5. Codd. T aa bb satis bene addunt non, secundum illud, secundum quod est idem.
    Codd. T aa bb suitably add non, according to that sense in which [the thing] is the same.
  6. De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, §. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.
    On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, §. 1; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.
  7. Modus iste loquendi, qui occurrit etiam infra d. 15, p. II, q. 1 in corp. et d. 44, a. 2, q. unic. in corp., sumptus est ex Aristot., II Elench. c. 3, secundum translationem Boethii: Nam si esset haec solutio, dantem oppositum non possibile esset solvere.
    This mode of speaking, which also occurs below at d. 15, p. II, q. 1 in corp. and d. 44, a. 2, q. unic. in corp., is taken from Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations II, c. 3, according to Boethius's translation: «For if this were the solution, it would not be possible for the one giving the opposite to solve [it]».
  8. Priscian., XVIII Grammat. c. 1 post medium: Subauditur enim participium verbi substantivi ens, quod in usu nunc nobis non est, pro quo possumus qui est vel qui fuit dicere vel subaudire.
    Priscian, Institutes of Grammar XVIII, c. 1 (after the middle): «For the participle of the substantive verb ens is to be understood — which is no longer in our use — in place of which we can say or understand qui est («who is») or *qui fuit» («who was»).
  9. Natione Italus, ab a. 1206 Cancellarius Universitatis Parisiensis [Prepositivus], scripsit Summam theologicam ex dictis SS. Patrum, a S. Bonav. et S. Thom. non raro allegatam et adhuc ineditam.
    [Prepositivus,] an Italian by birth, Chancellor of the University of Paris from 1206, wrote a theological Summa drawn from the sayings of the Holy Fathers, frequently cited by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas and still unpublished.
  10. Hoc est, non supponit confuse et indiscriminatim pro tribus personis, sed determinate solum pro persona Filii; e contra in negativa supponit simpliciter, i. e. indiscriminatim et confuse pro personis et etiam pro essentia.
    That is, it does not supposit confusedly and indiscriminately for the three persons, but determinately only for the person of the Son; contrariwise, in the negative it supposits simpliciter, i. e. indiscriminately and confusedly for the persons and also for the essence.
  11. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 una.
    The Vatican ed., against the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, reads una.
  12. De praedicatione per identitatem vide infra d. 3, a. I, q. 1, ad 2; d. 33, q. 3, et d. 34, q. 2. — De hoc dubio cfr. supra q. 4, et Scot., hic q. 2.
    On predication by identity, see below d. 3, a. I, q. 1, ad 2; d. 33, q. 3; and d. 34, q. 2. — On this doubt, cf. above q. 4, and Scotus, here q. 2.
  13. Dist. XXII, c. 3, et dd. XXIV et XXV.
    [Master's] Distinction XXII, c. 3, and Distinctions XXIV and XXV.
  14. Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 po pro Deo.
    The Vatican ed., against the mss. and edd. 1, 2, 3, reads po for Deo.
  15. Porphyr. de Praedicab. c. de Differentia.
    Porphyry, On Predicables, c. On Difference.
← Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 4