Dist. 5, Part NaN, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 5
Articulus I
De comparatione generationis ad substantiam sive essentiam in ratione principii.
Quaestio I
Utrum substantia sive essentia generet.
Circa primum, quod substantia non generet, ostenditur sic:
1. Generare dicit relationem1: ergo cui convenit generare, convenit et referri; sed essentiae non convenit referri: ergo nec generare.
2. Item, generare importat distinctionem: ergo cui convenit generare, per consequens et distingui; sed essentia cum sit una, non distinguitur: ergo etc. Aut si generat, plures sunt essentiae.
3. Item, generare dicit actionem personalem: ergo de illo solo dicitur, quod vel supponit personam; sed essentia non significat personam, cum sit communis, nec personam supponit, cum sit omnino abstractum: ergo etc.
4. Item, generare est proprietas personae, communicabilitas2 est essentiae: ergo sicut se habet communicabilitas ad personam, ita proprietas personalis ad essentiam; sed communicabilitas nunquam est personae, quia haec est falsa: Pater est communicabilis; ergo nec proprietas personalis erit essentiae: ergo nec generare, cum sit personae.
Contra:
1. Quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum est idem alii, et non habent diversas proprietates, quidquid dicitur de uno, et de altero; sed persona et essentia sunt huiusmodi, quia persona est essentia: ergo etc.
2. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum praedicatur de altero, unum supponit pro altero, quia subiectum vere subiicitur praedicato; sed essentia vere praedicatur de Patre; unde haec est vera: Pater est essentia: ergo et supponit: ergo sicut Deus Pater generat, sic potest dici, essentia generat.
3. Item, de quocumque praedicatur subiectum, et propria passio; sed generare est sicut propria passio Patris; sed haec est vera: divina essentia est Pater: ergo et haec similiter: divina essentia generat.
4. Item, de quocumque praedicatur definitum, et definitio; sed definitio patris est filii pater. Cum igitur haec sit vera: divina essentia est Pater, et haec erit vera: divina essentia est Filii Pater: ergo a convertibili: Filius est Filius essentiae.
Conclusio
Haec locutio «divina essentia generat» est omnino impropria et neganda, vel saltem pie exponenda.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod fides vera dicit quasi fundamentum, Deum esse trinum et unum, et ita trinum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita unum, quod unitas non multiplicatur. Si ergo quod credimus oportuit significare, opportune inventa sunt nomina in divinis, immo a Deo nobis manifestata, quae significent trinitatem sub distinctione et unitatem sine omni multiplicatione.
Sicut igitur nomina imposita personis omnino sunt incommunicabilia et quantum ad suppositum et quantum ad significatum; unde haec oratio est falsa: Pater est Filius, vel Pater est communicabilis; ita ex parte essentiae vel naturae oportuit nomina imponi, quae non distinguerentur nec quantum ad significatum nec quantum ad suppositum.
Triplex genus nominum. Notandum autem, quod triplex est genus nominum significantium essentiam. Quaedam enim significant in concretione, ut hoc nomen Deus; quaedam in omnimoda abstractione, ut hoc nomen essentia; quaedam medio modo, ut lumen, sapientia, voluntas et consimilia; et ista dicuntur medio modo significare, quia non concernunt suppositum per modum inhaerentiae, sed concernunt suppositum ratione eius, quod dicunt aliquam rationem actus vel originis, quae sunt ipsorum suppositorum.
Cum igitur tres sint nominum differentiae, nomen concretum supponit pro persona proprie; nomen medium supponit partim proprie, partim improprie; nomen abstractum et absolutum non supponit nisi omnino improprie.
Unde haec est propria: Deus generat, et in usum adducenda; haec autem: sapientia generat de sapientia, partim propria, partim impropria; ideo est sustinenda, sed non extendenda; haec autem: essentia generat, omnino impropria, et ideo neganda est, et si legatur alicubi, est exponenda. Sancti enim quandoque ad confundendas haereses expressius loquuntur, quam proprietas sermonis sustineat.
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod essentia et persona non habent diversas proprietates; dicendum, quod diversitas rationis dupliciter3 est in divinis. Uno modo per habere diversas proprietates; et illud inducit distinctionem, et sic differunt ratione nec praedicantur de eodem, ut Pater et Filius; alio modo est per habere proprietatem et non habere; et illud non inducit distinctionem nec facit, quod unum non praedicetur de altero; facit tamen, quod aliquid dicitur de uno, quod non dicitur de altero, ut patet in Petro et homine: Petrus est individuum, homo non; et tamen homo vere praedicatur de Petro.
Ad illud, quod summa oppositio est affirmationis et negationis; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi negatio nihil ponit, sicut inter aliquid et nihil; sed ubi ponit extrema, minima potest esse et surgit ex quantulacumque parva differentia sive rei sive rationis.
2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod de quocumque praedicatur subiectum4, de eo et propria passio; dicendum, quod verum est5 de propria passione adaequata; sed generare non est proprietas adaequata Patris, quia hoc est extra communicabilitatem ab essentia: ideo non sequitur.
3. Ad illud quod tertio obiicitur de propria passione Patris; similiter dicendum, quod generare non est propria passio Patris in hoc sensu, sed est proprietas eius distinguens.
4. Ad illud quod quarto obiicitur de definitione; dicendum, quod pater secundum rationem nominis importat distinctionem, et ideo definitio eius, filii pater, importat distinctionem; sed essentia non importat distinctionem. Ideo non praedicatur de essentia filii pater, licet praedicetur de Patre.
I. Quaestio haec est circa principium quod divinarum productionum, quod secundum fidem catholicam ipsae sunt divinae personae producentes. Conclusiones huius et primae quaestionis sequentis articuli sunt contra abbatem Ioachim, cuius doctrina censurata est in Concilio Lateranensi IV, can. de Fide catholica, cap. Damnamus: «Nos autem, sacro approbante Concilio, credimus et confitemur cum Petro [Lombardo], quod una quaedam res est incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis… et illa res non est generans nec genita nec procedens». — Hanc doctrinam catholicam Seraphicus gravissimis argumentis confirmat.
II. In solut. ad 1 distinguit S. Doctor duplicem diversitatem rationis in divinis secundum differentiam, quae est inter habere diversas proprietates et habere vel non habere unam eandemque proprietatem, de quo cfr. hic dub. 4 et infra dist. 49, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4. Affirmat etiam alteram inducere distinctionem realem, alteram non. Tres enim sunt in divinis proprietates personales, scil. paternitas, filiatio et spiratio passiva, et habere distinctas has proprietates inducit realem personarum distinctionem; unde etiam una nequit praedicari de alia. Sed diversitas rationis, quae exsurgit ex habere aliquam proprietatem et eandem non habere, non importat realem distinctionem. Essentia enim divina non habet proprietatem generandi, quam habet Pater; nihilominus paternitas et essentia divina non distinguuntur realiter et possunt de se praedicari. Nec valet argumentatio (1 ad opp.), quod habere proprietatem et non habere sint contradictorie opposita, et quod exinde maiorem differentiam inducant inter personam et essentiam, quam quae est inter personas ad invicem. Nam bene distinguit S. Doctor inter contradictionem, cuius unum extremum nihil ponit (ut inter aliquid et nihil) et illam contradictionem, cuius extrema aliquid ponunt. Si unum extremum nihil ponit, non potest verificari de aliquo termino positivo, bene tamen si aliquid ponit. Insuper minima rationis distinctio sufficit ad hoc, ut contradictoria de distinctis dicantur. Sic terminus incommunicabilis verificatur de paternitate et praedicatur de ipsa, non de essentia, licet haec non realiter distinguatur a paternitate. Cfr. infra dist. 26, q. 1, ad 2; d. 34, q. 1, per totam; et d. 33, q. 2; et S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1.
III. Prima opinio in solut. ad 2 posita, quae distinguit inter praedicationem secundum substantiam et secundum rationem, Praepositivi fuisse dicitur. Secunda opinio distinguit inter praedicationem per identitatem et per inhaerentiam, sive denominationem, quae a Scoto dicitur praedicatio formalis. De hac distinctione cfr. infra d. 33, q. 3; et d. 34, q. 2. Praedicatio identica fit per abstracta; praedicatio per inhaerentiam fit semper in concreto et ratione suppositi. Differunt hae praedicationes, tum quia abstractum eandem rem significat et supponit, concretum vero saepe aliam significat et pro alia supponit (supra, d. 4, q. 1); tum quia abstractum nomen imponitur formae et a forma denominatur, concretum vero non imponitur formae, sed supposito; tum quia identica omnimodam identitatem complectitur, praedicatio vero per inhaerentiam aliquam diversitatem. Unde falsa est ratiocinatio, quae transit a praedicatione identica ad alteram et ab abstracto ad concretum; et in hoc erravit abbas Ioachim, teste S. Thom. (Summa I, q. 39, a. 5). — In creatis locum non habere praedicationem identicam in proprio sensu, est sententia communis, si excipias Franciscum Mayronis.
IV. Quoad ipsam conclusionem cfr. supra d. 4, q. 1 in corp. — Alex. Hal., p. I, q. 49, m. 1, a. 4 (ubi affert et solvit 25 argumenta contraria); q. 42, m. 3, a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 39, a. 5. — B. Albert., I Sent. d. 4, a. 2, ad 1 quaesit.; Summa p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1 princ. q. 2, aa. 1 et 2. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 39, q. 3, n. 13; q. 4, n. 12; et a. 54, q. 3, nn. 21, 28. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1.
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Article I
On the comparison of generation to substance or essence in the account of principle.
Question I
Whether substance or essence begets.
On the first point: that substance does not beget, it is shown thus:
1. To beget expresses a relation1: therefore to what it belongs to beget, it also belongs to be referred; but it does not belong to the essence to be referred: therefore neither does it [belong to the essence] to beget.
2. Likewise, to beget imports distinction: therefore to what it belongs to beget, consequently also to be distinguished; but the essence, since it is one, is not distinguished: therefore, etc. — Or if it begets, there are several essences.
3. Likewise, to beget expresses a personal action: therefore it is said only of that which either supposits for a person; but the essence does not signify a person, since it is common — nor does it supposit for a person, since it is altogether abstract: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, to beget is a property of the person, communicability2 of the essence: therefore, as communicability stands to the person, so personal property stands to the essence; but communicability is never of the person — for this is false: «the Father is communicable»; therefore neither will personal property be of the essence: therefore neither to beget, since it is of the person.
On the contrary:
1. Of whatever things it is true that one is the same as the other and they do not have diverse properties, whatever is said of one is said of the other; but person and essence are such, because the person is the essence: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, of whatever things it is true that one is predicated of the other, one supposits for the other, because the subject is truly subjected to the predicate; but essence is truly predicated of the Father — whence this is true: «the Father is essence»; therefore it also supposits: therefore, just as God the Father begets, so it can be said «essence begets».
3. Likewise, of whatever the subject is predicated, so also its proper property; but to beget is as it were the proper property of the Father; and this is true: «the divine essence is the Father»: therefore likewise this: «the divine essence begets».
4. Likewise, of whatever the defined is predicated, so also its definition; but the definition of father is the father of a son. Since, then, this is true: «the divine essence is the Father», this too will be true: «the divine essence is the father of the Son»: therefore, by conversion: «the Son is the Son of the essence».
Conclusion
The expression «the divine essence begets» is altogether improper and is to be denied, or at least piously expounded.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it should be noted that the true faith says, as a kind of foundation, that God is triune and one — and so triune that the trinity is not confounded, and so one that the unity is not multiplied. If therefore what we believe had to be signified, names were aptly invented in divine matters — indeed, manifested to us by God — which signify the trinity under distinction and the unity without any multiplication.
Just as, therefore, the names imposed upon the persons are altogether incommunicable, both with respect to the supposit and with respect to the signified — whence this expression is false: «the Father is the Son», or «the Father is communicable» — so on the side of the essence or nature it was necessary that names be imposed which would not be distinguished, either with respect to signification or with respect to supposition.
Threefold genus of names. It should be noted that there is a threefold genus of names signifying the essence. For some signify in concretion, as this name God; some in every kind of abstraction, as this name essence; some in an intermediate mode, as light, wisdom, will, and the like — and these are said to signify in an intermediate mode because they do not concern the supposit in the manner of inherence, but they concern the supposit by reason of what they express — some account of an act or origin, which belong to the supposits themselves.
Since, therefore, there are three differences of names, a concrete name properly supposits for a person; a medium name supposits partly properly, partly improperly; an abstract and absolute name does not supposit except altogether improperly.
Hence this is proper: «God begets», and is to be brought into use; but this: «wisdom begets from wisdom» is partly proper, partly improper — therefore it is to be sustained but not extended; but this: «essence begets» is altogether improper, and therefore it is to be denied — and if it is read anywhere, it is to be expounded. For the Saints sometimes, in order to confound heresies, speak more expressly than the propriety of speech sustains.
1. To the objection that essence and person do not have diverse properties: it must be said that there is a twofold3 diversity of account in divine things. In one way — through having diverse properties; and this induces distinction, and in this way they differ in account and are not predicated of the same [subject], as Father and Son. In another way — through one having a property and the other not having it; and this does not induce distinction, nor does it cause one not to be predicated of the other; but it does cause that something is said of one which is not said of the other — as is clear in Peter and man: «Peter is an individual», «man [is] not»; and yet man* is truly predicated of Peter.
To the objection that the highest opposition is of affirmation and negation: it must be said that this is true where the negation posits nothing, as between something and nothing; but where it posits extremes, it can be minimal and arises from however small a difference of thing or of account.
2. To the second objection, that of whatever the subject is predicated4, also the proper property [is predicated]: it must be said that this is true5 of a proper property that is adequate; but to beget is not an adequate property of the Father, because it is outside what is communicable from the essence: therefore it does not follow.
3. To the third objection concerning the proper property of the Father: it must similarly be said that to beget is not the proper property of the Father in this sense, but it is His distinguishing property.
4. To the fourth objection concerning definition: it must be said that father, according to the account of its name, imports distinction — and therefore its definition, the father of a son, imports distinction; but essence does not import distinction. Therefore the father of a son is not predicated of the essence, although it is predicated of the Father.
I. This question is concerned with a principle — namely, that of divine productions, which according to the Catholic faith are the divine persons themselves as producing. The conclusions of this question and of the first question of the following article are against Abbot Joachim, whose doctrine was censured at the Fourth Lateran Council, de Fide catholica, chap. Damnamus: «We, with the approval of the sacred Council, believe and confess with Peter [Lombard] that there is one certain thing — incomprehensible, indeed, and ineffable… and that thing is neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding». — The Seraphic confirms this Catholic doctrine by the gravest arguments.
II. In the reply to 1, the Holy Doctor distinguishes a twofold diversity of account in divine things, according to the difference between having diverse properties and having or not having one and the same property — on which cf. here dub. 4, and below dist. 49, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4. He affirms also that the one induces a real distinction, the other does not. For there are three personal properties in God — namely paternity, filiation, and passive spiration — and having these distinct properties induces a real distinction of the persons; hence even one cannot be predicated of another. But the diversity of account that arises from having some property and not having the same does not import a real distinction. For the divine essence does not have the property of begetting which the Father has; nevertheless paternity and the divine essence are not really distinguished and can be predicated of each other. Nor is the argument (1 ad opp.) valid — that to have a property and not to have [it] are contradictorily opposed and therefore induce a greater difference between person and essence than that which is between the persons among themselves. For the Holy Doctor rightly distinguishes between a contradiction whose one extreme posits nothing (as between something and nothing), and that contradiction whose extremes both posit something. If one extreme posits nothing, it cannot be verified of any positive term, but well can if it posits something. Moreover, the smallest distinction of account suffices for contradictories to be said of distinct things. Thus the term incommunicable is verified of paternity and predicated of it, not of the essence, though the latter is not really distinguished from paternity. Cf. below dist. 26, q. 1, ad 2; d. 34, q. 1, throughout; and d. 33, q. 2; and St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1.
III. The first opinion placed in the reply to 2, which distinguishes between predication according to substance and according to account (ratio), is said to have been that of Prepositivus. The second opinion distinguishes between predication by identity and predication by inherence (or denomination), which Scotus calls formal predication. On this distinction, cf. below d. 33, q. 3; and d. 34, q. 2. Identical predication is made through abstracts; predication by inherence is always made in the concrete and by reason of the supposit. These predications differ: in that the abstract signifies and supposits for the same thing, while the concrete often signifies one thing and supposits for another (above, d. 4, q. 1); in that the abstract name is imposed upon the form and is named from the form, whereas the concrete is imposed not on the form but on the supposit; and in that the identical predication embraces every kind of identity, while predication by inherence [embraces] some diversity. Hence reasoning is false that passes from identical predication to the other and from abstract to concrete; and in this Abbot Joachim erred, as St. Thomas testifies (Summa I, q. 39, a. 5). — That in created things identical predication in the proper sense does not obtain is the common opinion, if Francis of Meyronnes be excepted.
IV. On the conclusion itself, cf. above d. 4, q. 1 in corp. — Alexander of Hales, p. I, q. 49, m. 1, a. 4 (where he brings forward and solves 25 contrary arguments); q. 42, m. 3, a. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 39, a. 5. — Blessed Albert, I Sent. d. 4, a. 2, ad 1 quaesit.; Summa p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 1 princ. q. 2, aa. 1 and 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 39, q. 3, n. 13; q. 4, n. 12; and a. 54, q. 3, nn. 21, 28. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 1.
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- Cfr. Aristot., Praedicam. c. de Relatione; et Priscian., XVII Grammat. c. 1.Cf. Aristotle, Categories, c. On Relation; and Priscian, Institutes of Grammar XVII, c. 1.
- Cfr. S. Thom., Summa I, q. 39, a. 5; et supra d. 4, q. 1.Cf. St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 39, a. 5; and above, d. 4, q. 1.
- Nonnulli codd. ut T V Y cum ed. 1 duplex, et paulo infra multi codd. ut A C G K L R S T V X etc. post et addunt per, sed minus apte. Deinde sensu non mutato codd. D T nec praedicatur unum de altero, ut Pater. Cfr. de hoc d. 26, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2. Cod. X post eodem legit glossando: nam alia est persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti; ideo una non praedicatur de alia, ut Pater est Filius.Some codd. (T V Y) with ed. 1 read duplex; and a little later, many codd. (A C G K L R S T V X etc.) after et add per, though less aptly. Then — with no change of sense — codd. D T read nec praedicatur unum de altero, ut Pater. Cf. on this d. 26, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2. Cod. X after eodem reads by way of gloss: «for the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another; therefore one is not predicated of another, as the Father is the Son».
- Plures codd. ut A B C L R S U X bb cum ed. 1 falso praedicatio loco praedicatum, et paulo infra post praedicatione omittunt multi codd. ut A F G I K T aa etc. cum ed. 1 non bene secundum substantiam.Several codd. (A B C L R S U X bb) with ed. 1 wrongly read praedicatio for praedicatum; and a little later, after praedicatione, many codd. (A F G I K T aa etc.) with ed. 1 not well omit secundum substantiam.
- Vat. et codd. cc contra antiquos codd. et ed. 1 non bene haec; cod. X ibi.The Vatican ed. and codd. cc, against the older codd. and ed. 1, not well read haec; cod. X ibi.