Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 5
Quaestio II
Utrum Filius dicatur genitus de substantia Patris, vel de aliquo alio.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit concedendum, quod aliquis generetur de substantia Patris, ut Filius. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Per multas auctoritates in littera et maxime per illam1: Dicitur quoque et frequenter in Scriptura legitur: Pater de sua substantia genuisse Filium; sed Scriptura non dicit nisi verum nec frequentat nisi proprium: ergo praedictus sermo est verus et proprius.
2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: quicumque est ab aliquo2 et est ei consubstantialis, est de eius substantia; sed Filius est a Patre et est ei consubstantialis: ergo est de eius substantia.
3. Item, Pater generat Filium: aut ergo de aliquo, aut de nihilo; non de nihilo, quia tunc esset creatura: ergo de aliquo; non de aliquo alio a se: ergo de sui substantia.
4. Item, in inferioribus filius, qui habet partem substantiae a patre, dicitur esse de substantia patris: ergo multo fortius, qui habet totam substantiam, dicitur esse de substantia generantis: ergo haec est vera: Filius est de substantia Patris.
Contra:
1. Propositiones sunt transitivae3, et ubi transitio, ibi est distinctio et diversitas: ergo cum dicitur: Filius de substantia Patris, haec praepositio de notat distinctionem inter substantiam Patris et Filium: ergo cum nulla sit distinctio, quia Filius est substantia Patris, propositio praedicta est falsa.
2. Item, praepositio de, prout accipitur specialiter, aliquando tenetur materialiter, ut cultellus de ferro; aliquando ordinaliter, ut de mane fit meridies4; aliquando originaliter, ut radius de sole vel splendor de igne5. Sed quocumque istorum modorum accipiatur, falsa est locutio: si materialiter, quia Filius caret materia; si ordinaliter, falsa, quia sensus est, quod Filius sit post Patrem; si originaliter, falsa, quia tunc est sensus, quod Filius habeat ortum a substantia Patris; sed ista non admittitur: substantia Patris generat Filium.
3. Item, differt haec praepositio de et a: quia a proprie dicit habitudinem principii activi, sed de dicit habitudinem principii passivi; sed Deo et eius substantiae magis convenit ratio principii activi quam passivi: ergo haec est magis vera: Filius est a substantia Patris, quam de; sed haec non recipitur: ergo nec alia debet recipi.
4. Item, de aut dicit identitatem aut diversitatem; si identitatem: ergo cum summa identitas sit in essentia vel substantia, haec erit vera: substantia de substantia, quam negat Magister; si diversitatem: sed non distinguitur substantia Patris a Filio, quia Filius est ipsa substantia Patris: ergo omnino est falsa.
Conclusio
Concedendum est, Filium generari de substantia Patris.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedicta locutio est concedenda.
Et ad intelligentiam praedictorum notandum, quod praeter praedictos tres modos, quibus haec praepositio de accipitur, quarto modo etiam potest accipi, scilicet substantialiter, ut dicat substantialem convenientiam inter extrema; sed hanc nunquam pure dicit, cum sit praepositio et importet aliquam habitudinem et respectum ad extrema. Si enim tantum substantialiter teneretur6, sicut dicitur: filius de substantia patris, ita diceretur: pater de substantia filii; quod absonum est.
Propterea notandum, quod substantialiter accipi consuevit tripliciter. Aliquando accipitur substantialiter et partialiter, ut cum dicitur, quod partes sunt de toto sive de substantia totius, ut urceus vini de dolio. Aliquando accipitur substantialiter et ordinaliter, ut cum dicitur: de pane fit corpus Christi; ibi enim est7 ordo, quia substantia panis non manet in corpore Christi, sicut nec mane in meridie; sed ulterius substantialiter, quia substantia panis transit in substantiam corporis Christi. Aliquando accipitur8 substantialiter et originaliter, ut cum dicitur: Filius de substantia Patris; ratione ablativi tenetur substantialiter, ratione genitivi originaliter: et ideo importat aliquam distinctionem Filii ad Patrem, non ad eius substantiam, et ita praepositio tenet ibi generale significatum et speciale.
1. 2. Et sic patet responsio ad primum argumentum et secundum.
3. Patet etiam tertium, quod de non tantum dicit habitudinem principii passivi nec tantum habitudinem principii activi, sed habitudinem consubstantialem cum habitudine originis; quod non facit haec praepositio a; et ideo non est simile.
4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, patet responsio, quia de non dicit ibi penitus identitatem nec diversitatem, sed consubstantialitatem cum habitudine originis.
I. Pro intelligentia aliquorum terminorum in solut. ad 1 et alibi occurrentium haec ex antiquis grammaticis notamus.
1. Duplex distinguebatur constructio transitiva, scil. tum actuum tum personarum. In prima constructibile dependens per modum actus significat, ut in verbis transitivis, v. g. lego librum; secunda vero est, in qua constructibile dependens per modum substantiae significat. Haec fit vel per casus obliquos (v. g. filius Socratis; similis Ciceroni) vel etiam per praepositiones, quae inde vocantur transitivae. Vide Scotum, Grammatica speculativa c. 46 usque 51, de hoc subtiliter disputantem.
2. Constructio transitiva secundum antiquam definitionem est illa, in qua constructibilia pertinent ad diversa vel videntur pertinere ad diversa; intransitiva vero est ea, in qua constructibilia pertinent ad idem vel saltem ad idem videntur pertinere.
3. Quomodo casus grammaticales sint transitivi quantum ad modum significandi, late Scot. explicat ibid. c. 49.
4. Ipse S. Bonav. infra d. 37, p. I, dub. 2 docet, quod praepositiones non notent necessario diversitatem.
Ampliorem expositionem et applicationem huius solutionis exhibent Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 4, a. 2, ad 3; et Richard. a Med., hic q. 3, ad 1.
II. In conclusione doctores conveniunt. Cfr. Alex. et Richard. locc. citt. — Scot., hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2, a. 1; Summa I, q. 41, a. 3. — B. Albert., I Sent. d. 4, a. 2, ad 1; Summa p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 2, p. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3, a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2 princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 54, q. 3, nn. 53 seqq. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 2.
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Question II
Whether the Son is said to be begotten of the substance of the Father, or of anything else.
Second it is asked whether it is to be conceded that anyone is begotten of the substance of the Father, as the Son is. And it seems so:
1. By many authorities in the text and especially by this1: «It is said — and in Scripture it is frequently read — that the Father begot the Son from His own substance»; but Scripture says only what is true, and uses frequently only what is proper: therefore the aforesaid statement is true and proper.
2. Likewise, it is shown by reason thus: whoever is from another2 and is consubstantial with him, is of his substance; but the Son is from the Father and is consubstantial with Him: therefore He is of His substance.
3. Likewise, the Father begets the Son: either, then, from something, or from nothing; not from nothing, because then He would be a creature: therefore from something; not from something other than Himself: therefore from His own substance.
4. Likewise, among inferior beings a son who has a part of his father's substance is said to be of the father's substance: therefore much more strongly, one who has the whole substance is said to be of the substance of the begetter: therefore this is true: the Son is of the Father's substance.
On the contrary:
1. Propositions are transitive3, and where there is transition, there is distinction and diversity: therefore when it is said the Son from the Father's substance, this preposition from (de) denotes a distinction between the Father's substance and the Son: therefore, since there is no distinction — because the Son is the Father's substance — the aforesaid proposition is false.
2. Likewise, the preposition de, as it is taken specially, is sometimes taken materially — as a knife from iron; sometimes ordinally — as midday is from morning4; sometimes originally — as a ray from the sun or splendor from fire5. But in whatever of these modes it is taken, the expression is false: if materially, because the Son lacks matter; if ordinally, false because the sense is that the Son is after the Father; if originally, false because then the sense is that the Son has His origin from the Father's substance — but this is not admitted: «the Father's substance begets the Son».
3. Likewise, this preposition de differs from a (from): for a properly expresses the relation of an active principle, but de expresses the relation of a passive principle; but the account of an active principle belongs more to God and His substance than that of a passive: therefore this is more true: the Son is from (a) the Father's substance, than of (de); but this is not received: therefore neither should the other be received.
4. Likewise, de expresses either identity or diversity; if identity — then since the highest identity is in the essence or substance, this will be true: substance of substance, which the Master denies; if diversity — but the substance of the Father is not distinguished from the Son, because the Son is the very substance of the Father: therefore it is altogether false.
Conclusion
It is to be conceded that the Son is begotten from the substance of the Father.
I respond: It must be said that the aforesaid expression is to be conceded.
For understanding the foregoing, it should be noted that besides the three aforementioned modes in which this preposition de is taken, it can also be taken in a fourth mode — namely substantially — so that it expresses a substantial agreement between the extremes. But it never says this purely, since it is a preposition and imports some relation and respect to the extremes. For if it were taken only substantially6 — as it is said son from the father's substance, so it would be said father from the son's substance, which is absurd.
Therefore it should be noted that to be taken substantially is of three kinds. Sometimes it is taken substantially and partially, as when it is said that parts are of the whole or of the substance of the whole, as a jug of wine from the barrel. Sometimes it is taken substantially and ordinally, as when it is said the body of Christ is made from bread; for there is7 order, because the substance of bread does not remain in the body of Christ, just as morning does not remain in midday — but further substantially, because the substance of bread passes into the substance of the body of Christ. Sometimes it is taken8 substantially and originally, as when it is said the Son from the substance of the Father; by reason of the ablative it is taken substantially, by reason of the genitive originally. And therefore it imports some distinction of the Son to the Father, not to His substance — and so the preposition here holds its general signified meaning together with its special one.
1., 2. From this is clear the response to the first and second arguments.
3. The third is also clear: that de does not express only the relation of a passive principle, nor only the relation of an active principle, but a consubstantial relation together with the relation of origin — which this preposition a does not do; and therefore they are not alike.
4. To the last objection the response is clear, because de there does not express identity at all, nor diversity, but consubstantiality with the relation of origin.
I. For the understanding of certain terms occurring in the reply to 1 and elsewhere, we note the following from the ancient grammarians.
1. A twofold transitive construction was distinguished — namely of acts and of persons. In the first, the dependent constructible signifies in the manner of an act, as in transitive verbs — e.g. I read a book; the second is that in which the dependent constructible signifies in the manner of a substance. This occurs either by oblique cases (e.g. Socrates's son; similar to Cicero) or also by prepositions — which are therefore called transitive. See Scotus, Grammatica speculativa, cc. 46–51, who discusses this subtly.
2. A transitive construction, according to the ancient definition, is one in which the constructibles pertain to diverse things, or seem to pertain to diverse things; an intransitive is one in which the constructibles pertain to the same thing, or at least seem to pertain to the same.
3. In what manner grammatical cases are transitive as to mode of signifying, Scotus explains at length ibid. c. 49.
4. St. Bonaventure himself below at d. 37, p. I, dub. 2 teaches that prepositions do not necessarily denote diversity.
A fuller exposition and application of this solution is given by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 4, a. 2, ad 3; and Richard of Middleton, here q. 3, ad 1.
II. On the conclusion the doctors agree. Cf. Alexander and Richard loc. cit. — Scotus, here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; Summa I, q. 41, a. 3. — Blessed Albert, I Sent. d. 4, a. 2, ad 1; Summa p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 2, p. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 2 princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 54, q. 3, nn. 53 ff. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 2.
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- Textum Magistri vide in lit. c. 1 et 2 circa finem. Ipsa verba Pater de sua substantia genuit Filium apud Augustinum crebrius recurrunt, e. gr. XV de Trin. c. 20, n. 38.See the Master's text in littera c. 1 and 2 near the end. The words «the Father begot the Son from His own substance» recur frequently in Augustine — e.g. de Trin. XV, c. 20, n. 38.
- Ex fere omnibus codd. et ed. 1 substituimus aliquo pro alio. Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut K V W X post modorum addunt tenetur.From nearly all the codd. and ed. 1 we have substituted aliquo («from something») for alio. A little later, several codd. (K V W X) after modorum add tenetur.
- Cfr. Priscian., XIV Grammat. c. 1 seqq. — Mox post ibi Vat. habet etiam est loco et. Paulo infra ed. 1 verbo nulla praemittit satis bene in substantia.Cf. Priscian, Institutes of Grammar XIV, c. 1 ff. — Next, after ibi the Vatican ed. reads etiam est in place of et. A little later, ed. 1 prefixes in substantia before the word nulla, suitably.
- Priscian., XV Grammat. c. 1: Nam si (ordinatio partium orationis) incongrua sit, soloecismum faciet, quasi elementis orationis inconcinne coeuntibus.Priscian, Institutes of Grammar XV, c. 1: «For if [the ordering of the parts of speech] is incongruous, it will produce a solecism, as when the elements of speech come together inelegantly».
- Similia habet Aristot., V Metaph. text. 29 (IV, 24), de praepositione ex.Aristotle has similar things, Metaphysics V, text 29 (IV, 24), on the preposition ex («out of»).
- Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 similiter accipitur.The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, reads similiter accipitur.
- Aliqui codd. ut T V addunt est.Some codd. (T V) add est.
- Substituimus ex codd. et ed. 1 accipitur pro dicitur. Paulo infra post Filius cod. V addit est.From the codd. and ed. 1 we have substituted accipitur for dicitur. A little later, after Filius, cod. V adds est.