Dist. 5, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 5
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et prima dubitatio est de rationibus Magistri.
Dubium I
Nam prima eius ratio ducit ad hoc inconveniens, scilicet quod, si essentia generaretur a Patre, essentia poneretur pro relativo; et haec ratio ponitur ibi: Ideo non est dicendum, quod Pater genuit divinam essentiam. Sed hoc nullum videtur inconveniens. Si enim magis convenit essentia cum supposito, quam universale cum singulari; si non est inconveniens, quod universale ponatur pro singulari, nec est inconveniens, quod essentia ponatur pro relativo.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod si essentia poneretur pro relativo, esset inconveniens. Non a parte generativae, sed a parte essentiae. Nam in divinis est quod significat et supponit idem, et essentia de suo intellectu significat commune indistinctum; si autem staret pro relativo, distingueretur ratione suppositi.
Dubium II
Item secundo obiicitur contra secundam rationem, qua ducit ad hoc inconveniens, quod eadem res gigneret se ipsam, et ponitur, ibi: Item cum Deus Pater sit divina essentia, si eius esset genitor, esset utique genitor eius rei, quae ipse est. Et obiicitur: si dicatur homo Petrus generat hominem, et ipse est homo: ergo generat se, argumentum istud nihil valet.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod commune dicitur quod est in multis; sed hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut quod plurificatur in multis et quantum ad formam et quantum ad suppositum, ut hoc nomen homo. Alio modo est commune quod plurificatur quantum ad suppositum, non quantum ad formam, ut hoc nomen Deus. Est tertio modo commune secundum nomen, quod est in multis, nec tamen plurificatur quantum ad formam, quia est unum in multis, nec quantum ad supposita, quia pro illis non supponit, ut hoc nomen essentia. Et ita argumentum Magistri est bonum: si Pater genuit essentiam, Pater genuit se.
Dubium III
Item tertio obiicitur contra tertiam rationem: si Pater genuit divinam essentiam, tunc genitum gignenti causa est, ut sit et Deus sit. Sed haec ratio nihil videtur valere, quia ratio causae non cadit in divinis; sed in divinis non est aliud: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sumendo nomen causae proprie, non cadit in divinis, cadit tamen et recipitur ratio principiantis et ratio informantis. Quoniam igitur ratio essendi significatur per hoc nomen essentia: ideo essentia significat quodam modo in ratione causae respectu entis. Si ergo essentia esset genita ab ente, significaretur in ratione effectus sive principiati, et idem esset tunc principium et principiatum respectu eiusdem, quod est impossibile; et in hoc fundatur ratio Magistri.
Dubium IV
Ita etiam non est dicendum, quod divina essentia genuit Filium. Contra hoc obiicit Ioachim, tam contra positionem quam contra rationem. Contra positionem, quia si essentia non generat nec generatur nec procedit: ergo in divinis est res generans et genita et procedens, et res nec generans nec genita nec procedens; et ita est quaternitas, si sunt quatuor res. Item, irridet rationem Magistri: si essentia generat essentiam, et essentia est una res: ergo una res generat se ipsam.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Ioachim non recte arguit, et deficit sua ratio, quia res non accipitur uniformiter, quia cum dicitur res primo modo, ibi accipitur res pro re naturae; sed cum dicitur secundo modo, accipitur pro ipsa natura divina. Ad instantiam eius dicendum, quod essentia est res una quantum ad suppositum et significatum; sed Deus est res una quantum ad significatum, sed plures quantum ad suppositum. Et ideo ignoranter Ioachim reprehendit Magistrum, et ideo iusto Dei iudicio damnatus fuit libellus eius in Lateranensi Concilio, et positio Magistri approbata1.
Dubium V
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius2: Nihil habet Filius, nisi quod nascendo accepit. Quaeritur ergo de hoc verbo accepit, utrum dicat substantiam vel relationem. Si substantiam: ergo Pater similiter accepit; si relationem: ergo cum essentiam acceperit Filius, essentia est accepta: ergo essentia refertur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod accipere dicit duo, scilicet habere et esse ab alio; quantum ad habere respicit essentiam; sed quantum ad hoc quod est esse ab alio, respicit personam: unde per verbum accipiendi significatur, quod essentia habetur a persona, quae est ab alio3.
Dubium VI
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Et ideo non refertur ad aliud, quod in uno subsistit ex uno, quia videtur falsum; quoniam Filius subsistit a Patre, tamen refertur ad Spiritum sanctum.
Respondeo: Hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo, quod Filius non habet respectum nisi ad unam personam; et hoc intelligitur in quantum Filius, quia in quantum spirans est, refertur ad alium; vel quod persona Filii non habet respectum nisi ad unam naturam; et hoc verum est, quia Filius non habet in se nisi naturam Patris.
Dubium VII
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Et naturam suam, ut ita dicam, sequitur indemutabilis Deus. In divinis enim non est prius nec posterius, et ita nec praecedere nec sequi. Si tu dicas, quod est secundum rationem intelligendi; hoc nihil est, quia Deus gignens nec secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum sequitur aliquid.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Hilarius improprie loquitur, et ideo addit determinationem: ut ita dicam; et tantum vult dicere sequi, quantum inseparabiliter comitari4 et consociare et ab illo non recedere.
Dubium VIII
Item quaeritur de auctoritatibus Augustini, primo de hoc quod dicit, quod Deus semel genuit Filium. Videtur enim male dicere semel, quia semel dicit vicissitudinem; sed in generatione aeterna nulla cadit vicissitudo: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod semel potest dicere nunc temporis, vel nunc aeternitatis. Et si dicat nunc temporis, cum tempus habeat diversa nunc, notat intercisionem; si autem nunc aeternitatis, et illud nunc semper est et invariabile et unum, semel dicit omnimodam invariabilitatem, perfectionem et unitatem.
Dubium IX
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Filii caritatis suae, utrum caritas accipiatur ibi essentialiter aut notionaliter. Si essentialiter: ergo Christus Filius est essentiae, quod non conceditur. Si tu dicas, quod est impropria locutio, et est sensus: Filii essentiae, id est, qui est essentia; tunc nullus videtur sensus, et pro nihilo additum hoc quod est caritatis. Et rursus Augustinus exponit5, Filii caritatis, id est Filii dilecti; sed Pater diligit Filium Spiritu sancto: ergo etc. Si propter hoc dicas, quod tenetur notionaliter; tunc ergo Filius Dei est Filius Spiritus sancti, quod absurdum est omnino.
Respondeo: Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod ille genitivus nec proprie essentialiter nec proprie notionaliter, sed medio modo tenetur, id est appropriate. Licet enim caritas sit omnibus communis et proprium Spiritus sancti, uno tamen modo appropriate convenit Patri, quia caritas est amor gratuitus; et sic dicit Richardus6, quia amor gratuitus est, qui tantum dat et nihil accipit, et hoc est in persona Patris, ideo appropriatur Patri. Alio modo dici potest, quod caritas ibi tenetur essentialiter, sicut dicit Augustinus, quod nihil aliud est dicere Filii caritatis quam Filii substantiae; sed genitivus non construitur in ratione principii, sed ex vi declarationis essentiae, et est sensus: Filii caritatis, id est Filii cari; et Filii substantiae vel naturae, hoc est Filii consubstantialis et naturalis.
Dubium X
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Filius est de substantia Patris homoousion, quia — cum filius naturalis partem substantiae trahat a patre, partem a matre in his inferioribus, et in Deo totam substantiam trahat a Patre — videtur quod Pater non tantum deberet dici pater, sed etiam mater, et multo fortius mater, quia mater plus dat quam pater. Item, Filius Dei vocat se sapientiam, et sapientiam quae concipitur et parturitur, Proverbiorum octavo7. Ergo cum hoc proprium sit matris, videtur quod Pater proprius deberet dici mater quam pater.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomen matris non transfertur ad divina. Et unam rationem assignat Anselmus in Monologio8: quia principium maternum praeexigit aliud principium prius. Et ratio huius est, quia mater est principium passivum, et omne tale movetur ab alio: ergo ante ipsum est principium aliud. Quoniam igitur principium generationis Filii est primum et est pure actuale, ideo nullo modo transfertur maternum principium; transfertur tamen actus maternus, ut concipere et parturire, pro eo quod ibi agit unum principium quod hic duo.
Dubium XI
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Filius et Spiritus sanctus non est de nihilo. Videtur enim falsum, quia illud quod de nulla praeiacente materia est, de nihilo est; sed Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt huiusmodi: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt de aliquo, ut de Patre; quaeritur tunc, utrum Pater sit ex nihilo; et videtur quod sic, quia non aliquid et nihil convertuntur; sed Pater non est ex aliquo: ergo est ex nihilo. Item, quia Pater non habet principium effectivum, ideo dicitur esse a nullo: ergo cum non habeat materiam, debet dici de nihilo. Si conceditur de Patre; contra: omne quod habet esse de nihilo, est creatum: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicitur aliquid esse de nihilo, secundum Anselmum in Monologio9 tripliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, ut nihil accipiatur simpliciter privative, ut cum dicitur de tacente: iste loquitur de nihilo; alio modo positive, ut si ita dicatur vel intelligatur aliquid fieri ex nihilo, sicut cultellus de ferro; tertio modo partim positive, partim privative, ut si dicatur aliquid fieri ex nihilo, quia post nihil est aliquid, sicut dicitur: de paupere fit dives.
Dicendum ergo, quod secundum primum sensum Deus potest dici de nihilo esse, sive Pater sive divina essentia; tamen hic modus non est usitatus. Quantum ad secundum modum, omnino nihil fit ex nihilo, quia nihil nullius est materia. Quantum ad tertium modum, secundum quem loquitur Augustinus, quod sola creatura fit de nihilo sive est de nihilo, quia de notat ibi ordinem, ut habeat esse post non esse — hoc quod est de nihilo privat materiam praeiacentem. Quamvis ergo Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non habeant materiam praeiacentem, quia tamen non habent esse post non esse, ideo non dicuntur esse ex nihilo. Et ideo non valet primum argumentum, quia procedit ab insufficienti.
Secundum vero et tertium argumentum, de Patre factum, procedit, secundum quod negatio eius quod est nihil, fertur extra ad verbum et facit orationem negativam; et secundum hunc sensum, sicut conceditur, quod Pater a nullo sit, ita de nihilo. Tamen, sicut dictum est, sensus iste non est usitatus; communiter enim utimur hac locutione, secundum quod negatio de nihilo sistit intra, et hoc quod est de accipitur ibi ordinaliter10.
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Doubts concerning the Master's text
In this part doubts arise concerning the text, and the first doubt concerns the Master's reasonings.
Doubt I
For his first reasoning leads to this incongruity — namely that, if the essence were begotten by the Father, the essence would be set down for a relative; and this reasoning is placed at: «Therefore it must not be said that the Father begot the divine essence.» But this seems no incongruity. For if the essence agrees more with the supposit than the universal does with the singular, and if it is no incongruity for the universal to be set down for the singular, then it is no incongruity for the essence to be set down for a relative.
I respond: It must be said that if the essence were set down for a relative, it would be incongruous — not on the side of the generative power, but on the side of the essence. For in God what signifies and supposits is the same, and the essence by its very intellect signifies the common indistinct; but if it stood for a relative, it would be distinguished by reason of supposit.
Doubt II
Likewise, second, an objection is made against the second reasoning, by which he leads to this incongruity — that the same thing would beget itself — placed at: «Likewise, since God the Father is the divine essence, if He were its begetter, He would surely be the begetter of that which He Himself is.» And it is objected: if it is said the man Peter begets a man, and he himself is a man — therefore he begets himself — this argument has no force.
I respond: It must be said that common is what is in many; but this can be in three ways: either what is multiplied in many both as to form and as to supposit, as the name man. In another way, what is multiplied as to supposit, not as to form, as the name God. There is, third, the common according to name, which is in many — yet is not multiplied as to form (because it is one in many), nor as to supposits (because it does not supposit for them) — as the name essence. And so the Master's argument is good: if the Father begot the essence, the Father begot Himself.
Doubt III
Likewise, third, an objection is made against the third reasoning: if the Father begot the divine essence, then the begotten is the cause to the begetter — that He is and is God. But this reasoning seems to have no force, because the account of cause does not fall in God; and in God there is no other: therefore, etc.
I respond: It must be said that, taking the name cause properly, it does not fall in God — yet the account of principle and the account of informant do fall and are received. Since, then, the account of being (ratio essendi) is signified by this name essence, therefore essence signifies in some way in the account of cause with respect to being. If, then, the essence were begotten by being, it would be signified in the account of effect or principled — and the same would then be principle and principled with respect to the same, which is impossible; and on this is founded the Master's reasoning.
Doubt IV
Similarly, it must not be said that the divine essence begot the Son. Against this, Joachim objects, both against the position and against the reasoning. Against the position: because if the essence neither generates nor is generated nor proceeds, then in God there is a thing generating and generated and proceeding, and a thing neither generating nor generated nor proceeding; and so there is a quaternity, if there are four things. Likewise, he ridicules the Master's reasoning: if essence begets essence, and essence is one thing — therefore one thing begets itself.
I respond: It must be said that Joachim does not argue rightly, and his reasoning fails — because thing is not taken uniformly: when thing is said in the first way, thing is taken for thing of nature; but when said in the second way, it is taken for the very divine nature. To his counter-instance it must be said that the essence is one thing as to supposit and signified; but God is one thing as to signified, but several as to supposit. And therefore Joachim ignorantly rebuked the Master, and so by the just judgment of God his book was condemned at the Lateran Council, and the Master's position approved1.
Doubt V
Likewise, it is asked about what Hilary2 says: «The Son has nothing except what He received in being born.» It is asked, then, about this verb received, whether it expresses substance or relation. If substance: then the Father similarly received; if relation: then since the Son received the essence, the essence is received: therefore the essence is referred.
I respond: It must be said that to receive expresses two things — namely to have and to be from another; as to having it regards the essence; but as to being from another it regards the person: hence by the verb receive it is signified that the essence is had by a person, who is from another3.
Doubt VI
Likewise it is asked about what he says: «And therefore He is not referred to another, who in one subsists from one»; because this seems false — since the Son subsists from the Father, yet is referred to the Holy Spirit.
I respond: This can be understood in two ways: in one way, that the Son does not have a respect except to one person — and this is understood insofar as He is Son, because insofar as He is spirator He is referred to another; or that the person of the Son does not have a respect except to one nature — and this is true, because the Son does not have in Himself anything except the Father's nature.
Doubt VII
Likewise it is asked about what he says: «And the unchangeable God follows His nature, as it were.» For in God there is no prior or posterior, and so neither to precede nor to follow. If you say that this is according to the account of understanding — this is nothing, because God begetting follows nothing either in reality or in understanding.
I respond: It must be said that Hilary speaks improperly, and therefore he adds the qualifier as it were; and he means by to follow simply inseparably to accompany4, to consort with, and not to depart from it.
Doubt VIII
Likewise it is asked about Augustine's authorities — first about what he says, that God begot the Son once. For once seems to be said badly, because once expresses succession; but in eternal generation no succession occurs: therefore, etc.
I respond: It must be said that once can express either now of time or now of eternity. And if it expresses now of time — since time has diverse nows — it denotes interruption; but if now of eternity — and that now is always invariable and one — then once expresses every kind of invariability, perfection, and unity.
Doubt IX
Likewise it is asked about what he says: «Of the Son of His charity» (Filii caritatis suae) — whether charity is taken there essentially or notionally. If essentially: then Christ the Son is of the essence, which is not conceded. If you say that it is an improper expression, and the sense is of the Son of the essence — i.e., who is the essence — then there seems to be no sense, and the addition of of charity is for nothing. And again, Augustine expounds5 of the Son of His charity as of His beloved Son; but the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit: therefore, etc. If for this reason you say it is taken notionally, then the Son of God is the Son of the Holy Spirit, which is altogether absurd.
I respond: Some say that this genitive is taken neither properly essentially nor properly notionally, but in an intermediate way — that is, appropriatively. For although charity is common to all and proper to the Holy Spirit, yet in one mode it suitably belongs to the Father by appropriation, because charity is gratuitous love; and so Richard says6, because gratuitous love is that which only gives and receives nothing, and this is in the person of the Father, therefore it is appropriated to the Father. In another way it can be said that charity there is taken essentially, as Augustine says — that to say of the Son of charity is no different than of the Son of substance; but the genitive is not construed in the account of principle, but by force of declaration of the essence — and the sense is: of the Son of charity = of the dear Son; and of the Son of substance or nature = of the Son consubstantial and natural.
Doubt X
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the Son is of the substance of the Father, homoousion. For — since a natural son in inferior beings draws part of his substance from the father, part from the mother, and in God draws the whole substance from the Father — it seems that the Father should not only be called father but also mother, and much more mother, because the mother gives more than the father. Likewise, the Son of God calls Himself wisdom, and wisdom which is conceived and brought forth (Proverbs 8)7. Therefore, since this is proper to a mother, it seems that the Father should more properly be called mother than father.
I respond: It must be said that the name mother is not transferred to divine things. And one reason is given by Anselm in the Monologion8: that the maternal principle pre-supposes another prior principle. And the reason for this is that the mother is a passive principle, and every such is moved by another: therefore there is another principle before it. Since, then, the principle of the generation of the Son is first and is purely actual, the maternal principle is in no way transferred [to God]; the maternal act however is transferred — to conceive and to bring forth — because there one principle does what here two do.
Doubt XI
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not from nothing. For this seems false: because that which is from no pre-existing matter is from nothing; but the Son and the Holy Spirit are such: therefore, etc. If you say that the Son and the Holy Spirit are from something — namely from the Father — it is then asked whether the Father is from nothing; and it seems so, because not-something and nothing are convertible; but the Father is not from anything: therefore He is from nothing. Likewise, because the Father has no effective principle, He is therefore said to be from no one: therefore, since He has no matter, He must be said from nothing. If this is conceded of the Father — on the contrary: everything that has being from nothing is created: therefore, etc.
I respond: It must be said that when it is said something is from nothing, according to Anselm in the Monologion9 it can be understood in three ways. In one way, nothing is taken simply privatively, as when it is said of one silent: he speaks of nothing; in another way positively, as when it is so said or understood that something is made from nothing — as a knife from iron; in a third way partly positively, partly privatively, as when it is said something is made from nothing because after nothing is something, as is said: from a poor man comes a rich man.
It must therefore be said that according to the first sense, God can be said to be from nothing — whether the Father or the divine essence; yet this mode is not customary. As to the second mode, nothing at all is made from nothing, because nothing is the matter of nothing. As to the third mode — according to which Augustine speaks, that only the creature is made from nothing or is from nothing, because from there denotes order, that it has being after non-being — this from nothing removes pre-existing matter. Although, then, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit do not have pre-existing matter, yet because they do not have being after non-being, they are not said to be from nothing. And therefore the first argument has no force, because it proceeds from an insufficient cause.
The second and third argument, made about the Father, do hold according as the negation of nothing is carried outside to the verb and makes a negative sentence; and according to this sense, just as it is conceded that the Father is from no one, so also from nothing. Yet, as has been said, this sense is not customary; for we commonly use this expression according as the negation of nothing stays within, and this from (de) is taken there ordinally10.
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- Vide supra a. 1, q. 1, Scholion, ubi de hac controversia cum abbate Ioachim et eius condemnatione in Concilio Lateranensi IV agitur.See above a. 1, q. 1, Scholion, where the controversy with Abbot Joachim and his condemnation at the Fourth Lateran Council is treated.
- Hilarius, II de Trin. n. 11.Hilary, On the Trinity II, n. 11.
- De eisdem Hilarii verbis cfr. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1, ad 8.On the same words of Hilary, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1, ad 8.
- Vat. communicare et consonare; plurimi codd. communicari et consonare. Verbum comitari recepimus ex ed. 1 et consociare ex cod. Z.The Vatican ed. reads communicare et consonare; most codd. communicari et consonare. We have received the word comitari from ed. 1 and consociare from cod. Z.
- August., de Trin. XV, c. 19, n. 37: Filii caritatis suae, nihil aliud intelligitur, quam Filii sui dilecti.Augustine, On the Trinity XV, c. 19, n. 37: «Of the Son of His charity — is understood as nothing else than of His beloved Son».
- Textum Richardi vide supra d. 2, q. 4. — De amore gratuito cfr. Richard. a S. Vict., de Trin. III, c. 2.See Richard's text above d. 2, q. 4. — On gratuitous love cf. Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity III, c. 2.
- Vers. 24–25. — De Sapientia in Prov. 8 ut figura Filii Dei vide late S. Bonav. infra d. 27, p. II, q. 2.[Proverbs 8,] verses 24–25. — On Wisdom in Proverbs 8 as a figure of the Son of God, see at length St. Bonaventure below at d. 27, p. II, q. 2.
- Anselm., Monologion c. 42: Quia prima et principalis causa prolis semper est in patre. Nam si maternam causam quolibet modo semper paterna praecedit, nimis est incongruum, ut illi parenti adaptetur nomen matris, cui ad gignendam prolem nulla alia causa aut sociatur aut praecedit. — De proxime sequenti ratione vide Aristot., I de Generat. animal. c. 19–20 et ibid. II, c. 4.Anselm, Monologion c. 42: «Because the first and principal cause of the offspring is always in the father. For if the maternal cause is in any way always preceded by the paternal, it is exceedingly incongruous that the name of mother be applied to that parent for whom no other cause is associated with or precedes [it] in begetting offspring». — On the immediately following reason see Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals I, cc. 19–20, and ibid. II, c. 4.
- Anselm., Monologion c. 8.Anselm, Monologion c. 8.
- Cfr. infra d. 8, p. II, dub. 2, ubi de hoc de nihilo in creatione fusius agitur. — Pro ordinaliter hic intellige nota ordinis temporalis: post non esse esse.Cf. below d. 8, p. II, dub. 2, where from nothing in creation is treated more fully. — For ordinaliter here understand a note of temporal order: being after non-being.