Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 5
Quaestio II
Utrum substantia sive essentia per generationem communicetur.
Ultimo quaeritur, utrum substantia per generationem communicetur1; et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo:
1. Per illud res communicatur, per quod fit, ut sit in pluribus; sed substantia est in pluribus personis et non est nisi per generationem et per processionem: ergo per generationem communicatur.
2. Item, causa est, qua posita ponitur res et qua remota removetur2; sed posita emanatione in divinis, ponitur communitas et distinctio; remota generatione vel emanatione, essentia est in uno solo, sicut hypostasis: ergo generatio est ratio communicandi essentiam.
3. Item, quod datur alicui et non desinit haberi a dante, per illud per quod datur, per illud communicatur3; sed substantia a Patre datur Filio per generationem et non desinit haberi a Patre, dum datur Filio: ergo per generationem communicatur.
4. Item, generatio in his inferioribus est ratio communicandi substantiam sive naturam; sed in divinis natura est illis multo communicabilior, quia simplicior: ergo in divinis per generationem substantia vel essentia communicatur.
Contra:
1. Generatio est principium distinguendi; sed non est idem principium distinguendi et communicandi: ergo per generationem non est ratio communicandi in divinis: ergo per generationem nihil communicatur.
2. Item, quod facit aliquid esse in hoc, non est ratio communicandi, sed appropriandi; sed generatio facit esse substantiam in tali persona, utpote in persona Filii: ergo non est ratio communicandi, sed appropriandi.
3. Item, omne illud quod per generationem communicatur, per generationem est commune. Si ergo substantia per generationem communicatur, generatione circumscripta, non erit communis: ergo propria; sed proprium per generationem non potest communicari: ergo nec substantia.
4. Item, quod per generationem communicatur, per generationem datur et recipitur, et omne tale, si non est generationi accidentale, generatur; sed substantia non accidit generationi: ergo etc.
Conclusio
Verissime substantia vel essentia per generationem communicatur, quia per generationem fit, ut sit una in pluribus.
Respondeo: Ad hoc intelligendum notandum, quod commune4, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad actum et potentiam. Commune enim potest dici illud quod est communicabile, quamvis non sit in pluribus; sicut patet in multis universalibus, ut in sole et luna et huiusmodi. Commune etiam dicitur communicatum, quod est actu in pluribus.
Dico ergo, quod quemadmodum forma universalis, quantum est de se, est communicabilis; sed quod sit actu communicata in pluribus, non est nisi per illud quod multiplicat sive plurificat supposita: sicut natura humana est de se communicabilis, sed quod actu sit in Petro et Paulo, est per generationem; sic et e converso, sic natura divina vel essentia de se quidem communicabilis est, sed quod actu communicetur, non est nisi per illud quod multiplicat vel plurificat supposita; haec autem est generatio.
Quoniam igitur per generationem personae pluriflcantur, et substantia in illis non numeratur, hinc est, quod verissime substantia vel essentia per generationem communicatur, quia per generationem fit, ut sit una in pluribus.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod generatio est principium distinguendi; dicendum, quod generatio per se est principium distinguendi suppositum a supposito, quia ad illud terminatur per se; etiam est principium communicandi naturam communem, quia similem ex simili. Sed quoniam natura in inferioribus numeratur in suppositis, ideo est principium distinguendi etiam commune, sed per accidens; in Deo autem nec est per se nec per accidens.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod facere commune esse in hoc est ratio appropriandi; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, quando commune est appropriabile vel appropriatum per esse in hoc. Divina autem essentia non est sic appropriabilis, vel appropriata per esse in hoc, quia non est appropriabilis quoad significatum nec quoad suppositum, quia idem significat et supponit, sicut supra ostensum est; significatum autem eius nulla additione distinguitur. Haec enim est vera: essentia Patris et essentia, quae est in Patre, est Filius.
Vel aliter potest dici, quod facere esse in hoc est dupliciter: aut absolute; et sic est ratio appropriandi; aut in comparatione, ut illud quod erat prius in uno, fiat postea in alio; et sic est ratio communicandi naturam.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod, si per generationem communicatur, generatio substantiam facit communem; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod commune dicitur secundum actum, quia in pluribus, sed non secundum potentiam. Unde circumscripta generatione, substantia est communis, quia communicabilis; sed non est communis, quia communicata.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod per generationem datur, generatur; dicendum, quod falsum est: quia generari dicit productionem et distinctionem, sed datio dicit auctoritatem et communicationem; et quoniam per generationem substantia non distinguitur, quamvis communicetur5: ergo etc.
I. Scotus (hic q. 2.) observat, quod aliud est aliquid per generationem communicare, aliud per eandem aliquid producere: productio enim infert realem distinctionem inter producentem et productum, non vero communicatio. Essentia igitur divina nec generatur nec producitur nec multiplicatur, tamen secundum omnes theologos communicatur. Terminus totalis generationis in Deo est Filius, et relatio inter generantem et generatum est realis cum reali distinctione. Sed inter communicantem et communicatum, quod est essentia divina, non est realis relatio, nec alia distinctio nisi secundum rationem. Cfr. infra d. 19. p. II. q. 2. in corp. et ad 2; et d. 34. q. 2. ad 7, et ibid. q. 1.
II. Inter antiquos Scholasticos non invenimus, qui explicite hanc quaestionem tractent, praeter B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 60. q. 1. n. 57. et seqq. — Petr. Aureolum, hic q. 5. — Eam tangit Scot., hic q. 2.
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Question II
Whether substance or essence is communicated through generation.
Last, it is asked whether substance is communicated through generation1; and that it is, is shown thus:
1. A thing is communicated through that by which it comes about that it is in many; but substance is in many persons, and is so only through generation and procession: therefore it is communicated through generation.
2. Likewise, the cause is that with which posited the thing is posited, and with which removed it is removed2; but with emanation posited in God, commonality and distinction are posited; with generation or emanation removed, the essence is in only one, just as the hypostasis: therefore generation is the principle of communicating the essence.
3. Likewise, what is given to one and does not cease to be possessed by the giver is communicated through that through which it is given3; but substance is given by the Father to the Son through generation, and does not cease to be possessed by the Father while it is given to the Son: therefore it is communicated through generation.
4. Likewise, generation in inferior beings is the principle of communicating substance or nature; but in God the nature is much more communicable, because more simple: therefore in God substance or essence is communicated through generation.
On the contrary:
1. Generation is the principle of distinguishing; but the principle of distinguishing and of communicating is not the same: therefore generation is not the principle of communicating in God: therefore through generation nothing is communicated.
2. Likewise, what makes something to be in this [supposit] is not the principle of communicating, but of appropriating; but generation makes substance to be in such a person — namely in the person of the Son: therefore it is not the principle of communicating, but of appropriating.
3. Likewise, all that is communicated through generation is by generation common. If therefore substance is communicated through generation, then with generation removed, it will not be common: therefore it would be proper; but the proper cannot be communicated through generation: therefore neither can substance.
4. Likewise, what is communicated through generation is given and received through generation, and every such thing — if it is not accidental to generation — is begotten; but substance is not accidental to generation: therefore, etc.
Conclusion
Most truly substance or essence is communicated through generation, because through generation it comes to be that one [substance] is in many.
I respond: For understanding this it should be noted that common4, considered in itself, is indifferently disposed to act and potency. For common can be said of that which is communicable, although it not be in many — as is clear in many universals, such as the sun and the moon and the like. Common is also said of what is communicated — that which is actually in many.
I say therefore that, just as the universal form, considered in itself, is communicable; but its being actually communicated in many is only through that which multiplies or pluralizes the supposits — as human nature is in itself communicable, but its being actually in Peter and Paul is through generation; so also conversely, the divine nature or essence is in itself indeed communicable, but its being actually communicated is only through that which multiplies or pluralizes the supposits; and this is generation.
Since, therefore, through generation the persons are pluralized, and the substance in them is not numbered, it follows that most truly substance or essence is communicated through generation, because through generation it comes to be that one [substance] is in many.
1. To the objection that generation is the principle of distinguishing: it must be said that generation is per se the principle of distinguishing one supposit from another, because it is per se terminated at it; it is also the principle of communicating the common nature, because [it produces] the like from the like. But because the nature in inferior beings is numbered in supposits, therefore it is also the principle of distinguishing the common, but per accidens; in God, however, it is neither per se nor per accidens [a principle of distinguishing the common].
2. To the objection that to make something to be in this is the principle of appropriating: it must be said that this is true when the common is appropriable or appropriated through being in this. But the divine essence is not thus appropriable, nor appropriated through being in this — because it is not appropriable as to its signified or its supposit, since it signifies and supposits the same, as was shown above; and its signified is not distinguished by any addition. For this is true: the essence of the Father, and the essence which is in the Father, is the Son.
Or it can be said otherwise: to make to be in this is in two ways — either absolutely, and in this way it is the principle of appropriating; or by comparison — that what was previously in one comes to be afterward in another, and in this way it is the principle of communicating the nature.
3. To the objection that, if [substance] is communicated through generation, generation makes the substance common: it must be said that this is true according as common is said in act, because [it is] in many; but not according to potency. Hence with generation set aside, substance is common because communicable; but is not common as communicated.
4. To the objection that what is given through generation is begotten: it must be said that this is false: because to be begotten expresses production and distinction; but giving expresses authority and communication. And since through generation substance is not distinguished, although it is communicated5: therefore, etc.
I. Scotus (here q. 2) observes that one thing is to communicate something through generation, another to produce something through the same: for production infers a real distinction between producer and produced, but not communication. The divine essence, then, is neither generated nor produced nor multiplied, yet according to all theologians it is communicated. The total term of generation in God is the Son, and the relation between begetter and begotten is real with a real distinction. But between the communicator and the communicated — which is the divine essence — there is no real relation, nor any distinction except by account. Cf. below d. 19, p. II, q. 2 in corp. and ad 2; and d. 34, q. 2, ad 7, and ibid. q. 1.
II. Among the older Scholastics we do not find any who explicitly treat this question, except Blessed Albert here a. 1; Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 60, q. 1, n. 57 ff.; and Peter Aureolus here q. 5. Scotus touches on it here q. 2.
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- Cfr. supra hic q. 1, ubi substantia communicari potius dicitur quam generari.Cf. above, here q. 1, where substance is said to be communicated rather than begotten.
- Aristot., II Anal. Poster. c. 11 (c. 12): Causa est quod, eo posito, ponitur effectus.Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II, c. 11 (c. 12): «A cause is that with which posited, the effect is posited».
- Cfr. Aristot., V Metaph. text. 6 seqq. (IV, c. 2), de prius et posterius in causalitate.Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 6 ff. (IV, c. 2), on prior and posterior in causality.
- Cfr. supra d. 4, q. 4, et hic q. 1, ad 2, ubi de duplici sensu termini substantia (prima et secunda) agitur.Cf. above d. 4, q. 4, and here q. 1, ad 2, where the twofold sense of the term substance (first and second) is treated.
- Cfr. infra d. 19, p. II, q. 2 in corp. et ad 2; et d. 34, q. 2, ad 7, ubi de relatione reali inter generantem et generatum, et de eo quod inter communicantem et communicatum non sit nisi distinctio rationis, latius agitur.Cf. below d. 19, p. II, q. 2 in corp. and ad 2; and d. 34, q. 2, ad 7, where the real relation between begetter and begotten — and the fact that between communicator and communicated there is only a distinction of account — is treated more fully.