Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 6
Quaestio I
Utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem necessitatis.
Circa primum, quod generatio sit secundum conditionem necessitatis, sic ostenditur:
1. Fecundior et actualior est natura in Patre ad producendum Filium, quam sit in luce ad producendum radium1; sed lucem necesse est radium producere, ita quod productio in ipsa est secundum conditionem necessitatis: ergo multo fortius in Patre respectu Filii.
2. Item, omne quod emanat ab alio, emanat secundum conditionem necessitatis, aut contingentiae: ergo et Filius emanat altero istorum duorum modorum; sed non secundum conditionem contingentiae, quia tunc contingens esset Filium generari: ergo etc.
3. Item, ab omnipotente detrahere maximum posse est impossibile; sed Deus Pater est omnipotens, cuius maximum posse est generare Filium: ergo detrahere ei posse generare Filium est impossibile. Sed in aeternis potentia est coniuncta actui: ergo pari ratione impossibile est auferre actum generationis: ergo impossibile est non generare; sed impossibile non esse et necesse esse convertuntur: ergo necesse est generare.
Contra:
1. Augustinus ad Orosium, et Magister dicit in littera2: «Nec voluntate nec necessitate genuit Pater Filium, quia necessitas in Deo non est»: ergo etc.
2. Item, Hilarius in libro de Synodis3: «Non naturali necessitate ductus Pater genuit Filium»: ergo non fuit ibi necessitas naturalis nec necessitas alia, ut videtur: ergo etc.
3. Item, nobilius producens est illud quod dominatur suae actioni, quam quod subiacet; sed agens secundum rationem necessitatis subiacet actioni, quia velit nolit oportet ipsum facere: ergo si Pater, qui est nobilissimum agens, nobilissimo modo producit Filium, non igitur secundum conditionem necessitatis.
4. Item, hoc idem potest ostendi sic: quod gratis datur, non de necessitate datur; sed Richardus dicit4, quod in Patre est amor gratuitus, quia dat esse Filio et Spiritui sancto: si ergo gratis dat, non de necessitate dat.
Conclusio
Generatio in divinis necessaria est necessitate immutabilitatis, non tamen alia specie necessitatis.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod multiplex est necessitas. Quaedam enim est necessitas proveniens ex principio disconveniente, quaedam ex principio deficiente, quaedam ex principio conveniente et sufficiente.
Illa quae provenit ex principio disconveniente, est contra voluntatem, et ista est necessitas coactionis; et de istis duobus modis quaerit haereticus, qui sunt valde usitati.
Illa similiter, quae est ex principio deficiente, est duplex: aut enim est respectu eius, quo res est nata compleri; et haec est necessitas indigentiae, ut cibi et potus; de hac dicitur 1 Ioannis 35: Qui viderit fratrem suum necessitatem patientem. Aut respectu eius, quod incurrit ex ipso defectu; et haec est necessitas inevitabilitatis, qualis est in morte et in primis motibus; hanc necessitatem incurrit homo ex carentia originalis iustitiae, Psalmus6: De necessitatibus meis erue me.
Tertia similiter, quae est ex principio sufficiente et conveniente, est duplex: aut enim est ex principio sufficiente in disponendo, et haec est necessitas materiae dispositae, quae potest dici necessitas exigentiae; aut in complendo, et haec est necessitas immutabilitatis.
Et haec ultima necessitas cadit in Deo, et principaliter in Deo, quia ipse solus est qui sibi omnino sufficit et qui secum omnino convenit. Haec autem necessitas non repugnat libertati voluntatis, sed solum vertibilitati, qualis non est in Deo.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de littera, dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de necessitate coactionis, quae nullo modo cadit in Deo, et de hac quaerebat haereticus.
2. Similiter et Hilarius intelligit de hac eadem, unde et subdit in littera: non naturali necessitate, cum nollet; tunc enim ibi esset coactio, dum repugnaret voluntas.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod agens per necessitatem subiacet suae actioni; dicendum, quod falsum est, nisi sit necessitas repugnans voluntati. Cum enim est necessitas repugnans, necesse est voluntatem subiici, quia non potest praevalere. Sed quando est necessitas summe consonans, non potens discordare a voluntate, tunc nullam inducit subiectionem, sicut patet. Deus enim necessario est beatus et necessario vult esse beatus; et sicut necessarium est, ipsum esse beatum, ita et velle; sic intelligendum est in generatione Filii.
4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de amore gratuito, dicendum, quod duo sunt in gratuito amore: unum est, quod dat ex mera liberalitate, ita quod nulla est exigentia sive debitum meriti vel naturae; aliud, quod dat sine retributione, et quantum ad hoc secundum dicitur amor gratuitus in Patre, non quantum ad primum. Naturalis enim fecunditas Patris necessario est ratio communicandi naturam alii.
I. Quoad ipsam generationem in divinis cfr. infra d. 9. per totam. — Easdem distinctiones necessitatis, paulo alio modo explicatas, S. Doctor habet in quadam quaestione disputata: utrum divinum esse sit summe necessarium. «Triplex est necessitas: quaedam omnino extrinseca, quaedam partim extrinseca, partim intrinseca, et quaedam omnino intrinseca. Necessitas omnino extrinseca est illa quae ortum habet a principio, quod est extra, nihil cooperante passo; et haec dupliciter habet esse, vel respectu operum naturalium, vel respectu operum voluntariorum; et sic duplex est necessitas, scilicet violentiae et coactionis. Necessitas vero partim intra, partim extra est, quae aliquo modo est a principio intrinseco respiciente aliquid extra vel per modum principii moventis, vel per modum termini quiescentis; et sic est necessitas dupliciter dicta, scilicet inevitabilitatis et indigentiae. Quaedam vero est necessitas omnino intrinseca, quae inest rei ex propria natura; et haec est necessitas immutabilitatis et independentiae, et talis necessitas secundum quid reperitur in creatura, simpliciter autem non potest reperiri nisi in creatrice essentia. Ipsa enim sola est, quae non admittit aliquam dependentiam; cetera vero, cum sint creata, necessario dependent ab ipsa. Haec autem necessitas necessario ponitur in esse divino, quia est in se ipso et a se ipso».
II. Quoad conclusionem ipsam cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1, et Report., hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 41. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic.
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Question I
Whether the generation of the Son is according to the account of necessity.
On the first point: that the generation is according to the condition of necessity, it is shown thus:
1. The nature in the Father is more fruitful and more actual for producing the Son than [the nature] in light is for producing a ray1; but it is necessary that light produce a ray — so that the production in it is according to the condition of necessity: therefore much more so in the Father with respect to the Son.
2. Likewise, all that emanates from another emanates either according to the condition of necessity or of contingency: therefore the Son too emanates according to one of these two modes; but not according to contingency, because then it would be contingent that the Son be begotten: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, to remove the greatest power from one omnipotent is impossible; but God the Father is omnipotent, whose greatest power is to beget the Son: therefore to remove from Him the power of begetting the Son is impossible. But in eternal things power is conjoined with act: therefore by the same reasoning it is impossible to remove the act of generation: therefore it is impossible not to generate; but impossible not to be and necessary to be are convertible: therefore it is necessary to generate.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine to Orosius, and the Master in the text2 say: «Neither by will nor by necessity did the Father beget the Son, because necessity is not in God»: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, Hilary in the book On the Synods3: «Not led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son»: therefore there was neither natural necessity nor any other necessity, as it seems: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, the more noble producer is the one that has dominion over its action — not the one that is subject to it; but the agent acting from necessity is subject to its action, because willy-nilly it must do it: therefore if the Father, the most noble agent, produces the Son in the most noble manner, then not according to the condition of necessity.
4. Likewise, the same point can be shown thus: what is given gratuitously is not given of necessity; but Richard says4 that in the Father is gratuitous love, because He gives being to the Son and the Holy Spirit: if therefore He gives gratuitously, He does not give of necessity.
Conclusion
The generation in God is necessary by the necessity of immutability, but not by another species of necessity.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it should be noted that necessity is manifold. There is a necessity proceeding from a discordant principle, a necessity from a deficient principle, and a necessity from a fitting and sufficient principle.
That which proceeds from a discordant principle is contrary to the will, and this is the necessity of coercion; and the heretic asks about these two modes, which are very common.
Likewise, that which is from a deficient principle is twofold: either it is with respect to that by which the thing is naturally completed — and this is the necessity of indigence, as of food and drink; on which it is said in 1 John 35: «Whoever sees his brother suffering necessity» (i.e. need). Or with respect to that which incurs from the very defect itself; and this is the necessity of inevitability, such as is in death and in first motions; this necessity man incurs from the lack of original justice, as in the Psalm6: «Free me from my necessities».
The third, likewise, which is from a sufficient and fitting principle, is twofold: either it is from a sufficient principle in disposing, and this is the necessity of disposed matter, which can be called the necessity of exigency; or in completing, and this is the necessity of immutability.
And this last necessity falls in God, and principally in God, because He alone is wholly sufficient to Himself and wholly fitting to Himself. But this necessity is not opposed to liberty of will, but only to mutability — which is not in God.
1. To the objection from the text: it must be said that this is understood of the necessity of coercion, which in no way falls in God — and the heretic was asking about this.
2. Likewise Hilary understands [it] of this same one — whence he adds in the text: «not by natural necessity, when He was unwilling»; for then there would be coercion, when the will was opposed.
3. To the objection that the agent acting through necessity is subject to its action: it must be said that this is false unless it is a necessity opposed to the will. For when there is opposing necessity, the will must be subject — because it cannot prevail. But when there is a necessity supremely consonant, unable to discord with the will, then it induces no subjection — as is clear. For God necessarily is blessed, and necessarily wills to be blessed; and just as it is necessary that He be blessed, so also that He will [it]; thus is it to be understood in the generation of the Son.
4. To the last objection on gratuitous love: it must be said that there are two things in gratuitous love: one is, that He gives from sheer liberality, so that there is no exigency or debt of merit or of nature; the other, that He gives without retribution. With respect to this second, it is called gratuitous love in the Father — not with respect to the first. For the natural fruitfulness of the Father is necessarily the principle of communicating the nature to another.
I. On generation in God, see below d. 9 throughout. — The same distinctions of necessity, slightly differently explained, the Holy Doctor has in a certain disputed question: whether divine being is supremely necessary. «Necessity is threefold: one wholly extrinsic, another partly extrinsic and partly intrinsic, and another wholly intrinsic. Wholly extrinsic necessity is that which has its origin from a principle that is outside, with the patient cooperating in nothing; and this exists in two ways — either with respect to natural works or with respect to voluntary works; and so necessity is twofold, namely of violence and of coercion. Necessity that is partly intrinsic, partly extrinsic, is that which is in some way from an intrinsic principle regarding something outside, either by way of moving principle or by way of resting term; and so there is necessity in two ways — namely of inevitability and of indigence. Some necessity is wholly intrinsic, which is in a thing from its own nature; and this is the necessity of immutability and independence, and such necessity is found in the creature only in some respect — but absolutely it cannot be found except in the creating essence. For it alone is what does not admit any dependence; everything else, since they are created, necessarily depend on it. But this necessity is necessarily posited in the divine being, because [the divine being] is in itself and from itself».
II. On the conclusion itself, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 5, a. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1, and Reportatio here q. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 41, a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here.
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- Cfr. Aristot., II Phys. text. 75 seqq. (c. 8): de necessitate naturae in agentibus naturalibus.Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, text 75 ff. (c. 8): on the necessity of nature in natural agents.
- Vide supra in lit. Magistri huius distinctionis: «Voluntate genuit Pater Filium, vel necessitate? Nec voluntate, nec necessitate, quia necessitas in Deo non est».See above in the Master's text of this distinction: «Did the Father beget the Son by will or by necessity? Neither by will nor by necessity, because necessity is not in God».
- Hilar., de Synodis n. 58: Genitus autem est non in id quod erat ex eo quod non erat, neque ex non exstantibus, neque ex altera substantia, sed ex Deo Deus, naturae propriae plenitudine, non naturali necessitate ductus, quia hoc volens quod necesse est ei velle.Hilary, On the Synods n. 58: «He was begotten not into what was, out of what was not, nor out of non-existents, nor out of another substance, but God out of God — by the fullness of His proper nature, not led by natural necessity, because He wills that which it is necessary for Him to will».
- Cfr. Richard. a S. Vict., de Trin. III, c. 2 et 4: Amor gratuitus est, qui dat tantum et nihil accipit.Cf. Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity III, cc. 2 and 4: «Gratuitous love is that which only gives and receives nothing».
- 1 Ioan. 3, 17: Qui habuerit substantiam mundi, et viderit fratrem suum necessitatem habere. — Vat. patientem; Vulgata habere.1 John 3:17: «Whoever has the substance of the world, and sees his brother in need». — Vat. ed. reads patientem («suffering»); the Vulgate habere («having»).
- Psalm. 24, 17: Tribulationes cordis mei multiplicatae sunt; de necessitatibus meis erue me.Psalm 24 (25):17: «The tribulations of my heart are multiplied; deliver me from my necessities».