Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 6
Quaestio II
Utrum generatio in divinis sit secundum rationem voluntatis.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem voluntatis. Et quod non, ostenditur primo per auctoritates, secundo per rationes:
1. Primo ostenditur per auctoritatem Hilarii, qui dicit in libro de Synodis1: «Omnibus creaturis substantiam Dei voluntas attulit, sed Filio natura dedit».
2. Item, Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate2 reprehendit Eunomium, qui posuit Filium Dei esse Filium voluntatis: ergo si recte reprehendit, generatio Filii non est secundum conditionem voluntatis.
3. Item, rationibus ostenditur sic: Generatio, quantum est de se, est exitus naturalis sive per modum naturae; sed iste est alius modus producendi quam per voluntatem: ergo etc.
4. Item, Filius est sapientia Patris: ergo si procedit secundum rationem voluntatis, voluntas est prior sapientia; sed hoc est inconveniens, quia cognitio secundum naturalem ordinem intelligendi praecedit affectionem sive voluntatem: ergo etc.
Sed contra:
1. In omni natura ordinata positum naturalis subiacet voluntati, vel saltem conformatur voluntati, sicut patet in primo homine; sed in Deo est natura ordinatissima: ergo nihil est a natura vel per naturam, quod non sit per voluntatem: ergo etc.
2. Item, consimilis est modus procedendi in imagine creata et in Trinitate increata; sed in imagine notitia oritur mediante voluntate a mente: ergo et Filius a Patre mediante voluntate sive per voluntatem. Minor patet per Augustinum nono de Trinitate3: «Partum mentis praecedit appetitus, quo, dum quaerendo invenimus quod nosse volumus, nascitur proles, ipsa notitia».
3. Item, ubi est maior communicatio, ibi est liberalitas maior; sed Pater plus communicat Filio quam omnibus creaturis: ergo maior est ibi liberalitas: ergo cum creaturae procedant per modum liberalitatis, multo magis Filius.
4. Item, in creaturis in actu generationis simul movet natura et voluntas, et nihil ex hoc filio derogatur: ergo si Pater magis producit secundum se totum quam creatura: ergo multo fortius per naturam et voluntatem.
5. Item, ad hoc est auctoritas Hilarii in tertio de Trinitate4: «Pater ante omne tempus Filium procreavit, omne quod est Deus per caritatem nativitati eius impartiens»; si per caritatem: ergo per voluntatem.
6. Item, Origenes5 loquens de mente divina dicit: «Germen proferens voluntatis fit Verbi Pater»: ergo videtur, quod Filius generetur a Patre per voluntatem et quod sit Filius voluntatis.
Conclusio
Generatio Filii est secundum voluntatem ut in ratione approbantis, non vero ut in ratione producentis, nisi quatenus voluntas est principium coniunctum naturae — et quidem sic, ut natura producat principaliter, voluntate concomitante.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod voluntas potest dupliciter considerari respectu voliti, scilicet ut in ratione approbantis et diligentis; et sic est respectu omnis boni, sive sit necessarium sive sit contingens, sive creatum sive increatum sive ab alio, quod dicitur, quod alia sunt a natura, alia a voluntate; aut prout est coniunctum.
Si prout est principium distinctum, sic distinguitur voluntas dupliciter, scilicet accedens et antecedens. Voluntas accedens est, qua aliquis de non volente fit volens; haec non est in Deo nec respectu Dei nec respectu creaturae. Deus enim non habet aliquam novam voluntatem nec respectu sui nec respectu alterius. Voluntas antecedens praecedit effectum causalitate et duratione; haec quidem est in Deo, sed non respectu Dei, sed respectu creaturae solum; omnes enim divinae personae sunt simul.
Alio modo, prout voluntas consideratur ut principium coniunctum naturae, potest esse dupliciter; quia tunc natura et voluntas sunt principium; aut igitur natura est producens principaliter, voluntate concomitante, aut e converso; utrumque enim principaliter esse non potest.
Si voluntas est principium, concomitante natura, sic est processio Spiritus sancti, qui procedit per modum amoris, tamen similis in natura. Si vero natura est primum principium, concomitante voluntate, sic est generatio Filii, qui producitur ut omnino similis et per modum naturae, nihilominus ut dilectus; et ideo dicitur, quod sibi in eo complacet Pater, et ad Colossenses primo dicitur Filius caritatis6.
1. 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod generatio est per modum voluntatis sive secundum rationem voluntatis; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur aut de voluntate approbante, ut ostendunt duae auctoritates Hilarii et Origenis, aut de voluntate concomitante, ut ratio, quae posita est primo.
2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de similitudine imaginis; dicendum, quod in hoc est dissimilis imago creata ipsi Trinitati increatae, ut dicit Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate7, quia ibi non nascitur verbum per inquisitionem, sicut potest nasci in nobis; unde potius valet ad oppositum quam ad propositum.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est communicatio in generatione Filii; dicendum, quod maior communicatio vel minor non facit modum emanandi esse secundum liberalitatem vel secundum modum voluntatis, sed modus sive ratio communicandi. Et quia Pater communicat creaturis per voluntatem, ita quod voluntas eius est causa producens, Filio per fecunditatem naturae: ideo non sic dicitur Filius produci per voluntatem, sicut creaturae.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in generatione hominis simul movet natura et voluntas; dicendum, quod hoc est propter defectum magis quam propter complementum; quia pater per se non potest generare, sed ex coniunctione cum alio distante, quod fit ad imperium voluntatis; Deus autem alio adiuvante non indiget; et ideo non est simile.
I. De diversis modis volendi, quae hic tanguntur, Seraphicus in anecdota quaestione disputata: utrum stent simul Trinitas et summa necessitas, haec habet: «Est voluntas accedens, i. e. de novo adveniens; et haec non est in Deo. Est iterum voluntas antecedens; et haec est in Deo, sed non respectu sui, sed respectu creati, quod antecedit natura et aeternitate. Est tertio voluntas concomitans et acceptans; et haec est in Deo respectu sui et respectu creati; approbat enim et acceptat voluntas divina omne bonum sive creatum sive increatum, sive contingens sive necessarium».
II. Quoad processionem Spiritus sancti secundum rationem voluntatis cfr. infra d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. — Circa differentiam inter generationem et spirationem cfr. infra d. 26. q. 1. et ibi Scholion.
III. In conclusione doctores consentiunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1; et q. 43. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 1; Report., hic q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2; S. I. q. 41. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.
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Question II
Whether the generation in God is according to the account of will.
Second it is asked whether the generation of the Son is according to the account of will. And that it is not, is shown first by authorities, second by reasons:
1. First, it is shown by the authority of Hilary, who says in the book On the Synods1: «To all creatures will gave the substance of God, but to the Son nature gave it».
2. Likewise, Augustine in the fifteenth book On the Trinity2 rebukes Eunomius, who held that the Son of God is Son of will: therefore if he rightly rebukes him, the generation of the Son is not according to the condition of will.
3. Likewise, by reasons it is shown thus: Generation, as it is in itself, is a natural going-forth, or by way of nature; but this is another mode of producing than through will: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, the Son is the Father's Wisdom: therefore if He proceeds according to the account of will, will is prior to wisdom; but this is incongruous, because cognition according to the natural order of understanding precedes affection or will: therefore, etc.
On the contrary:
1. In every well-ordered nature, what is naturally placed is subject to the will, or at least is conformed to the will — as is clear in the first man; but in God the nature is most well-ordered: therefore there is nothing from nature or through nature which is not also through will: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, the mode of proceeding is similar in the created image and in the uncreated Trinity; but in the image knowledge arises from the mind by means of the will: therefore so the Son [arises] from the Father by means of the will, or through the will. The minor premise is clear from Augustine, ninth book On the Trinity3: «The birth of the mind is preceded by appetite, by which — when, by seeking, we find what we wish to know — there is born an offspring, which is knowledge itself».
3. Likewise, where there is greater communication, there is greater liberality; but the Father communicates more to the Son than to all creatures: therefore there is greater liberality there: therefore, since creatures proceed by way of liberality, much more so the Son.
4. Likewise, in creatures in the act of generation nature and will move at the same time, and nothing of this is detracted from the son: therefore if the Father produces according to His whole self more than the creature does: therefore much more strongly through nature and will.
5. Likewise, for this is the authority of Hilary in the third [book] On the Trinity4: «The Father before all time procreated the Son, imparting all that He is as God by charity to His birth»; if through charity: therefore through will.
6. Likewise, Origen5, speaking of the divine mind, says: «Bearing the seed of will, He becomes Father of the Word»: therefore it seems that the Son is begotten by the Father through will, and that He is Son of will.
Conclusion
The generation of the Son is according to will as in the account of approving — but not as in the account of producing, except insofar as the will is a principle conjoined to nature; and this so that nature produces principally, with the will concomitant.
I respond: It must be said that the will can be considered in two ways with respect to what is willed — namely either as in the account of approving and loving; and so it is with respect to every good — whether necessary or contingent, whether created or uncreated, or from another (which is what is said: that some things are from nature, others from will); — or as conjoined.
If as a distinct principle, the will is then distinguished in two ways: as accedent and antecedent. The accedent will is by which someone, from non-willing, becomes willing; this is not in God — neither with respect to God nor with respect to creature. For God does not have any new will either with respect to Himself or with respect to another. The antecedent will precedes the effect in causality and in duration; this indeed is in God, but not with respect to God — only with respect to creature. For all the divine persons are simultaneous.
In another way, as the will is considered as a principle conjoined to nature, it can be in two ways; for then nature and will are the principle: either nature is the principal producer, with will concomitant, or conversely; for both cannot be principal.
If the will is the principle, with nature concomitant — so is the procession of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds by way of love, yet similar in nature. If nature is the first principle, with the will concomitant — so is the generation of the Son, who is produced as wholly similar and by way of nature, yet as beloved; and therefore it is said that the Father is well-pleased in Him, and at Colossians 1 He is called Son of charity6.
1., 5., 6. To the objection on the contrary, that generation is by way of will or according to the account of will: it must be said that this is understood either of the will approving — as the two authorities of Hilary and Origen show — or of the will concomitant, as the reason set down first holds.
2. To the objection from the likeness of the image: it must be said that in this respect the created image is unlike the uncreated Trinity itself, as Augustine says in the fifteenth book On the Trinity7 — because there a word is not born by inquiry, as it can be born in us; whence [the argument] avails for the opposite rather than for the proposition.
3. To the objection that there is greater communication in the generation of the Son: it must be said that greater or lesser communication does not make the mode of emanation be according to liberality or according to the mode of will, but rather the mode or account of communicating. And because the Father communicates to creatures through will (so that His will is the producing cause), and to the Son through the fruitfulness of nature: therefore the Son is not said to be produced through will in the same way as creatures are.
4. To the objection that in the generation of a man nature and will move together: it must be said that this is on account of defect rather than completion; because the father by himself cannot generate, but only through conjunction with another distant being — which happens at the command of the will. But God needs no other helper; and therefore it is not similar.
I. On the various modes of willing touched on here, the Seraphic in a certain disputed unpublished question — whether the Trinity and supreme necessity stand together — has the following: «There is accedent will, i.e., coming anew; and this is not in God. There is also antecedent will, and this is in God, but not with respect to Himself, but with respect to the created — which it antecedes in nature and in eternity. There is third the concomitant and accepting will, and this is in God with respect to Himself and with respect to the created; for the divine will approves and accepts every good — whether created or uncreated, whether contingent or necessary».
II. On the procession of the Holy Spirit according to the account of will, see below d. 10, a. 1, q. 1. — On the difference between generation and spiration, see below d. 26, q. 1, and the Scholion there.
III. On the conclusion the doctors agree: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 5, a. 1; and q. 43, m. 3, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. 1; Reportatio here qq. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2; Summa I, q. 41, a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here aa. 1, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 2 princ. q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2.
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- Hilar., de Synodis n. 58 (post medium): Omnibus enim creaturis substantiam Dei voluntas attulit, sed naturam Filio dedit ex Patre nativitas.Hilary, On the Synods n. 58 (after the middle): «For will brought the substance of God to all creatures, but nativity from the Father gave nature to the Son».
- De Trin. XV, c. 20, n. 38. Vide supra in lit. Magistri huius distinctionis.[Augustine,] On the Trinity XV, c. 20, n. 38. See above in the Master's text of this distinction.
- August., IX de Trin. c. 12, n. 18: Verbi appetitus, qui dum quaerendo invenimus quod nosse volumus, nascitur proles, ipsa notitia, quae est verbum mentis.Augustine, On the Trinity IX, c. 12, n. 18: «The appetite for the word — by which, when by seeking we find what we wish to know, there is born an offspring, knowledge itself, which is the word of the mind».
- Hilar., III de Trin. n. 4: Pater ante omne tempus Filium procreavit, omne quod est Deus per caritatem nativitati eius impertiens.Hilary, On the Trinity III, n. 4: «The Father before all time procreated the Son, imparting to His birth all that He is as God by charity».
- Origenes, In Ioan. tom. I, n. 24 seqq.; cfr. fragmenta apud S. Athan., Epist. de decretis Nicaeni concilii n. 27.Origen, Commentary on John book I, n. 24 ff.; cf. fragments in St. Athanasius, Letter on the Decrees of the Council of Nicaea n. 27.
- Coloss. 1, 13: In regnum Filii dilectionis suae. Vide etiam supra d. 5 dub. 9, ubi de hoc Filio caritatis fusius agitur.Colossians 1:13: «Into the kingdom of the Son of His love». See also above d. 5, dub. 9, where this Son of charity is treated more fully.
- August., XV de Trin. c. 16, n. 26: In nobis verbum quod inquirendo invenitur, ostendit naturam aliam quam in Verbo Dei.Augustine, On the Trinity XV, c. 16, n. 26: «In us the word that is found by inquiry shows a nature other than [that] in the Word of God».