Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 7
Articulus Unicus
De comparatione potentiae generandi ad personam.
Quaestio I
Utrum potentia generandi dicat aliquid absolutum vel relativum — hoc est, utrum dicat quid vel ad aliquid.
Quod dicat quid, ostenditur:
1. Per auctoritatem Magistri in littera: Pater non est potens nisi natura; eius enim potentia natura ipsa est vel essentia; sed natura et potentia dicunt quid, non ad aliquid: ergo et potentia generandi.
2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: generare est simile sibi producere1; sed omne tale dicit quid: ergo etc.
3. Item, in perpetuis non differt esse et posse2: ergo multo fortius in aeternis; ergo idem est esse et posse, et potentia et essentia; sed esse et essentia in divinis dicunt quid, non ad aliquid, sive per se dicatur, sive cum adiuncto; unde essentia Patris dicit quid: ergo pari ratione potentia generandi.
4. Item, in divinis idem est secundum rem posse scire et velle; sed non est in divinis scientia propria sive ad aliquid, immo scientia dicit quid et est trium — similiter et voluntas: ergo potentia generandi dicit quid sive essentiam.
Sed contra:
1. Magister dicit in littera, et habetur primo capitulo3: Posse generare non est posse aliquid — ergo non dicit quid; et dicit quid vel ad aliquid: ergo etc.
2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: potentiae distinguuntur per actus4: ergo si actus potentiae dicit quid, et potentia; et si dicit ad aliquid, tunc et potentia similiter. Sed constat quod generare in divinis non dicit quid, sed ad aliquid: ergo nec posse generare.
3. Item, quamvis in creaturis differant virtus et operatio, tamen in Deo idem sunt, sicut vult Dionysius5: ergo in Deo idem est posse generare et generare; sed generare in divinis dicit ad aliquid et non quid: ergo similiter posse.
4. Item, Pater generat et potest generare: aut ergo ideo potest, quia generat; aut ideo generat, quia potest. Constat quod non ideo potest generare, quia generat: ergo ideo generat, quia potest generare. Si ergo ratio proprii debet esse propria, ergo potentia generandi debet esse propria; et nihil est proprium in divinis, nisi quod dicit ad aliquid: ergo etc.
5. Item, omnis potentia activa, quae inest creaturae, inest secundum aliquas conditiones sive proprietates, ut patet. Posse enim illuminare inest luminoso per lucem, posse calefacere calido per caliditatem. Quamvis autem potentia generandi non sit activa, tamen activae similis est: ergo cum insit Patri, inest per aliquam proprietatem; illa autem proprietas aut dicit quid, aut ad aliquid. Si quid: ergo inest omnibus personis, et ita posse generare, quod manifeste negat Magister: ergo dicit ad aliquid: ergo et potentia, quae inest secundum illam: ergo etc.
Conclusio
Potentia generandi non dicit purum absolutum nec purum relativum, sed essentiam cum habitudine ad originem — et ideo est media quodammodo inter essentiale et personale.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod haec quaestio difficilis est et duae sunt opiniones. Prima tenet quod potentia generandi dicit purum absolutum sive quid, quia est ipsa essentia divina. Secunda opinio tenet quod dicit relativum sive ad aliquid, quia generare est proprietas personalis Patris. Tertia media sententia, quam S. Doctor praefert, tenet quod potentia generandi dicit essentiam cum habitudine ad originem, et ideo potest dicere habitudinem propriam et personae ad personam.
Unde illud simile Magistri non valet secundum hanc positionem, quod, sicut una est voluntas, qua Pater vult esse Pater et non vult esse Filius, et e converso, similiter una est potentia, ut videtur.
Si quis autem vult sustinere positionem Magistri, de facili potest ad omnes rationes in oppositum respondere.
Quatuor genera nominum in divinis: Quaedam enim essentialia sunt dicta essentialiter, ut deitas et maiestas; quaedam essentialia personaliter dicta, ut potentia generandi; quaedam personalia dicta personaliter, ut generans et genitus; quaedam personalia dicta essentialiter, ut missus, incarnatus et huiusmodi, quae dicunt respectum ad personam, et ideo personalia, et effectum in creatura, et ideo essentialiter sunt dicta.
1. Nam nulla ratio probat, quod potentia de se dicat proprium, sed quod potentia generandi active dicta sive posse generare dicat ex adiuncto respectum ad personam, et ita dicit ad aliquid; sed hoc est solum ratione additi.
2. Duabus rationibus sequentibus facile est respondere, quia illud non habet veritatem, nisi quando actus complectitur totam potentiam; non sic est in potentia Dei, quia eadem est potentia gignere et gigni in Deo.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est posse generare et generare; dicendum, quod non valet. Quamvis enim idem sit Pater et substantia, non tamen sequitur, quod si Pater dicitur ad aliquid, quod et substantia.
4. 5. Duabus ultimis rationibus difficile est bene respondere; tamen potest quis dicere, quod rationes illae non concludunt, quod potentia dicat ad aliquid de se, sed solum ratione adiuncti, quod est generare; et sic patent cetera.
I. In productione divinarum emanationum distinguitur principium quod et principium quo. Ipsae personae producentes sunt principium quod, cum actiones sint suppositorum. Principium quo (sive ratio, qua suppositum agit) divinarum productionum communiter asseritur esse potentiam generandi et spirandi. Aliis verbis haec quaestio sic exprimitur: utrum potentia generandi dicat quid absolutum (essentiam), an relativum sive relationem. Quaestio utraque est potius de modo loquendi quam de gravi aliqua differentia in re.
II. Quoad diversas opiniones: S. Thom. (S. I. q. 41. a. 5) secundae opinioni favens asserit, quod potentia generandi significat «in recto naturam divinam, sed in obliquo relationem», et cum B. Albert. (hic a. 2) affirmat, eam «esse quasi mediam inter essentiale et personale». Hanc opinionem S. Bonav. dicit esse «satis probabilem, et satis bene videtur sustineri posse», immo ipse in fine solutionis obiectorum argumenta quaedam in eius favorem affert.
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Single Article
On the comparison of the power of begetting to the person.
Question I
Whether the power of begetting signifies something absolute or relative — that is, whether it signifies something (quid) or in relation to something (ad aliquid).
That it signifies something (quid), it is shown:
1. By the authority of the Master in the text: «The Father is not powerful except by nature; for His power is the very nature or essence»; but nature and power signify quid, not ad aliquid: therefore so does the power of begetting.
2. Likewise, by reason: to beget is to produce a likeness of oneself1; but every such [act] signifies quid: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, in everlasting things being and being-able do not differ2: therefore much more so in eternal things; therefore to be and to be-able are the same — power and essence; but being and essence in God signify quid, not ad aliquid, whether spoken of by themselves or with an addition; whence the essence of the Father signifies quid: therefore by the same reasoning the power of begetting.
4. Likewise, in God to be able to know and [to be able to] will are the same in reality; but in God there is no proper science (ad aliquid) — rather, science signifies quid and is of the three [persons]; likewise will: therefore the power of begetting signifies quid or essence.
On the contrary:
1. The Master says in the text, and is held in chapter one3: «To be able to beget is not to be able [to do] something» — therefore it does not signify quid; and it signifies either quid or ad aliquid: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, by reason: powers are distinguished by their acts4: therefore if the act of a power signifies quid, so does the power; and if it signifies ad aliquid, then likewise the power. But it is established that to beget in God does not signify quid but ad aliquid: therefore neither does to be able to beget.
3. Likewise, although in creatures power and operation differ, yet in God they are the same — as Dionysius holds5: therefore in God to be able to beget and to beget are the same; but to beget in God signifies ad aliquid and not quid: therefore likewise to be able.
4. Likewise, the Father generates and can generate: either, then, He can because He generates, or He generates because He can. It is clear that He cannot generate because He generates: therefore He generates because He can generate. If, then, the principle of what is proper must itself be proper, then the power of begetting must be proper; and nothing is proper in God except what signifies ad aliquid: therefore, etc.
5. Likewise, every active power in a creature is in it according to certain conditions or properties — as is clear. For the power of illuminating is in the luminous through light; the power of heating is in the hot through heat. Although the power of begetting is not active, yet it is similar to active power: therefore, since it is in the Father, it is in Him through some property; and that property signifies either quid or ad aliquid. If quid: then it is in all the persons — and so [also] to be able to beget, which the Master manifestly denies: therefore it signifies ad aliquid: therefore so does the power that is in [the Father] according to it: therefore, etc.
Conclusion
The power of begetting signifies neither pure absolute nor pure relative, but the essence with a relation of origin — and is therefore in some way midway between the essential and the personal.
I respond: It must be said that this question is difficult and there are two opinions. The first holds that the power of begetting signifies a pure absolute — i.e. quid — because it is the divine essence itself. The second opinion holds that it signifies a relative — i.e. ad aliquid — because to beget is a personal property of the Father. The third middle opinion, which the Holy Doctor prefers, holds that the power of begetting signifies the essence with a relation of origin, and therefore can express a property and the relation of person to person.
Hence the Master's similitude does not hold according to this position — namely that, just as there is one will by which the Father wills to be Father (and not Son), and by which the Son wills to be Son (and not Father), so likewise there is one power. (As it seems.)
But if anyone wishes to sustain the Master's position, he can easily respond to all the arguments on the contrary.
Four genera of names in God. For some are essential names spoken essentially, as deity and majesty; some essential names spoken personally, as power of begetting; some personal names spoken personally, as begetter and begotten; some personal names spoken essentially, as sent, incarnate, and the like — which express a respect to a person (and so are personal) and an effect in creature (and so are spoken essentially).
1. For no reason proves that power in itself signifies what is proper; only that the power of begetting taken actively — or to be able to beget — signifies, by an addition, a respect to a person, and so signifies ad aliquid; but this is only by reason of the addition.
2. To the two following arguments it is easy to respond — because that holds true only when the act embraces the whole power; but it is not so in the divine power, because the same is the power to beget and to be begotten in God.
3. To the objection that to be able to beget and to beget are the same: it must be said that this does not hold. For although the Father and the substance are the same, yet it does not follow that, if the Father is said ad aliquid, then so is the substance.
4., 5. To the last two arguments it is difficult to respond well; yet one can say that those arguments do not conclude that the power signifies ad aliquid in itself, but only by reason of the addition — which is to beget; and so the rest is clear.
I. In the production of the divine emanations a distinction is made between principium quod (principle which) and principium quo (principle by which). The persons producing themselves are the principium quod, since actions belong to supposits. The principium quo (or the account by which the supposit acts) of the divine productions is commonly asserted to be the power of begetting and of spirating. In other words, this question is expressed thus: whether the power of begetting signifies quid absolutum (essence), or relativum — i.e. relation. Either question is rather of the mode of speaking than of any grave difference in the matter.
II. As to the diverse opinions: St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 41, a. 5), favoring the second opinion, asserts that the power of begetting signifies «in the direct case the divine nature, but in the oblique a relation», and with Blessed Albert (here a. 2) affirms that it «is, as it were, midway between the essential and the personal». This opinion St. Bonaventure says is «sufficiently probable, and seems sufficiently sustainable»; indeed at the end of the solution of the objections he himself brings forward certain arguments in its favor.
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- Aristot., I Magnor. Moral. c. 10: Omnis natura eius est essentiae procreatrix, qualis ipsa est. Cfr. V Metaph. text. 5 (IV, c. 4). — Auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 42: Natura siquidem est quaedam vis et potentia divinitus rebus creandis insita, quae unicuique rei suum esse tribuit.Aristotle, Greater Ethics I, c. 10: «Every nature is procreative of an essence such as it itself is». Cf. Metaphysics V, text 5 (IV, c. 4). — Author of the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 42: «For nature is a certain force and power divinely placed in things to be created, which assigns to each thing its own being».
- Cfr. Aristot., IX Metaph. text. 16 (VIII, c. 8) de coincidentia esse et posse in aeternis.Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 16 (VIII, c. 8), on the coincidence of being and being-able in eternal things.
- Cap. 2 in initio. — Mox Vat. contra multos codd. ut A G H I S T V Y Z bb ff et ed. 1 quia eius pro eiusque et in propositione minore contra omnes codd. et ed. 1 et essentia loco et potentia.[Master of the Sentences,] c. 2 at the beginning. — Next, the Vatican ed., against many codd. (A G H I S T V Y Z bb ff) and ed. 1, reads quia eius for eiusque; and in the minor premise, against all the codd. and ed. 1, et essentia in place of et potentia.
- Communiter allegatur hac de re Aristot., II de Anima, text. 33 (c. 4): Priores enim potentiis actus et operationes secundum rationem sunt; si autem sic, his adhuc priora opposita (i. e. obiecta).Commonly cited on this matter is Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 33 (c. 4): «For acts and operations are prior to powers according to account; and if so, then opposites (i. e., objects) are prior to these».
- Libr. de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 11; et de Div. Nom. c. 4, §. 1.[Dionysius,] On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 11; and On the Divine Names c. 4, §. 1.