Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 7
Quaestio II
Utrum Pater communicet Filio potentiam generandi, hoc est, utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio; et quod sic, videtur auctoritatibus et rationibus.
1. Primo sic: Hilarius nono de Trinitate1: «Filius habet in se naturaliter naturam gignentem»: ergo natura in Filio est nata generare.
2. Item, Augustinus in libro contra Maximinum2: «Neque enim non potuit Filius generare»; sed duae negationes aequivalent uni affirmationi: ergo potuit generare.
3. Item, rationibus ostenditur sic: plus ordinatur generare ad generandi potentiam, quam ad potentiam spirandi: sed Pater generans Filium communicat ei potentiam spirandi3: ergo multo fortius potentiam generandi.
4. Item, Filius est expressissima imago Patris: ergo tantum imitatur Patrem, quod non potest cogitari similior; sed si Filius cogitatur ut generans, magis cogitatur imitari: ergo si imitatur amplius, quam possit quis cogitare, ergo et in actu generandi.
5. Item, per simile videtur sic: maior communicatio et diffusio est in luce aeterna quam in luce creata4; sed lux creata dat splendori potentiam producendi alium, et sic procedendo; et si esset infinitae virtutis, produceret infinitos splendores: ergo etc.
Sed contra:
1. Generatio Filii a Patre similis est expresse ipsi generationi verbi a mente; sed verbum genitum non habet potentiam generandi aliud verbum, immo oportet, quod omne verbum immediate sit a mente: ergo si recte simile est Verbum increatum, non habet potentiam generandi, sed generandi potentia est in solo Patre.
2. Item, fiat argumentatio Augustini5 ducens ad impossibile. Si Filius habet potentiam sive posse generandi, ponatur quod generet; quaero de secundo similiter; et si non est stare in primo, oportet ponere infinitos filios, quia qua ratione non statur in primo, ergo nec in aliquo: ergo si est stare — quia hoc repugnat divinae completioni — sed qua ratione statur in aliquo, statur in primo: ergo primus non habet potentiam generandi.
3. Item, fiat argumentatio Richardi6: si generaret Filius alium filium: ergo cum filius genitus magis attineat patri quam avo, secundum hoc non esset ibi summa et aequalis connexio: ergo nec summa et aequalis dilectio: ergo nec perfecta beatitudo: quae omnia tanquam summe impossibilia respuit pia fides.
Conclusio
Pater potentiam generandi non communicat Filio, quod duabus rationibus probatur.
Respondeo: Opinio aliquorum est, quod in Filio est potentia generandi, sed non generat. Hoc autem non est, quia non potest, sed quia non convenit ei. Et ponunt simile in creaturarum productione sive creatione. Deus potest infinitas creaturas producere; sed quod non producit, hoc non est ex impotentia, sed quia non convenit ei; sic et in proposito.
Reprobatur. Sed contra: Ponatur tunc, quod illa potentia, quae est in Filio ad generandum, ducatur in actum; constat quod Filius generabit Deum aeternum: ergo aliquid poterit incipere habere esse et esse aeternum; hoc autem est impossibile et non intelligibile.
Propterea dicendum, quod Pater non communicat Filio posse generare propter duo. Unum est, quia non potest, aliud, quia non debet.
Ratio 1 (non potest). Fecunditas ad generandum est in Patre, quia principium, et ideo principium, quia primum7. Impossibile autem est, quod primum communicet alii primitatem. Nam hic est oppositio in adiecto, quod persona producta sit prima. Quia ergo fecunditas ad generandum ex primitate Patri inerat, ideo non potest eam communicare Filio.
Ratio 2 (non debet). Similiter non debet communicare, quoniam in emanatione divinarum personarum debet attendi originalis distinctio et plenissima communicatio. Originalis distinctio: quia necesse est, ea quae communicant in natura distingui vel per materiam, vel per originem. Per materiam distingui personas est impossibile; et ideo necesse est distingui per originem sive habitudinem: ergo per generare et generari: ergo si Filius potest generare, potest etiam non distingui.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium per auctoritatem Hilarii, quod Filius habet in se naturam gignentem; dicendum, quod verbum illud est improprium, et ex verbis impropriis non est arguendum. Est enim sensus: habet in se naturam gignentem, id est naturam Patris.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod neque non potuit; dicendum, quod Magister bene exponit, id est, non fuit ex hoc impotens. Unde secundum artem distinguendum est, quando dicitur, Filius non potuit generare: quia non potest teneri privative; et tunc est sensus, non potuit, id est, impotens fuit. Alio modo non posse tenetur negative; et in hoc sensu concedendum est, quod Filius non potuit generare.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Pater communicat Filio potentiam spirativam: patet responsio: quia cum Filius generetur, non potest habere primitatem respectu generationis; sed cum non spiretur, est inspirabilis: et ideo potuit habere primitatem et fecunditatem respectu illius.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius est expressissima imago etc.; dicendum, quod ideo Filius dicitur expressissima imago, quia repraesentat in omnibus, in quibus imago nata est repraesentare; sed imago sic nata est repraesentare, ut tamen ipsa non sit imaginatum; alioquin non esset imago. Si autem Filius repraesentaret in actu generandi, iam esset Pater.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de luce et splendore, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia lux non perfecte se multiplicat in primo splendore: ideo in pluribus facit quod non potest in uno.
6. Similiter et in filio carnali intelligendum. Haec tamen ratio non est principalis, sed illa quae dicta est supra, quia in his inferioribus non est fecunditas per rationem primitatis, sed per rationem perfectionis. In Deo autem, quia est perfectissimum et primum, non tantum est per naturam perfectionis — quia tunc in omnibus personis esset — sed per rationem primitatis.
I. Doctrina S. Doctoris de primitate Patris ut ratione fecunditatis ad generandum est propria Schola Franciscana et fusius exponitur infra d. 27, p. I, q. 2 in corp.; ac in Itinerar. mentis in Deum, c. 6, n. 2: «In quibus considerandum est, quod paternitas in divinis dicitur ratione primitatis et fecunditatis sive generativae naturae». Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 51, m. 1, a. 1, ubi simili modo agitur.
II. S. Thomas (S. I, q. 41, a. 6) hanc rationem primitatis expresse non admittit, sed dicit potentiam generandi non communicari Filio quia secundum modum significandi potentia generandi importat relationem paternitatis. Discrepantia tamen est plus de modo loquendi quam in re, ut ipsi doctores modernores admittunt.
III. Quoad ipsam quaestionem cfr. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 51, m. 1, a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 2; Summa I, q. 41, a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1 princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 54, q. 8, n. 27. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 2.
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Question II
Whether the Father communicates to the Son the power of begetting — that is, whether the power of begetting is in the Son.
Second it is asked whether the power of begetting is in the Son; and that it is, seems evident by authorities and by reasons:
1. First thus: Hilary in the ninth book On the Trinity1: «The Son has in Himself naturally a generating nature»: therefore the nature in the Son is naturally suited to generate.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the book Against Maximinus2: «For not that the Son could not generate»; but two negations equal one affirmation: therefore He could generate.
3. Likewise, by reasons it is shown thus: to generate is more ordered to the power of generating than to the power of spirating; but the Father, by generating the Son, communicates to Him the power of spirating3: therefore much more strongly the power of generating.
4. Likewise, the Son is the most express image of the Father: therefore He imitates the Father so perfectly that no greater likeness can be conceived; but if the Son is conceived as generating, He is conceived as imitating still more: therefore if He imitates more than can be conceived, then also in the act of generating.
5. Likewise, by analogy: greater communication and diffusion is in the eternal Light than in created light4; but created light gives to its splendor the power of producing another, and so on; and if it were of infinite power, it would produce infinite splendors: therefore, etc.
On the contrary:
1. The generation of the Son by the Father is similar in expression to the generation of a word from the mind; but a generated word has no power of generating another word — rather every word must be immediately from the mind: therefore if the uncreated Word is rightly similar [to it], He has no power of generating, but the power of generating is in the Father alone.
2. Likewise, let the Augustinian argument5 be made leading to the impossible. If the Son has a power of generating, suppose that He generates; I ask similarly of the second; and if there is no stopping at the first, infinite sons must be posited — because by the same reasoning that there is no stopping at the first, there is no stopping anywhere: therefore if there is a stop — because this would be repugnant to divine completion — by the same reasoning there is a stopping at the first: therefore the first does not have the power of generating.
3. Likewise, let Richard's argument6 be made: if the Son were to generate another son: then since the begotten son belongs more to his father than to his grandfather, accordingly there would not there be the supreme and equal connection: therefore neither supreme and equal love: therefore neither perfect beatitude — all of which, as supremely impossible things, pious faith rejects.
Conclusion
The Father does not communicate the power of begetting to the Son — which is proved by two reasons.
I respond: The opinion of some is that the power of begetting is in the Son, but that He does not generate. This is not because He cannot, but because it is not fitting for Him. And they posit a similar case in the production of creatures or in creation. God can produce infinite creatures; yet He does not produce them — not from impotence but because it is not fitting for Him; so also in the matter at hand.
Refutation. But on the contrary: Suppose, then, that the power that is in the Son for generating is brought into act; it is plain that the Son will generate an eternal God: therefore something will be able to begin to have being and to be eternal — which is impossible and unintelligible.
Therefore it must be said that the Father does not communicate to the Son to be able to generate, for two reasons. One is that He cannot; the other is that He ought not.
Reason 1 (cannot). Fruitfulness for generating is in the Father because [He is] principle, and so [He is] principle because [He is] first7. But it is impossible that the first communicate primacy to another — for it is a contradiction in terms that a produced person be first. Since therefore fruitfulness for generating was in the Father from primacy, He cannot communicate it to the Son.
Reason 2 (ought not). Likewise, He ought not to communicate it — because in the emanation of the divine persons must be observed original distinction and most full communication. Original distinction: because what communicate in nature must be distinguished either by matter or by origin. To be distinguished by matter is impossible for persons; therefore they must be distinguished by origin or relation: therefore by generating and being generated: therefore if the Son could generate, He could also fail to be distinguished.
1. To the objection from Hilary's authority — that the Son has in Himself a generating nature: it must be said that this expression is improper, and from improper expressions one must not argue. The sense is: He has in Himself a generating nature — that is, the nature of the Father.
2. To the objection that not that He could not: it must be said that the Master rightly explains [it] — namely, He was not, on this account, impotent. Hence according to the art [of grammar], a distinction must be made when it is said the Son could not generate: for not able can be taken privatively; and then the sense is, He could not = He was impotent. In another way, not to be able is taken negatively; and in this sense it is to be conceded that the Son could not generate.
3. To the objection that the Father communicates to the Son the spirative power: the response is clear: because, since the Son is generated, He cannot have primacy with respect to generation; but since He is not spirated, He is un-spiratable — and therefore He could have primacy and fruitfulness with respect to it.
4. To the objection that the Son is the most express image, etc.: it must be said that the Son is therefore called the most express image because He represents in all things in which an image is naturally suited to represent; but an image is so suited to represent that it itself nevertheless not be the imaged — otherwise it would not be an image. But if the Son represented [the Father] in the act of generating, He would already be the Father.
5. To the objection from light and splendor: it must be said that this is not similar — because light does not perfectly multiply itself in the first splendor; therefore in many it does what it cannot do in one.
6. Likewise [the same applies] in the case of the carnal son. This reasoning, however, is not principal but the one given above — because in inferior beings fruitfulness is not by reason of primacy but by reason of perfection. In God, however, since He is most perfect and first, [fruitfulness] is not only by reason of perfection (because then it would be in all the persons) but by reason of primacy.
I. The Holy Doctor's doctrine of the Father's primacy as the ground of fruitfulness for generating is proper to the Franciscan School and is more fully expounded below at d. 27, p. I, q. 2 in corp.; and in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum c. 6, n. 2: «In which it must be considered that paternity in God is said by reason of primacy and the fruitfulness or generative nature». Cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 51, m. 1, a. 1, where it is treated similarly.
II. St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 41, a. 6) does not expressly admit this account of primacy, but says the power of generating is not communicated to the Son because according to the mode of signifying the power of generating imports the relation of paternity. The disagreement, however, is more of the mode of speaking than of the matter — as the more recent doctors themselves admit.
III. On the question itself, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 51, m. 1, a. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 2; Summa I, q. 41, a. 6. — Blessed Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1 princ. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 54, q. 8, n. 27. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 2.
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- Hilar., IX de Trin. n. 31: Filius Dei habet in se naturaliter naturam gignentem.Hilary, On the Trinity IX, n. 31: «The Son of God has in Himself naturally a generating nature».
- August., contra Maximinum II, c. 12, n. 1. Vide supra in lit. Magistri huius distinctionis.Augustine, Against Maximinus II, c. 12, n. 1. See above in the Master's text of this distinction.
- Cfr. infra d. 11, q. 1, ubi de processione Spiritus sancti a Patre et Filio fusius agitur.Cf. below d. 11, q. 1, where the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is treated more fully.
- Cfr. supra d. 5, a. 2, q. 2 in corp., ubi simili modo de simili exemplo agitur.Cf. above d. 5, a. 2, q. 2 in corp., where similar example is treated in similar manner.
- Argumentum ducens ad infinitos allegatur a Richard. a S. Vict., de Trin. V, c. 9. — Cfr. etiam August., contra Max. II, c. 12, n. 2.The argument leading to infinite [sons] is alleged by Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity V, c. 9. — Cf. also Augustine, Against Maximinus II, c. 12, n. 2.
- Richard. a S. Vict., de Trin. V, c. 9–10: rationem summae connexionis inter personas multipliciter expandit.Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity V, cc. 9–10: he expands in many ways the account of the supreme connection between the persons.
- Doctrina primitatis Patris a Bonaventura constanter retinetur, e. g. in Itinerar. mentis, c. 6, n. 2; et in Hexaem. coll. 11, n. 11. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 51, m. 1, a. 1.The doctrine of the Father's primacy is constantly retained by Bonaventure — e.g. in Itinerarium mentis, c. 6, n. 2; and in Hexaemeron coll. 11, n. 11. Cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 51, m. 1, a. 1.