Dist. 7, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 7
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et prima est de solutione ista Magistri.
Dubium I
Prima est de solutione ista Magistri, qua dicit, quod non sequitur: Pater potest generare, quod non Filius: ergo potest aliquid, quod non Filius; et respondet, quod posse generare non est posse aliquid subiectum divinae potentiae. Sed hoc non videtur solvere, sed aggravare argumentum. Tunc enim, cum posse generare sit posse maximum, videtur quod maius inconveniens sequatur, et magis derogetur potentiae Filii, si in hoc deficit, quam si in subiectis divinae potentiae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister bene solvit. Potentia enim Patris habet comparari ad inferius et ad aequale, sed ad superius non, cum careat superiori1. Cum comparatur ad inferius, tunc est potentia essentialis et essentialiter retenta, quia connotat respectum in creatura; et respectu talis potentiae inconveniens esset, quod aliquid posset Pater, quod non posset Filius, quia tunc differrent per essentiam. Cum autem comparatur ad aequale, ut ad personam, tunc trahitur ad personam; et tunc nullum inconveniens est, si aliqua proprietas personalis est in Patre, quae non est in Filio. Ideo non sequitur, quod aliqua potentia sit in Patre, quae non sit in Filio.
Dubium II
Item dubitatur de hoc quod dicitur, quod generatio Filii non est de omnibus. Videtur enim Richardus de sancto Victore2 dicere contrarium, qui dicit, quod quia omnipotens est, excusari non potest, quin Filium genuerit: ergo generatio Filii continetur sub omnipotentia: ergo Filius inter omnia continetur et est.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister, generatio Filii non continetur sub omnipotentia, nisi acciperetur omnipotentia per appropriationem. Et quod dicit Richardus non intelligitur, tanquam Filius sit inter omnia, sed tanquam ante omnia; unde arguit a posteriori. Si enim emanatio naturae secundum rationem intelligendi praecedit emanationem secundum rationem voluntatis, nunquam Deus esset potens producere creaturam per voluntatem, nisi etiam produxisset Filium per naturam.
Dubium III
Item videtur male dicere, cum dicit, quod esse Patrem non est esse aliquid3; quia cum inter aliquid et nihil non cadat medium, si non est esse aliquid: ergo est esse nihil.
Respondeo: Esse aliquid dicitur dupliciter: vel communiter ad essentiam et personam; et sic non cadit medium, et in hoc sensu esse Patrem est esse aliquid; alio modo, prout trahitur ad essentiam; et sic cadit inter esse aliquid et esse nihil medium, scilicet esse aliquem; persona enim praedicatur ut quis, non ut quid.
Dubium IV
Item quaeritur de ista illatione Magistri4: Spiritus sanctus potuit esse Filius, ergo potuit mutari, et ponitur ibi: Si enim nasci potuit, potuit esse Filius etc. Videtur ista illatio non valere, quia in creaturis, ubi magis differt relatio a supposito, potest dici, quod similis potest esse alteri dissimilis sine sui mutatione: ergo cum filiatio et spiratio sint relationes, pari ratione Filius poterit esse Spiritus sanctus, et e converso sine mutatione. Item, omne mutabile est aliquid praeter illud, secundum quod mutatur, ut si non album fiat album, est aliud quam albedo: ergo si intelligatur Spiritus sanctus mutari, si generetur, tunc aliud esset in eo generatio, aliud ille qui generatur; sed hoc falsum: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Secus est in relationibus creaturae et Dei: quoniam relationes in creaturis non dant relativis existere; unde sine illis potest res esse et cum illis; in divinis autem dant personis existere; et ideo si in personis intelligatur, quod proprietas insit hypostasi, intelligitur esse hypostasis, et similiter, si intelligitur non inesse, intelligitur hypostasis non esse. Cum ergo Spiritus sanctus non possit simul spirari et generari — quia quamvis una persona possit duobus modis producere, tamen una persona non potest nisi uno modo produci — sequitur de necessitate: si potest Spiritus sanctus esse Filius vel potuit, potest non esse Spiritus sive non spirari; et si potuit non spirari, potuit non esse; et iterum si potuit generari, potuit esse: et ita potuit fieri de ente non ens et de non ente ens, ac per hoc mutari.
Et sic patet ultimum, quia non dicitur mutari propter diversificationem proprietatum circa idem suppositum, sicut est in mutatione naturali, sed propter corruptionem et inceptionem eiusdem5. Nec est illud simile: Pater potest generare et spirare sine sui mutatione: ergo Spiritus sanctus generari et spirari; quia non est inconveniens, unum principium pluribus modis producere, sed unum principiatum pluribus modis produci est impossibile et incompossibile.
Dubium V
Item videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit: Pater non est potens nisi natura; eius enim potentia est essentia, quia secundum hoc generare, quod nullo modo est essentiae, nullo modo esset potentiae.
Respondeo: Quamvis potentia, absolute considerata, sit idem quod essentia, tamen potentia, quia non est nomen adeo abstractum sicut essentia, trahitur ad personam. Unde potentia generandi non dicit naturam divinam simpliciter, sed naturam ut in tali persona, scilicet innascibili; ideo non est simile de hoc nomine essentia et de hoc nomine potentia.
Dubium VI
Item videtur male dicere ibi6: Aliam significes potentiam, qua Pater potest gignere etc.; quia potentiae divisio sufficiens est per activam et passivam; sed posse gignere dicit potentiam activam, posse gigni potentiam passivam: ergo non potest alia potentia significari. Si tu dicas, quod generare non est agere proprie, similiter nec generari pati; obiicitur, quod potentiae distinguuntur per actus; sed aliud est gignere et aliud gigni: ergo alia est potentia huius et illius.
Respondeo: Ista distinctio, quam ponit Magister de potentia gignendi active et passive, fundatur super hoc, quod potentia potest considerari secundum id quod est; et sic dicit naturam, et sicut una natura est in generante et genito, sed alio et alio modo, sic eadem potentia. Potest iterum considerari secundum id ad quod est; et sic dicit modum existendi naturam in persona in comparatione ad alium, qui est principium vel principiatum. Et sic, cum diversi modi sint, diversae dicuntur proprietates posse generare et posse generari et distinguuntur secundum actus personales; sed primo modo non.
Dubium VII
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Filius habet potentiam, qua potest esse Filius sive qua potest gigni7. Videtur enim dubium vel falsum, quia gigni omnino est a gignere, et gignere est a potentia Patris: ergo et gigni.
Respondeo: Sicut potentia gignendi in Patre non dicit nisi naturam in persona ut natam ex se producere aliam, sic potentia gignendi in Filio non dicit nisi naturam in persona ut natam produci ab alia; sicut enim hypostasi Patris convenit generare, sic hypostasi Filii convenit generari. Nec valet quod obiicitur in contrarium. Nam omne quod habet Filius, sive essentiale sive personale, habet a Patre. Ideo quamvis ipsum gigni sit a potentia Patris, non excluditur tamen, quin potentia gignendi passiva sit in Filio.
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Doubts concerning the Master's text
In this part doubts arise concerning the text, and the first is concerning the Master's solution.
Doubt I
The first is concerning that solution of the Master, in which he says that this does not follow: the Father can generate, which the Son cannot: therefore He can [do] something which the Son cannot; and he responds that to be able to generate is not to be able [to do] something subject to divine power. But this seems not to solve [the difficulty] but to aggravate the argument. For then, since to be able to generate is the greatest being-able, it seems that a greater inconvenience would follow, and the power of the Son would be more derogated, if He fails in this than if He fails in things subject to divine power.
I respond: It must be said that the Master rightly solves [the problem]. For the Father's power is to be compared either to the inferior or to the equal, but not to the superior — since He has none above Him1. When it is compared to the inferior, then it is essential power, retained essentially — because it connotes a respect to a creature; and with respect to such power it would be inconvenient that the Father can [do] something which the Son cannot, because then they would differ by essence. But when it is compared to the equal — that is, to the person — then it is drawn to the person; and then it is no inconvenience if some personal property is in the Father which is not in the Son. Therefore it does not follow that some power is in the Father which is not in the Son.
Doubt II
Likewise, it is doubted concerning what is said: that the generation of the Son is not among all things. For Richard of St. Victor2 seems to say the contrary — who says that, because He is omnipotent, He cannot be excused [from the fact] that He generated the Son: therefore the generation of the Son is contained under omnipotence: therefore the Son is contained among all things and exists.
I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says, the generation of the Son is not contained under omnipotence — except if omnipotence be taken by appropriation. And what Richard says is not understood as if the Son were among all things, but as before all things; whence he argues a posteriori. For if the emanation of nature precedes, according to the account of understanding, the emanation according to the account of will, God would never have been able to produce a creature through will unless He had also produced the Son through nature.
Doubt III
Likewise, it seems wrong to say, when he says that to be Father is not to be something3; because, since between something and nothing no middle falls, if it is not to be something: therefore it is to be nothing.
I respond: To be something is said in two ways: either commonly to essence and to person; and so no middle falls, and in this sense to be Father is to be something; in another way, as it is drawn toward essence; and so a middle falls between to be something and to be nothing — namely to be someone; for a person is predicated as who (quis), not as what (quid).
Doubt IV
Likewise, it is asked about this inference of the Master4: the Holy Spirit could have been the Son, therefore He could have been changed — placed at: «For if He could be born, He could be the Son» etc. This inference seems not to hold, because in creatures, where relation differs more from supposit, it can be said that one similar can become dissimilar to another without its own change: therefore since filiation and spiration are relations, by the same reasoning the Son could be the Holy Spirit, and conversely, without change. Likewise, every changeable is something besides that according to which it is changed — as if not-white becomes white, it is something other than whiteness: therefore if the Holy Spirit is understood to be changed, if He were generated, then in Him the generation would be one thing and the one generated another; but this is false: therefore, etc.
I respond: It is otherwise in the relations of creature and of God: because relations in creatures do not give existence to the relatives — hence a thing can be without them and with them; in God, however, they give existence to the persons. And therefore if it is understood in the persons that a property is in a hypostasis, the hypostasis is understood to exist; and likewise, if it is understood not to be in [the hypostasis], the hypostasis is understood not to exist. Since, then, the Holy Spirit cannot at the same time be spirated and generated — because although one person can produce in two modes, yet one person cannot be produced except in one mode — it follows of necessity: if the Holy Spirit can be the Son or could have been, He can not-be the Spirit or not-be-spirated; and if He could not be spirated, He could not be; and again if He could be generated, He could be: and so He could become from being non-being, and from non-being being — and through this be changed.
And so the last [argument] is clear, because we do not say changed on account of diversification of properties around the same supposit (as is in natural change), but on account of corruption and beginning of the same5. Nor is it similar [to say]: the Father can generate and spirate without His own change, therefore the Holy Spirit [can be] generated and spirated; because it is no inconvenience for one principle to produce in many modes, but for one principled to be produced in many modes is impossible and incompossible.
Doubt V
Likewise it seems wrong to say, when he says: «The Father is not powerful except by nature; for His power is the essence» — because according to this, to generate, which is in no way of the essence, would in no way be of the power.
I respond: Although power, absolutely considered, is the same as essence, yet power, since it is not so abstract a name as essence, is drawn to the person. Hence the power of begetting does not signify the divine nature simply, but the nature as in such a person — namely, the unbegettable; therefore the case of the name essence and the name power is not similar.
Doubt VI
Likewise it seems badly said where he says6: «You mean another power by which the Father can beget» etc.; because the division of power is sufficient by active and passive; but to be able to beget expresses active power, to be able to be begotten passive power: therefore no other power can be signified. If you say that to generate is not properly to act, and likewise to be generated is not to be acted upon, it is objected that powers are distinguished by their acts; but to beget and to be begotten are different: therefore the power of one is different from that of the other.
I respond: This distinction which the Master makes about the power of begetting actively and passively is founded on this: that power can be considered according to what it is; and so it expresses nature — and just as one nature is in begetter and begotten (but in one mode and another), so is the same power. It can also be considered according to that toward which it is; and so it expresses the mode of existing of the nature in a person in comparison to another, who is principle or principled. And so, since the modes are diverse, the properties to be able to generate and to be able to be generated are said to be diverse and are distinguished according to personal acts; but in the first way they are not [distinguished].
Doubt VII
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the Son has the power by which He can be Son or by which He can be begotten7. For this seems doubtful or false, because to be begotten is altogether from to beget, and to beget is from the power of the Father: therefore also to be begotten.
I respond: Just as the power of begetting in the Father expresses nothing but the nature in the person as naturally suited of itself to produce another, so the power of begetting in the Son expresses nothing but the nature in the person as naturally suited to be produced by another; for just as to generate belongs to the hypostasis of the Father, so to be generated belongs to the hypostasis of the Son. Nor does what is objected to the contrary hold. For everything which the Son has — whether essential or personal — He has from the Father. Therefore although to be generated itself is from the Father's power, this does not exclude that the passive power of begetting be in the Son.
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- Cfr. supra hic q. 1 in corp.: distinctio inter potentiam essentialem (ad inferius) et potentiam personalem (ad aequale).Cf. above here q. 1 in corp.: the distinction between essential power (toward the inferior) and personal power (toward the equal).
- Richard. a S. Vict., III de Trin. c. 4: Sed qui absque dubio omnipotens est, per impossibilitatem excusari non potest.Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity III, c. 4: «But He who without doubt is omnipotent, cannot be excused [as if it were] through impossibility».
- Cfr. supra in lit. Magistri huius dist., c. 1 circa medium: Esse Patrem non est esse aliquid, sed esse ad aliquid. — De distinctione inter quis et quid cfr. infra d. 23.Cf. above in the Master's text of this distinction, c. 1 near the middle: «To be Father is not to be something, but to be in relation to something». — On the distinction between who and what see below d. 23.
- De hoc et sequenti dubio vide hic q. 3 et 4 cum Scholiis.On this and the following doubt, see here qq. 3 and 4 with their Scholia.
- Cfr. supra hic q. 2 et q. 1, ubi de impossibilitate plurificationis personae productae fusius agitur.Cf. above here qq. 2 and 1, where the impossibility of the multiplication of a produced person is more fully treated.
- Cfr. supra in lit. Magistri huius distinctionis, c. 2: distinctio Magistri inter posse generare et posse gigni. — De distinctione inter potentiam activam et passivam in divinis cfr. etiam infra d. 19, p. II, q. 2.Cf. above in the Master's text of this distinction, c. 2: the Master's distinction between to be able to generate and to be able to be generated. — On the distinction between active and passive power in God, see also below d. 19, p. II, q. 2.
- Cfr. supra hic q. 2, ubi de hac quaestione («utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio») fusius agitur.Cf. above here q. 2, where this question (whether the power of begetting is in the Son) is more fully treated.