Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 4
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 7
Quaestio IV
Utrum posse generari et posse creari sit posse univocum.
Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum posse generari et posse creari sit posse univocum. Et quod non, videtur:
1. Generatio dicit productionem ad similitudinem naturae; creatio vero dicit productionem de nihilo sine similitudine in natura: ergo posse generari et posse creari in sua generalitate differunt1.
2. Item, creatio dicit egressum et mutationem, generatio vero omnem excludit mutationem: ergo cum posse creari importet potentiam transmutandi, posse generari non, cum potentiae differant in sua generalitate in potentia transmutandi, et in hac non conveniunt: ergo in nulla.
3. Item, omne distribuit terminum pro omnibus, quae univocantur vel analogantur in illo; sed cum dico omnipotens, non fit distributio pro illo, quod potest generare, quia tunc Filius non esset omnipotens: ergo manifestum est, quod utrumque posse nec est univocum nec analogum; alioquin omnipotentia non convenit Filio.
Contra:
1. Res est commune ad fruibile et utibile2: ergo cum aequalis ambitus vel maioris sit possibile quam res, et non sit maior differentia inter generatum et creatum quam inter fruibile et utibile, pari ratione possibile sive posse est commune ad utrumque.
2. Item, in aeternis non potest esse multiplicitas nec diversitas: ergo cum posse creari et posse generari ab aeterno ante conditionem creaturae fuerint, non habent multiplicationem in ipsa potentia.
3. Item, cum dico creatura potest creari, nihil dico creatum; quia illud vere dicitur de eo quod omnino nihil est, sicut de anima antichristi: ergo solum dico potentiam agentis; sed potentia Dei est unica, non habens aliquam multiplicitatem: ergo eius posse univocum est ad posse creari et posse generari.
Conclusio
Posse generari et posse creari quoad principale significatum re idem sunt et univoce dicuntur; quoad connotatum vero analogice.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dico posse creari et posse generari, dico principale significatum et dico connotatum. Quantum ad principale significatum, dico, quod posse creari idem dicit re, quod posse creare, differens solum modo loquendi vel dicendi: quia quod dicitur per modum actionis per posse creare, dicit posse creari per modum passionis. Quantum vero ad connotatum dicit effectum in creatura.
Quando ergo comparantur posse creari et posse generari, si comparentur ratione principalis significati, dico, quod non tantum est univocum, immo etiam unicum, aliter tamen et aliter intellectum et enuntiatum, sicut posse generare et posse creare. Si autem ratione connotati comparentur, sic concedo, quod est analogum, sicut hoc nomen res ad fruibilia et utibilia. Quamvis enim Creator et creatura non habeant commune univocum, habent tamen analogum.
Duplex analogia. Notandum tamen, quod duplex est analogia3: quaedam per reductionem ad unitatem naturae secundum prius et posterius; et haec potest esse comparando creaturam ad creaturam, et in hac signum distribuit pro omnibus contentis. Alia est analogia per reductionem ad unitatem similitudinis proportionalis, non naturae; et quod sic analogatur non est inter alia, sed super alia. Unde distributio proprie pro illo non distribuit, nisi sit extensa. Unde Deus non est ens inter omnia, sed super omnia.
Et hinc est, quod omnipotens non distribuit pro potentia generandi proprie accepta distributione, nisi fiat quaedam extensio, et ex illa per consequens fiat quaedam appropriatio circa suppositum. Unde proprie omnipotens convenit tribus, quia non distribuit pro potentia generandi; appropriate autem, secundum quod fit ampliatio ex parte signi, solius est Patris.
Ex his patent omnia obiecta; procedunt enim per diversas vias, ut patet intuenti.
III. Quoad analogiam in genere cfr. supra d. 1. dub. 5. et species sive analogia proportionalitatis declaratur in textu. Ex hac distinctione analogiarum pendet intelligentia multorum locorum S. Bonav. De omnipotentia Dei cfr. infra d. 42. q. 1. et 2.
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Question IV
Whether to be able to be begotten and to be able to be created is a univocal being-able.
Fourth and last it is asked whether to be able to be begotten and to be able to be created is a univocal being-able. And that it is not, seems evident:
1. Generation expresses a production toward a likeness of nature; creation, however, expresses a production from nothing without likeness in nature: therefore to be able to be begotten and to be able to be created differ in their general account1.
2. Likewise, creation expresses a coming forth and a change; generation, however, excludes all change: therefore since to be able to be created imports the power of being changed, and to be able to be begotten does not, since powers differ in their general account in the power of being changed, and they do not agree in this: therefore in nothing.
3. Likewise, all (omne) distributes a term for all things which are univocal or analogical in it; but when I say omnipotent, no distribution is made for that which can generate, because then the Son would not be omnipotent: therefore it is manifest that the two beings-able are neither univocal nor analogical; otherwise omnipotence would not belong to the Son.
On the contrary:
1. Thing (res) is common to enjoyable (fruibile) and useful (utibile)2: therefore since possible (or being-able) has equal or greater extension than thing, and there is not a greater difference between the begotten and the created than between the enjoyable and the useful, by the same reasoning possible or being-able is common to both.
2. Likewise, in eternal things there can be no multiplicity or diversity: therefore since to be able to be created and to be able to be begotten existed from eternity before the establishment of the creature, they have no multiplication in the power itself.
3. Likewise, when I say the creature can be created, I do not say anything about the created [thing]; for that is truly said of what is altogether nothing — as of the soul of the Antichrist: therefore I speak only of the agent's power; but God's power is one, having no multiplicity: therefore His being-able is univocal to to be able to be created and to be able to be begotten.
Conclusion
To be able to be begotten and to be able to be created, with respect to the principal signified, are the same in reality and are said univocally; with respect to the connoted, however, analogically.
I respond: It must be said that when I say to be able to be created and to be able to be begotten, I express a principal signified and a connoted. As to the principal signified, I say that to be able to be created expresses the same in reality as to be able to create — differing only in mode of speaking or saying: because what is said by way of action through to be able to create, to be able to be created expresses by way of passion. As to what is connoted, however, it expresses an effect in the creature.
When, then, to be able to be created and to be able to be begotten are compared, if they are compared by reason of the principal signified, I say that it is not only univocal but indeed one [thing] — yet understood and stated in one way and another — as to be able to beget and to be able to create. But if they are compared by reason of the connoted, then I concede that it is analogical — like the name thing (res) for enjoyables and useables. For although Creator and creature have no univocal common [term], they have an analogical one.
Twofold analogy. It should be noted, however, that analogy is twofold3: one is by reduction to the unity of nature according to prior and posterior; and this can be by comparing creature to creature, and in this analogy a sign distributes for all things contained. The other is analogy by reduction to the unity of proportional likeness, not of nature; and what is so analogically related is not among others, but above others. Hence a distribution does not properly distribute for it, unless it is extended. Hence God is not a being among all things, but above all things.
And hence omnipotent does not distribute for the power of generating taken properly, unless a certain extension is made — and from that, by consequence, a certain appropriation is made regarding the supposit. Hence properly omnipotent belongs to the three [persons], because it does not distribute for the power of generating; appropriately, however, according as the sign is extended, [it belongs] to the Father alone.
From these the responses to all the objections are clear; for they proceed by different paths, as is plain to one who looks.
III. On analogy in general, cf. above d. 1, dub. 5; and the species — or analogy of proportionality — is declared in the text. From this distinction of analogies depends the understanding of many places of St. Bonaventure. On the omnipotence of God, cf. below d. 42, qq. 1 and 2.
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- Cfr. supra hic q. 3 in corp., ubi de differentia secundum rem et secundum rationem inter posse generare et posse creare agitur.Cf. above here q. 3 in corp., where the difference according to reality and according to account between to be able to beget and to be able to create is treated.
- Distinctio inter fruibile et utibile sumitur ex August., I de Doctrina christiana c. 3 seqq.; cfr. supra d. 1, q. 1.The distinction between enjoyable and useful is taken from Augustine, On Christian Doctrine I, c. 3 ff.; cf. above d. 1, q. 1.
- Cfr. supra d. 1, dub. 5, ubi de duplici analogia (proportionalitatis et proportionis) latius agitur. — De omnipotentia divina vide infra d. 42, qq. 1 et 2.Cf. above d. 1, dub. 5, where the twofold analogy (of proportionality and of proportion) is treated more fully. — On the divine omnipotence, see below d. 42, qq. 1 and 2.