Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
Articulus I. De veritate Dei.
Quaestio I. Utrum veritas sit proprietas divini esse.
Quod veritas sit proprietas divini esse, ostenditur auctoritatibus et rationibus.
1. Primo modo sic: Hieronymus ad Marcellam1, et habetur in littera: «Solus Deus vere est, cuius essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est»; sed quod alicui soli convenit, est proprium illi: ergo veritas est proprium divini esse.
2. Item, Augustinus de Vera Religione2: «Falsitas est ex istis rebus, quae imitantur illud unum, quo est unum quidquid est, inquantum illud implere non possunt». Si ergo nulla creatura potest illud summum unum implere, veritas non est in aliqua creatura, sed in omnibus falsitas.
3. Item, Augustinus in Soliloquiis et de Vera Religione3 dicit, quod lux increata est ratio cognoscendi se et omnia cognoscibilia: ergo si veritas est ratio cognoscendi, et sola lux increata est veritas: ergo veritas est proprietas Dei solius.
4. Item, Anselmus in libro de Veritate4 dicit, quod omnia sunt vera prima veritate: aut ergo intelligit effective, aut formaliter; non effective, quia similiter omnia possent dici vera prima bonitate: ergo intelligitur formaliter: ergo non est alia veritas quam veritas increata: ergo si illa est in Deo et Deus, veritas est solius Dei proprietas.
5. Item, rationibus probatur sic: veritas et vanitas opponuntur; sed omnis creatura habet vanitatem5 et permixtionem cum non esse, cum sit ex nihilo, et solus Deus hac caret omnino: ergo in solo Deo est veritas.
6. Item, veritas opponitur umbrae. Quod enim est umbra rei, non habet veritatem6; sed creaturae sunt umbrae illius summi esse: ergo non habent veritatem in esse.
7. Item, veritas est, qua aliquid est verum; sed veritas est vera, cum sit cognoscibilis; sed constat quod non alio quam se, quia alias esset abire in infinitum; sed quod est verum se ipso, est verum per essentiam: ergo omnis veritas est vera per essentiam; sed sola veritas increata est vera per essentiam: ergo veritas est proprietas Dei solius.
Contra:
1. Si veritas est Dei proprietas, aut ergo veritas complexa, aut incomplexa. Non complexa; quia talis est cum compositione, in Deo autem non est compositio aliqua. Non incomplexa; quia haec convertitur cum ente7: ergo cum entitas non sit Dei proprietas, pari ratione nec veritas erit.
2. Item, verum aeque commune est ut bonum, et quodam modo magis; sed bonitas non est Dei proprietas: ergo pari ratione nec veritas.
3. Item, veritas est ratio discernendi Creatorem a creatura et creaturam a creatura; sed quod est ratio discernendi et distinguendi est diversum in diversis: ergo alia veritas est in Deo quam in creatura, et in una creatura quam in alia: ergo non est proprium solius Dei.
4. Item, Augustinus in Soliloquiis8: «Verum est id quod est», ergo veritas est ipsa entitas: ergo non est proprium essentiae, quia si sic, qua ratione dicitur veritas est proprietas essentiae, posset dici e converso, cum omnino idem sint.
Conclusio. Veritas, quatenus opponitur falsitati, invenitur etiam in creaturis secundum triplicem suam comparationem — ad subiectum quod informat, ad principium quod repraesentat, ad intellectum quem excitat; quatenus vero opponitur permixtioni, est proprietas solius Dei.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod veritas habet triplicem comparationem. Habet enim comparari ad subiectum quod informat, ad principium quod repraesentat, et ad intellectum quem excitat. In comparatione ad subiectum dicitur veritas actus et potentiae indivisio. In comparatione ad principium dicitur veritas summae unitatis et primae repraesentatio sive imitatio. In comparatione ad intellectum dicitur veritas ratio discernendi.
Et in omnibus istis comparationibus dupliciter potest accipi veritas: uno modo, prout distinguitur contra falsitatem; alio modo, prout distinguitur contra permixtionem, secundum quod verum dicitur purum et impermixtum.
Prout veritas dividitur contra falsitatem, quae est privatio indivisionis et imitationis et expressionis, sic cum in creatura sit aliquo modo invenire et indivisionem et imitationem et expressionem, sic est veritas non tantum in Creatore, sed etiam in creatura; et sic non assignatur Dei proprietas.
Alio modo, prout veritas dividitur contra permixtionem sive impuritatem, sic est in solo Deo. Nam in solo Deo est indivisio pura, non permixta alicui diversitati; in solo Deo est imitatio et similitudo pura, non permixta alicui dissimilitudini; et in solo Deo est expressio luminis non permixta obscuritati. In creatura autem est indivisio cum actus et potentiae diversitate, et imitatio cum dissimilitudine; est ulterius in ea expressio cum obscuritate. Et ideo hoc modo veritas est divini esse proprietas; et sic accipit Magister et Augustinus et Hieronymus. Vocant enim verum esse quod nihil habet de possibilitate, nihil habet de vanitate, nihil de non-entitate. Et ideo in Deo non cadit praeteritio et futuritio, quae aliquo modo non-entia sunt.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:
Ad 1, 2, 5, 6. Et sic procedunt duae primae auctoritates et rationes.
Ad 3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod non sit alia veritas quam aeterna, quia ipsa sola facit intelligere; dicendum, quod sicut color est obiectum visus et motivum visus — tamen non sine actu lucis — et differt ab ipsa luce; sic dicendum, quod veritas creata, quamvis non possit movere sine veritate increata, nihilominus est motiva suo modo et alia veritas ab illa.
Ad 4 et 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Anselmo, quod omnia sunt vera veritate prima; dicendum, quod verum de sui impositione dicit comparationem ad causam exemplarem, sicut bonum ad causam finalem. Sicut enim dicitur bonum ratione ordinis, sic verum ratione expressionis; et ratio exprimendi est ipsius exemplaris. Sicut igitur, cum dicitur de bonis creatis, quod sunt bona bonitate increata, bonitas praedicat finem in ablativo, non formam, quia Dei bonitas nullius creati est forma; similiter, cum dicitur, quod omnia sunt vera veritate increata, ablativus dicit causam formalem exemplarem9. Omnia enim vera sunt et nata sunt se exprimere per expressionem illius summi luminis; quod si cessaret influere, cetera desinerent esse vera. Ideo nulla veritas creata est vera per essentiam, sed per participationem; et per hoc patet ultimum.
Ad argumenta pro parte contra:
Ad 1–3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non est proprietas; patet responsio: quoniam obiicit de veritate, secundum quod habet oppositionem ad defectum falsitatis, non ad permixtionem possibilitatis; praedicto enim modo convenit non tantum Creatori, sed etiam creaturae.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veritas est idem quod divina essentia; dicendum, quod de ratione proprietatis in creatura10 sunt ista tria: primum est, quod convenit soli; secundum est, quod est ratio innotescendi; tertium est, quod differt ab eo cuius est proprietas. Duo prima sunt perfectionis, ultimum vero imperfectionis, quia excludit simplicitatem. Et ideo veritas dicitur divinae essentiae proprietas, non quia differat vel sit inhaerens divinae essentiae, sicut accidens subiecto, sed quia soli convenit et est ratio cognoscendi eam. Et haec est causa, quare e converso essentia non est proprietas veritatis, quia non est ratio innotescendi eam, sicut e converso.
Quaestio incidens. Si autem quaeras, cum idem significent essentia et veritas, quare unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum, et non e converso; ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod quamvis idem significent essentia et veritas, tamen unum, scilicet veritas, est magis ratio cognoscendi ratione connotati. Sed hoc non potest stare, quia veritas nihil connotat. Dicendum ergo, quod hoc est ratione modi significandi et intelligendi.
Et notandum, quod dupliciter est loqui de his nominibus: uno modo ratione eius quod nominant seu significant; alio modo ratione eius in quo significatur poni quod nominant. Unde differt dicere sensum et sensum hominis; quia primo dicitur commune ad sensum hominis et bruti, secundo proprium hominis. Si ergo accipimus huiusmodi nomina secundum se, alia est ratio essentiae, alia veritatis, quoniam essentia dicit quid, veritas conditionem entis. Cum vero essentiam et veritatem trahimus ad Deum, quamvis idem sint, tamen ratione generalium significatorum unum accipitur ut proprietas alterius; et non est ibi synonymia nec sunt nomina synonyma, sed manet ratio subiecti et proprietatis secundum modum significandi, et manet etiam secundum modum intelligendi; quia per essentiam in creatura intelligimus essentiam in Creatore, et per veritatem creaturae intelligimus veritatem increatam. Unde sicut veritas creata est proprietas et ratio cognoscendi essentiam creatam, sic veritas increata secundum rationem significandi et intelligendi est ratio cognoscendi et intelligendi essentiam increatam.
I. Sensus quaestionis est, utrum veritas competat Deo tanquam proprium, sive utrum sit de essentia Dei et proprietas Dei solius. Veritas hic accipitur, non prout est formaliter in intellectu, nec etiam pro re, quatenus est obiectum intellectus, sed in ordine ad ipsam rem, cuius est actus, sive quatenus dicit indivisionem entis et esse. — Ad intelligentiam terminorum, qui in prima ratione pro parte negativa et alibi saepe occurrunt, notandum quod complexum et incomplexum idem sunt ac compositum et incompositum. Veritas complexa est passio sive proprietas propositionis, quae dicit connexionem praedicati cum subiecto, et habetur in secunda mentis operatione, nempe in iudicio. Veritas autem incomplexa est passio simplex cuiuslibet entis, et definitur per hoc quod sit adaequatio rei ad intellectum, qui rem cognoscit sicuti est. Haec habetur in qualibet prima mentis operatione, quae est simplex apprehensio.
II. Alibi S. Bonav. cum sententia communi distinguit veritatem tripliciter, scil. sumtam vel formaliter, quae est veritas in intellectu, vel radicaliter sive causaliter, quae est in rebus, vel prout est in oratione tanquam in signo. Cfr. infra d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1; supra d. 3, p. I, dub. 7; II. Sent. d. 30, a. 3, q. 2; Hexaem. Serm. 5. De veritate signi, infra d. 46, a. 1, q. 1. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 19, q. 5; de Verit. q. 1, a. 1 et seqq.; S. Th. I, q. 16, aa. 1. 2. 3. 5. — Hoc loco et in Prolog. ad Comment. in Ecclesiast. circa finem agit solummodo de veritate in rebus, sive prout veritas est proprietas entis. Haec veritas in rebus iterum triplici modo considerari potest: primo quidem respectu subiecti; et sic veritas est indivisio actus et potentiae, vel cum Avicenna (XI. Metaph. c. 2): Veritas cuiuslibet rei est proprietas sui esse, quod stabilitum est rei; sive veritas est illa res quae est in actu; et sub hoc respectu definitur: indivisio esse et quod est. — Secundo consideratur respectu sui principii, quod est exemplar divinum cui res assimilantur; et sub hoc respectu definitur secundum Augustinum (de Vera Religione c. 36, n. 66): Veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla dissimilitudine est, unde falsitas oritur. — Tertio modo consideratur respectu ad effectum consequentem, quatenus obiectum in intellectu causat veritatem; et sic est ratio cognoscendi rem eamque distinguendi, et sub hoc respectu definitur ab Augustino (loc. cit.): Veritas est quae ostendit id quod est; et ab Hilario: Veritas est declarativum esse. Cfr. supra d. 3, p. I, dub. 7; Alex. Hal., p. I, q. 15, m. 3; S. Thom., de Veritate q. 1, a. 1. — Alia distinctio veritatis contra falsitatem et contra permixtionem patet ex textu.
III. Quoad ordinem argumentorum pro et contra notandum, quod prima propositio, quae agit de veritate quatenus distinguitur contra falsitatem, probatur tribus prioribus argumentis pro parte negativa. Secunda vero, quae est de veritate quatenus distinguitur contra permixtionem, probatur 3. et 6. argumento pro parte affirmativa. Cetera argumenta per distinctionem in recto sensu explicantur. — Attentione digna sunt quae hic in corp. et in solut. ad 1, 2, et ad ult. de veritate creata dicuntur, scil. quod nulla veritas creata sit veritas per essentiam, sed per participationem, et quod nihilominus suo modo est ratio cognoscendi distincta a veritate increata. Quod dictum est contra rigidos Ontologistas.
IV. Quoad 1. et 2. concl. cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 15, m. 5; et q. 17, m. 4. — Pro explicatione loci sumti ex Anselmo (4. fundam.) cfr. S. Thom. (S. Th. I, q. 16, a. 6), et praecipue Richard. (hic q. 2, ad 4.), qui in extenso et bene rem tractat, licet alia via incedat ac S. Bonav. — De differentia inter esse divinum et esse creatum cfr. hic dub. 8. — De tota quaestione: S. Thom., S. c. Gent. I, c. 60; S. Th. I, q. 16, a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 1 et d. 46, a. 14 seqq., ubi diffuse multas de hac re quaestiones solvit; S. p. I, tr. 4, q. …
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Article I. On the truth of God.
Question I. Whether truth is a property of the divine being.
That truth is a property of the divine being is shown from authorities and reasons.
1. First, thus: Jerome to Marcella1, cited in the Master's text: "God alone truly is, and our being compared to His essence is not"; but what belongs to one alone is proper to that one: therefore truth is proper to the divine being.
2. Likewise, Augustine On True Religion2: "Falsity comes from those things which imitate the one thing by which whatever is one is one, insofar as they cannot fulfill it." If, therefore, no creature can fulfill that supreme One, truth is not in any creature, but falsity in them all.
3. Likewise, Augustine in the Soliloquies and On True Religion3 says that the uncreated light is the ground of knowing itself and all knowables: therefore if truth is the ground of knowing, and only the uncreated light is truth: therefore truth is the property of God alone.
4. Likewise, Anselm in his book On Truth4 says that all things are true by the first truth: either, therefore, he understands this effectively or formally; not effectively, because in the same way all things could be called good by the first goodness: therefore it is understood formally: therefore there is no truth other than uncreated truth: therefore, since that is in God and is God, truth is the property of God alone.
5. Likewise, by reasons it is proved thus: truth and vanity are opposed; but every creature has vanity5 and a mixture with non-being, since it is from nothing, and God alone lacks this altogether: therefore truth is in God alone.
6. Likewise, truth is opposed to shadow. For what is the shadow of a thing does not have truth6; but creatures are the shadows of that supreme being: therefore they do not have truth in being.
7. Likewise, truth is that by which something is true; but truth is true, since it is knowable; yet this is known not by anything other than itself — otherwise there would be an infinite regress; but what is true by its very self is true by essence: therefore all truth is true by essence; but only the uncreated truth is true by essence: therefore truth is the property of God alone.
On the contrary:
1. If truth is a property of God, then it is either complex or incomplex. Not complex, for such truth involves composition, and in God there is no composition. Nor incomplex, since this is convertible with being7: therefore, since being is not a property of God, for the same reason neither will truth be.
2. Likewise, true is as common a term as good, and in a certain way more so; but goodness is not a property of God: therefore for the same reason neither is truth.
3. Likewise, truth is the ground by which we distinguish Creator from creature and creature from creature; but what is the ground of distinguishing is different in different things: therefore the truth in God is other than the truth in a creature, and other in one creature than in another: therefore it is not proper to God alone.
4. Likewise, Augustine in the Soliloquies8: "True is that which is", therefore truth is entity itself: therefore it is not proper to essence; for if so, for the same reason it is said "truth is a property of essence" one could say the reverse, since they are wholly the same.
Conclusion. Truth, insofar as it is opposed to falsity, is found also in creatures according to its threefold comparison — to the subject which it informs, to the principle which it represents, to the intellect which it excites; but insofar as it is opposed to admixture, it is the property of God alone.
I respond: It must be said that truth has a threefold comparison. For it may be compared to the subject which it informs, to the principle which it represents, and to the intellect which it excites. In comparison to the subject, truth is called the undividedness of act and potency. In comparison to the principle, truth is called the representation or imitation of the highest unity and of the first. In comparison to the intellect, truth is called the ground of distinguishing.
And in all these comparisons, truth can be taken in two ways: in one way, as it is distinguished against falsity; in another, as it is distinguished against admixture — according as the true is called pure and unmixed.
As truth is divided against falsity (which is the privation of undividedness, of imitation, and of expression), then since in a creature there is in some way both undividedness, imitation, and expression, truth exists not only in the Creator but also in the creature; and in this way it is not assigned as God's property.
In the other way — as truth is divided against admixture or impurity — it exists in God alone. For in God alone is there pure undividedness, not mixed with any diversity; in God alone is there imitation and likeness pure, not mixed with any unlikeness; and in God alone is there expression of light not mixed with obscurity. But in a creature there is undividedness with a diversity of act and potency, and imitation with unlikeness; further, there is in it expression with obscurity. And therefore in this way truth is a property of the divine being; and thus the Master and Augustine and Jerome take it. For they call true being that which has nothing of possibility, nothing of vanity, nothing of non-entity. And therefore in God there is no having-been or being-about-to-be, which are in some way non-beings.
To the arguments for the affirmative:
To 1, 2, 5, 6. And thus proceed the first two authorities and reasons [i.e., they hold].
To 3. As for the objection that there is no truth other than the eternal, because that alone causes understanding, it must be said that just as color is the object and mover of sight — yet not without the act of light — and is distinct from the light itself, so it must be said that created truth, though it cannot move without uncreated truth, is nevertheless a mover in its own way and is a truth distinct from that one.
To 4 and 7. As for the objection from Anselm that all things are true by the first truth, it must be said that true by its very imposition names a comparison to the exemplary cause, just as good to the final cause. For just as the good is said in terms of order, so the true is said in terms of expression; and the ground of expressing belongs to the exemplar itself. Just as, then, when it is said of created goods that they are good by the uncreated goodness, goodness in the ablative predicates the end, not the form (since God's goodness is the form of no creature), similarly, when it is said that all things are true by uncreated truth, the ablative names the exemplary formal cause9. For all true things are and are born to express themselves by the expression of that supreme light; for if it ceased to flow in, the rest would cease to be true. Hence no created truth is true by essence but by participation; and by this the last point is clear.
To the arguments for the contrary:
To 1–3. As for what is objected on the contrary, that it is not a property, the response is plain: for it objects concerning truth according as it has opposition to the defect of falsity, not to the admixture of possibility; for in the first manner, it belongs not only to the Creator but also to the creature.
To 4. As for the objection that truth is the same as the divine essence, it must be said that the notion of property in a creature10 consists of these three: first, that it belongs to one alone; second, that it is the ground of becoming known; third, that it differs from that whose property it is. The first two pertain to perfection, the last to imperfection — since it excludes simplicity. And therefore truth is called a property of the divine essence not because it differs from, or inheres in, the divine essence as an accident in a subject, but because it belongs to God alone and is the ground of knowing Him. And this is the reason why, conversely, essence is not a property of truth: because it is not the ground of making truth known, as truth is the ground of making essence known.
Incidental question. If, however, you ask: since essence and truth signify the same thing, why is one the ground of knowing the other, and not conversely? — to this some have replied that, although essence and truth signify the same, yet one (namely truth) is more the ground of knowing by reason of what is connoted. But this cannot stand, since truth connotes nothing. It must therefore be said that this is by reason of the mode of signifying and of understanding.
And it should be noted that there is a twofold way to speak of these names: one way, by reason of that which they name or signify; another, by reason of that in which what they name is signified as placed. Hence it makes a difference to say sense and a man's sense: for the first is said in common of the sense of man and of beast, the second is proper to man. If, then, we take such names in themselves, the notion of essence is one thing, of truth another — since essence names a what, and truth names a condition of being. When, however, we draw essence and truth to God, although they are the same, nevertheless by reason of their general significations one is taken as a property of the other; and there is neither synonymy there nor are the names synonyms, but the character of subject and of property remains according to the mode of signifying, and also remains according to the mode of understanding — since through created essence we understand essence in the Creator, and through created truth we understand uncreated truth. Whence, just as created truth is the property and ground of knowing created essence, so uncreated truth according to the mode of signifying and understanding is the ground of knowing and understanding the uncreated essence.
I. The sense of the question is whether truth belongs to God as something proper — that is, whether it belongs to God's essence and is the property of God alone. Truth is here taken, not as it is formally in the intellect, nor as it is the object of the intellect, but in the order to the reality itself, of which it is the act — that is, insofar as it expresses the undividedness of the being and existence. — For understanding the terms that occur in the first argument for the negative side and often elsewhere, it should be noted that complex and incomplex are the same as composite and incomposite. Complex truth is the property or accident of a proposition which expresses the connection of predicate with subject, and is had in the second operation of the mind, namely in judgment. Incomplex truth is the simple property of any being, and is defined as the adequation of the thing to the intellect which knows the thing as it is. It is had in every first operation of the mind, which is simple apprehension.
II. Elsewhere St. Bonaventure, with the common opinion, distinguishes truth in three ways: as taken either formally (truth in the intellect), or radically or causally (truth in things), or as it is in speech as in a sign. Cf. below d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1; above d. 3, p. I, dub. 7; II. Sent. d. 30, a. 3, q. 2; Hexaemeron Sermon 5. On truth of signs, see below d. 46, a. 1, q. 1. — St. Thomas, I. Sent. d. 19, q. 5; On Truth q. 1, a. 1 ff.; Summa Theologiae I, q. 16, aa. 1–3, 5. — Here, and in the Prologue to the Commentary on Ecclesiastes near the end, he treats only of truth in things, or as truth is a property of being. This truth in things in turn can be considered in three ways: first, with respect to its subject, and thus truth is the undividedness of act and potency — or with Avicenna (XI. Metaph. c. 2): "the truth of anything is the property of its being, which has been established for it"; or truth is that thing which is in act; and in this respect it is defined as the undividedness of being and of what is. — Second, with respect to its principle, which is the divine exemplar to which things are likened; and in this respect it is defined according to Augustine (On True Religion c. 36, n. 66): "Truth is the supreme likeness of the principle which is without any unlikeness, from which falsity arises." — Third, with respect to the consequent effect, insofar as the object causes truth in the intellect; and thus truth is the ground of knowing the thing and distinguishing it — and in this respect it is defined by Augustine (loc. cit.): "Truth is that which shows what is"; and by Hilary: "Truth is being-declarative." Cf. above d. 3, p. I, dub. 7; Alex. Hal., p. I, q. 15, m. 3; St. Thomas, On Truth q. 1, a. 1. — The other distinction of truth against falsity and against admixture is evident from the text.
III. As for the order of the arguments pro and contra: the first proposition — that truth as distinguished against falsity is found also in creatures — is proved by the first three arguments for the negative side. The second — that truth as distinguished against admixture is the property of God alone — is proved by the 3rd and 6th arguments for the affirmative. The remaining arguments are explained by distinction in their proper sense. — Worthy of attention are what is said here in the body and in the responses to 1, 2, and the last, concerning created truth — namely, that no created truth is truth by essence, but by participation, and nevertheless is in its own way a ground of knowing distinct from uncreated truth. Which was said against the rigid Ontologists.
IV. For the 1st and 2nd conclusions cf. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 15, m. 5; and q. 17, m. 4. — For explanation of the passage from Anselm (4th fundamentum) cf. St. Thomas (S. Th. I, q. 16, a. 6), and especially Richard of Mediavilla (here q. 2, ad 4), who treats the matter extensively and well, though by a different way than St. Bonaventure. — On the difference between divine being and created being see here dub. 8. — On the whole question: St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 60; S. Th. I, q. 16, a. 5. — B. Albert the Great, here a. 1 and d. 46, a. 14 ff., where he resolves many questions on this matter at length; Summa p. I, tr. 4, q. …
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- Hieron., Ep. ad Marcellam (cfr. litteram Magistri supra, d. 8, Cap. I, ubi integra citatur). In nostra ed. c. 1 circa medium.Jerome, Letter to Marcella (cf. the littera Magistri above, d. 8, Cap. I, where the full text is cited). In our edition, c. 1, near the middle.
- August., de Vera Religione c. 36, n. 66. Vat., contra plurimos codd., legit summe pro summum.Augustine, On True Religion c. 36, n. 66. The Vatican edition, against most manuscripts, reads summe for summum.
- August., I Soliloq. c. 8, n. 15; de Vera Religione c. 31, n. 64 et c. 36, n. 66. Vat., absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1, omittit verba se et omnia usque cognoscendi.Augustine, Soliloquies I, c. 8, n. 15; On True Religion c. 31, n. 64 and c. 36, n. 66. The Vatican edition, without any support of the manuscripts or ed. 1, omits the words se et omnia usque cognoscendi.
- Anselm., de Veritate c. 13, ubi probat omnium rerum unam solum esse rectitudinem, ex qua concludit: una igitur in omnibus illis est veritas.Anselm, On Truth c. 13, where he proves that there is only one rectitude of all things, from which he concludes: "there is therefore one truth in all of them."
- Rom. 8, 20: Vanitati enim creatura subiecta est. Cfr. etiam Eccles. 3, 19.Romans 8:20: "For the creature was made subject to vanity." Cf. also Ecclesiastes 3:19.
- Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 34 (IV, c. 29). Mox post summi supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 male omissum esse.Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 34 (IV, c. 29). Shortly after summi, we have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 the word esse, which was badly omitted.
- Veritas incomplexa convertitur cum ente ut passio entis. Cfr. scholion I huius q. ad explicationem distinctionis inter veritatem complexam (propositionis) et incomplexam (entis).Incomplex truth is convertible with being as a property of being. Cf. scholion I of this question for the explanation of the distinction between complex truth (of a proposition) and incomplex truth (of being).
- August., II Soliloq. c. 5, n. 8: Verum mihi videtur esse id quod est. Multi codd. ut BDFIPQTXYZ cum ed. 1 omittunt est.Augustine, Soliloquies II, c. 5, n. 8: "True seems to me to be that which is." Many manuscripts (BDFIPQTXYZ) with ed. 1 omit est.
- Codd. DT expressius: ablativus non dicit causam formalem esse rerum complectivam, sed exemplarem. Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. cc, contra alios et ed. 1, legit expressione loco per expressionem.Codices DT read more explicitly: "the ablative names the formal cause of things not as comprehensive but as exemplary." Shortly after, the Vatican edition with codex cc — against the others and edition 1 — reads expressione in place of per expressionem.
- Cfr. Aristot., V Topic. c. 1 et 2, ac Porphyr., de Praedicabilibus c. de Proprio. Mendum Vat. antecedens loco accidens correximus fide mss. et trium primarum edd.Cf. Aristotle, Topics V, cc. 1 and 2; and Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter On the Proper. We have corrected the error of the Vatican edition antecedens to accidens on the authority of the manuscripts and the first three editions.