Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
Quaestio II. Utrum divinum esse sit adeo verum, quod non possit cogitari non esse.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec proprietas conveniat Deo in summo, id est, utrum divinum esse sit adeo verum, quod non possit cogitari non esse.
1. Et quod sic, videtur per Anselmum1, qui dicit, quod Deus secundum communem animi conceptionem est quo nihil maius cogitari potest; sed maius est quod non potest cogitari non esse quam quod potest: ergo cum Deo nihil maius cogitari possit, divinum esse ita est, quod non potest cogitari non esse.
2. Item, Damascenus2 dicit, quod cognitio essendi Deum nobis naturaliter est impressa; sed naturales impressiones non relinquunt nec assuescunt in contrarium: ergo veritas Dei impressa menti humanae est inseparabilis ab ipsa: ergo non potest cogitari non esse.
3. Item, maior est veritas in esse divino quam in aliqua dignitate3; sed aliqua dignitas ita est vera, quod non est ei contradicere corde (ut omne totum est maius sua parte, et similia), unde non potest cogitari non esse: ergo multo fortius hoc erit verum dicere de prima veritate.
4. Item, intellectus noster nihil intelligit nisi per primam lucem et veritatem; ergo omnis actio intellectus, quae est in cogitando aliquid non esse, est per primam lucem; sed per primam lucem non contingit cogitare non esse primam lucem sive veritatem: ergo nullo modo contingit cogitare primam veritatem non esse.
5. Item, quod contingit cogitare contingit enuntiare; sed non contingit enuntiare primam veritatem non esse: ergo nec cogitare. Probatio: omnis sermo enuntiativus asserit se esse verum; unde sequitur, si homo est asinus, hominem esse asinum est verum; sed omne quod ponit veritatem, ponit primam veritatem, quia omnis veritas infert illam: ergo omnis sermo asserit primam veritatem esse: ergo etc.
6. Item, omnis sermo enuntiativus4 aut affirmativus est, aut negativus; sed affirmativus affirmat hoc de hoc; sed sequitur: si est ens quod est hoc, est ens quod non est hoc, quia cum dico ens hoc, dico ens limitatum, finitum et arctatum; et tali posito, ponitur ens summum: ergo omnis sermo affirmativus circa creaturam infert Deum.
7. Item, negativus similiter: quia nullus sermo est magis negativus quam iste: nulla est veritas. Sed Augustinus in Soliloquiis5 probat, quod sermo iste ponit aliquam veritatem esse; quia si nulla veritas est, verum est nullam veritatem esse; et si hoc est verum, aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, aliqua veritas est: ergo etc.
Sed contra:
1. Damascenus6: «In tantum praevaluit perniciosa hominum malitia, ut dicat Deum non esse, secundum illud Psalmi: Dixit insipiens etc.»
2. Item, idolatra dicit, quod non est alius Deus nisi idolum, et hoc credit et cogitat; sed constat idolum non esse Deum: ergo etc.
3. Item, omne illud, quo intellecto non esse potest aliquid intelligi, potest cogitari non esse. Sed dicit Boethius in libro de Hebdomadibus7, quod intellecto per impossibile summum bonum non esse, adhuc potest aliquid intelligi rotundum et album: ergo similiter in summo vero, et sic poterit cogitari non esse.
4. Item, illud quod maxime nos latet, de facili potest cogitari non esse: sed veritas divini esse est huiusmodi, quia Deus habitat lucem inaccessibilem8: ergo etc.
5. Item, quaero quid est dicere Deum non posse cogitari non esse? Si quia non potest aliquo modo cogitari nec vere nec false, illud est manifeste falsum; si quia non potest vere, similiter nec anima nec caelum et huiusmodi.
6. Item, quod contingit exprimere contingit et cogitare; sed contingit exprimere divinum esse non esse: ergo et cogitare. Quod contingat, hoc patet, cum dicitur in speciali Deus non est, et in generali nihil est; et quod neutra istarum inferat Deum esse, patet, quia oppositum non infert oppositum, et quod nihil ponit nihil infert; quaelibet autem istarum nihil ponit.
Conclusio. Tanta est veritas divini esse, ut non possit cum assensu cogitari non esse nisi propter defectum ex parte intelligentis, qui ignorat quid sit Deus; ex parte vero intelligibilis non potest esse defectus nec praesentiae nec evidentiae, sive in se, sive in probando.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquid cogitare non esse est dupliciter.
Aut in ratione falsi, sicut cogito de hac homo est asinus; et hoc cogitare nihil aliud est quam quid est, quod dicitur, intelligere. Hoc modo potest cogitari non esse veritas divini esse.
Alio modo est cogitare cum assensu, sicut cogito aliquid non esse et credo non esse; et hoc modo aliquid cogitare non esse, quod est, potest venire aut ex defectu intelligentis, aut ex defectu intelligibilis.
Defectus autem intelligentis est caecitas vel ignorantia, ob quam, quia ignorat rem, cogitat ipsam non esse. Contingit autem dupliciter esse cogitationem de aliquo ente, videlicet si est et quid est.
Intellectus autem noster deficit in cogitatione divinae veritatis quantum ad cognitionem quid est, tamen non deficit quantum ad cognitionem si est. Unde Hugo9: «Deus sic ab initio cognitionem suam in homine temperavit, ut sicut nunquam quid esset poterat comprehendi, ita nunquam quia esset poterat ignorari.» Quia ergo intellectus noster nunquam deficit in cognitione Dei si est, ideo nec potest ignorare ipsum esse simpliciter, nec cogitare non esse.
Quia vero deficit in cognitione quid est, ideo frequenter cogitat Deum esse quod non est (sicut idolum) vel non esse quod est (sicut Deum iustum). Et quia qui cogitat Deum non esse quod est (ut iustum), per consequens cogitat ipsum non esse: ideo ratione defectus intellectus Deus potest cogitari non esse — sive summa veritas; non tamen simpliciter sive generaliter, sed ex consequenti, sicut qui negat beatitudinem esse in Deo negat eum esse.
Hoc autem modo procedunt rationes probantes quod aliquis intellectus cogitat vel cogitare potest divinum esse non esse.
Alio modo potest cogitari aliquid non esse propter defectum a parte intelligibilis, et huiusmodi defectus potest esse dupliciter: aut defectus praesentiae, aut defectus evidentiae. Defectus praesentiae, utpote quia non semper, non ubique, non ubique totaliter. Quod non semper est, aliquando est, aliquando non: et ideo aliquando vere potest cogitari non esse. Similiter de eo quod non est ubique, quia eadem ratione qua potest cogitari non esse hic, potest cogitari non esse alibi. Similiter de eo quod secundum partem adest, secundum partem abest.
Deus autem est semper et ubique et totus semper et ubique: ideo non potest cogitari non esse. Hanc rationem assignat Anselmus in libro contra Insipientem10.
Non solum propter defectum praesentiae potest cogitari aliquid non esse, sed etiam propter defectum evidentiae, quia non est evidens in se, nec est evidens in probando. Sed divini esse veritas est evidens et in se et in probando.
In se, quia sicut principia cognoscimus in quantum terminos [cognoscimus], et quia causa praedicati clauditur in subiecto, ideo se ipsis sunt evidentia; sic et in proposito. Nam Deus sive summa veritas est ipsum esse, quo nihil melius cogitari potest: ergo non potest non esse nec cogitari non esse. Praedicatum enim clauditur in subiecto.
Nec tantum habet evidentiam ex se, sed etiam ex probatione, quoniam divinam veritatem sive divinum esse probat et concludit omnis veritas et natura creata, quia si est ens per participationem et ab alio, est ens per essentiam et non ab alio. Probat etiam ipsam et concludit omnis intelligentia recta, quia omni animae eius cognitio est impressa, et omnis cognitio est per ipsam. Probat iterum ipsam et concludit omnis propositio affirmativa; omnis enim talis aliquid ponit; et aliquo posito ponitur verum; et vero posito ponitur veritas, quae est causa omnis veri.
Propositio autem negativa non potest probare ipsam nisi sophistice, ut dicunt. Unde ex hoc quod est nihil esse, vel nullam veritatem esse, non contingit concludere nec inferre veritatem esse. Haec enim propositio nihil esse destruit omnem veritatem. Et ideo ad ipsam non sequitur aliqua affirmatio, et haec est falsa: si nihil est, nihil esse est verum. Et si dicatur quod omnis propositio infert dictum, verum est — sed si nihil est, nulla propositio est nec aliquid. Augustinus autem tale argumentum non facit approbando, sed inquirendo.
Concedendum est igitur, quod tanta est veritas divini esse, quod cum assensu non potest cogitari non esse, nisi propter ignorantiam cogitantis qui ignorat quid est quod per nomen Dei dicitur. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, licet aliquae sint sophisticae.
Ad argumenta contra:
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium In tantum praevaluit etc.; dicendum, quod Damascenus loquitur de cogitatione quae venit ab excaecatione — quod patet ex ipso verbo eius cum dicit malitia.
Ad 2. Similiter ad illud de idolo, dicendum, quod ideo errat [idolatra] quia ignorat quid sit [Deus]; unde non cogitat Deum non esse in universali.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellecto Deo non esse possunt alia intelligi; dicendum, quod Boethius loquitur de intellectu quo per impossibile aliquid cogitamus, sed non assentimus.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maxime nos latet; patet responsio: quia maxime nos latet quid est, sed tamen maxime patet si est.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur quid est dicere divinam veritatem non posse cogitari non esse? dicendum, quod hoc est dicere quod aliquis non potest credere Deum non esse, dummodo utatur ratione. Non sic de creaturis; quia etsi certum est unam creaturam esse praesentem uni, non tamen omnibus — quia non est virtutis tantae, ut se omnibus offerat aequaliter, sicut prima veritas.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contingit exprimere contingit et cogitare; dicendum, quod potest accipi cogitare generaliter pro actu mentis sive errantis sive non, sive assentientis sive non — et tunc est illud verum; vel pro cogitatione cum assensu — et sic est falsum, quia dignitatibus contingit contradicere quantum ad exterius rationem, non tamen quantum ad interius, ut dicit Philosophus in libro Posteriorum11.
I. Quaestio haec fere coincidit cum illa quae communiter sic exprimitur, utrum Deum esse sit per se notum. Nihilominus, ut bene intelligatur mens S. Doctoris, observare iuvat quod status quaestionis, et consequenter etiam forma solutionis, aliquatenus differunt a quaestione posita in forma supradicta et eius solutione. Sanctus enim loquitur hic directe de veritate divini esse, et tantum indirecte de nostra cognitione huius divini esse; illa vero alia quaestio immediate est de nostra cognitione huius divini esse, seu an ipsa propositio Deus est sit per se nota.
II. Similia habet B. Albertus ad propositum, et ab aliquibus ignorari notant et aestimant beatitudinem... In omnibus autem consentit doctrina. Scotus facit quasdam difficultates circa dictam propositionem per se notam quoad nos; attamen quoad rem principalem concedit dictam propositionem esse notam per se Deo et Beatis, non tamen nobis. S. Thomas simpliciter docet dictam propositionem esse notam per se secundum se, non tamen nobis (S. Th. I, q. 2, a. 1). Sub aliquo respectu tamen admittit existentiam Dei esse etiam nobis notam per se, non sub ratione propria, sed sub rationibus communibus — nempe entis, veri, boni, beatitudinis; cfr. S. Thom., S. Th. I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1 et 3; S. c. Gent. I, c. 11, ad 4; I. Sent. d. 3, q. 2. — Alex. Halens., Summa p. I, q. 3, m. 2, ad 3, rem sic explicat: «Cognitio alicuius potest esse duobus modis: in ratione communi et in ratione propria. Potest igitur aliquid cognosci in ratione communi, et tamen ignorari sub ratione propria — sicut cum aliquis cognoscit mel sub ratione communi (videlicet quod est corpus molle, rubeum), ignorat autem ipsum sub ratione propria; et ideo cum videt fel esse corpus molle, rubeum, deceptus credit ipsum esse mel. Similiter cognitio beatitudinis et appetitus ipsius nobis innatus est ratione communi (quod est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus); tamen in ratione propria ignoratur imperfectis; multi quippe nesciunt quod ipsum ens, in qua ens est, imperfectissime nominatur Deus.» Patet ergo S. Bonaventuram non declinasse a via communi, dicendo intellectum nostrum non deficere quoad quaestionem si Deus est (i. e., sub aliqua ratione communi), sed tantum quoad quaestionem quid Deus est (i. e., sub ratione propria). Cfr. de hoc Trigosus, Summa theol. q. 2, a. 2, dub. 1 (qui tamen istam distinctionem non satis considerat). Quodsi Seraphicus argumentum notum Anselmi approbare videtur, observandum est eum loqui vel de divino esse in se, vel de eo intellectu qui Deum sub ratione propria iam cognoscit. Huic enim evidens esse debet existentiam Dei includi in eius essentia. Excaecato vero intellectui et ignoranti quid Deus est, manet absconditum id quod in se est evidens, ita ut Deum verum et vivum in stultitia sua negare praesumat.
III. Quoad ipsas conclusiones praeter iam citatos cfr. Bonav., Itinerarium c. 5; Hexaem. Serm. 5 et 10. — Scotus, I. Sent. d. 2, q. 2. — B. Albert., Summa p. I, tr. 4, q. 19, m. 1. 4. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 22 per totum, et a. 30, q. 3. — Durand., hic p. I, q. 3 et 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.
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Question II. Whether the divine being is so true that it cannot be thought not to be.
Secondly it is asked whether this property [i.e., truth] belongs to God in the highest degree — that is, whether the divine being is so true that it cannot be thought not to be.
1. And that it is so seems [to follow] from Anselm1, who says that God, according to the common conception of the mind, is that than which nothing greater can be thought; but that which cannot be thought not to be is greater than that which can: therefore, since nothing greater than God can be thought, the divine being so is, that it cannot be thought not to be.
2. Likewise, Damascene2 says that the knowledge that God is is naturally impressed upon us; but natural impressions do not leave us, nor do they grow accustomed to the contrary: therefore the truth of God impressed on the human mind is inseparable from it: therefore it cannot be thought not to be.
3. Likewise, greater is the truth in the divine being than in any axiom3; but some axiom is so true that one cannot contradict it in his heart — such as the whole is greater than its part, and the like — hence it cannot be thought not to be: therefore much more strongly will this be true to say of the first truth.
4. Likewise, our intellect understands nothing except through the first light and truth; therefore every action of the intellect — including one that thinks something not to be — is through the first light; but through the first light it does not occur to think that the first light or truth is not: therefore in no way does it occur to think that the first truth is not.
5. Likewise, what can be thought can be stated; but it cannot be stated that the first truth is not: therefore neither thought. Proof: every declarative statement asserts that itself is true; whence it follows: if a man is a donkey, then "a man is a donkey" is true; but everything that posits truth posits the first truth, since all truth implies it: therefore every statement asserts the first truth to be: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, every declarative statement4 is either affirmative or negative; the affirmative affirms this of this; but it follows: if there is a being that is this, there is a being that is not this — because when I say this being, I say a being limited, finite, bounded; and with such posited, the supreme being is posited: therefore every affirmative statement concerning a creature implies God.
7. Likewise, the negative too: for no statement is more negative than this: there is no truth. But Augustine in the Soliloquies5 proves that this very statement posits some truth to exist; for if there is no truth, then it is true that there is no truth; and if this is true, something is true; and if something is true, some truth exists: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. Damascene6: "To such an extent has the pernicious wickedness of men prevailed, that it says that God is not — according to the Psalmist: The fool has said etc."
2. Likewise, the idolater says that there is no other God but the idol, and believes and thinks this; but it is settled that the idol is not God: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, everything such that, once it is understood not to be, something else can still be understood — can be thought not to be. But Boethius in his Hebdomads7 says that even if, per impossibile, the highest good is understood not to be, something round and white can still be understood: therefore similarly in the case of the highest truth, and thus it will be able to be thought not to be.
4. Likewise, that which most escapes us can easily be thought not to be; but the truth of the divine being is of this kind, since God dwells in inaccessible light8: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, I ask: what does it mean to say God cannot be thought not to be? If [it means] that he cannot be thought in any way — neither truly nor falsely — that is manifestly false; if [it means] that he cannot be thought [not to be] truly, then likewise neither can the soul, nor the heaven, nor the like.
6. Likewise, what can be expressed can also be thought; but the divine being's not-being can be expressed: therefore it can also be thought. That it can be expressed is plain, since one says in particular God is not, and in general nothing is; and that neither of these implies God is, is plain, since the opposite does not imply the opposite, and what posits nothing implies nothing — and each of these posits nothing.
Conclusion. So great is the truth of the divine being that it cannot be thought with assent not to be, except through a defect on the part of the thinker, who is ignorant of what God is. But on the part of the intelligible, there can be no defect either of presence or of evidence — whether in itself or in being proved.
I respond: It must be said that to think something not to be is twofold.
Either in the manner of a falsehood, as when I think of this: a man is a donkey; and this to think is nothing other than to understand what is being said. In this way the truth of the divine being can be thought not to be.
In another way it is to think with assent — as when I think something not to be and believe it not to be; and in this way, to think not to be what is, can come either from a defect on the part of the thinker, or from a defect on the part of the intelligible.
A defect of the thinker is blindness or ignorance, on account of which, because he is ignorant of a thing, he thinks it not to be. But there can be two kinds of thought about any being: namely, whether it is and what it is.
Our intellect falls short in the thinking of the divine truth as regards the cognition of what it is, yet does not fall short as regards the cognition of whether it is. Whence Hugh9: "God from the beginning so moderated his own knowledge in man, that just as what he was could never be comprehended, so that he was could never be ignored." Since therefore our intellect never falls short in the cognition of God as to whether he is, it can neither be ignorant of his being simply, nor think him not to be.
But since it does fall short in the cognition of what he is, it frequently thinks that God is what he is not (as [in the case of] an idol), or that he is not what he is (as a just God). And since one who thinks God not to be what he is — for instance just — consequently thinks him not to be: therefore by reason of the defect of intellect, God — or the supreme truth — can be thought not to be: yet not simply or generally, but consequently, as one who denies that blessedness is in God denies that he is.
It is in this mode that the reasons proceed which prove that some intellect thinks, or can think, the divine being not to be.
In another way something can be thought not to be on account of a defect on the part of the intelligible; and this defect can be twofold: either a defect of presence, or of evidence. A defect of presence arises because it is not always, not everywhere, not wholly everywhere. What does not always exist sometimes is, sometimes is not; and therefore at some time it can truly be thought not to be. Likewise of what is not everywhere, since by the same reasoning by which it can be thought not to be here, it can be thought not to be elsewhere. Likewise of what is present in part, absent in part.
But God is always and everywhere, and wholly always and everywhere: therefore he cannot be thought not to be. This reasoning is given by Anselm in his book Against the Fool10.
Not only on account of defect of presence can something be thought not to be, but also on account of defect of evidence, since it is not evident in itself, nor evident in being proved. But the truth of the divine being is evident both in itself and in being proved.
In itself, because as we know principles insofar as we know [their] terms, and because the cause of the predicate is contained in the subject, therefore they are evident by themselves; so also in the present case. For God — or the supreme truth — is the very being than which nothing better can be thought: therefore he cannot not be, nor be thought not to be. For the predicate is contained in the subject.
Nor does it have evidence only from itself, but also from proof — since every created truth and nature proves and concludes the divine truth or divine being, because if it is a being by participation and from another, it is a being by essence and not from another. Every right intelligence also proves and concludes it, since the cognition of him is impressed upon every soul, and every cognition is through him. Again, every affirmative proposition proves and concludes it; for every such proposition posits something; and by positing something, the true is posited; and by positing the true, truth — which is the cause of all truth — is posited.
But a negative proposition cannot prove him, except sophistically, as they say. Hence from the fact that nothing is, or no truth is, it does not follow that one can conclude or infer that truth is. For this proposition nothing is destroys all truth. And therefore no affirmation follows from it; and this is false: if nothing is, then 'nothing is' is true. And if it be said that every proposition implies its enunciation, that is true — but if nothing is, no proposition is, nor anything at all. Augustine makes such an argument not by way of approval, but of inquiry.
It must therefore be granted that the truth of the divine being is so great that it cannot be thought with assent not to be, except on account of the ignorance of the thinker who is ignorant of what the name "God" signifies. And the reasons to this [affirmative] are to be granted, though some of them are sophistical.
To the arguments for the contrary:
To 1. To what is objected on the contrary, In tantum praevaluit etc.: Damascene speaks of the thinking that comes from blindness, which is clear from his very word when he says wickedness.
To 2. Similarly to the one about the idol: the idolater errs precisely because he is ignorant of what God is; hence he does not think that God is not in universal.
To 3. To what is objected — that once God is understood not to be, other things can be understood — it must be said that Boethius speaks of an intellect by which we think something per impossibile, but do not assent.
To 4. To what is objected — that it most escapes us — the response is plain: for it most escapes us what he is, yet most plain whether he is.
To 5. To what is objected — what does it mean to say that the divine truth cannot be thought not to be? — it must be said that it means that no one can believe God not to be, as long as he uses reason. It is not so of creatures; for even though it is certain that one creature is present to another, it is not [certain that it is present] to all, because no [creature] is of such power as to offer itself equally to all, as the first truth is.
To 6. To what is objected — that what can be expressed can also be thought — it must be said that to think can be taken generally for any act of the mind, whether erring or not, whether assenting or not; and then that is true. Or for thought with assent — and thus it is false, since axioms (dignitates) can be contradicted as to their outward reason, yet not as to the inward, as the Philosopher says in the Posterior Analytics11.
I. This question almost coincides with the one commonly expressed thus: whether it is per se known that God is. Nevertheless, so that the mind of the holy Doctor may be well understood, it is worth observing that the state of the question — and consequently the form of the solution — differs somewhat from the question as posed in that other form and its solution. For the saint speaks here directly of the truth of the divine being, and only indirectly of our knowledge of this divine being; whereas that other question is immediately about our knowledge of the divine being — that is, whether the very proposition God is is per se known.
II. B. Albert [the Great] says similar things on this subject, and some note and judge blessedness to be ignored by some... In all these, however, the teaching agrees. Scotus raises certain difficulties about the said proposition as per se known to us; yet as to the principal matter he concedes that the said proposition is per se known to God and to the Blessed, yet not to us. St. Thomas simply teaches that the said proposition is per se known in itself, yet not to us (S. Th. I, q. 2, a. 1). In a certain respect, however, he admits that God's existence is per se known even to us — not under its proper notion, but under common notions, namely those of being, true, good, and blessedness; cf. St. Thomas, S. Th. I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1 and 3; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 11, ad 4; I. Sent. d. 3, q. 2. — Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 3, m. 2, ad 3, explains the matter thus: "The knowledge of something can be twofold — in a common notion, and in a proper notion. It is therefore possible that something be known under a common notion and yet be unknown under its proper notion — just as when one knows honey under its common notion (namely, as a soft, reddish body), but does not know it under its proper notion; and therefore, when he sees that gall is a soft, reddish body, he is deceived and believes it to be honey. Similarly, the knowledge of beatitude and the appetite of it is innate in us under a common notion — namely, that it is a state perfect by the aggregation of all goods — yet under its proper notion it is unknown to the imperfect; many indeed do not know that being-itself, insofar as it is being, is most imperfectly named God." It is clear, then, that St. Bonaventure has not departed from the common way by saying that our intellect does not fall short regarding the question whether God is (i.e., under some common notion), but only regarding the question what God is (i.e., under its proper notion). Cf. on this Trigosus, Summa theol. q. 2, a. 2, dub. 1 (who however does not sufficiently consider this distinction). And if the Seraphic Doctor seems to approve Anselm's well-known argument, it must be observed that he speaks either of the divine being in itself, or of that intellect which already knows God under his proper notion. For to the latter it must be evident that the existence of God is included in his essence. But to the blinded and ignorant intellect — which does not know what God is — what is in itself evident remains hidden, so that it presumes in its folly to deny the true and living God.
III. For the conclusions themselves, besides those already cited, cf. Bonav., Itinerarium c. 5; Hexaemeron Serm. 5 and 10. — Scotus, I. Sent. d. 2, q. 2. — B. Albert, Summa p. I, tr. 4, q. 19, m. 1 and 4. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 22 throughout, and a. 30, q. 3. — Durandus, here p. I, q. 3 and 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1.
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- Anselm., Proslogion c. 2 seqq.Anselm, Proslogion c. 2 ff.
- Damasc., I de Fide orthodoxa c. 1 et 3: Nemo quippe mortalium est, cui non hoc ab eo naturaliter insitum sit, ut Deum esse cognoscat.John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith I, cc. 1 and 3: "For there is no mortal in whom it is not naturally implanted by Him to know that God is."
- Dignitas, graece ἀξίωμα, hic et passim significat propositionem immediate sive per se notam, quam definit Aristot., I Poster. c. 2, quod sit propositio indemonstrabilis quam necesse est quemlibet docendum habere; et Boeth., de Hebdomad., quod sit enuntiatio quam quisque probat auditam.Dignitas, Greek axiōma, here and throughout signifies an immediate or per-se-known proposition, which Aristotle (Posterior Analytics I, c. 2) defines as an indemonstrable proposition which any learner must have; and Boethius (On the Hebdomads), as a statement which anyone accepts upon hearing.
- De enuntiatione eiusque speciebus vide Aristot., I Periherm. c. de Enuntiatione. Mox Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 legit quia sequitur pro sed sequitur.On the proposition and its species see Aristotle, On Interpretation I, chapter On the Statement. Shortly after, the Vatican edition — against the manuscripts and edition 1 — reads quia sequitur in place of sed sequitur.
- August., II Soliloq. c. 2, n. 2 et c. 15, n. 28. Vat. cum cod. cc post ponit addit primam, sed contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1 necnon contra ed. operum Augustini.Augustine, Soliloquies II, c. 2, n. 2 and c. 15, n. 28. The Vatican edition with codex cc adds primam after ponit, but against the other manuscripts and edition 1, and against the edition of Augustine's works.
- Damasc., I de Fide orthodoxa c. 3: Quoniam vero Satanae improbitas tantum adversus hominum naturam valuit, ut et quosdam in stolidissimam et quovis malo peiorem exitii voraginem detruserit, ita ut Deum esse negarent, quorum insipientiam divinorum verborum interpres David palam faciens ait: Dixit insipiens in corde suo (Psalm. 13, 1) etc.John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith I, c. 3: "But since Satan's wickedness has so prevailed against the nature of men that it has dragged some into the most stupid and any-evil-worse chasm of destruction — so that they deny that God is — David, the interpreter of the divine words, making their folly plain, says: 'The fool has said in his heart' (Psalm 13:1) etc."
- Boeth., Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint (= de Hebdomadibus), circa medium.Boethius, How substances are good in that they are (= On the Hebdomads), near the middle.
- I Tim. 6, 16. Vulgata: lucem inhabitat inaccessibilem.1 Timothy 6:16. The Vulgate reads: "He dwells in light inaccessible."
- Hugo de S. Victore, I de Sacramentis p. III, c. 1 in fine. Vat. sola in hoc textu post poterat addit ab homine.Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments I, p. III, c. 1 at the end. The Vatican edition alone in this text adds ab homine after poterat.
- Anselm., Liber apologeticus contra Gaunilonem pro Insipiente c. 1.Anselm, Apologetic Book against Gaunilo on behalf of the Fool c. 1.
- Aristot., I Poster. c. 5 (c. 10) iuxta translat. Boethii: Semper enim est instare ad exterius orationem, sed ad interius orationem non semper (πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον, πρὸς τὸν ἔσω λόγον). Cfr. S. Thomas in Comment. super hunc locum, lect. 19, ubi et in translatione antiqua et in Commentario ipso pro orationem semper habetur rationem.Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 5 (c. 10), according to Boethius's translation: "For it is always possible to object against the outer speech, but not always against the inner speech" (pros ton exō logon, pros ton esō logon). Cf. St. Thomas in his Commentary on this place, lect. 19, where both in the old translation and in the Commentary itself, rationem is given for orationem.