Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
Quaestio II. Utrum solus Deus immutabilis sit.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum immutabilitas sit divinae essentiae proprietas, ita quod nulli creaturae conveniat. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Primae ad Timotheum ultimo1 dicitur de Deo, quod solus habet immortalitatem. Et Augustinus dicit contra Maximinum2: «In omni natura mutabili nonnulla mors est ipsa mutatio»: ergo si solus Deus habet immortalitatem, solus habet immutabilitatem.
2. Item, omne vertibile est mutabile; sed omnis creatura est vertibilis; unde Damascenus3: «Omne quod a versione incipit, in versionem tendit»: ergo etc.
3. Item, omne quod sibi relictum in nihilum cedit, quantum est de se, est mutabile: sed omnis creatura est huiusmodi; unde Gregorius4: «Cuncta in nihilum tenderent, nisi manus Conditoris ea retineret»: ergo etc.
4. Item, nullum accidens de se habet stabilitatem; sed esse omni creaturae accidit, sicut dicit Hilarius et habetur in littera, quia ab alio venit: ergo omnis creatura quantum ad esse est instabilis.
5. Item, omne vanum est subiectum variabilitati; sed omnis creatura vana, cum sit ex nihilo; unde ad Romanos octavo5: Vanitati subiecta est creatura etc.: ergo si omnis creatura vana, nulla immutabilis.
6. Item, omne mutatum habet in se mutabilitatem; sed omnis creatura facta est: ergo omnis creatura mutata, ergo nulla immutabilis.
Contra: Immutabilitas non dicitur nisi tripliciter. Dicitur enim immutabilitas aut invariabilitas, aut incorruptibilitas, aut invertibilitas.
Quoad invariabilitatem:
1. Ostenditur autem, quod invariabilitas conveniat creaturis, utpote principiis. Nam Augustinus ostendit in duodecimo Confessionum6, quod materia informis est invariabilis; quia quod caret forma, caret ordine, et quod caret ordine, caret vicissitudine, ergo variatione. Auctor autem Sex Principiorum7 dicit hoc de forma: «quod est in simplici et invariabili essentia consistens».
2. Item videtur, quod invariabilitas conveniat Beatis, quia ubi perfecta beatitudo, ibi nulla deperditio, et ubi hoc, nulla variatio.
3. Item, variatio attenditur, sicut dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram8, aut secundum locum, aut secundum tempus; sed aliqua creatura caret determinato loco et tempore, ut universale, quod est semper et ubique, et caelum empyreum, quod est extra tempus et locum: ergo etc.
Quoad incorruptibilitatem:
4. Item, si immutabilitas dicatur incorruptibilitas, idem ostenditur. «Nam omnis corruptio naturalis venit ex contrarietate», sicut dicit Philosophus in libro de Morte et vita9; sed multae creaturae carent contrarietate: ergo et corruptibilitate.
5. Item, omnis corruptio est in aliquid prius se, quia corruptio naturalis in aliquid est; sed principia non habent aliquid prius, utpote materia: ergo sunt incorruptibilia.
6. Item, omne perpetuum incorruptibile; sed aliqua creatura naturaliter est perpetua: ergo etc. Minor probari potest sic: perpetuitas est de ratione imaginis; unde Augustinus10: «Non esset anima imago, si mortis termino clauderetur»; cum ergo anima naturaliter sit imago, ergo naturaliter est immortalis sive perpetua.
Quoad invertibilitatem:
7. Item, ostenditur, quod creatura sit invertibilis, sic: vertibilitas est in non esse; sed nihil est quod possit creaturam aliquam vertere in non esse — quia a se non vertitur (cum nihil se corrumpat), ab alio non, quia actio creaturae in id terminatur ex quo incipit; sed nullius creaturae actio incipit a non esse: ergo etc. Praeterea, distantia infinita est inter esse creaturae et nihil; sed inter extrema in infinitum distantia non potest fieri mutatio per virtutem finitam: ergo nihil potest cedere in nihil, nisi Deo faciente.
8. Item, vertibilitas dicitur per corruptionem in non esse omnino; sed nihil quod corrumpitur secedit omnino in non-ens: ergo nullum corruptibile vertibile. Si tu dicas, quod invertibilitatem non habet creatura per naturam, sed solum per gratiam; contra: quod omnibus inest, est naturale, quoniam gratia speciale est; sed naturale est quod est idem apud omnes; sed fere omnis creatura est invertibilis, quia nulla redigitur in nihilum: ergo hoc est naturale.
9. Item, ostenditur, quod nec per gratiam: quia gratia est perfectio naturae; ergo quod repugnat naturae, non datur per gratiam: ergo si invertibilitas est contra naturam creaturae, ergo non datur per gratiam.
10. Item, obiicitur de illa gratia: quia si est creatura, est vertibilis; si ergo conveniat ei invertibilitas, oportet quod per aliam gratiam; et sic erit abire in infinitum. Si ergo oportet stare, patet quod non per gratiam. Si dicas, quod gratia illa non dicitur habitus, sed Deus gratis conservans; hoc nihil est, quia sine Deo operante nulla creatura operatur: ergo sicut nulla creatura est invertibilis nisi per gratiam, sic nulla creatura operatur nisi per gratiam: ergo nulla operatio est naturalis — quod stultum est dicere.
Conclusio. Immutabilitas, accepta ut invariabilitas, est propria solius Dei; accepta ut incorruptibilitas aut invertibilitas, a Deo communicatur aliquibus creaturis vel per naturam vel per gratiam.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod immutabilitas dicitur per privationem mutabilitatis. Mutatio autem dicitur tripliciter:
uno modo, ab ente in ens — et haec est mutatio secundum accidens, et dicitur variatio;
alio modo, ab ente simpliciter in ens potentia sive secundum quid — et haec est mutatio secundum formam, et dicitur corruptio;
alio modo, mutatio ab ente in simpliciter non-ens — et haec est secundum totam rei substantiam, et dicitur versio.
Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod immutabilitas dicitur tripliciter: uno modo invariabilitas, alio modo incorruptibilitas, et tertio modo invertibilitas.
Si ergo immutabilitas dicatur invariabilitas, sic dico, quod in nulla omnino est creatura — neque per naturam neque per gratiam; nam omne creatum aut est accidens, aut habet accidens, et ita variabile; et haec [invariabilitas] est proprie proprium ipsius Dei.
Si autem dicatur immutabilitas incorruptibilitas, sic dico, quod in aliquibus est creaturis: in quibusdam per naturam (ut puta in simplicibus), in quibusdam per gratiam (ut puta in glorificatis corporibus). Nec sic est proprie proprium divinae essentiae.
Si vero tertio modo dicatur immutabilitas [sc. invertibilitas], sic omnibus creaturis inest per gratiam, nulli autem per naturam nisi soli Deo. Invertibile enim per naturam est, quod ex se ipso habet, ut possit stare; hoc autem est, in quo nulla est vanitas, et in quo omnino nulla essentiae mutatio nec ad esse nec ad non esse; et hoc est solum aeternum. Ideo haec invertibilitas est in solo Deo, et est proprie proprium eius. Invertibilitas autem per gratiam inest omnibus vel pluribus creaturis, quia Deus sua gratuita bonitate cetera continet, ne in nihil cedant; et loquor de creaturis, quae dicunt quid completum et per se.
Epilogus. Concedendum igitur, quod immutabilitas, prout privat variationem secundum accidens quantum ad actum et potentiam, solius Dei est. Similiter, prout privat mutationem in non esse secundum actum et potentiam, quantum est de natura, solius Dei est — licet per gratiam conveniat multis creaturis; et sic procedunt rationes ad primam partem, unde concedendae sunt.
Ad argumenta contra:
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod principia rerum sunt invariabilia; dicendum, quod verum est si considerentur secundum essentiam abstractam; sed si considerentur secundum esse naturae, sic de necessitate habent accidentia coniuncta et possunt variari; variatio autem accidentalis respicit esse.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Beatis non potest esse variatio; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad substantiam praemii sive quantum ad praemium substantiale; cadit tamen quantum ad conversionem ad inferius, tum quantum ad affectiones (sicut patet in Angelis), tum quantum ad actiones. Unde Beati erunt agiles et poterunt moveri.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de universali et de empyreo, dicendum, quod utrumque recipit variationem; sed universale ratione eius in quo est — quia «motis nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt»; empyreum vero ratione contenti. Potest enim aliquid continere, quod non continet, et aliquid non continere, quod continet.
Ad 4, 5, 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de incorruptibilitate, dicendum, sicut praetactum est, quod convenit creaturis; aliquae enim creaturae sunt ita simplices et ita bona coniunctione coniunctae, quod nulla cadit in eis contrarietas, nec est in eis maior ratio corruptionis quam in principiis. Unde sicut principia non sunt resolubilia in aliquid, tamen cederent in nihil si sibi relinquerentur, sic intelligendum in aliquibus substantiis. Unde non est dicendum, quod sit verum, quod omne compositum sit resolubile secundum rem; sed sicut dicit Anselmus11: «est resolubile re, vel intellectu». Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.
Ad 7, 8. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de vertibilitate, dicendum, quod quaelibet creatura vertibilis est per naturam, si sibi relinquatur.
Si quaeritur causa huius, dicendum, quod huius versionis, cum sit defectus purus, non est reddenda causa efficiens vel reducens in non esse, sed solum deficiens. Propter quod notandum, quod natura dicitur naturalis origo. Origo autem creaturae et est ex nihilo et est ex suis principiis: secundum hoc dupliciter dicitur aliquid ipsi creaturae naturale, vel quia inest ei ex eo quod est ex nihilo, vel quia inest ei ex eo quod est ex suis principiis. Et quia nihil nullius est causa efficiens, sed deficiens, ideo proprietates quae insunt creaturae ratione eius quod est ex nihilo non sunt positiones, sed defectus; nec sunt a virtute, sed a defectu virtutis; nec habent causam efficientem, sed deficientem: et tales sunt vanitas, instabilitas, vertibilitas. Si igitur quaeratur, a quo est vertibilis creatura, dico, quod non ab aliquo efficiente, sed per defectum in se ipsa.
Secundum autem quod naturale dicitur quod inest rei per propria et intrinseca principia, sic non dicuntur naturaliter inesse privationes vel defectus, sed habilitates: et ideo hoc modo accipiendo naturale, nulla creatura est vertibilis in non esse; nec tamen dicitur invertibilis naturaliter, quia naturale est in quod potest natura; sed principia rei non possunt in rei conservationem nec conservationem sui; et ideo invertibilitas non est huiusmodi naturalis. Nec tamen est contra naturam, immo est ei consona; quia omnis natura appetit salvari, quamvis ex se non possit, et maxime illa creatura quae appetit beatificari — et haec est illa quae ad Dei imaginem facta est. Et quia desiderium naturae non est frustra12, ubi deficit natura, supplet Dei gratuita influentia. Et sic patet, quod vertibilitas inest per naturam, sed invertibilitas per gratiam.
Ad 9. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione gratiae ad naturam, intelligendum est, quod gratia dicitur adiutorium veniens a superiori, respectu eius quod est supra posse naturae. Hoc autem adiutorium est duplex: aut respectu esse simpliciter, aut respectu esse perfecti.
Si respectu esse simpliciter (ut puta conservationis esse, quia nulla principia, cum sint vana, de se possunt se ipsa conservare), sic non est mediante aliquo habitu infuso vel dato. Quia respicit esse, et quia esse est commune omnibus, ideo haec gratia est omnibus communis. Unde haec est gratia habens modum naturae, et haec est gratia qua dicuntur cetera invertibilia.
Alio modo dicitur gratia adiutorium respectu perfecti esse; et quia perfectio esse est in his quae ad beatitudinem ordinantur, respicit bene esse, quod non est omnium. Ideo haec est habitus specialis aliquorum, non omnium; et haec est gratia per modum gratiae. Ex his patet quod obiicit de gratia: obiicit enim secundum quod gratia est specialis habitus divisus contra naturam, quia sic dicit aliquid de novo creatum; sed gratia praedicto modo non.
Ad 10. Et ex hoc patet ultimo obiectum: quia gratia dicitur adiutorium respectu eius quod est supra posse naturae; et quia conservatio principiorum est supra posse naturae, non autem egressus actionum (immo infra), ideo patet etc.
I. Triplex illa distinctio mutationis, cui correspondet triplex immutabilitas, sumpta est ex Damasceno (de Fide orthod. I, c. 3). Prima mutatio, quae a S. Doctore vocatur variatio, tunc fit quando subiectum de aliquo accidente mutatur in aliud accidens; haec nunc communiter vocatur motus sive mutatio accidentalis. Secunda est corruptio, sive mutatio ab esse substantiali formae in materia ad non esse eiusdem, manet tamen materia in potentia ad actum. Tertia est annihilatio, a S. Bonav. vocata versio, qua fit de ente simpliciter non-ens; cfr. II. Sent. d. 1, p. I, a. 3, q. 2 in corp. Aristoteles (V. Phys. c. 1), omittendo hoc ultimum membrum, mutationes sic distinguit: ex subiecto in subiectum (alteratio, augmentatio), ex subiecto in non-subiectum (corruptio), ex non-subiecto in subiectum (generatio).
II. S. Doctor non sibi contradicit, hic asserendo quibusdam creaturis (ut Angelis) inesse incorruptibilitatem per naturam, et alibi dicendo solius Dei esse incorruptibilitatem. Nam in primo loco sermo est de incorruptione respectu suae particularis naturae, non respectu dependentiae a causa prima; in secundo loco loquitur de illa proprietate quae soli primae causae competit — quae potest creare et annihilare. Cfr. S. Thom., S. Th. I, q. 9, a. 2 in corp. Notanda est egregia doctrina in solut. ad 6, 7, 8 exposita. Circa causam efficientem et deficientem cfr. II. Sent. d. 34, a. 1, q. 2.
III. Quoad conclusionem: Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 4, m. 3, et p. II, q. 13, mm. 2, 3, 4. — Scotus, hic q. 5; et Reportata, hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 3, aa. 1 et 2; S. Th. loc. cit. — B. Albert, hic a. 16 et seqq.; Summa p. I, tr. 4, q. 21, m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2, q. 2. — Aegidius R., hic 3. princ. q. 2.
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Question II. Whether God alone is unchangeable.
Secondly it is asked, whether unchangeableness is a property of the divine essence in such a way that it belongs to no creature. And that it is so, it seems.
1. In the last chapter of 1 Timothy1 it is said of God that He alone has immortality. And Augustine says Against Maximinus2: "In every changeable nature, change itself is a kind of death." Therefore if God alone has immortality, God alone has unchangeableness.
2. Likewise, every convertible (vertibile) is changeable; but every creature is convertible; whence Damascene3: "Every thing that begins from turning (conversio) tends to turning": therefore etc.
3. Likewise, whatever, if left to itself, would sink into nothing, is — so far as it is from itself — changeable; but every creature is of this kind; whence Gregory4: "All things would tend to nothing, unless the hand of the Creator held them fast": therefore etc.
4. Likewise, no accident has stability of itself; but being is accidental to every creature, as Hilary says (and it is found in the Master's text), since it comes from another: therefore every creature is, as regards being, unstable.
5. Likewise, everything vain is subject to variability; but every creature is vain, since it is from nothing; whence Romans 85: "The creature was made subject to vanity" etc.: therefore if every creature is vain, none is unchangeable.
6. Likewise, everything that has been changed has changeability in itself; but every creature has been made: therefore every creature has been changed, therefore none is unchangeable.
On the contrary: Unchangeableness is said only in a threefold way. For unchangeableness is either invariability, or incorruptibility, or inconvertibility (invertibilitas).
Regarding invariability:
1. It is shown that invariability befits creatures — namely, principles. For Augustine shows in the twelfth book of his Confessions6 that unformed matter is invariable; because what lacks form lacks order, and what lacks order lacks succession, therefore lacks variation. And the Author of the Six Principles7 says of form: "which consists in a simple and invariable essence."
2. Likewise, it seems that invariability befits the Blessed; because where there is perfect blessedness, there is no loss, and where there is this, there is no variation.
3. Likewise, variation is reckoned, as Augustine says in On Genesis according to the Letter8, either according to place or according to time; but some creature lacks definite place and time — such as the universal, which is always and everywhere, and the empyrean heaven, which is outside time and place: therefore etc.
Regarding incorruptibility:
4. Likewise, if unchangeableness is called incorruptibility, the same is shown. "For every natural corruption comes from contrariety," as the Philosopher says in his book On Life and Death9; but many creatures lack contrariety: therefore also incorruptibility.
5. Likewise, every corruption is into something prior to itself, because natural corruption is into something; but principles do not have anything prior — such as matter: therefore they are incorruptible.
6. Likewise, everything perpetual is incorruptible; but some creature is naturally perpetual: therefore etc. The minor can be proved thus: perpetuity belongs to the ratio of image; whence Augustine10: "The soul would not be an image, if it were shut up within the boundary of death"; since therefore the soul is naturally an image, it is naturally immortal or perpetual.
Regarding inconvertibility:
7. Likewise, it is shown that a creature is inconvertible thus: convertibility is into non-being; but there is nothing which can convert any creature into non-being — because it is not converted by itself (since nothing corrupts itself), and not by another, because the action of a creature terminates in that from which it begins; but no creature's action begins from non-being: therefore etc. Furthermore, there is infinite distance between the being of a creature and nothing; but between extremes infinitely distant no change can take place by a finite power: therefore nothing can sink into nothing, except by God's act.
8. Likewise, convertibility is said to be corruption into non-being altogether; but nothing that is corrupted departs altogether into non-being: therefore no corruptible is convertible. If you say, that a creature has inconvertibility not by nature but only by grace; against this: what is in all is natural, since grace is special; but the natural is what is the same in all; but almost every creature is inconvertible, since none is reduced to nothing: therefore this is natural.
9. Likewise, it is shown that [inconvertibility is] not by grace: for grace is the perfection of nature; therefore what is repugnant to nature is not given by grace: therefore if inconvertibility is against the nature of the creature, it is not given by grace.
10. Likewise, an objection against that grace [itself]: since if it is a creature, it is convertible; therefore if inconvertibility is to belong to it, it must be by another grace; and thus there will be an infinite regress. If therefore one must stop, it is plain it is not by grace. If you say that grace is not called a habit, but God graciously conserving; this is nothing, since without God operating no creature operates: therefore just as no creature is inconvertible except by grace, so no creature operates except by grace: therefore no operation is natural — which is foolish to say.
Conclusion. Unchangeableness, taken as invariability, is proper to God alone; taken as incorruptibility or inconvertibility, is communicated by God to some creatures either by nature or by grace.
I respond: It must be said that unchangeableness is said by privation of changeableness. But change is said in a threefold way:
in one way, from being to being — and this is change according to accident, and is called variation;
in another way, from being simpliciter to being in potency or in a qualified way — and this is change according to form, and is called corruption;
in another way, change from being to simpliciter non-being — and this is according to the whole substance of a thing, and is called conversion (versio).
According to this, it must be understood that unchangeableness is said in three ways: in one way, invariability; in another, incorruptibility; and in a third, inconvertibility.
If, therefore, unchangeableness is called invariability, I say that it is in no creature whatever — neither by nature nor by grace; for every created thing is either an accident, or has an accident, and so is variable; and this [invariability] is properly proper to God Himself.
But if unchangeableness is called incorruptibility, I say that it is in some creatures: in some by nature (as in simple things), in some by grace (as in glorified bodies). And in this sense it is not properly proper to the divine essence.
If, thirdly, unchangeableness is taken [as inconvertibility], then it is in all creatures by grace, but in none by nature except in God alone. For that is inconvertible by nature which has from itself that it can stand; and this is that in which there is no vanity, and in which there is altogether no change of essence either to being or to non-being; and this alone is eternal. Therefore this inconvertibility is in God alone, and is properly proper to Him. But inconvertibility by grace is in all, or in most, creatures — because God by His gratuitous goodness holds all else together, lest they sink into nothing; and I speak of creatures that designate something complete and per se.
Epilogue. It must therefore be granted that unchangeableness, as it privates variation according to accident, as regards act and potency, is of God alone. Similarly, as it privates change into non-being according to act and potency, as regards nature, is of God alone — though by grace it belongs to many creatures; and thus proceed the reasons for the first part, and are therefore to be granted.
To the arguments for the contrary:
To 1. As for the objection that the principles of things are invariable, it must be said that this is true if they are considered according to their abstract essence; but if they are considered according to their being in nature, they necessarily have accidents joined to them and can vary; for accidental variation regards being.
To 2. As for the objection that there can be no variation in the Blessed, it must be said that this is true as regards the substance of the reward, or the substantial reward; but it occurs as regards conversion to what is lower, both as regards affections (as is plain in the Angels) and as regards actions. Whence the Blessed will be agile and will be able to be moved.
To 3. As for the objection about the universal and the empyrean, it must be said that both receive variation — but the universal by reason of that in which it is, since "when we are moved, the things which are in us are moved"; but the empyrean by reason of its content. For something can contain what it does not contain, and something can not contain what it does contain.
To 4, 5, 6. As for the objection about incorruptibility, it must be said, as noted before, that it belongs to creatures: for some creatures are so simple and so bound together in a good conjunction, that no contrariety arises in them, nor is there in them any more reason for corruption than in their principles. Whence, just as principles are not resolvable into anything, yet would sink into nothing if left to themselves, so it must be understood of some substances. Whence it is not to be said that every composite is resolvable in reality; but as Anselm says11, "it is resolvable in reality or by intellect." Whence the reasons adduced to this are to be granted.
To 7, 8. As for the objection about convertibility, it must be said that every creature is convertible by nature, if left to itself.
If the cause of this be sought: since this conversion, being a pure defect, no efficient or reducing-into-non-being cause need be given, but only a deficient cause. For which it must be noted that nature is called natural origin. Now the origin of a creature is both ex nihilo and from its own principles: accordingly, something is said to be natural to the creature in two ways — either because it inheres in it from its being ex nihilo, or because it inheres in it from its being from its own principles. And since nothing is the efficient cause of nothing, but only the deficient cause, therefore the properties which inhere in the creature by reason of its being ex nihilo are not positions but defects; they are not from power but from defect of power; nor do they have an efficient cause but a deficient one: and such are vanity, instability, convertibility. Therefore, if it be asked from whom is the creature convertible?, I say: not from an efficient, but by the defect within itself.
But inasmuch as natural is said of that which inheres in a thing through its own and intrinsic principles, privations or defects are not said to inhere naturally, but capacities (habilitates): and in this way of taking natural, no creature is convertible into non-being. Yet it is not called naturally inconvertible, because the natural is that to which nature has power; but the principles of a thing do not have power to the conservation of the thing, nor to the conservation of themselves; and therefore inconvertibility is not natural in this sense. Nor is it against nature — rather it is in accord with nature; since every nature desires to be preserved, even if from itself it cannot — and most of all that creature which desires to be beatified, and this is the one which is made to the image of God. And since the desire of nature is not in vain12, where nature fails, God's gratuitous influence supplies. And thus it is plain that convertibility belongs by nature, but inconvertibility by grace.
To 9. As for the objection about the comparison of grace to nature, it must be understood that grace is called a help coming from a superior, with respect to that which is above the power of nature. This help is twofold: either with respect to being simpliciter, or with respect to the being of perfection.
If [it regards] being simpliciter (such as the conservation of being, since no principles, being vain, can conserve themselves of themselves), it is not through some infused or given habit. Because it regards being, and since being is common to all, this grace is common to all. Hence this is grace in the mode of nature, and this is the grace by which other things are called inconvertible.
In another way, grace is called a help with respect to the perfect being; and since perfection of being is in those things which are ordered to blessedness, it regards well-being, which is not of all. Therefore this is a special habit of some, not of all; and this is grace in the mode of grace. From these it is clear what the objection about grace asserts: for it objects according as grace is a special habit divided against nature, for so it signifies something newly created; but grace in the first sense is not [such].
To 10. And from this the last objection is clear: because grace is called a help with respect to that which is above the power of nature; and since the conservation of principles is above the power of nature, but the emergence of actions is not (it is rather below), the response is plain, etc.
I. That threefold distinction of change — to which corresponds a threefold unchangeableness — is taken from Damascene (On the Orthodox Faith I, c. 3). The first change, which the holy Doctor calls variation, occurs when the subject is changed from one accident to another; this is now commonly called motion or accidental change. The second is corruption, i.e., change from the substantial being of a form in matter to its non-being — the matter, however, remaining in potency to act. The third is annihilation, called by St. Bonaventure versio, whereby from being there comes simpliciter non-being; cf. II. Sent. d. 1, p. I, a. 3, q. 2 in the body. Aristotle (Physics V, c. 1), omitting this last member, distinguishes changes thus: from subject to subject (alteration, augmentation), from subject to non-subject (corruption), from non-subject to subject (generation).
II. The holy Doctor does not contradict himself here by asserting that incorruptibility belongs to some creatures (such as the Angels) by nature, and elsewhere saying that incorruptibility belongs to God alone. For in the first place, the speech concerns incorruption with respect to the creature's particular nature, not with respect to dependence on the first cause; in the second place, he speaks of that property which belongs only to the first cause — which can create and annihilate. Cf. St. Thomas, S. Th. I, q. 9, a. 2 in the body. Noteworthy is the excellent doctrine exposed in the solutions to 6, 7, 8. Regarding efficient and deficient cause, cf. II. Sent. d. 34, a. 1, q. 2.
III. On the conclusion: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 4, m. 3, and p. II, q. 13, mm. 2, 3, 4. — Scotus, here q. 5; and Reportata, here q. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, aa. 1 and 2; S. Th. loc. cit. — B. Albert, here a. 16 ff.; Summa p. I, tr. 4, q. 21, m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 4, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 3. princ. q. 2.
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- I Tim. 6, 16: Qui solus habet immortalitatem, et lucem inhabitat inaccessibilem.1 Timothy 6:16: "Who alone has immortality, and dwells in light inaccessible."
- August., contra Maximinum II, c. 12, n. 2.Augustine, Against Maximinus II, c. 12, n. 2.
- Damasc., I de Fide orthodoxa c. 3: Quorum enim esse a mutatione incepit, ea mutationi quoque subsint necesse est.John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith I, c. 3: "For those things whose being began from change must also be subject to change."
- Gregor., XVI Moral. c. 37: Cuncta quippe ex nihilo facta sunt, eorumque essentia rursum ad nihilum tenderet, nisi eam auctor omnium regiminis manu retineret.Gregory the Great, Moralia XVI, c. 37: "For all things were made from nothing, and their essence would again tend to nothing, unless the Author of all held it by the hand of his governance."
- Rom. 8, 20. Vulgata: Vanitati enim creatura subiecta est non volens etc.Romans 8:20. The Vulgate reads: "For the creature was made subject to vanity not willingly" etc.
- August., XII Confess. c. 9, n. 9.Augustine, Confessions XII, c. 9, n. 9.
- Gilbertus Porretanus, Liber Sex Principiorum c. 1: Forma est compositioni contingens, simplici et invariabili essentia consistens.Gilbert Porretanus, Book of Six Principles c. 1: "Form is that which adjoins composition, consisting in a simple and invariable essence."
- August., Super Genesim ad litteram VIII, c. 20.Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter VIII, c. 20.
- Aristot. (melius citandum: de Longitudine et brevitate vitae c. 2 et seq.): Quare, cui non est contrarium et ubi non est, impossibile utique erit corrumpi.Aristotle (better cited as: On Length and Shortness of Life c. 2 ff.): "Therefore, that to which there is no contrary and in which there is none, it is impossible for it to be corrupted."
- Cfr. August., XIV de Trin. cc. 2–4, nn. 4–6. Ad litteram habetur in libro de Spiritu et anima c. 18, et in Cassiodori libro de Anima c. 2: Nam quemadmodum poterat esse imago aut similitudo Dei, si animae hominum mortis termino clauderentur?Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, cc. 2–4, nn. 4–6. The verbatim text is found in On the Spirit and the Soul c. 18, and in Cassiodorus's On the Soul c. 2: "For how could [the soul] be an image or likeness of God, if men's souls were shut up within the boundary of death?"
- Anselm., de Fide Trinitatis c. 3: Quoniam omne compositum necesse est aut actu aut intellectu posse disiungi.Anselm, On the Faith of the Trinity c. 3: "Since every composite must be able to be disjoined either in act or in intellect."
- Aristot., I de Caelo text. 32 (c. 4 in fine) et III de Anima text. 45 (c. 9): desiderium naturae non est frustra. Codd. VX in vanum loco frustra.Aristotle, On the Heavens I, text 32 (c. 4 at the end), and On the Soul III, text 45 (c. 9): "The desire of nature is not in vain." Codices VX read in vanum instead of frustra.