Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
Articulus II. De immutabilitate Dei.
Consequenter secundo loco est quaestio de secunda proprietate divini esse, scilicet immutabilitate. De qua duo quaeruntur:
Primo quaeritur, utrum immutabilitas sit in Deo.
Secundo, utrum sit Dei proprietas.
Quaestio I. Utrum Deus sit immutabilis.
Quod immutabilitas sit in Deo, ostenditur hoc modo.
1. Omnis mutatio aut est secundum substantiam, aut secundum accidens1; sed Deus non mutatur secundum substantiam, quia omne tale est corruptibile, Deus autem sive divina substantia, cum non habeat principium, est incorruptibilis: ergo etc.
2. Item, nec secundum accidens, quia in Deo non est accidens: ergo nulla in eo est mutatio.
3. Item, omne quod mutatur, per prius est in potentia quam in actu2, et in tali differt actus a potentia; sed Deus est purus actus: ergo nullo modo mutatur.
4. Item, fiat deductio Richardi3: «Omnis mutatio aut est de statu in statum meliorem, aut de statu in statum deteriorem, aut de statu in statum priori aequalem»; sed nullo istorum modorum mutatur divina natura — quia non in meliorem, quia verissime est; non in deteriorem, quia a semetipsa est; non in aequalem, quia perfecta est: ergo nullo modo convenit divino esse mutabilitas.
Contra:
1. Sapientiae septimo4: Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est sapientia: ergo etc. Si dicatur, quod sapientia dicitur mobilis per causam, eo quod facit alia moveri; contra: nihil dat quod non habet; sed Deus dat omnibus motum: ergo motus vel mutatio maxime est in Deo.
2. Item, omne quod nunc est aliquid, quod non prius, est mutatum; sed Filius Dei est homo, ab aeterno autem non fuit homo: ergo est mutatus. Si dicas, quod homo praedicatur de Filio Dei non per inhaerentiam, sed per unionem — et unio est relatio, et relatio advenit sine mutatione, ut de nummo fit pretium, ut dicit Augustinus in quinto de Trinitate5; contra: Ambrosius6 ita arguit contra haereticum, qui posuit Filium ex tempore genitum a Patre: quia si hoc, tunc Pater factus est de non-Patre Pater, ergo mutatur; ergo similiter in proposito.
3. Item, quicumque de non-agente fit agens, mutatur mutatione quae est ab otio in actum7; sed Deus de non-creante factus est creans: ergo est mutatus. Si dicas quod Deus de non-agente fit agens non propter mutationem sui, sed propter mutationem effectus producti — sicut sol de non-illuminante fit illuminans; contra: non quia creatura est, ideo Deus creat, sed quia Deus creat, creatura fit sive producitur. Per prius est ergo Deum agere, quam creaturam fieri: ergo cum posterius non sit causa prioris, non quia creatura fit de non-ente ens, Deus fit de non-creante creans, sed e converso; et ita mutatio est ratione agentis, non effectus.
4. Item, Deus aliquid vult, quod prius non voluit, quia ex tempore voluit creare, quod non voluit ab aeterno; sed quicumque vult aliquid quod non prius, mutatus est8: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod ab aeterno voluit creare mundum in illo instanti, sicut ego volo audire missam cras; contra: voluntas Dei est causa rerum proxima et immediata; sed posita causa proxima et immediata, ponitur effectus: ergo si ab aeterno voluit, ab aeterno mundus fuit.
Conclusio. Deus est omnino immutabilis, et secundum locum, quia immensus, et secundum tempus, quia aeternus, et secundum formam, quia simplex; et quia immutabilis, ideo omnia movet.
Respondeo: Dicendum quod, sicut dicit Boethius9, «Deus stabilis manens dat cuncta moveri». Unde divina essentia est immutabilis. Non enim mutatur loco, quia ubique est; non tempore, quia aeternitas simul est; non forma, quia pure actus est. Unde mutationem secundum formam tollit simplicitas, secundum tempus tollit aeternitas, secundum locum tollit immensitas.
Et ideo in Deo est summa stabilitas, et inde omnis motus causalitas; quia, sicut probat Augustinus et vult Philosophus, omnis motus procedit ab immobili: ut cum movetur manus, stat cubitus, et movetur cubitus, stante humero. Quia ergo Dei sapientia est stabilis, ideo omnia movet.
Ad argumenta contra:
Ad 1. Quod ergo obiicitur de sapientia, quod dicitur mobilis; dicendum, quod mobile dicitur active de ea, quia facit moveri, non passive, sicut sensibile de animali.
Et ad illud quod obiicitur, nihil dat alteri quod non habet; dicendum, quod tripliciter est aliquid habere, scilicet formaliter, exemplariter, causaliter; et quolibet istorum modorum quod habet dare potest. Primo autem modo non habet Deus motum, sed secundo et tertio sic.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de relatione, dicendum, quod relatio, cum dicitur de novo, de necessitate ponit mutationem in altero extremorum, nec oportet quod in utroque. Ideo ista relatio, quae est personae ad personam, ponit mutationem in altera personarum; et una mutata, mutatur et reliqua, quia eadem sunt essentia: ideo de necessitate, si de non-Patre fieret Pater, mutaretur. Relatio autem essentiae ad essentiam non de necessitate ponit mutationem nisi in altero extremorum, quia cum diversae sint essentiae, potest unum mutari, altero non permutato: et ideo in relatione ad creaturam semper intelligitur in creatura facta mutatio, non in Deo. Tamen proprie loquendo, sicut alibi patebit, Deus non refertur ad creaturam nisi secundum dici et modum loquendi.
Alia solutio. Posset tamen aliter dici, sicut supra tactum est, quod non est simile: quia relatio personalis dat personae existere, non sic autem relatio ad creaturam; et ideo sequitur: si incipit esse Pater, incipit esse; non autem sequitur: si Deus incipit esse homo, incipit esse. Et ideo bene valet argumentum Ambrosii, quod si Pater incepisset gignere, quod esset mutatus — quia incepisset esse, non quia ab uno statu in alterum mutatus esset.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quando de non-agente etc.; dicendum, quod est agens quod est sua actio, et est agens quod non est sua actio, sed actio est ab ipso. Agens quod non est sua actio sic agit, quod inter ipsum et effectum cadit medium quod disponit ipsum; et tale agens nunquam fit agens de non-agente quin mutetur, quia novum sibi advenit. Sed agens quod est sua actio agit se ipso; et ideo inter ipsum et effectum non cadit aliquod medium ipsum disponens; et ideo cum de non-agente fit agens, quia nihil novum sibi accidit, ideo non mutatur. Tale agens Deus est.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de voluntate, dicendum, quod causa proxima et immediata dicitur tripliciter: aut respectu substantiae, aut dispositionis, aut actus. Respectu substantiae, inter quam et effectum non cadit alia substantia media causans; respectu dispositionis, cui non additur nova dispositio ad effectum producendum; respectu actus, quando actui coniungitur. Dico ergo, quod Dei voluntas fuit causa proxima et immediata ab aeterno respectu substantiae et dispositionis, sed non respectu actus; quia actui non coniungitur voluntas nisi pro tempore in quo vult agere, ut patet, cum dicitur volo cras legere: voluntas non copulatur actui nisi pro tempore crastino.
I. Quoad diversas species mutationis et immutabilitatis cfr. q. seq., et quoad solut. ad 1. S. Thom., S. Th. I, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2.
II. Immutabilitas Dei iam in Nicaeno Concilio definita est. Cfr. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 4, m. 1, a. 2. — Scotus, hic q. 5; Report., hic q. 2; de rerum principio q. 5. — S. Thom., hic q. 3, a. 1; S. Th. loc. cit. — B. Albert, hic a. 16 seqq.; Summa p. I, tr. 4, q. 21, mm. 1–2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4, a. 1. — Aegidius R., hic 3. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. q.; Summa a. 30. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. — Biel, hic q. 7.
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Article II. On the unchangeableness of God.
Then, in the second place, is the question concerning the second property of the divine being — namely unchangeableness. Two questions are asked about it:
First, whether unchangeableness is in God.
Second, whether it is a property of God.
Question I. Whether God is unchangeable.
That unchangeableness is in God is shown thus.
1. Every change is either according to substance or according to accident1; but God is not changed according to substance, because everything of that kind is corruptible, whereas God or the divine substance, since He has no principle, is incorruptible: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, nor according to accident, since there is no accident in God: therefore no change in Him.
3. Likewise, everything that is changed is prior in potency to being in act2, and in such a thing act differs from potency; but God is pure act: therefore He is in no way changed.
4. Likewise, let Richard's deduction be made3: "Every change is either from a state to a better state, or from a state to a worse state, or from a state to a state equal to the prior one"; but the divine nature is changed by none of these modes — not into a better, since it most truly is; not into a worse, since it is from itself; not into an equal, since it is perfect: therefore in no way does changeableness belong to the divine being.
On the contrary:
1. Wisdom 74: "Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things": therefore etc. If it be said that wisdom is called mobile by cause, inasmuch as it causes other things to be moved; against this: nothing gives what it does not have; but God gives motion to all things: therefore motion or change is most of all in God.
2. Likewise, everything which now is something which it was not before, is changed; but the Son of God is man, and from eternity He was not man: therefore He is changed. If you say that man is predicated of the Son of God not by inherence but by union — and union is a relation, and relation comes in without a change, as price comes from a coin, as Augustine says in the fifth book On the Trinity5; against this: Ambrose6 argues thus against the heretic who held that the Son was begotten from the Father in time: if this, then the Father was made Father from not-Father, therefore He is changed; therefore likewise in the present case.
3. Likewise, whoever from non-agent becomes agent is changed by the change which is from rest into act7; but God from non-creator has become creator: therefore He is changed. If you say that God from non-agent becomes agent not on account of a change in Himself but on account of a change in the effect produced — as the sun from non-illuminating becomes illuminating; against this: it is not because the creature exists that God creates, but because God creates that the creature comes to be or is produced. God's acting is therefore prior to the creature's coming to be: therefore since the posterior is not the cause of the prior, it is not the case that, because the creature comes to be a being from a non-being, God comes to be a creator from a non-creator, but the reverse; and thus the change is by reason of the agent, not of the effect.
4. Likewise, God wills something which He did not previously will, since He willed in time to create what He did not will from eternity; but whoever wills something that he did not previously, is changed8: therefore etc. If you say that He willed from eternity to create the world at that instant, as I will to hear mass tomorrow; against this: the will of God is the proximate and immediate cause of things; but once a proximate and immediate cause is posited, the effect is posited: therefore if He willed from eternity, the world was from eternity.
Conclusion. God is altogether unchangeable — both in place, because He is immense; in time, because eternal; in form, because simple; and because unchangeable, therefore He moves all things.
I respond: It must be said, as Boethius says9, that "God, remaining stable, gives all things to be moved." Hence the divine essence is unchangeable. For He is not changed in place, since He is everywhere; not in time, since eternity is all at once; not in form, since He is purely act. Hence change according to form is taken away by simplicity; according to time, by eternity; according to place, by immensity.
And therefore in God is the highest stability, and from Him is all causality of motion; for, as Augustine proves and the Philosopher holds, every motion proceeds from what is immobile: as when the hand is moved, the elbow stands, and the elbow is moved, the shoulder standing. Since therefore God's wisdom is stable, He moves all things.
To the arguments for the contrary:
To 1. As for the objection about wisdom being called mobile, it must be said that mobile is said of it actively, since it makes things to be moved — not passively, as sensible is said of an animal.
And to the objection that nothing gives to another what it does not have, it must be said that there are three ways of having something: formally, exemplarily, causally; and in any of these modes what one has, one can give. In the first way God does not have motion, but in the second and third He does.
To 2. As for the objection about relation, it must be said that a relation, when it is said de novo, necessarily posits change in one of the extremes, though not necessarily in both. Hence the relation which is person to person posits change in one of the persons — and when one is changed, the other also is changed, since they are of the same essence: hence necessarily, if from non-Father were made a Father, He would be changed. But the relation of essence to essence does not necessarily posit change except in one of the extremes, since, different essences being posited, one can be changed, the other not altered: and therefore in relation to a creature, the change is always understood to be in the creature, not in God. Nevertheless, properly speaking (as will appear elsewhere), God is not referred to the creature except according to predication (secundum dici) and mode of speaking.
Alternative solution. It could, however, be said otherwise, as was touched on above, that the case is not alike: for a personal relation gives the person existence, whereas a relation to a creature does not. And therefore it follows: if He begins to be Father, He begins to be; but it does not follow: if God begins to be man, He begins to be. And therefore Ambrose's argument is valid: if the Father had begun to beget, He would have been changed — because He would have begun to be, not because He would have been changed from one state to another.
To 3. To the objection when from non-agent etc., it must be said that there is an agent which is its own action, and an agent which is not its own action, but whose action is from it. The agent which is not its own action acts in such a way that between it and the effect there falls a means which disposes it; and such an agent never becomes an agent from a non-agent without being changed, because something new comes upon it. But the agent which is its own action acts by itself; and therefore between it and the effect no intermediary disposing it falls; and therefore when from non-agent it becomes agent, since nothing new comes upon it, it is not changed. Such an agent is God.
To 4. To the objection about the will, it must be said that proximate and immediate cause is said in three ways: with respect to substance, or disposition, or act. With respect to substance — between which and the effect no other substance falls as a causing intermediary; with respect to disposition — to which no new disposition is added for producing the effect; with respect to act — when it is conjoined to the act. I say, therefore, that the will of God was the proximate and immediate cause from eternity with respect to substance and disposition, but not with respect to act; since the will is conjoined to the act only for the time in which it wills to act — as is clear when one says "I will to read tomorrow": the will is not coupled to the act except for the morrow.
I. Regarding the various species of change and unchangeableness, cf. the following question, and regarding the solution to 1, St. Thomas, S. Th. I, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2.
II. The unchangeableness of God was already defined in the Council of Nicaea. Cf. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 4, m. 1, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. 5; Reportata, here q. 2; On the Principle of Things q. 5. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1; S. Th. loc. cit. — B. Albert, here a. 16 ff.; Summa p. I, tr. 4, q. 21, mm. 1–2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 4, a. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 3rd principale q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following q.; Summa a. 30. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4. — Biel, here q. 7.
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- Vide Aristot., V Phys. text. 1 seqq. ac XI Metaph. c. 10 (X, c. 11).See Aristotle, Physics V, text 1 ff., and Metaphysics XI, c. 10 (X, c. 11).
- Aristot., XII Metaph. text. 8 (XI, c. 2): Omne motum ex potentia ente in actu ens.Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, text 8 (XI, c. 2): "Everything that is moved is from something existing in potency to something existing in act."
- Richardus de S. Victore, II de Trinitate c. 3: Sciendum itaque, quia omnis mutatio est aut de statu in statum meliorem, aut de statu in statum deteriorem, aut de statu in statum priori aequalem; ubi autem nihil horum esse potest, vera incommutabilitas inest.Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity II, c. 3: "It must be understood that every change is either from a state to a better state, or from a state to a worse state, or from a state to a state equal to the prior one; but where none of these can occur, there is true unchangeableness."
- Sap. 7, 24: Omnibus enim mobilibus mobilior est sapientia.Wisdom 7:24: "For wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things."
- August., V de Trin. c. 16, n. 17: Nummus autem cum dicitur pretium, relative dicitur, nec tamen mutatus est, cum esse coepit pretium. Nota tamen, quod relatio pretii in nummo est tantum accidentalis, relatio vero quae est in unione hypostatica est substantialis. Explicationem huius exempli vide infra d. 30, dub. 3.Augustine, On the Trinity V, c. 16, n. 17: "A coin, when it is called a 'price,' is so called relatively; yet it has not been changed, though it has begun to be a price." Note, however, that the relation of "price" in a coin is only accidental, whereas the relation which is in the hypostatic union is substantial. For the explanation of this example, see below d. 30, dub. 3.
- Ambros., I de Fide c. 9: Nam si Pater esse coepit, Deus ergo primo erat, postea Pater factus est.Ambrose, On the Faith I, c. 9: "For if the Father began to be, then He was first God, and afterwards made Father."
- Cfr. Aristot., VIII Phys. text. 7, et II de Anima text. 43 (c. 4), ubi sic: Faber autem mutatur solum in actum ex otio.Cf. Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 7, and On the Soul II, text 43 (c. 4), where he says: "But the craftsman is changed only from rest into act."
- Averroes in libro Destructio Destructionum, disput. 1, dub. 1, et in Commentario super VIII Physic. text. 15, ex hac propositione impossibilitatem creationis deducere conatur.Averroes, in his Destruction of the Destruction, disputation 1, doubt 1, and in his Commentary on Physics VIII, text 15, tries to deduce from this proposition the impossibility of creation.
- Boeth., III de Consolatione, Metrum 9: Stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri.Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy III, Meter 9: "Abiding stable, You give all things to be moved."