Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
Quaestio II. Utrum summa simplicitas soli Deo conveniat.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum simplicitas sit Dei proprietas. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.
1. Nulla creatura est actus purus, quia in omni creatura, ut dicit Boethius1, differt quo est et quod est; ergo in omni creatura est actus cum possibili; sed omnis talis habet in se multiformitatem et caret simplicitate: ergo etc.
2. Item, omnis creatura habet esse finitum et limitatum: ergo habet esse arctatum; sed ubicumque est esse limitatum, est ibi aliquid quod contrahit, et aliquid quod contrahitur, et in omni tali est compositio et differentia: ergo omnis creatura est composita: ergo nulla simplex.
3. Item, omnis creatura habet esse datum aliunde, ergo habet esse aliunde acceptum, ergo nulla creatura est suum esse, ergo in omni creatura est dependentia sive differentia; sed nullum tale simpliciter simplex: ergo etc.
4. Item, omne quod est post primam unitatem deficit ab illa, ergo statim cadit in dualitatem, sicut dicit Dionysius2, quod post monadem dyas est: sed omnis creatura est a prima unitate: ergo omnis creatura est ab illa deficiens: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. «Ab uno non procedit nisi unum»3, et a vero non procedit nisi verum; sed unitas et simplicitas eandem rationem habent in Deo: ergo sicut ab uno unum, ita a simplici simplex.
2. Item, videtur specialiter quod simplicitas sit in creaturis, quia simplex est quod non habet partem; sed punctus non habet partem, quia ita definitur: Punctus est, cuius pars non est4: ergo etc.
3. Item, omne illud, ante quod non est aliud, est simplex; quia si compositum est, necessario habet ante se aliud; sed ens est primum, sicut dicit auctor de Causis5: «Prima rerum creatarum est esse»: ergo etc.
4. Item, omne illud est simplex, in quo stat resolutio; sed resolutio stat in principiis, quae sunt materia et forma, quia materia ulterius non resolvitur, cum sit status in causis (alioquin esset ire in infinitum): ergo cum resolutio stet in creato, aliquid creatum est simplex. Si tu dicas, quod principia non habent omnimodam simplicitatem, quia quamvis non componantur ex aliis, tamen componuntur aliis; contra: hoc non videtur facere contra simplicitatem, quod componatur alii. Nam quod aliquid non sit componibile alii non facit aliquam simplicitatem, cum ista proprietas sit in individuis completis, quae maxime sunt composita: ergo hoc quod dico componibile aliis non tollit ab eis simplicitatem, et sic etc.
Conclusio. Deum solum esse summe simplicem duplici modo probatur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod simplicitas essentiae privat compositionem et privat essentialem differentiam sive multiplicitatem. Unde simplex est quod non habet compositionem partium nec multiplicitatem actionum sive formarum. In solo autem Deo est privatio compositionis et differentiae sive multiplicitatis: ideo simplicitas in solo Deo est essentialiter.
Unde notandum, quod multiplex est compositio:
(a) Una compositio est ex partibus essentialibus; et haec est in omnibus per se entibus6.
(b) Alia est ex partibus integrantibus; et haec est in omnibus corporibus.
(c) Tertia est ex partibus dissimilibus sive repugnantibus; et haec est in omnibus animatis et viventibus.
Unde in omni substantia per se ente, quae proprie dicitur creatura, est compositio — quia omnis creatura aut est corporalis, aut spiritualis, aut composita ex utroque.
Similiter est considerare triplicem differentiam in creaturis:
(a) Prima est substantiae, virtutis et operationis, sive substantiae et accidentis.
(b) Secunda est differentia suppositi et essentiae.
(c) Tertia est differentia entis et esse.
Prima differentia est rei prout est agens; secunda, prout est ens in genere; tertia, prout est ens in se.
Prima differentia est in omni subiecto, quoniam omne subiectum habet esse mixtum; ideo non agit ex se toto, et ideo differt in eo quo agit et quod agit, et actio sive subiectum et proprietas.
Secunda differentia est in omni individuo, quia omne individuum habet esse limitatum; et ideo in aliquo convenit, in aliquo differt cum alio, et ideo in omni individuo differt essentia et suppositum — multiplicatur enim essentia in suppositis.
Tertia differentia est in omni creato et concreato7: quia enim omne quod est praeter Deum accipit esse aliunde (sive principium sit, sive principiatum), ideo nihil est suum esse, sicut lux non est suum lucere.
Si ergo dicatur simplicitas per privationem compositionis, sic proprium est solius Dei in ratione substantiae, quia nulla alia substantia est quae non habet compositionem ex possibili et actuali saltem.
Si autem simplicitas dicat privationem essentialis differentiae et dependentiae, ita quod in essentia nulla sit diversitas nec dependentia, est proprium Dei in ratione entis, quia nullum aliud ens est in quo non cadat aliqua diversitas vel dependentia.
Epilogus. Concedendum ergo est, quod simplicitas est Dei proprium, ut visum est. Creaturae autem compositae sunt nec vere simplices — quia habent esse mixtum ex actu et potentia, quia habent esse limitatum et ita in genere et specie per additionem contractum, quia habent esse aliunde datum, quia habent esse post Deum unum a quo deficiunt; et ita cadunt in compositionem.
Alius modus. Aliter potest dici et brevius, quod simplex dicitur per privationem compositionis. Sed notandum, quod compositio dicitur dupliciter: uno modo alicuius ex aliquibus; alio modo, qua aliquid dicitur componi alii.
Si ergo simplicitas privet compositionem ex aliis, sic convenit etiam creatis — utpote primis principiis, quae non componuntur ex aliis. Si autem privet compositionem cum aliis et ex aliis, sic solius Dei est. Omnis enim creatura aut est ens per se et in se, et ita composita ex aliis; aut est ens cum alio et in alio, et ita alii composita. Et iterum omne creatum aut est principium (et ita componibile alii), aut principiatum (et sic compositum ex aliis); et sic accipitur simplicitas, prout est rei proprietas, per privationem, videlicet utriusque compositionis.
Ad argumenta contra:
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod ab uno non est nisi unum etc.; dicendum, quod simplex non est conditio generalis entis sicut unum. Nam simplicitas dicit modum unitatis nobilissimum, quem Deus nulli communicat creaturae; quia creatura non potest recipere [talem modum], cum esse eius sit limitatum, sit mixtum, sit etiam esse dependens et aliunde datum.
Ad 2, 3, 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de simplicitate puncti et entis et principii, dicendum, quod ibi est simplicitas per privationem compositionis ex aliis, non autem prout simplicitas dicit indifferentiam omnimodam. In omnibus enim, ut dictum est, cadit aliqua differentia et dependentia: quamvis enim non sint composita, tamen eorum esse dependet a composito sive compositione.
Unde bene concedendum est illud quod ultimo dicebatur: quod illud derogat simplicitati rei, quod sit alteri componibilis — in quantum simplicitas privat multiplicitatem et differentiam in re simplici, quamvis non deroget in quantum privat compositionem ex aliis. Omnis enim dependentia facit ipsum quod dependet a summa simplicitate et indifferentia recedere. Solus autem Deus est independens. Omnia autem alia sunt dependentia — sive comparatione ad principia ex quibus sunt, sive unum principium componens complicetur ad aliud, sive esse dependens comparatione ad Deum sive ab ipso Deo. Nihil autem quod dependet est sua dependentia: ideo nihil tale est summe simplex, quia omne simplicissimum est absolutissimum8.
I. In responsione dicitur, quod compositio ex partibus essentialibus (scil. materia et forma) est «in omnibus per se entibus». His verbis S. Bonav. tangit illam opinionem quod etiam in Angelis sit aliquo modo spiritualis materia et forma. Hic modus loquendi et ante et post S. Thomam in scholis fuit receptus et approbatus; nunc vero est obsoletus, immo multis immerito est lapis offensionis. Quo sensu haec locutio ab ipso S. Bonav., Alex. Hal. et aliis multis intellecta sit, alibi dicetur; cfr. interim II. Sent. d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, et d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. — Alex. Hal., Summa p. II, q. 61, m. 1; ibid. q. 20, m. 2, §1.
II. Duae exhibentur quaestionis solutiones. In prima enumerantur quinque genera compositionis; aliud sextum genus, quod est ex genere et differentia, infra (q. 4 huius dist.) specialiter explicatur. Secundum modum dicendi S. Doctor declarat veriorem, cui consentit S. Thom., S. Th. I, q. 3, aa. 7 et 8.
III. Celebris est distinctio inter quod est et quo est, sive inter essentiam et existentiam. Sumpta est haec distinctio ex Boethii libro de Hebdomadibus, vel potius ex commentario quem Gilbertus Porretanus in hoc opusculum scripsit. Deus quidem est et sua essentia et suum esse, ut dicit sententia communis, sed in creatura esse (existentia) non est id quod existit, sed quo essentia existit. Haec distinctio ab omnibus admittitur, sed de natura eiusdem fuit et est controversia. Nominales volunt hanc distinctionem esse solius rationis; pluralitas Thomistarum, eam esse realem; Scotus vero (II. Sent. d. 1, q. 2, et d. 3, q. 3) tenet hic suam distinctionem formalem. Seraphicus Doctor in his duabus quaestionibus naturam huius distinctionis explicite non determinat, tamen verba eius valde conveniunt cum verbis S. Thomae.
IV. Tangitur in hac et sequenti quaestione alia celebris controversia de distinctione quae est in Deo inter essentiam et attributa et inter ipsa attributa — utrum scil. haec sit solummodo rationis ratiocinantis, ut dicunt Nominales; an sit formalis in sensu Scoti (hic q. 4); an virtualis sive fundamentalis, ut vult S. Thom. (I. Sent. d. 2, q. unic., aa. 2 et 3; S. Th. I, q. 13, a. 4). Sententiae Angelici S. Bonav. quoad distinctionem inter essentiam divinam et attributa absoluta omnino consentit.
V. In conclusione principali conveniunt omnes: Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 5, m. 3; p. II, q. 12 per totam. — Scotus, hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 5, aa. 1 et 2; S. Th. I, q. 3, aa. 7, 8. — B. Albert, hic a. 14. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6, a. 1. — Richard a Med., hic a. 3, q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2 princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7. — Biel, hic q. 7, dub. 3.
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Question II. Whether supreme simplicity belongs to God alone.
Secondly it is asked, whether simplicity is a property of God. And that it is, so it seems thus.
1. No creature is pure act, since in every creature, as Boethius says1, "that by which it is" (quo est) differs from "that which is" (quod est); therefore in every creature is act with the possible; but every such has in itself multiformity and lacks simplicity: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, every creature has finite and limited being: therefore has constricted being; but wherever being is limited, there is something that contracts and something that is contracted, and in every such there is composition and difference: therefore every creature is composite: therefore none is simple.
3. Likewise, every creature has being given from elsewhere, therefore has being received from elsewhere, therefore no creature is its own being, therefore in every creature there is dependence or difference; but no such is simpliciter simple: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, everything that is after the first unity falls short of it, therefore immediately falls into duality — as Dionysius says2 that after the monad is the dyad; but every creature is from the first unity: therefore every creature falls from it: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. "From one proceeds only one"3, and from the true proceeds only the true; but unity and simplicity have the same character in God: therefore as from the one comes one, so from the simple comes the simple.
2. Likewise, it seems particularly that simplicity is in creatures, since that is simple which has no part; but a point has no part, since it is so defined: "A point is that of which there is no part"4: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, everything before which nothing else is, is simple; because if it is composite, it necessarily has something else before it; but being is first, as the author of the Liber de Causis5 says: "The first of created things is being": therefore etc.
4. Likewise, everything in which resolution halts is simple; but resolution halts in principles, which are matter and form — since matter is not further resolved, being the stopping-point in causes (otherwise there would be an infinite regress): therefore since resolution halts in the created, some created thing is simple. If you say that principles do not have unqualified simplicity, since though they are not composed of other things, yet they are composed with other things; against this: that [a thing] is composable with another does not seem to count against simplicity. For that something is not composable with another does not make any simplicity, since this property is in complete individuals, which are supremely composed: therefore this of which I speak, composable with another, does not take simplicity away from them, and thus etc.
Conclusion. That God alone is supremely simple is proved in two ways.
I respond: It must be said that simplicity of essence privates composition and privates essential difference or multiplicity. Hence the simple is that which has neither composition of parts nor multiplicity of acts or of forms. But in God alone is there privation of composition and of difference or multiplicity: therefore simplicity is essentially in God alone.
Hence it should be noted that composition is manifold:
(a) One composition is from essential parts; and this is in all per se beings6.
(b) Another is from integrating parts; and this is in all bodies.
(c) The third is from dissimilar or conflicting parts; and this is in all animate and living beings.
Hence in every substance per se being, which is properly called a creature, there is composition — since every creature is either corporeal, or spiritual, or composite of both.
Likewise there is a threefold difference to be considered in creatures:
(a) The first is of substance, power, and operation — or of substance and accident.
(b) The second is the difference of supposit and essence.
(c) The third is the difference of being and esse.
The first difference [regards] a thing as agent; the second, as a being in a genus; the third, as a being in itself.
The first difference is in every subject, since every subject has mixed being; therefore it does not act from its whole self, and therefore that by which it acts and that which acts differ, as do the action or subject and property.
The second difference is in every individual, because every individual has limited being; and therefore it agrees in something, differs in something with another — and so in every individual essence and supposit differ; for essence is multiplied in supposits.
The third difference is in every created and concreated7: for since everything beyond God receives being from elsewhere (whether it be a principle or principled), therefore nothing is its own being, as light is not its own shining.
If, therefore, simplicity is taken by privation of composition, it is proper to God alone in the notion of substance, since there is no other substance that does not have composition at least of possible and actual.
But if simplicity signifies the privation of essential difference and dependence — so that in the essence there is no diversity nor dependence — it is proper to God in the notion of being, since there is no other being in which some diversity or dependence does not fall.
Epilogue. It must therefore be granted that simplicity is proper to God, as has been seen. But creatures are composite and not truly simple — because they have being mixed from act and potency; because they have limited being and thus in genus and species contracted by addition; because they have being given from elsewhere; because they have being after the one God from whom they fall short; and thus they fall into composition.
Another mode. It can be said otherwise and more briefly, that the simple is said by privation of composition. But it should be noted that composition is said in two ways: in one way, of something from some things; in another, by which something is said to be composed with another.
If, therefore, simplicity privates composition from other things, it befits also created things — namely, the first principles, which are not composed from others. But if it privates composition with others and from others, it is of God alone. For every creature is either a being per se and in itself, and so composed from others; or is a being with another and in another, and so composed with another. And again every created thing is either a principle (and so composable with another), or principled (and so composed from others); and thus simplicity is taken, as it is a property of a thing, by privation — namely, of both compositions.
To the arguments for the contrary:
To 1. As for the objection that from one comes only one, etc.; it must be said that simple is not a general condition of being as one is. For simplicity signifies the most noble mode of unity, which God communicates to no creature; since a creature cannot receive [such a mode], its being being limited, mixed, and also dependent and given from elsewhere.
To 2, 3, 4. As for the objection about the simplicity of the point, being, and principle, it must be said that there [in such things] is simplicity by privation of composition from others, but not insofar as simplicity signifies complete indifference. For in all [these], as has been said, some difference and dependence falls: for though they are not composite, yet their being depends on a composite or on composition.
Hence it should well be granted what was said last — that what derogates from the simplicity of a thing is that it is composable with another — insofar as simplicity privates multiplicity and difference in the simple thing, though it does not derogate [from simplicity] insofar as simplicity privates composition from other things. For every dependence makes that which depends recede from supreme simplicity and indifference. But only God is independent. All else is dependent — either by comparison to the principles from which they are, or in that one composing principle is folded to another, or in that its being is dependent in comparison to God or from God himself. But nothing that depends is its own dependence: therefore nothing such is supremely simple, since every most-simple is most-absolute8.
I. In the response it is said that composition from essential parts (namely, matter and form) is "in all per se beings". By these words St. Bonaventure touches on that opinion that even in the Angels there is in some way spiritual matter and form. This mode of speaking was received and approved in the schools both before and after St. Thomas; now, however, it is obsolete and indeed a stumbling block to many — undeservedly. In what sense this expression was understood by St. Bonaventure himself, by Alex. of Hales, and by many others, will be said elsewhere; cf. in the meantime II. Sent. d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. — Alex. Hal., Summa p. II, q. 61, m. 1; ibid. q. 20, m. 2, §1.
II. Two solutions of the question are given. In the first, five kinds of composition are enumerated; another sixth kind, which is from genus and difference, is specifically explained below (q. 4 of this distinction). The second mode of speaking the holy Doctor declares the truer, and St. Thomas agrees, S. Th. I, q. 3, aa. 7 and 8.
III. Famous is the distinction between that which is (quod est) and that by which it is (quo est) — or between essence and existence. This distinction is taken from Boethius's On the Hebdomads, or rather from the commentary which Gilbert Porretanus wrote on that work. God indeed is His essence and His being, as the common opinion says, but in a creature being (existence) is not that which exists, but that by which the essence exists. This distinction is admitted by all, but concerning its nature there has been and is controversy. The Nominalists hold that this distinction is only of reason; the majority of the Thomists, that it is real; Scotus (II. Sent. d. 1, q. 2, and d. 3, q. 3) here maintains his formal distinction. The Seraphic Doctor in these two questions does not explicitly determine the nature of this distinction, yet his words agree greatly with those of St. Thomas.
IV. Touched on in this and the following question is another famous controversy concerning the distinction in God between essence and attributes and among the attributes themselves — whether it be solely of reason reasoning, as the Nominalists say; or formal in Scotus's sense (here q. 4); or virtual or fundamental, as St. Thomas will have it (I. Sent. d. 2, q. unic., aa. 2, 3; S. Th. I, q. 13, a. 4). To the opinion of the Angelic Doctor concerning the distinction between the divine essence and the absolute attributes, St. Bonaventure wholly consents.
V. On the principal conclusion all agree: Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 5, m. 3; p. II, q. 12 per totam. — Scotus, here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 5, aa. 1, 2; S. Th. I, q. 3, aa. 7, 8. — B. Albert, here a. 14. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 6, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 7. — Biel, here q. 7, dub. 3.
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- Boeth., de Hebdomadibus et de Trinitate c. 2. Vide supra d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, fundam. 3.Boethius, On the Hebdomads and On the Trinity c. 2. See above d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, fundam. 3.
- Dionys., de Divinis Nominibus cc. 1 et 13.Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names cc. 1 and 13.
- Avicenna, IX Metaph. c. 2 seqq. Cfr. etiam Averroes, Comment. in XII Metaph. text. 44. Allegatur etiam II de Gener. et corrupt. text. 56 (c. 10), ubi Aristot. ait: Idem enim et similiter se habens semper idem natum est facere.Avicenna, Metaphysics IX, c. 2 ff. Cf. also Averroes, Commentary on Metaphysics XII, text 44. It is also cited from Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 56 (c. 10), where he says: "For the same thing, behaving in the same way, is naturally fitted always to produce the same."
- Euclid., I Geometriae, iuxta translationem Boethii: Punctus est, cuius pars nulla est.Euclid, Elements I, in Boethius's translation: "A point is that of which there is no part."
- Liber de Causis, prop. 4.Book of Causes, proposition 4.
- Ed. 1 legit accidentium pro actionum, cum qua lectione concordant verba Magistri hic c. 3 in initio. Pro lectione mss. allegari potest Alanus ab Insulis, Regulae theologicae, reg. 1, ubi praeter pluralitatem partium et proprietatum affert pluralitatem effectuum.Edition 1 reads accidentium for actionum — with which reading the Master's words here c. 3 at the beginning agree. In favor of the manuscript reading, Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, Rule 1, can be cited, where besides the plurality of parts and properties he adduces also the plurality of effects.
- Substantiae sive supposita dicuntur creari; accidentia et annexa, inter quae est ipsa creatio passive sumta, dicuntur concreari. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1, p. I, a. 3, q. 2.Substances or supposits are said to be created; accidents and appendages (among which is creation taken passively) are said to be con-created. Cf. II. Sent. d. 1, p. I, a. 3, q. 2.
- Verba omne simplicissimum est absolutissimum exprimunt ultimum terminum rationis S. Doctoris: simplicitas suprema consistit in independentia absoluta, quae soli Deo competit.The words "every most-simple is most-absolute" express the final term of the holy Doctor's reasoning: supreme simplicity consists in absolute independence, which belongs to God alone.