Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
Quaestio III. Utrum anima rationalis sit tota in toto corpore, et tota in qualibet parte ipsius.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum anima rationalis sit in toto corpore, ita quod in qualibet parte. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Augustinus1 dicit, quod sicut Deus est in maiori mundo, sic anima in minori: sed Deus sic est in maiori, quod in qualibet parte totus: ergo anima sic est in minori, scilicet in corpore.
2. Item, quod dat esse toti et partibus unitur toti et partibus secundum essentiam, quia forma per sui essentiam dat esse, et hoc non nisi ei cui essentialiter unitur2; sed anima dat esse toti corpori et omnibus partibus: ergo etc.
3. Item, in oculo est videre, est sentire, est vivere. Quaero ergo, utrum sint haec unus actus vel differentes. Non unus; hoc constat, quia privato visu, adhuc sentit per tactum; privato sensu, adhuc vivit, sicut in paralytico. Cum ergo vivere sit a substantia, videre a potentia, in oculo est anima secundum substantiam; eadem ratione potest probari et in omnibus partibus esse.
4. Item, anima operatur in toto corpore, ergo in toto corpore est per potentiam; sed potentia animae simplex est: ergo si potentia una est in manu et pede, idem est in diversis partibus; sed non est simplicior potentia quam substantia: ergo etc.
5. Item, anima est in corpore: aut ergo est in qualibet parte, aut in una determinate, aut in puncto. Si in qualibet parte, habeo propositum. Si in una, cum illa habeat plures partes, et anima sit simplex, erit in pluribus partibus: ergo non est inconveniens animam esse in pluribus partibus. Sed qua ratione est in partibus partis, eadem ratione est in partibus totius. Si est in puncto corporis — ergo cum punctus non habeat proportionem ad totum corpus, anima est improportionabilis toti corpori: ergo non potest esse perfectio, cum proportio sit perfectionis ad perfectibile. Similiter, «punctus est substantia posita» sive habens positionem, ergo anima habet situm in corpore; sed nulla forma situalis est motor sufficiens: ergo etc.
Sed contra:
1. Forma quae est in toto et in partibus una, denominat partes et totum ratione consimili3. Unde quaelibet pars ignis est ignis: ergo si anima est in qualibet parte, tunc quaelibet pars animalis est animal sicut totum — cum quaelibet pars sit substantia animata sensibilis.
2. Item, existentia animae rationalis non dependet ab aliqua parte corporis, cum sit fixa in se: ergo non est in qualibet [parte].
3. Item, operatio eius non dependet ab aliqua parte corporis nec alicui communicatur: ergo in nulla parte corporis est — nec in quantum perfectio, nec in quantum motor. Unde Philosophus4 dicit, quod «anima nullius corporis est actus» — id est nullius partis corporis, sed in quo est, est sicut actus.
4. Item, corpus organicum est diversarum rationum in partibus et toto, ergo habet diversam perfectionem: ergo cum anima perficiat totum quantum ad essentiam, perficit partes quantum ad potentiam: ergo anima rationalis non est in partibus nisi solum quantum ad rationem potentiae; et hoc etiam dicit Philosophus5: «Sicut anima ad corpus, sic partes animae ad partes corporis».
5. Item, si anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis, ergo tota est in manu; sed quando aliquod totum est in aliquo, movetur illo moto: ergo mota manu, movetur anima; et similiter, manu quiescente, quiescit: ergo cum manus una possit moveri, altera existente in quiete, anima una et eadem numero simul quiescit et movetur secundum idem.
6. Item, si anima est in pluribus partibus tota, qua ratione in tribus, eadem ratione in pluribus, et ita in infinitis, et quantumcumque extendatur corpus: ergo anima nata est esse ubique, et ita videtur quod anima non sit substantia limitata, sed infinita.
7. Item, si tota anima est in manu sicut in aliis partibus — ergo cum vita sit ab anima, non magis recipit motum et sensum manus a corde, quam e converso. Hoc autem est contra omnes philosophos; et sequitur ex hoc tale inconveniens, quod, sicut laeso corde perit vita, ita laesa manu.
Conclusio. Anima rationalis est tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqui dicunt, quod anima secundum essentiam est in aliqua parte determinate, secundum potentiam vero est et influit in toto corpore — sicut aranea est in tela6. Unde dixerunt, quod est in corde, quia cor est domicilium vitae, et eius inhabitator est anima. Et ad hoc ponendum movit eos experimentum cum defectu rationis. Experimentum, quia visibiliter apparet, quod laeso corde separatur anima, et ab ipso fluit sensus et motus, et est membrum nobile existens in medio, sicut centrum corporis. Defectus rationis, quia non potuerunt intelligere, quomodo aliquid limitatum sit unum et idem totum in pluribus; et quia fides non cogit credere, et ratio non intelligit, ideo dicunt, non esse ponendum, quod sit in toto ratione cuiuslibet partis.
Sed aliorum opinio est, ut Augustini7, quod anima in qualibet parte corporis sit tota; et ad hoc ponendum movet experimentum, exemplum et rationale argumentum.
Experimentum, quia anima in partibus distantibus a corde ita cito sentit, sicut et in propinquis; item simul quasi in ictu oculi sentit laesionem in partibus distantibus, et cum anima separatur, dolor est in singulis partibus et resolutio.
Exemplum similiter movet, sicut dicit Augustinus: «Videmus enim quod uno animali perfecte sano est una sanitas in singulis partibus, nec maior in maiori nec minor in minori.» Si ergo hoc est in forma corporali, quanto magis in spirituali?
Rationis argumentum movet, quia anima est forma simplex et motor sufficiens. Quia forma totalis corporis, est in toto; quia vero simplex, non est secundum partem et partem sui; quia motor sufficiens, ideo non habet situm, et ideo nec est in puncto nec in parte determinata.
Et quia magis rationalis est opinio quae fundatur supra rationem quam quae fundatur supra defectus rationis, et quia Augustinus hoc dicit, hanc approbo tanquam meliorem.
Ad argumenta contra:
Ad 1 et 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, forma quae est in toto etc.; dicendum, quod triplex est genus formae.
(a) Est enim quaedam quae perficit et extenditur et dependet. Et haec, quia totum perficit, est in toto; quia vero extenditur, perfectionem totius communicat partibus; quia vero dependet nec agit per se, operationem totius communicat partibus — ut patet in forma ignis, quia quaelibet pars ignis est ignis et quaelibet calefacit.
(b) Est alia forma, quae perficit et dependet, sed non extenditur; et talis forma, quia totum perficit, est in toto et qualibet parte; quia vero non extenditur, ideo actum totius non attribuit partibus; quia vero dependet, operationem totius communicat partibus; et talis est anima vegetabilis et sensibilis, quia nulla pars animalis est animal, tamen quaelibet pars animalis vivit et sentit.
(c) Est iterum forma, quae totum perficit, tamen nec extenditur nec dependet quantum ad operationem; et talis, quia perfectio est, est in toto et partibus; quia vero non extenditur, perfectionem totius non communicat partibus; quia non dependet, ideo nec operationem communicat: et talis est anima rationalis, quia nulla pars hominis est homo, et nulla pars hominis intelligit. Tamen, etsi non communicet actum totius ut toti, communicat ut partibus; quia quaelibet pars est pars hominis et vivificatur a perfectione hominis; et ideo perfectio hominis est in qualibet parte.
Ad 3. Et sic patet responsio ad illud, quod nullius corporis est actus: quia nulli parti corporis communicat propriam operationem nec perfectionem totius, tamen omnes partes perficit in toto. Similiter ad aliud de forma, quia forma quae est in partibus non denominat similiter totum et partes nisi sit forma dependens et extensa; et loquor hic de forma substantiali tantum, non de accidentali.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non sunt eiusdem rationis totum et partes; dicendum, quod in partibus est considerare organizationem et complexionem. Ratione complexionis sunt uniformes toti et sunt dispositae ad idem genus vitae et perficiuntur ab uno; ratione organizationis sunt diversae et perficiuntur a potentiis.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod movetur mota manu etc.; dicendum, quod perfectio potest super totum perfectibile et quantum ad substantiam et quantum ad potentiam; et cum anima sit perfectio totius corporis, super totum potest, et ideo nullo minori quam sit totum corpus definitur eius substantia nec potentia; definitur autem corpore suo, quod perficit, et ideo corpore moto, movetur per consequens; partibus autem non definitur, quia sunt minores toto, et ita est in una, quod est extra illam. Et ideo, quia in nulla parte est definitive, non movetur ad motum alicuius partis — sicut nec Deus movetur ad motum alicuius creaturae.
Ad 6. Et per hoc patet sequens, quia totum corpus comparatur ipsi animae tanquam unus locus; et ideo in pluribus partibus non est nisi in quantum in uno loco; unde si separentur, non erit in illis. Nec sequitur ex hoc, quod sit infinita, quia «omnium natura constantium terminus est et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti», et ita corporis humani. Unde potest cogitari tam magnum corpus, quod non posset vivificari ab anima.
Ad 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod tunc una pars non recipit ab alia; dicendum, quod sicut Deus in maiore mundo immediate est in omni creatura, ipsam continens, tamen per ordinem universi influit aliquid una creatura in aliam; sic intelligendum, quod anima per sui praesentiam est in qualibet parte immediate, quam continet et conservat, non tamen omnino, sed influit in omnes partes per unam: et ideo cessante illa parte et eius influentia, perit ordo corporis essentialis, et ita anima separatur.
I. Propositio in arg. 1 ad opp. — quod forma aliqua denominat partes et totum — vera est, quando agitur de rebus organizatione carentibus, quarum partes sunt proinde omnino homogeneae; sed falsissime applicatur ad corpora organizata — sicut fit in illo sophismate Buridani ad probandum digitum hominis esse hominem. Triplici illa distinctione formarum S. Doctor ad 1 istam difficultatem iam solvit.
II. Pro intelligentia solutionis ad 5 hoc notandum: anima vocatur perfectio totius corporis et corpus perfectibile, quia secundum Aristotelem anima, ut forma substantialis, est actus corporis — unde «super totum potest», i.e. per substantiam suam potest totum corpus vivificare, et per potentiam movere. Hoc tamen non excludit quod magis influat in organa principaliora, uti explicatur in solut. ad 7. Verba «Ideo nulli minori quam sit totum corpus definitur eius substantia» sensum habent, quod anima sit in toto corpore modo definitivo, ut nunc dicitur, non circumscriptive. Esse in loco circumscriptive dicitur quando totum locatum est in toto loco, et pars locati in parte loci; quando vero aliquid determinatur quidem ad aliquem locum (ut naturaliter non possit simul esse in alio) et insuper ut sit totum in toto et totum in qualibet parte loci, tunc dicitur esse definitive in loco.
III. Circa conclusionem omnibus communem cfr. Alex. Hal., Summa p. II, q. 71. — Scotus, De rerum principio q. 12, a. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 5, a. 3; S. Th. I, q. 76, a. 8; S. c. Gent. II, c. 72. — B. Albert, hic a. 26. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6, a. 2. — Richard a Med., hic a. 4, q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7 post medium. — Biel, II Sent. d. 16, q. unic., dub. 4.
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Question III. Whether the rational soul is whole in the whole body, and whole in every part of it.
Thirdly it is asked, whether the rational soul is in the whole body so as to be in every part. And that it is, so it seems.
1. Augustine1 says that just as God is in the larger world, so the soul is in the smaller; but God is so in the larger world that He is whole in every part: therefore the soul is thus in the smaller — namely, in the body.
2. Likewise, what gives being to the whole and to the parts is united to the whole and to the parts according to essence, because a form through its essence gives being, and this only to that to which it is essentially united2; but the soul gives being to the whole body and to all the parts: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, in the eye there is seeing, sensing, living. I ask, therefore, whether these are one act or different. Not one — which is clear, since with sight taken away, [the eye] still feels by touch; with sense taken away, it still lives, as in a paralytic. Since, then, living is from the substance [of the soul], seeing from a potency, the soul is in the eye according to substance; by the same reasoning it can be proved to be in all the parts.
4. Likewise, the soul operates in the whole body, therefore it is in the whole body by potency; but the soul's potency is simple: therefore if one potency is in the hand and the foot, the same is in diverse parts; but the potency is not simpler than the substance: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, the soul is in the body: therefore either in every part, or in one determinately, or in a point. If in every part, I have what was to be proved. If in one, since that one has several parts, and the soul is simple, it will be in several parts: therefore it is not unfitting that the soul be in several parts. But by the same reasoning by which it is in the parts of a part, by the same reasoning it is in the parts of the whole. If it is in a point of the body — then since a point has no proportion to the whole body, the soul is disproportionate to the whole body: therefore it cannot be a perfection, since proportion is that of perfection to the perfectible. Likewise, "a point is a posited substance" or one having position, therefore the soul has location in the body; but no located form is a sufficient mover: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. A form which is one in the whole and in the parts names the parts and the whole by a like notion3. Hence every part of fire is fire: therefore if the soul is in every part, then every part of an animal is an animal just like the whole — since every part is an animated sensible substance.
2. Likewise, the existence of the rational soul does not depend on any part of the body, since it is fixed in itself: therefore it is not in every part.
3. Likewise, its operation does not depend on any part of the body, nor is communicated to any part: therefore in no part of the body is it — neither as perfection nor as mover. Hence the Philosopher4 says that "the soul is the act of no body" — that is, of no part of the body, but in that in which it is, it is as act.
4. Likewise, an organic body is of diverse characters in its parts and in the whole, therefore has diverse perfection: therefore since the soul perfects the whole as to essence, it perfects the parts as to potency: therefore the rational soul is in the parts only as to the character of potency; and this also the Philosopher5 says: "As the soul is to the body, so the parts of the soul to the parts of the body."
5. Likewise, if the soul is whole in every part of the body — therefore it is whole in the hand; but when any whole is in something, it is moved when that [something] is moved: therefore when the hand is moved, the soul is moved; and likewise, when the hand is at rest, it is at rest: therefore since one hand can be moved while the other is at rest, the soul one and the same in number is at once at rest and moved in the same respect.
6. Likewise, if the soul is whole in many parts, by the same reasoning by which it is in three, it is in more, and so in infinite [parts] — however much the body may be extended: therefore the soul is fitted to be everywhere, and thus it seems that the soul is not a limited substance but infinite.
7. Likewise, if the whole soul is in the hand just as in the other parts — therefore since life is from the soul, the hand no more receives motion and sense from the heart than the reverse. But this is contrary to all the philosophers; and this unfitting consequence follows: that as when the heart is injured life perishes, so also when the hand is injured.
Conclusion. The rational soul is whole in the whole body and whole in every part.
I respond: It must be said that some say that the soul, according to its essence, is in some part determinately, while according to its potency it is and flows into the whole body — like a spider in its web6. Hence they said that it is in the heart, since the heart is the dwelling-place of life, and its inhabitant is the soul. They were moved to hold this by experiment and by defect of reason. Experiment, because it is visibly apparent that when the heart is injured, the soul separates, and from it sense and motion flow, and [the heart] is a noble member situated in the middle, like the center of the body. Defect of reason, because they could not understand how anything limited could be one and the same whole in many [parts]; and since faith does not compel belief, and reason does not understand, they therefore say that it is not to be held that [the soul] is in the whole by reason of every part.
But the opinion of others, such as Augustine7, is that the soul is whole in every part of the body; and to hold this they are moved by experiment, example, and rational argument.
Experiment, because the soul senses in parts distant from the heart just as quickly as in nearby ones; likewise, as if in the twinkling of an eye it senses injury in distant parts, and when the soul separates, there is pain in each part and dissolution.
Example likewise moves them, as Augustine says: "We see that in one perfectly healthy animal there is one health in each of the parts — neither greater in the greater nor less in the less." If, then, this is so in a corporeal form, how much more in a spiritual?
Argument from reason moves them, because the soul is a simple form and a sufficient mover. Because it is the total form of the body, it is in the whole; because simple, it is not according to part and part of itself; because a sufficient mover, it has no location, and therefore is neither in a point nor in a determinate part.
And because the opinion that is founded on reason is more rational than that founded on defects of reason, and because Augustine says this, I approve this one as better.
To the arguments for the contrary:
To 1 and 2. As for the objection — a form which is in the whole etc. — it must be said that there is a threefold kind of form:
(a) There is one form which perfects and extends and depends. This, because it perfects the whole, is in the whole; because it extends, it communicates the whole's perfection to the parts; because it depends and does not act by itself, it communicates the whole's operation to the parts — as is plain in the form of fire, since every part of fire is fire and every part heats.
(b) There is another form, which perfects and depends, but does not extend; and such a form, because it perfects the whole, is in the whole and in every part; because it does not extend, it does not attribute the whole's act to the parts; because it depends, it communicates the whole's operation to the parts. And such is the vegetable and sensitive soul, since no part of an animal is an animal, yet every part of an animal lives and senses.
(c) Again, there is a form which perfects the whole, yet neither extends nor depends as to operation; and such a one, because it is a perfection, is in the whole and in the parts; because it does not extend, it does not communicate the whole's perfection to the parts; because it does not depend, neither does it communicate the operation. And such is the rational soul — since no part of a man is a man, and no part of a man understands. Yet even if it does not communicate the act of the whole as to the whole, it communicates [it] as to the parts; for every part is a part of a man and is vivified by the perfection of the man; and therefore the perfection of the man is in every part.
To 3. And thus the response is clear to what [was said], that it is the act of no body: for it communicates to no part of the body either its own operation or the whole's perfection, yet it perfects all the parts in the whole. Similarly to the other [objection] about form: for a form which is in the parts does not similarly name the whole and the parts unless it be a dependent and extended form; and I speak here of the substantial form only, not the accidental.
To 4. To the objection that the whole and the parts are not of the same character; it must be said that in the parts one must consider organization and complexion. By reason of complexion they are uniform with the whole, and are disposed to the same kind of life, and are perfected by one thing; by reason of organization they are diverse, and are perfected by potencies.
To 5. To the objection that, when the hand is moved, [the soul] is moved, etc.; it must be said that a perfection has power over the whole perfectible both as to substance and as to potency. Since the soul is the perfection of the whole body, its power extends over the whole; and therefore by nothing smaller than the whole body is its substance or potency delimited. But it is delimited by its body, which it perfects; and therefore when the body is moved, it is moved consequently. But it is not delimited by the parts, since they are smaller than the whole, and thus it is in one in such a way that it is outside that one. And therefore, because it is in no part definitively, it is not moved to the motion of any part — just as neither is God moved to the motion of any creature.
To 6. And by this the following is clear, since the whole body is compared to the soul as one place; and therefore it is not in the many parts except as in one place; hence if they are separated, it will not be in those. Nor does it follow from this that it is infinite, since "of all constituted natures there is a terminus and a ratio of magnitude and growth" — and thus of the human body. Whence a body can be thought so large that it could not be vivified by a soul.
To 7. To the objection last, that then one part does not receive from another; it must be said that just as God in the larger world is immediately in every creature, containing it — yet by the order of the universe one creature flows into another — so it must be understood that the soul by its presence is immediately in every part, which it contains and conserves; yet not altogether, but flows into all the parts through one: and therefore when that part fails and its influence [ceases], the essential order of the body perishes, and so the soul is separated.
I. The proposition in arg. 1 ad opp. — that a form names the parts and the whole — is true when one deals with things lacking organization, whose parts are entirely homogeneous; but it is most falsely applied to organized bodies — as occurs in Buridan's sophism to prove that a man's finger is a man. By that triple distinction of forms the holy Doctor has already solved this difficulty in ad 1.
II. For the understanding of the solution to 5, note this: the soul is called the perfection of the whole body, and the body the perfectible, because according to Aristotle the soul, as substantial form, is the act of the body — hence "it has power over the whole" (i.e., by its substance it can vivify the whole body, and by its potency move it). This, however, does not exclude that it flows more into the principal organs, as is explained in the solution to 7. The words "Therefore by nothing smaller than the whole body is its substance delimited" have the sense that the soul is in the whole body in the definitive mode, as it is now called, not in the circumscriptive. To be in a place circumscriptively is said when the whole located thing is in the whole place, and a part of the located thing is in a part of the place. But when something is determined to some place (so that it naturally cannot at the same time be in another), and besides is whole in the whole and whole in every part of the place, it is then said to be in the place definitively.
III. On the conclusion, which is common to all: Alex. Hal., Summa p. II, q. 71. — Scotus, On the Principle of Things q. 12, a. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 5, a. 3; S. Th. I, q. 76, a. 8; S. c. Gent. II, c. 72. — B. Albert, here a. 26. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 6, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 2. princ. q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 7 after the middle. — Biel, II Sent. d. 16, q. unic., dub. 4.
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- Pseudo-August., de Spiritu et Anima c. 13 in fine.Pseudo-Augustine, On the Spirit and the Soul c. 13 at the end.
- Cfr. Aristot., VIII Metaph. text. 15 et 16 (VII, c. 6). De proxime sequente propositione vide II de Anima text. 4 seqq. et 24 (cc. 1 et 2), ac I de Partib. animal. c. 1.Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, texts 15–16 (VII, c. 6). On the following proposition see On the Soul II, texts 4 ff. and 24 (cc. 1–2), and On the Parts of Animals I, c. 1.
- Aristot., I de Historia animal. c. 1.Aristotle, History of Animals I, c. 1.
- Aristot., II de Anima text. 11 (c. 1) et III de Anima text. 6 (c. 4).Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 11 (c. 1), and III, text 6 (c. 4).
- Aristot., II de Anima text. 9 (c. 1).Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 9 (c. 1).
- Chalcidius, in Platonis Timaeum (ed. Lipsiae 1876, cura Dr. Ioh. Wrobel, pag. 296, n. CCXX): Sicut aranea in medietate cassis omnia filorum tenet pedibus exordia, ut cum quid ex bestiolis plagas incurrerit ex quacumque parte de proximo sentiat, sic animae principale positum in media sede cordis, sensuum exordia retinere, ut cum quid nuntiabunt, de proximo recognoscat. Cfr. Greg. Nyss., de Hominis opificio c. 12.Chalcidius, on Plato's Timaeus (Leipzig 1876 ed., ed. Wrobel, p. 296, §220): "Just as a spider in the middle of its web holds with its feet all the starting-points of the threads, so that when something of the little animals strikes the mesh, it may feel it from whatever part near at hand — so the principal [seat] of the soul, placed in the middle seat of the heart, holds the starting-points of the senses, so that when they report anything, it recognizes it at hand." Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man c. 12.
- August., VI de Trin. c. 6, n. 8; de Immortalitate animae c. 16, n. 23; de Origine animae hom. (ep. 166) n. 4; contra Epist. Manichaei c. 16, n. 20. Textus de una sanitate ex de Praesentia Dei seu Epist. 187, c. 4, n. 13.Augustine, On the Trinity VI, c. 6, n. 8; On the Immortality of the Soul c. 16, n. 23; On the Origin of the Soul (Epistle 166) n. 4; Against the Letter of the Manichaean c. 16, n. 20. The text on one health from On the Presence of God (Epistle 187), c. 4, n. 13.