Dist. 8, Part 2, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Dubium I
In parte ista circa litteram incidit hic quaestio de ordine. Cum enim compositio in creatura sit ratio et causa mutationis, simplicitas est causa immutabilitatis; quia si affirmatio est causa affirmationis, et negatio causa negationis1: ergo cum causa sit ante effectum, debuit primo Magister ponere proprietatem simplicitatis.
Respondeo: Prima solutio. Dicendum, quod revera compositio secundum rationem intelligendi prior est quam mutatio; sed quoniam negationes se habent e contrario affirmationibus, hinc est quod immutabilitas est prior — ita volunt aliqui dicere.
Alia solutio. Potest tamen aliter dici et melius: quod est prius et notius nobis, et prius simpliciter2. Et quia simplicitas est maxime nobis occulta (propter hoc, quod simplex inquantum simplex habet rationem principii, et nos venimus a cognitione posterioris in cognitionem prioris), ideo prius agit de immutabilitate quam de simplicitate.
Dubium II
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit in littera: «Eademque proprie ac vere simplex, quia nec habet compositionem partium» etc. Videtur enim superflua dicere, quia simplex est cuius pars non est, sicut compositum dicitur quod habet partes.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister notificat hic simplex secundum quod est Dei proprium; et ita opponitur compositioni et multiplicitati. Quantum ergo ad privationem compositionis, dicit quod non habet multitudinem partium; quantum vero ad privationem multiplicitatis extraneae, dicit quod non habet varietatem accidentium; quantum vero ad privationem multiplicitatis intrinsecae, dicit quod non habet varietatem formarum, ut generis, speciei et differentiae; et hoc modo simplex est simplex vere et proprie, quod solius Dei est.
Dubium III
Item quaeritur de ista ratione Augustini: «Cum enim aliud sit artificiosum esse, aliud inertem» etc. Probat enim animam esse compositam propter multitudinem proprietatum. Sed contra: nulla substantia componitur ex proprietatibus, neque per se neque cum alio: ergo ex hoc non probatur, quod anima sit composita.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus hoc non probat nisi a posteriori. Compositio enim accidentis ad subiectum et diversitas necessario praesupponit aliam compositionem — quia, ut dicit Boethius3: «Quod est pure forma subiectum esse non potest». Ergo ad hoc quod aliquid sit subiectum accidentium plurium, oportet in illo praeexistere compositionem intrinsecam; sed anima capit in se multitudinem accidentium: et ideo necessario infertur a posteriori, quod ipsa sit composita — licet non ex accidentibus.
Dubium IV
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: «Sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum» etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia a quocumque removetur superius, et inferius4: ergo si non habet qualitatem, nec bonitatem. Si tu dicas quod bonitas illa non est species qualitatis, quaeritur: quare non similiter dicitur in divinis qualitas divina sicut bonitas divina?
Respondeo: Solutio quorundam. Quidam volunt dicere, quod nomen generis non transfertur ad divina — tum quia non dicit rei complementum, sicut species; tum quia significat in concretione ad subiectum et in dependentia. Nomina autem specialia connotant effectum in creatura; et ideo dicitur sine qualitate bonus.
Non probata. Sed si quis velit inspicere, invenit hoc non habere veritatem. Si ergo quaeratur: quomodo differt in Deo magnitudo et bonitas? — dicendum, quod magnitudo significat divinam essentiam per modum quantitatis, bonitas per modum qualitatis: ergo isti modi cadunt in Deo. Et iterum, si quaeratur qualis est Deus? — respondetur: bonus et magnus.
Solutio auctoris. Et ideo dicendum, quod nomina generum in divinis reperiuntur, sed non prout habent rationem generis — quia Deus in nullo genere est. Et ad hoc significandum removet Augustinus5 nomina novem generum in quantum sunt genera.
Dubium V
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: «Si tamen est dignum, ut Deus dicatur substare». Videtur enim satis dignum, quia summa nobilitas est per se subsistere.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod duplex est proprietas ipsius substantiae — scilicet per se stare et alii subesse. Primum est perfectionis, secundum imperfectionis; et ideo ratione primae dicitur digne, non ratione secundae.
Dubium VI
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius: «Non ex compositis Deus, qui vita est, subsistit» etc. Quae differentia est inter illas differentias [sc. compositis / infirmis / obscuris / disparibus]? Quodsi nulla est, videtur facere inculcationem verborum.
Respondeo: Solutio 1. Dicendum, quod quidam volunt, quod per illa quatuor excludantur quatuor genera compositionum.
(a) Prima enim est essentiae ex principiis essentialibus, ratione cuius dicitur quod Deus non est ex compositis, id est simul positis.
(b) Secunda est substantiae ex principiis naturalibus, quae sunt materia et forma; ratione huius dicitur neque ex infirmis — quia materia subiecta est privationi, quae facit formam esse instabilem et infirmam, et similiter materiam (infirma enim dicuntur instabilia).
(c) Tertia est compositio mixti ex miscibilibus, ratione cuius dicit neque ex obscuris — quia ubi mixtio, ibi quaedam formarum confusio, et ita obscuratio.
(d) Quarta est compositio animati ex partibus disparibus — ex anima videlicet et corpore; ratione huius dicit neque ex partibus disparibus — quia ipse est spiritus.
Alia solutio. Aliter tamen potest dici, quod excludit eandem compositionem ratione diversarum conditionum. Ad hoc enim quod aliqua principia constituant aliquid, oportet quod principia sint differentia, sint dependentia, sint imperfecta, sint etiam difformia. Si enim essent omnino conformia et perfecta, non possent aliquid constituere — quia ex duobus entibus actu nihil fit6.
Quia ergo differentia, ideo sunt composita, quasi cum aliis posita; quia dependentia, ideo infirma; quia imperfecta, ideo obscura; quia dissimilia, ideo disparia.
Deus autem non potest esse ex differentibus et diversis, quia est vita per essentiam; non potest esse ex dependentibus et infirmis, quia virtus per essentiam; non potest esse ex imperfectis et obscuris, quia lux est; similiter non potest esse ex disparibus et dissimilibus, quia spiritus per essentiam.
Summa ergo actualitas, summa potestas, summa claritas, summa spiritualitas non permittunt in Deo esse aliquam compositionem. Unde ex his quatuor conditionibus quatuor rationes eliciuntur probantes Deum simplicissimum.
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Doubts concerning the Master's text
Doubt I
In this part, concerning the Master's text, a question arises about order. Since composition in a creature is the ground and cause of change, simplicity is the cause of unchangeableness; for "if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation"1: therefore since the cause is before the effect, the Master ought first to have placed the property of simplicity.
I respond: First solution. It must be said that indeed composition, according to the order of understanding, is prior to change; but since negations are contrary to affirmations, hence it is that unchangeableness is prior — so some would have it.
Another solution. It can, however, be said otherwise and better: that there is the prior and more known to us, and the prior simpliciter2. And since simplicity is especially hidden from us (because the simple insofar as it is simple has the character of a principle, and we come from knowledge of the posterior to knowledge of the prior), therefore he treats unchangeableness before simplicity.
Doubt II
Likewise it is asked concerning what he says in the text: "And the same is properly and truly simple, because it has neither composition of parts" etc. For it seems superfluous to say, since the simple is that of which there is no part, just as the composite is said to have parts.
I respond: It must be said that the Master notes here the simple as it is proper to God; and thus it is opposed both to composition and to multiplicity. As to privation of composition, he says [God] does not have multitude of parts; as to privation of extraneous multiplicity, he says not variety of accidents; as to privation of intrinsic multiplicity, he says not variety of forms — such as of genus, species, and difference. And in this way the simple is simple truly and properly — which belongs to God alone.
Doubt III
Likewise it is asked concerning that reason of Augustine: "For since to be artistic is one thing, to be dull another" etc. For he proves the soul to be composite on account of multitude of properties. But against this: no substance is composed from properties, neither by itself nor with another: therefore from this it is not proved that the soul is composite.
I respond: It must be said that Augustine proves this only a posteriori. For the composition of accident to subject and the diversity [of accidents] necessarily presupposes another composition — since, as Boethius says3: "What is pure form cannot be a subject." Therefore for something to be the subject of many accidents, there must pre-exist in it an intrinsic composition; but the soul receives in itself a multitude of accidents: and therefore it is necessarily inferred a posteriori that it is composite — though not from accidents.
Doubt IV
Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: "Good without quality, great without quantity" etc. For he seems to speak wrongly, since "from that from which the superior is removed, the inferior is also"4: therefore if [God] does not have quality, neither does He have goodness. If you say that that goodness is not a species of quality, it is asked: why is "divine quality" not said in God just as "divine goodness"?
I respond: A solution of some. Some wish to say that the name of the genus is not transferred to divine things — both because it does not signify the thing's completion, as the species does; and because it signifies in concretion to a subject and in dependence. But special names connote an effect in the creature; and so God is called good without quality.
Not proven. But if one wishes to look, one finds this not to hold. If then it be asked: how do magnitude and goodness differ in God? — it must be said that magnitude signifies the divine essence in the mode of quantity, goodness in the mode of quality: therefore these modes do fall in God. And again, if it be asked "what sort of being is God?", the answer is: good and great.
The author's solution. And therefore it must be said that the names of the genera are found in God, but not as they have the character of genus — since God is in no genus. And to signify this, Augustine5 removes the names of the nine genera insofar as they are genera.
Doubt V
Likewise it is asked concerning what is said: "If it is worthy that God be said to subsist". For it seems sufficiently worthy, since "the highest nobility is to subsist per se."
I respond: It must be said that the property of substance is twofold — namely, to stand per se and to underlie another. The first is of perfection, the second of imperfection; and therefore by reason of the first it is said [of God] worthily, not by reason of the second.
Doubt VI
Likewise it is asked concerning what Hilary says: "Not from composite things does God, who is life, subsist" etc. What is the difference among those differences [i.e., composite / weak / obscure / disparate]? If there is none, he seems to make a heaping-up of words.
I respond: Solution 1. It must be said that some hold that by those four [terms] four kinds of composition are excluded.
(a) The first is that of essence from essential principles, by reason of which it is said that God is not from composite things — that is, things placed together.
(b) The second is that of substance from natural principles, which are matter and form; by reason of this he says neither from weak things — since matter is subject to privation, which makes both form unstable and weak, and similarly matter; for the weak means the unstable.
(c) The third is the composition of a mixture from mixables, by reason of which he says neither from obscure things — since where there is mixture, there is some confusion of forms, and so obscuring.
(d) The fourth is the composition of a living thing from disparate parts — namely from soul and body; by reason of this he says neither from disparate parts — because He is spirit.
Another solution. It can, however, be said otherwise: that he excludes the same composition by reason of diverse conditions. For for some principles to constitute something, the principles must be different, must be dependent, must be imperfect, and must also be dissimilar. For if they were altogether conformed and perfect, they could not constitute anything — since "from two beings in act nothing comes to be"6.
Because, therefore, different, they are therefore composite, as if placed with others; because dependent, therefore weak; because imperfect, therefore obscure; because dissimilar, therefore disparate.
But God cannot be from different and diverse, since He is life by essence; cannot be from dependent and weak, since He is power by essence; cannot be from imperfect and obscure, since He is light; nor can He be from disparate and dissimilar, since He is spirit by essence.
Supreme actuality, supreme power, supreme clarity, supreme spirituality — these do not permit any composition to be in God. Hence from these four conditions four reasons are drawn which prove God to be most simple.
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- Aristot., I Poster. c. 10 (c. 13): Similiter autem et, si affirmatio est causa ipsius esse, et negatio ipsius non esse.Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 10 (c. 13): "Similarly also, if affirmation is the cause of its being, negation is the cause of its not-being."
- Aristot., I Poster. c. 2: de distinctione prius et notius nobis et prius simpliciter (or secundum naturam).Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 2: on the distinction between prior and more known to us and prior simpliciter (or by nature).
- Boeth., de Trinitate c. 2: Forma vero, quae est sine materia, non poterit esse subiectum.Boethius, On the Trinity c. 2: "Form, which is without matter, cannot be a subject."
- Cfr. Aristot., IV Topic. c. 2, et Petrus Hispanus, Summula, tract. de Syllogismo topico.Cf. Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 2, and Peter of Spain, Summula, tract On the Topical Syllogism.
- August., V de Trin. c. 1, n. 2. S. Thom. (hic q. 4, a. 3, et de Potentia q. 7, a. 4, ad 2) docet: Quantitas habet propriam rationem in comparatione ad subiectum; est enim quantitas mensura substantiae, qualitas dispositio substantiae; unde eadem ratione removentur a divina praedicatione secundum rationem generis, sicut removebantur per rationem accidentis.Augustine, On the Trinity V, c. 1, n. 2. St. Thomas (here q. 4, a. 3, and On Power q. 7, a. 4, ad 2) teaches: "Quantity has its proper character in relation to subject — for quantity is the measure of substance, quality the disposition of substance; hence they are removed from divine predication by the same reasoning according to the character of genus, as they were removed by the character of accident."
- Axioma scholasticum, cuius fundamentum patet in Aristotele: Ex duobus entibus actu nihil fit. Ut enim aliquid ex pluribus constituatur, oportet unum esse in potentia respectu alterius.A Scholastic axiom, whose foundation appears in Aristotle: "From two beings in act nothing comes to be." For for something to be constituted from several, one must be in potency with respect to the other.