Dist. 8, Part 1, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Dubium I
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo contingit dubitari de hoc quod dicit Magister: «Nunc de veritate sive proprietate divinae essentiae» etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia omne quod habet proprium distinguitur; sed divina essentia non est distinguibilis: ergo non habet proprium.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod divina essentia eo modo est distinguibilis quo modo habet proprietates, et e converso; quia quamvis in se non sit distinguibilis per plurificationem sui, nec a persona per diversitatem, est tamen distinguibilis respectu essentiae creatae, respectu cuius habet has proprietates.
Dubium II
Item quaeritur de illis tribus proprietatibus quas ponit — scilicet de veritate, immutabilitate, simplicitate — cum multae aliae conditiones sint divinae essentiae: quare solum de his tribus agit?
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod per has tres proprietates sufficienter distinguitur esse increatum a creato. Nam creatum, eo ipso quod creatum, habet esse post non esse, et ita esse vanum et possibile; ideo habet esse permixtum cum possibilitate, et propter hoc deficit a veritate, a stabilitate et simplicitate. Increatum vero esse habet contrarias proprietates, et in his sufficienter distinguitur. Nam veritas respicit quod est, immutabilitas quo est, simplicitas utrumque. Ideo patet sufficientia et ordo.
Dubium III
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit — quod a sapere dicitur sapientia — quia non videtur dicere verum. Sicut enim albedo se habet ad album, ita sapientia ad sapere; sed albedo non dicitur ab albo, immo magis e contra: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum intellectum componentem sapere dicitur a sapientia, quia intellectus componens procedit ab abstracto ad concretum; secundum vero intellectum resolventem est e converso — et quantum ad hunc loquitur Augustinus.
Alia solutio. Vel posset dici, quod loquitur secundum considerationem grammatici, non logici1.
Dubium IV
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: «Quis magis est quam ille, qui dixit famulo». Videtur enim male dicere, quia esse non recipit magis et minus, et maxime in Deo.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod magis et minus dupliciter possunt considerari: scilicet in comparatione ad idem, et sic dicunt intensionem et remissionem2; vel in comparatione ad diversas substantias et naturas, et sic dicunt gradum et excessum. Et hoc modo bene est ponere magis et minus in ente, respectu Creatoris et creaturae, et respectu creaturarum ad invicem. Sed in comparatione Creatoris ad creaturam est excessus improportionabilis et infinitus; respectu creaturarum ad invicem est proportionabilis.
Dubium V
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: «Cuius essentia non novit praeteritum vel futurum». Videtur enim esse ista proprietas et Angelorum, quia Augustinus de Civitate Dei3 dicit, quod «immortalitas Angelorum non est praeterita, quasi non sit, nec futura, quasi nondum sit», sed semper est praesens: ergo non est proprium solius Dei.
Respondeo: Quidam dicunt, quod duratio aevi est simplex et tota simul, non habens praeteritum et futurum; nihilominus ipsum aeviternum habet praeteritum et futurum quantum ad affectiones; et ita [non habere praeteritum et futurum] proprium est solius Dei.
Alia solutio. Alii dicunt, quod in omni duratione creata — quoniam differt a durante et habet esse possibile — est prius et posterius; sed distinguunt in priori et posteriori. Quoddam enim est quod dicit durationis successionem, quoddam successionis durationem cum variatione et innovatione. Primum est in aevo, secundum in tempore; et hoc vult Anselmus4 expresse, et hoc credo probabilius. Et patet responsio ad verbum Augustini; ipse enim loquitur de priori et posteriori, quod quidem dicit innovationem et variationem et corruptionem.
Dubium VI
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod «divinae essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est». Videtur enim falsum, quia quod inest alicui substantialiter non adimitur comparatione aliqua; sed esse est substantiale rei cuilibet: ergo etc. Item ex comparatione ad Deum creatura melioratur, ut dicit Augustinus5; ergo magis est quam si non comparetur: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Duplex comparatio creaturae ad Deum. Dupliciter est accipere talem comparationem. Uno modo secundum rationem influentiae et receptionis; et sic creatura ad Deum comparata est magis quam si non comparetur. Alio modo comparatur secundum habitudinem aequiparantiae et proportionis; et hoc modo verum est, quod nulla [creatura] est proportionabilis secundum conditionem veritatis et nobilitatis esse divini; et ideo quasi nihil est — non omnino in se, sed nihil ad proportionem, quia non potest inveniri aliqua proportio quantitativa.
Dubium VII
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: «Dicatur ergo, quod semper fuit, est et erit». Videntur enim haec verba non dici de Deo, quia dicunt diversa tempora; sed in Deo non cadit diversitas temporum.
Respondeo: Quidam voluerunt dicere, quod actus isti non praedicant de Deo diversa tempora secundum essentiam, sed secundum concomitantiam; quia divinum esse omnino invariatum omne tempus concomitatur. Sed haec positio non solvit plene. Dicitur enim vere, quod Deus fuit ante omne tempus; tunc ergo concomitantiam non potest dicere.
Alia positio, sed insufficiens. Ideo dicunt alii, quod tempus consignificatum non est dispositio rei acceptae sive intellectae quando dicitur de Deo, sed solum modus intelligendi; quando vero de re mobili, utroque modo. Exemplum patet de masculinitate in lapide et in viro: quoniam in viro est ut dispositio rei acceptae, in lapide ut modus intelligendi solum. Sed haec positio non videtur sufficiens, quia intellectus non ponit praeteritum circa suum intelligere, quando intelligit Deum fuisse: ergo oportet quod ponat circa rem.
Vera solutio. Propter hoc notandum, quod verba diversorum temporum aliter dicuntur de aeterno, aliter de aeviterno, aliter de temporali. Nam respectu temporalis important mutabilitatem et successionem et durationem. Secundum vero quod de aeviternis dicuntur, duo tantum important — successionem et durationem — sicut vult Hieronymus6, Augustinus et Anselmus. Secundum vero quod dicuntur de Deo, important solum durationem. Unde dicitur: Deus fuit, quia eius duratio non coepit; est, quia duratio eius non interrumpitur; erit, quia non desinit nec corrumpitur. Proprie ergo loquendo, non dicuntur de Deo, ut dicit Hieronymus; large autem loquendo, dicuntur, ut dicit Magister et Augustinus; et ad hoc vadit opinio Magistri.
Dubium VIII
Item quaeritur de verbo Hilarii: «Esse non est Deo accidens» etc.; quia nec creaturae est accidens — nulli enim omnino rei accidit esse — quomodo ergo per hoc notatur Deus differre a creatura?
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod accidens dicit quid natum in alio esse, ab alio exire, et ab illo recedere. Accidens enim dicitur quod inest subiecto et ab illo trahit ortum, et propterea potest adesse et abesse. In his tribus proprietatibus communicat esse creatum, licet non eodem modo omnino. Nam esse nostrum pendet ab alio sustinente, oritur ab alio efficiente; creatura etiam nata est suum esse perdere: ideo esse eius est quasi accidens, non tamen vere accidens — quia cum pendeat a Deo, non pendet sicut a subiecto. E contrario est in Deo; et ideo dicit Hilarius, quod esse non est accidens Deo; et hoc propter contrarias proprietates: quia accidens natum est alii inesse, propter hoc dicit subsistens veritas; quia natum est ab alio exire, contra hoc dicit manens causa; quia natum est etiam ab alio recedere, contra hoc dicit naturalis generis proprietas, quae non dimittit esse.
Dubium IX
Item quaeritur, quomodo intelligitur immortalitas, cum dicitur «Solus habet immortalitatem», et dicit Augustinus7, quod accipitur pro incommutabilitate; sed hoc non videtur conveniens. Mors enim non dicit omnem mutabilitatem, sed solum corruptibilitatem viventium: ergo non idem est dicere.
Respondeo: Sicut vita accipitur communiter et proprie, ita et mors, ita et immortalitas.
Uno modo dicitur vita actus continuus et internus, qui est a forma spirituali; et sic dicitur proprie; et sic immortalitas dicit vitam talem cum impossibilitate ad eius privationem.
Alio modo dicitur vita actus completus potentiae, quae est secundum rei naturam, sicut dicitur aqua viva, quae habet operationem aquae convenientem; et hoc modo importat repugnantiam ad corruptionem. Et ideo debet dici secundum hanc vitam immortale quod est ita in actu completo, quod nullo modo potest aliquam peiorationem recipere; et sic accipit Apostolus et exponit Augustinus.
Dubium X
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit beatus Iacobus et est in littera8: «Nec vicissitudinis obumbratio» — quae differentia est inter vicissitudinem et obumbrationem, et quae convenientia ratione cuius dicatur vicissitudo obumbrare?
Et dicendum, quod vicissitudo importat numerum vicis, et iste est numerus cum interruptione; sed obumbratio dicitur per privationem actus lucis. Quoniam igitur actus formae lux est, privatio eius recte dicitur obumbratio; et quia vicissitudo ratione numeri dicit interruptionem, et ratione interruptionis dicit privationem, et ratione privationis obumbrationem, hinc est quod recte dicitur vicissitudinis obumbratio.
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Doubts concerning the Master's text
Doubt I
In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there occurs a doubt concerning what the Master says: "Now of the truth or property of the divine essence" etc. For he seems to speak wrongly, since everything that has a proper [attribute] is distinguished; but the divine essence is not distinguishable: therefore it does not have a proper.
I respond: It must be said that the divine essence is distinguishable in the same way in which it has properties, and conversely; because although in itself it is not distinguishable through any multiplication of itself, nor from a person through diversity, it is nevertheless distinguishable with respect to created essence, with respect to which it has these properties.
Doubt II
Likewise it is asked concerning those three properties that he posits — namely truth, unchangeableness, simplicity — since many other conditions belong to the divine essence: why does he treat only these three?
I respond: It must be said that by these three properties uncreated being is sufficiently distinguished from created being. For created being, by the very fact that it is created, has being after non-being, and thus a being vain and possible; therefore it has being mixed with possibility, and on this account it falls short of truth, of stability, and of simplicity. Uncreated being, by contrast, has the opposite properties, and in these it is sufficiently distinguished. For truth regards what is, unchangeableness regards how it is (quo est), and simplicity regards both. Hence the sufficiency and the order are clear.
Doubt III
Likewise it is asked concerning what he says — that wisdom is named from being-wise — since this does not seem true. For just as whiteness is to white, so wisdom is to being-wise; but whiteness is not named from white — rather the reverse: therefore etc.
I respond: It must be said that according to the composing intellect, sapere is named from sapientia — since the composing intellect proceeds from the abstract to the concrete; but according to the resolving intellect, it is the reverse — and Augustine speaks with respect to the latter.
Alternative solution. Or it could be said that he speaks according to the consideration of the grammarian, not of the logician1.
Doubt IV
Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: "Who is more than He who said to His servant". For he seems to speak wrongly, since being does not receive more and less, and most of all in God.
I respond: It must be said that more and less can be considered in two ways: namely, in comparison to the same — and thus they signify intensification and remission2; or in comparison to diverse substances and natures — and thus they signify degree and excess. And in this latter way it is well to place more and less in being, with respect to the Creator and the creature, and with respect to creatures to one another. But in the comparison of Creator to creature the excess is disproportionate and infinite; with respect to creatures to one another it is proportionate.
Doubt V
Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: "Whose essence knows neither past nor future". For this seems to be a property of the Angels too, since Augustine in City of God3 says that "the immortality of the Angels is not past, as though it were not, nor future, as though it were not yet," but is always present: therefore it is not proper to God alone.
I respond: Some say that the duration of aevum is simple and all at once, not having past and future; yet the aeviternal itself has past and future as regards its affections; and thus [the absence of past and future as regards the affections] is proper to God alone.
Alternative solution. Others say that in every created duration — since it differs from the thing that endures and has possible being — there is prior and posterior; but they distinguish in the prior and posterior. For one kind is that which signifies the succession of duration; another, the duration of succession with variation and innovation. The first is in aevum, the second in time; and this Anselm4 holds expressly, and this I believe more probable. And the response to Augustine's word is clear; for he speaks of the prior and posterior which signifies innovation and variation and corruption.
Doubt VI
Likewise it is asked concerning what he says — that "our being compared to the divine essence is not". For it seems false, since what inheres substantially in anything is not taken away by any comparison; but being is substantial to any thing whatever: therefore etc. Again, from the comparison to God the creature is made better, as Augustine says5; therefore it is more than if it were not compared: therefore etc.
I respond: The twofold comparison of the creature to God. Such a comparison can be taken in two ways. In one way, according to the notion of influx and reception; and thus a creature, compared to God, is more than if it were not compared. In another way, it is compared according to the relation of equality and proportion; and in this way it is true that no creature is proportionable according to the condition of the truth and nobility of the divine being; and therefore it is as if nothing — not altogether in itself, but nothing with respect to proportion, since no quantitative proportion can be found.
Doubt VII
Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: "Let it therefore be said that He always was, is, and will be". For these words seem not to be said of God, since they signify diverse times; but in God there is no diversity of times.
I respond: Some have wished to say that these tensed expressions do not predicate diverse times of God according to essence, but according to concomitance — because the divine being, altogether unvaried, accompanies all time. But this position does not fully solve [the problem]. For it is truly said that God was before all time; then concomitance cannot be what is meant.
Another position, but insufficient. Therefore others say that the co-signified time is not a disposition of the thing received or understood when [the tense] is said of God, but only a mode of understanding; whereas when said of a mobile thing, it is both. The example is clear with masculinity in a stone and in a man: for in a man it is as a disposition of the thing received, in a stone as a mode of understanding only. But this position does not seem sufficient, since the intellect does not place the past around its own understanding when it understands God to have been: therefore it must place it around the thing.
The true solution. On account of this it must be noted that words of diverse times are said in one way of what is eternal, in another of what is aeviternal, in another of what is temporal. For with respect to what is temporal they imply changeableness, succession, and duration. But inasmuch as they are said of the aeviternal, they imply only two — succession and duration — as Jerome6, Augustine, and Anselm will have it. But inasmuch as they are said of God, they imply only duration. Hence it is said: God was, because his duration did not begin; is, because his duration is not interrupted; will be, because it does not cease nor is corrupted. Properly speaking, therefore, these are not said of God, as Jerome says; but loosely speaking, they are said, as the Master and Augustine say — and the Master's opinion goes in this direction.
Doubt VIII
Likewise it is asked concerning Hilary's word: "To-be is not an accident to God" etc.; since neither in a creature is it an accident — for to no thing whatever does being accidentally belong — how then by this is God distinguished from the creature?
I respond: It must be said that accident signifies something whose nature is to be in another, to come forth from another, and to recede from it. For an accident is called that which inheres in a subject and draws its origin from it, and therefore can be present and absent. In these three properties, created being shares, though not altogether in the same way. For our being depends on another sustaining; it arises from another efficient; a creature also can lose its own being: therefore its being is as-it-were accident, yet not truly an accident — for although it depends on God, it does not depend as on a subject. The contrary is in God; and therefore Hilary says that being is not an accident to God; and this on account of the opposing properties: because an accident is fit to inhere in another, therefore he says "subsisting truth"; because it is fit to come forth from another, against this he says "abiding cause"; because it is also fit to recede from another, against this he says "a property of a natural kind which does not let go of being."
Doubt IX
Likewise it is asked, how immortality is understood, when it is said "He alone has immortality", and Augustine says7 that it is taken for incommutability; but this does not seem fitting. For death does not signify every kind of changeableness, but only the corruptibility of living things: therefore it is not the same thing to say.
I respond: Just as life is taken commonly and properly, so also death, so also immortality.
In one way, life is called a continuous and internal act which is from a spiritual form; and thus it is said properly; and thus immortality signifies such a life with the impossibility of its privation.
In another way, life is called the completed act of a potency, which is according to the nature of the thing — as living water is said, which has an operation fitting to water; and in this way it implies repugnance to corruption. And therefore, according to this [sense of] life, that is to be called immortal which is so in completed act that it can in no way receive any worsening; and thus the Apostle takes it, and Augustine expounds it.
Doubt X
Likewise it is asked concerning what the blessed James says, as is in the Master's text8: "Nor shadow of alteration" — what is the difference between alteration and shadowing, and what is the agreement by reason of which alteration is said to overshadow?
And it must be said that vicissitudo ("alteration") implies a number of turns, and this is a number with interruption; but obumbratio ("shadowing") is said by the privation of the act of light. Since therefore the act of the form is light, its privation is rightly called shadowing; and since vicissitudo by reason of number signifies interruption, and by reason of interruption signifies privation, and by reason of privation signifies shadowing, hence it is that it is rightly called the shadow of alteration.
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- De intellectu resolvente sive analytico et componente sive synthetico vide infra d. 28, dub. 1, et IV Sent. d. 50, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4. Secunda solutio inde sumitur, quod grammatici formam verborum abstractam derivant a forma concreta, logici autem sive philosophi (Aristot., de Praedicamentis c. 1) e contrario. Cfr. infra d. 33, q. 3.On the resolving or analytic intellect and the composing or synthetic intellect, see below d. 28, dub. 1, and IV Sent. d. 50, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4. The second solution is taken from this: that grammarians derive the abstract form of words from the concrete form, while logicians or philosophers (Aristotle, On the Categories c. 1) do the contrary. Cf. below d. 33, q. 3.
- Vat. praeter fidem omnium mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 addit non, sed falso, quia iuxta omnes Scholasticos intensio et remissio est motus eiusdem (v.g. caloris) a statu imperfectiore ad perfectiorem et viceversa. Vide S. Thomam, qui hic circa litteram idem dubium solvit consimili distinctione, scilicet: Magis et minus potest dici aliquid vel quantum ad ipsam naturam participatam, quae secundum se intenditur et remittitur secundum accessum ad terminum vel recessum; et hoc non est nisi in accidentibus; vel quantum ad modum participandi; et sic etiam in essentialibus dicitur magis et minus secundum diversum modum participandi, sicut Angelus dicitur magis intellectualis quam homo.The Vatican edition, against all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, adds non — but falsely, since according to all the Scholastics intensification and remission is the motion of the same thing (e.g., of heat) from a more imperfect state to a more perfect one and vice versa. See St. Thomas, who solves the same doubt here on the text with a similar distinction: "More and less can be said of something either as regards the participated nature itself (which is intensified and remitted according to approach to or recession from the term, and this is only in accidents), or as regards the mode of participating; and thus in the case of essentials 'more' and 'less' is said according to a diverse mode of participation — as an Angel is said to be more intellectual than a man."
- August., XII de Civ. Dei c. 15, n. 2.Augustine, On the City of God XII, c. 15, n. 2.
- Anselm., Monologion c. 28 et Proslogion cc. 20 et 22.Anselm, Monologion c. 28 and Proslogion cc. 20 and 22.
- August., I de Genesi ad litteram cc. 2, 3, nn. 9, 10, et contra Epistolam Manichaei c. 40, n. 46.Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter I, cc. 2, 3, nn. 9–10, and Against the Letter of the Manichaean c. 40, n. 46.
- De Hieronymo vide notam hic in litt. Magistri c. 1. Augustini et Anselmi textus accipe ex dub. 5. Cfr. Scotus, I Sent. d. 9, q. unica in fine.On Jerome, see the note here in the Master's text c. 1. Take Augustine's and Anselm's texts from Dubium 5. Cf. Scotus, I Sent. d. 9, unique question at the end.
- Cfr. August., I de Trinitate c. 1, n. 3, ubi solus habet immortalitatem exponitur pro solus habet incommutabilitatem.Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity I, c. 1, n. 3, where "He alone has immortality" is expounded as "He alone has incommutability."
- Iac. 1, 17: Nec vicissitudinis obumbratio.James 1:17: "Nor shadow of alteration."
- De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 3. — S. Thom., S. Th. I, q. 10, a. 5.On this doubt cf. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 3. — St. Thomas, S. Th. I, q. 10, a. 5.
- De aequiparantia et proportione Creatoris et creaturae cfr. II Sent. d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 3 in corp., ubi S. Doctor ex possibilitate creaturae sive ex eo quod nulla creatura omnino est actus deducit durationem successionis sive prius et posterius in aevo.On the equality and proportion of Creator and creature, cf. II Sent. d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 3 in the body, where the holy Doctor deduces the duration of succession — that is, prior and posterior in aevum — from the possibility of the creature, or from the fact that no creature is altogether act.