Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 2
Quaestio III
Utrum numerus divinarum personarum sit infinitus.
Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere infinitatem. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.
1. Quia creatura est finita, et quidquid est in ipsa, est actu finitum: ergo ab oppositis, quia divina essentia est infinita, quidquid est in ipsa, est infinite: ergo cum in Deo sit numerus personarum, erit infinitus; et ita erunt personae infinitae.
2. Item, cum duplex sit infinitas, virtualis et numeralis, infinitas virtualis est in Deo: ergo pari ratione infinitas numeralis: ergo in Deo sunt infinitae personae.
3. Item, infinita virtus, cum emanat1 secundum suam totam infinitatem, non tantum producit infinitum intensive, sed etiam extensive; sed virtus Patris in productione personarum emanat secundum omnimodam sui potestatem: ergo non tantum producit personas infinitas in virtute, immo etiam2 infinitas in numero.
4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur sic: multiplicatio personarum aut est virtutis, aut non. Si non; ergo non debet in divinis poni; si est virtutis per se: ergo maior multiplicatio erit maioris virtutis, et summae virtutis infinita multiplicatio: ergo etc.
Contra hoc ostenditur quadruplici conditione, quae sumitur ab hoc quod semper Deo est attribuendum quod nobilius est, quod necesse est ponere finitatem personarum. Prima est distinctio, secunda ordo, tertia connexio, quarta summa completio3.
1. Ex prima conditione ostenditur sic: si est ibi distinctio, non ergo confusio; sed ubi est infinitas, ibi est confusio: ergo etc.
2. Item, ex secunda sic: ubi est ordo, ibi est terminatio, quia ubi deficit terminatio, deficit et4 mediatio et per consequens ordo; sed ubi est terminatio, non est infinitas: ergo si in personis divinis est ordo, non est infinitas.
3. Item, ex tertia sic: ubi est connexio, necesse est, quod omnes5 personae procedant ab una; nam si una ab alia et ita consequenter, tunc est infinita distantia inter primam et ultimam; sed6 hoc est inconveniens: ergo omnes ab una: aut ergo eisdem modis, aut diversis. Si eisdem: ergo nulla distinctio; si diversis, sed diversi modi emanandi sunt finiti: ergo etc.
4. Item, ex quarta sic: si est ibi summa completio, ergo nata est divinitas alia complere: ergo cum completio personarum sit in beatitudine, nata est beatificare7. Sed si essent personae infinitae, impossibile esset aliquem beatificari a Deo; cognitio enim cuiuslibet personae est de substantia beatitudinis, cum tota bonitas, quae est substantiale praemium, sit in qualibet8 personarum; ergo aut anima omnes cognosceret, aut non esset beata; sed impossibile esset omnes cognoscere, cum virtus eius sit finita: ergo etc.
Conclusio
Numerum divinarum personarum esse finitum, et fides tenet et ratio suadet.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in divinis personis quantum ad numerum non est ponere infinitatem sed finitatem.
Ratio autem huius est, quia infinitas numeralis repugnat perfectioni et ordini, quia est per recessum ab unitate sive ab origine sua. Similiter et infinitas molis; et ideo neutrum est in Deo. Infinitas autem virtutis est per accessum ad unitatem et originem; et ideo, cum ista sit perfectionis, ponenda est in Deo, alia non9.
1–2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod quidquid est in Deo, est infinite; dicendum, quod verum est infinite, sed non qualicumque infinitate, sed illa qua Deus est infinitus; et haec est infinitas immensitatis, et tali modo est Trinitas infinita, non infinitate numerali, quae non congruit Deo10.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinita virtus, infinite11 emanans, producit infinita; dicendum, quod divinae virtuti non convenit productio nisi perfecti; et ideo non convenit ei productio alicuius infinitatis nisi illius, quae stat cum summa perfectione. Haec autem non est infinitas numeralis, et ideo non est in Deo.
4. Ad ultimum quod obiicitur, quod potentiae est se multiplicare; dicendum, quod non omni modo12 est potentiae, sed perfecte multiplicare se potentiae est; et ideo non sequitur: ergo magis se multiplicare est maior perfectio, nisi intelligatur perfecte; sed infinite se multiplicare secundum numerum est imperfecte; et ideo non convenit Deo.
Tres solent communiter distingui species infinitatis, scil. numeralis, quae est in quantitate discreta, molis, quae est in quantitate continua, et virtutis sive immensitatis; cfr. infra d. 19. p. I. a. 1. q. 1 et 2. — Pro faciliore intelligentia quatuor argumentorum in fundam. haec notamus. Istae quatuor proprietates divinitatis, saltem tres primae, ita inter se connexae sunt, ut secunda (ordo) supponat primam (distinctionem) et tertia (connexio) utramque. Primum arg. ex distinctione sumptum sic procedit: si Deo attribuendum quod nobilius est, et si ibi est distinctio, ipsa distinctio debet esse sine confusione, cum confusio sit imperfectionis; sed ubi infinita multitudo, ibi est confusio: ergo etc.; cfr. infra d. 43. a. 1. q. 3. Secundum arg. procedit ex hoc axiomate, quod, ubi est ordo, ibi necessario est primum et ultimum (terminus) et medium. Tertium arg. est satis perspicuum. In quarto arg., quod sumitur ex summa completione, i. e. plenitudine perfectionis, S. Doctor supponit cum sententia communi, quod «cognitio cuiuslibet personae est de substantia beatitudinis». De hoc tamen Scot. (I. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.) dubitat et opinatur, non esse, absolute loquendo, impossibile, quod in caelo aliquis fruatur essentia Dei, non vero personis. De qua sententia videri potest Macedo, Collationes doctrinae S. Thom. et Scoti, collat. 3. differ. 3.
Circa ipsam quaestionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 43. m. 6, ubi latius fund. 1 et 2 explicantur. — Scot., hic q. 3 et q. 7. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 30. a. 2. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. quaest., S. p. 1. tr. 9. q. 41. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 9. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 10. q. 2. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 10. q. 1.
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Question III
Whether the number of divine persons is infinite.
Consequently, in the third place, it is asked whether infinity is to be posited in the divine persons. And that it is so is shown in the following way.
1. Because a creature is finite, and whatever is in it is actually finite: therefore by opposition, since the divine essence is infinite, whatever is in it is infinite: therefore, since in God there is a number of persons, that number will be infinite, and thus there will be an infinity of persons.
2. Likewise, since infinity is twofold — virtual and numerical — virtual infinity is in God: therefore by parity of reasoning numerical infinity is as well: therefore in God there are infinite persons.
3. Likewise, an infinite power, when it emanates1 according to its entire infinity, produces not only the infinite intensively but also extensively; but the power of the Father in the production of persons emanates according to the entire fullness of his might: therefore it produces persons infinite not only in power but even2 infinite in number.
4. Likewise, this same point is shown thus: the multiplication of persons is either a matter of power or it is not. If not, then it ought not to be posited in divine things. If it is a matter of power through itself, then greater multiplication will belong to greater power, and infinite multiplication to supreme power: therefore, etc.
On the contrary, it is shown by four conditions — conditions drawn from the principle that what is nobler must always be attributed to God — that it is necessary to posit finitude of the persons. The first condition is distinction, the second order, the third connection, the fourth supreme completion3.
1. From the first condition it is shown thus: if there is distinction there, then not confusion; but where there is infinity, there is confusion: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, from the second thus: where there is order, there is termination, because where termination is lacking, mediation is also4 lacking, and consequently order is lacking; but where there is termination, there is no infinity: therefore, if in the divine persons there is order, there is no infinity.
3. Likewise, from the third thus: where there is connection, it is necessary that all5 the persons proceed from one; for if one proceeds from another, and so on successively, then there is an infinite distance between the first and the last; but6 this is unfitting: therefore they all proceed from one. Either, then, by the same modes or by different modes. If by the same modes, then no distinction; if by different modes — but the different modes of emanating are finite: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, from the fourth thus: if there is supreme completion there, then the divinity is naturally suited to complete another: therefore, since the completion of persons consists in beatitude, it is naturally suited to beatify7. But if the persons were infinite, it would be impossible for anyone to be beatified by God. For the knowledge of every given person belongs to the substance of beatitude, since the whole goodness that is the substantial reward is in each8 of the persons; therefore either the soul would know all of them, or it would not be blessed. But it would be impossible to know all of them, since the soul's power is finite: therefore, etc.
Conclusion
That the number of the divine persons is finite is both held by faith and persuaded by reason.
I respond: It must be said that in the divine persons, with respect to number, one is not to posit infinity but finitude.
The reason for this is that numerical infinity is incompatible with perfection and order, because it arises from recession from unity or from one's origin. Likewise, infinity of mass; and therefore neither is in God. But infinity of power arises from approach toward unity and origin; and therefore, since this belongs to perfection, it is to be posited in God — the other is not9.
1–2. To the objection, then, that whatever is in God is infinite: it must be said that it is true that it is infinite, but not with just any infinity — rather with that infinity by which God is infinite; and this is the infinity of immensity. And it is in this way that the Trinity is infinite, not with numerical infinity, which does not belong to God10.
3. To the objection that an infinite power, emanating infinitely11, produces infinite things: it must be said that it does not belong to divine power to produce anything but the perfect; and therefore there does not belong to it the production of any infinity except that which stands together with supreme perfection. But this is not numerical infinity, and therefore it is not in God.
4. To the last objection, that it belongs to power to multiply itself: it must be said that it does not belong to power in every mode12, but it belongs to power to multiply itself perfectly; and therefore it does not follow that «to multiply itself more is a greater perfection», unless perfectly is understood. But to multiply itself infinitely according to number is to multiply itself imperfectly; and therefore this does not belong to God.
Three species of infinity are commonly distinguished: numerical (in discrete quantity), of mass (in continuous quantity), and of power or immensity; cf. below d. 19, p. I, a. 1, q. 1 and 2. — For easier understanding of the four arguments in the fundamenta we note the following. These four attributes of the divinity — at least the first three — are so connected to one another that the second (order) presupposes the first (distinction), and the third (connection) presupposes both. The first argument, drawn from distinction, proceeds thus: if what is nobler is to be attributed to God, and if there is distinction there, then that distinction must be without confusion — since confusion belongs to imperfection; but where there is an infinite multitude, there is confusion: therefore, etc. Cf. below d. 43, a. 1, q. 3. The second argument proceeds from the axiom that where there is order, there is necessarily a first and a last (the terminus) and a middle. The third argument is sufficiently clear. In the fourth argument, drawn from supreme completion — i.e., the fullness of perfection — the Holy Doctor supposes, with the common opinion, that «the knowledge of any given person belongs to the substance of beatitude». Of this, however, Scotus (I Sent., d. 1, q. 1) is in doubt, and he holds that it is not absolutely impossible for someone in heaven to enjoy the essence of God without enjoying the persons. On this opinion, see Macedo, Collationes doctrinae S. Thomae et Scoti, collation 3, difference 3.
Concerning the question itself: Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 43, m. 6, where fund. 1 and 2 are more broadly explained. — Scotus, here, q. 3 and q. 7. — St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 30, a. 2. — Bl. Albert the Great, on this and the following question, Summa, p. 1, tract. 9, q. 41, m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 2, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 53, q. 9. — Durandus, I Sent., d. 10, q. 2. — Biel, I Sent., d. 10, q. 1.
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- Sensu et mss. cum ed. 1 ita exigentibus, mutavimus emanet, quod habet Vat.With the sense and the manuscripts (together with ed. 1) so requiring, we have changed emanet, which the Vatican ed. has.
- Faventibus antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1, supplevimus etiam.With the older codices and ed. 1 in favor, we have supplied etiam.
- Id est, plenitudo perfectionis.That is, the fullness of perfection.
- Auctoritate vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 hic adiecimus et, ac paulo infra personis a Vat. et cod. cc minus recte omissa.On the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have here added et, and a little below personis, which the Vatican ed. and cod. cc less correctly omit.
- Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 hic et circa finem argumenti post si diversis ponit et loco sed.The Vatican ed., against the manuscripts and ed. 1, here and near the end of the argument after si diversis puts et in place of sed.
- [see [^5]; same apparatus entry]
- Sensus videtur esse: Deus omnia complet sive perfecta facit; sed personas, i. e. intellectuales naturas sive supposita, beatificando complet: ergo proprium Dei est beatificare. — Vat. illas complere pro beatificare et paulo ante personas complere et loco alia complere; ergo, quae lectio omnibus codd. et ed. 1 contraria est et progressum argumentationis aufert. Paulo post cod. A cum ed. 1 loco aliquem habet aliquam, supple personam.The sense seems to be: God completes all things — that is, makes them perfect — but persons, i.e., intellectual natures or supposits, he completes by beatifying them; therefore it is proper to God to beatify. — The Vatican ed. reads illas complere for beatificare, and a little earlier personas complere, and in place of alia complere, ergo — a reading which is contrary to all the codices and ed. 1 and removes the progress of the argument. A little later, cod. A with ed. 1 has aliquam in place of aliquem — supply personam.
- Plures codd. ut T Y est, et forte melius.Several codd. (T Y) read est, perhaps better.
- Desideratur hic in Vat. et, quod mss. et ed. 1 exhibent. Paulo post ex codd. et ed. 1 adiecimus verba et originem ac alia non, quae Vat. prave omittit. Item codd. et ed. 1 neutrum loco neutra, quod habet Vat.Here the Vatican ed. lacks et, which the manuscripts and ed. 1 have. A little below, on the witness of the codices and ed. 1, we have added the words et originem and alia non, which the Vatican ed. wrongly omits. Likewise, the codices and ed. 1 read neutrum instead of the Vatican's neutra.
- Codd. A T aliique cum ed. 1 pro qualibet, quod exstat in Vat., exhibent distinctius qualicumque. — Fide omnium mss. et ed. 1 expunximus propositionem sequentem: Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum, scilicet quare infinitas numeralis non est ponenda in Deo, sicut virtualis, quae hic a Vat. ad ordinem solutionum servandum additur. Sed semel pro semper notandum, quod saepe saepius specialis responsio ad obiectionem a S. Doctore omittitur, quando ipsa iam in praecedentibus, sicuti v. g. hic in corp. articuli, clare continetur.Codd. A T and others, with ed. 1, in place of the Vatican's qualibet more distinctly read qualicumque. — On the witness of all the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have deleted the following proposition: «And through this the response to the second is clear — namely, why numerical infinity is not to be posited in God, just as virtual [infinity is]», which is here added by the Vatican ed. to preserve the order of responses. But let it be noted once for always that more often than not a specific response to an objection is omitted by the Holy Doctor when it is already clearly contained in what precedes — as, for example, here in the body of the article.
- Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, in infinitate pro infinite.The Vatican ed., against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads in infinitate for infinite.
- Codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 omittunt hic in Vat. additum multiplicare se, quod facile suppletur. Paulo infra Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc, contrariantibus aliis mss. et ed. 1, interpunctione mutata ac posito convenit Deo loco ideo, habet et convenit Deo: non sequitur ergo, magis. Dein circa finem, ex mss. et ed. 1 ante ideo adiecimus particulam et.The codices with edd. 1, 2, 3 omit the Vatican ed.'s added multiplicare se, which is easily supplied. A little below, the Vatican ed., with the more recent cod. cc — against the other manuscripts and ed. 1 — with the punctuation changed and convenit Deo placed in the position of ideo, reads et convenit Deo: non sequitur ergo, magis. Then near the end, on the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, before ideo we have added the particle et. ---