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Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
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Articulus Unicus

De cognoscibilitate Dei.

Quaestio I

Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura.

Circa primum, quod non sit Deus cognoscibilis a creatura, ostenditur:

1. Per auctoritatem Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus1: «Deum neque dicere neque intelligere possibile est».

2. Item ostenditur ratione per quadruplicem suppositionem, quam necesse est esse in cognitione, scilicet proportionem, unionem sive receptionem, iudicium et2 informationem. Intellectus enim non intelligit nisi quod est sibi proportionabile, et quod sibi aliquo modo unitur, et de quo iudicat, et a quo acies intelligentiae informatur.

Ex prima suppositione arguitur sic: necesse est, esse proportionem cognoscentis ad cognoscibile3; sed Dei ad intellectum non est proportio, quia Deus est infinitus, et intellectus finitus: ergo etc. Praeterea, si est aliqua proportio, videtur quod non sit sufficiens, quia plus distat verum increatum ab intellectu humano, quam quodlibet creatum intelligibile a sensu. Sed sensus, qui est perceptivus sensibilis4, nunquam elevatur ad cognitionem intelligibilis creati: ergo nec intellectus unquam elevabitur ad cognitionem intelligibilis increati.

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3. Item, ex secunda suppositione sic: necesse est, esse unionem cognoscibilis ad cognoscentem, ita quod unum sit in altero5; sed cognoscens non est in cognoscibili, sed e converso; sed impossibile est, infinitum capi ab ipso finito: ergo impossibile est esse in illo: ergo Deum esse in intellectu est impossibile, cum sit infinitus.

4. Item, ex tertia suppositione sic: ad cognitionem necesse est, esse in cognoscente iudicium de cognito; sed omne iudicans habet posse super iudicatum6; finitum autem non habet posse super infinitum: ergo de illo non iudicat; sed ad cognitionem requirebatur iudicium: ergo intellectus finitus non cognoscit Deum infinitum, super quem non habet posse.

5. Item, ex quarta sic: necesse est, intellectum cognoscentem informari a cognito7; sed omne quod alterum informat, aut informat per essentiam, aut per similitudinem; sed Deus non informat per essentiam, quia nulli unitur ut forma, nec per similitudinem abstractam, quia similitudo abstracta est spiritualior eo a quo abstrahitur; Deo autem nihil est spiritualius nec potest esse: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

1. Anima rationalis est ad imaginem Dei. Sed sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Trinitate, et est in littera praesentis distinctionis8: «Eo mens est imago Dei, quo capax Dei est et particeps esse potest». Capere autem non est secundum substantiam vel essentiam, quia sic est in omnibus creaturis: ergo per cognitionem et amorem: ergo Deus potest cognosci a creatura.

2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: omnis cognitio spiritualis fit ratione lucis, et ratione lucis increatae, ut dicit Augustinus in Soliloquiis9; sed lux est maxime cognoscibilis, et Deus est summa lux: ergo maxime est cognoscibilis ipsi animae: ergo etc.

3. Item, cum sit10 cognitio aliquorum per praesentiam, aliquorum per similitudinem, illa cognoscuntur verius, quae cognoscuntur per praesentiam, ut dicit Augustinus11; sed Deus est unitus ipsi animae per praesentiam: ergo Deus verius cognoscitur quam alia, quae cognoscuntur per similitudinem.

4. Item, sicut se habet summa bonitas ad dilectionem, sic summa veritas ad cognitionem; sed summa bonitas est summe amabilis ab affectu: ergo12 summa veritas est summe cognoscibilis ab intellectu.

5. Item, unumquodque efficacius potest in id ad quod naturaliter ordinatur13; sed intellectus noster naturaliter ordinatur ad cognitionem summae lucis: ergo illa maxime est cognoscibilis ab ipso.

Conclusio

Deus, in se summe cognoscibilis, etiam nobis esset summe cognoscibilis, si non esset defectus ex parte intellectus nostri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Deus in se tanquam summa lux est summe cognoscibilis; et tanquam lux summe intellectum nostrum complens14, et quantum est de se, esset summe cognoscibilis etiam nobis, nisi esset aliquis defectus a parte virtutis cognoscentis; qui quidem non tollitur perfecte nisi per deiformitatem gloriae. Concedendae sunt igitur rationes15, quod Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura et etiam clarissime cognoscibilis, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid esset impediens vel deficiens ex parte intellectus, sicut post patebit16.

1. Ad obiecta in contrarium dicendum, quod est cognitio per comprehensionem et per apprehensionem. Cognitio per apprehensionem consistit in manifestatione veritatis rei cognitae; cognitio vero comprehensionis consistit in inclusione totalitatis17.

Ad primam cognitionem requiritur proportio convenientiae; et talis est in anima respectu Dei, quia «quodam modo est anima omnia»18, per assimilationem ad omnia, quia nata est cognoscere omnia, et maxime est capax Dei per assimilationem, quia est imago et similitudo Dei.

Quantum ad cognitionem comprehensionis requiritur proportio aequalitatis et aequiparantiae; et talis non est in anima respectu Dei, quia anima est finita, sed Deus est infinitus; et ideo hanc non habet; et de hac intelligit Dionysius, et de illa currit19 obiectio, de alia vero non.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de distantia intelligibilis et sensibilis; dicendum, quod est distantia secundum rationem entis, et secundum rationem cognoscibilis. Primo modo est maior distantia; secundo modo non, quia utrumque est intelligibile, scilicet Deus et anima. Non sic est de intellectu et sensu; quia sensus est potentia determinata21, sed intellectus non.

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3. Ad illud, quod infinitum non capitur a finito; dicunt aliqui, quod capere infinitum est dupliciter20, scilicet quantum ad essentiam; et sic capitur; et quantum ad virtutem22; et sic non capitur, sicut punctus a linea totus attingitur secundum substantiam, sed non totaliter secundum virtutem. Sed ista solutio non videtur solvere, quia in Deo idem est essentia quod virtus, et utraque est infinita.

Ideo dicendum, quod duplex est infinitum: unum, quod se habet per oppositionem ad simplex; et tale non capitur a finito, quale est infinitum molis; aliud est, quod habet infinitatem cum simplicitate, ut Deus23; et tale infinitum, quia simplex, est ubique totum, quia infinitum, in nullo sic est, quin extra illud sit24. Sic intelligendum est in cognitione Dei. Et ideo non sequitur, quod si cognoscitur totus, quod comprehendatur, quia intellectus eius totalitatem non includit, sicut nec creatura immensitatem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur: Iudicans habet posse etc.; dicendum, quod iudicare de aliquo est dupliciter: primo modo discernendo, utrum sit vel non sit; et hoc modo convenit iudicium omni intellectui cognoscenti respectu omnis obiecti; alio modo approbando vel reprobando, utrum ita debeat esse; et sic non iudicat de veritate, sed secundum ipsam de aliis, sicut dicit Augustinus de Vera Religione25, quod «iudex non iudicat de lege, sed secundum ipsam iudicat de aliis». Et de hoc modo verum est quod dicit Augustinus, quod «nullus de illa veritate iudicat, nullus tamen sine illa iudicat». Et de hoc secundo modo26 verum est quod opponit, quod iudicans potest super iudicatum; de primo vero non est verum, quod possit super; potest tamen dirigi ut in obiectum adminiculo illius.

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5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de informatione; dicendum, quod Deus est praesens ipsi animae et omni intellectui per veritatem; ideo non est necesse, ab ipso abstrahi similitudinem, per quam cognoscatur; nihilominus tamen27, dum cognoscitur ab intellectu, intellectus informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, inferior Deo, quia in natura inferiori est, superior tamen anima, quia facit ipsam meliorem. Et hoc dicit Augustinus nono de Trinitate, capitulo undecimo28: «Quemadmodum, cum per sensus corporum discimus corpora, fit eorum aliqua similitudo in animo nostro: ita cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua similitudo Dei; illa notitia tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est».

Scholion

I. Verba S. Doctoris in 2 fund., quod ratione lucis increatae fit omnis spiritualis cognitio, et infra ad 5, quod Deus est praesens omni intellectui per veritatem, aliaque similia plurima, quae praesertim in Itinerario mentis in Deum et in Hexaemeron leguntur, a Malebranche aliisque multis ita intellecta sunt, ut S. Bonaventuram cum ipsis docere putaverint, intellectum humanum videre res intelligibiles obscure quidem, sed immediate in Verbo sive in rationibus aeternis. Sed haec sententia, sicut non potest conciliari cum Decreto S. Congr. Inquisitionis (18. Sept. 1861), quo reprobatur propositio: «Immediata Dei cognitio, habitualis saltem, intellectui humano essentialis est, ita ut sine ea nihil cognoscere possit, siquidem est ipsum lumen intellectuale»; ita etiam manifeste contradicit exploratae nostri Doctoris doctrinae. Ipse enim docet, nec hominem in statu innocentiae, nec ipsos Angelos naturalibus suis viribus immediatam aliquam Dei visionem sive cognitionem habere posse. Quoad Angelos cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, ubi inter alia dicit: «Divina lux propter sui eminentiam est inaccessibilis viribus omnis creaturae»; quoad homines in statu integritatis cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3, qui locus est omnino peremptorius. Reiectis enim variis opinionibus, diffuse ibi docetur, in solo statu gloriae videri Deum immediate et in sui substantia et sine obscuritate; «in statu vero innocentiae et naturae lapsae videtur Deus mediante speculo, sed differenter, quia in statu innocentiae videbatur Deus per speculum clarum; nulla enim erat in anima peccati nebula; in statu vero miseriae videtur per speculum obscuratum per peccatum primi hominis; et ideo nunc videtur per speculum et in aenigmate». Reprobatur ibi etiam sententia eorum, qui saltem «extasim» quendam gradum immediate Deum videndi viris contemplativis pro hac vita a Deo concedi putarunt. Concludit his verbis valde notandis: «Unde si quae auctoritates illud dicere inveniantur, quod Deus in praesenti ab homine videtur et cernitur, non sunt intelligendae, quod videatur in sua essentia, sed quod in aliquo effectu inferiori cognoscitur» etc. — Idem docetur III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 3. et simul refutatur distinctio, quam quidam faciunt inter claritatem Dei eiusque naturam, quia «ipsa natura est claritas et claritas natura», et «non differt essentia luminis et actus lucendi». Et q. 2. dicitur, quod Deus, si immediate cognoscitur, «iam non secundum partem, sed totus cognoscitur». Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. dub. 2. aliique loci passim. Plura vide apud Em. Card. Zigliara: Della Luce intellettuale II. c. 14–18; P. Lepidi: Examen philos. theol. de Ontologismo c. 17; et ex nostris, P. Ludovicus a Castroplanio: Seraphicus Doctor S. Bonaventurae, Romae 1874, p. 61. et seqq.

S. Doctor omnino contrarius est etiam errori Averroistarum, qui unitatem Intellectus agentis in omnibus hominibus statuebant. Affirmat enim, quod «hic error destruit totum ordinem vivendi et agendi» (Serm. de Dono intellectus, Supplem. Bonelli, t. III. col. 475.), et manifestissime docet, in anima humana, quae ad imaginem Dei creata est, essentialiter esse potentiam intellectualem, quae propriam et activam virtutem ad eliciendos varios actus intellectuales habet; unde lumen quoddam creatum apte vocari potest. Hoc docet II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4; et p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi dicit, quod «ratio superior non solum habet iudicare secundum leges aeternas, sed etiam habet iudicare secundum lumen proprium et secundum lumen sibi ab inferiori acquisitum». Cfr. d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6; Hexaem. Serm. 12, et passim; cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 27. m. 1. a. 2. et p. II. q. 69. m. 2. a. 3.

Licet ergo immediatum et proximum principium actuum intellectualium sit animae potentia, sive lumen creatum naturaliter menti inditum, tamen iuxta sententiam scholasticorum communem veritas, certitudo et infallibilitas cognitionis humanae refundi debet in primam et increatam veritatem, quae est omnium rerum et intellectuum prima causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis. Unde recte dicitur, quod intellectus creatus omnia vera cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, non ut in obiecto prius cognito, sed ut in cognitionis principio, sive ut verbis Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1. ad 1.) utamur, non in rationibus, sed per eas. Ita S. Thom., S. I. q. 84. a. 5; q. 88. a. 3. ad 1; q. 12. a. 11. ad 3; q. 16. a. 6. ad 1; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. a. 7. ad 9; S. c. Gent. III. c. 47; de Veritate q. 1. a. 4; q. 10. a. 11. ad 12; Quodl. 10. q. 4. a. 7. et alibi. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 27. m. 1. a. 2. ad 1. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 3. q. 4. praesertim n. 18–23. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 4; aliique multi.

Fundamentalis huius doctrinae ratio, quae communiter ab antiquis scholasticis proponitur, haec est, quod increatae Veritatis lux secundum similitudinem refulget in veritate creata, sive haec accipiatur in sensu obiectivo, sive subiectivo. De veritate creata in sensu obiectivo dicit S. Bonav. (Hexaem. Serm. 12.): «In qualibet creatura est refulgentia divini exemplaris, sed cum tenebris permixta». In sensu subiectivo veritas creata est ipsum mentis lumen creatum, quod est impressio quaedam primae veritatis, cuius similitudo refulget in intellectu nostro, qui, ut imago Dei, «fert in se a sua origine lumen vultus divini» (S. Bonav. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1; cfr. S. Thom. Expos. in Psal. 34; S. I. q. 105. a. 3.).

Ratio secunda est, quod Deus non tantum lumen intellectus ad exemplar divinum creat et conservat, sed etiam ad actus eiusdem concurrit, dum immediate eum movet et dirigit. Etiam hac ratione actus intellectuales a Deo dependere et in eum debere aliquo modo refundi, est sententia communis antiquorum scholasticorum; cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 105. a. 3; I. II. q. 10. a. 4. — Scot., pluribus in locis, collectis ab Hieron. de Montefortino in Sum. Scoti, Romae, 1728, p. I. q. 105. a. 3–5. — Iste concursus divinus non immerito quaedam illuminatio Dei immediata vocari potest, uti bene docent Em. Card. Zigliara in opere: Della Luce intellettuale IV. c. 12. et P. Kleutgen in libro: Philosophie der Vorzeit t. I. 1. Abth. n. 60; cfr. etiam S. Thom. in Ioan. c. 1. lect. 3. n. 2; S. III. q. 8. a. 4. ad 2; S. I. q. 79. a. 4; Quaest. unica de anima a. 5. ad 9; Opusc. 73 supra Boeth. q. 1. a. 4. et alibi.

Hanc cooperationem divinam sive illuminationem multum urgent et S. August. et S. Bonav. Mens Doctoris Seraphici de hac re, sexcenties breviter expressa, fuse declaratur anecdota quadam quaestione disputata, a P. Fidele a Fanna reperta et quoad partem principalem in lucem edita (Ratio novae collectionis etc. Taurini, 1874, p. 222). Hanc quaestionem integram, additis aliis documentis ineditis tum ipsius Bonav., tum trium eiusdem discipulorum, nempe Matthaei ab Aquasparta, Ioan. Pecchami et cuiusdam Eustachii, Deo favente, libro speciali proxime in lucem dabimus, quo tum sententia S. Doctoris penitus declarabitur, tum demonstrabitur, B. Albertum M. aliosque antiquos omnino cum ipso Seraphico consentire, nec S. Thom. in re principali contrarium docere.

II. His praesuppositis, verba: «Deus est praesens omni intellectui per veritatem», nullam faciunt difficultatem, praesertim cum ab ipso S. Doctore interpretatio Ontologistarum explicite reprobetur (II. Sent. d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1, et ibid. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3. 4.). Egregie sinceram suam sententiam explicat infra d. 17. p. I. q. 4 in corp., ubi cum S. August. distinguit cognitionem per speciem a rebus materialibus abstractam ab illa cognitione, quae fit per veritatem, id est «per similitudinem infusam vel innatam»; et addit: «Utraque autem, quae sic cognoscuntur, dicuntur ab Augustino cognosci in veritate». De similitudine vel habitu innato cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Recte S. Doctor (ad 5.) negat, Deum cognosci per similitudinem ab ipso abstractam, quia de Deo non habemus conceptum nisi analogum et aliunde formatum. Etiam S. Thom. (I. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3.) docet: «Non dicimur cognoscere ea (Deum et Angelos) per abstractionem, sed per impressionem in intelligentias nostras». Consentiunt B. Albert. (hic a. 2. ad 2.) et Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 1. ad 4.).

III. In solut. ad 5. verba: «Intellectus noster informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa», explicari possunt de specie sive impressa sive expressa, quam intellectus format ex veritate creata et animae essentialiter impressa, de qua S. Doctor loquitur infra d. 17. p. II. q. 4. Non tamen excluditur, quod sub voce notitia intelligi possit etiam illa illuminatio divina, de qua supra locuti sumus. Hoc insinuare videntur alii loci S. Bonav., imprimis II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4, ubi loquendo de cognitione Angelorum, sic concludit: «Adhuc est tertius modus cognoscendi, scil. per effectus visibiles et per substantias spirituales et per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti, quod est similitudo quaedam Dei non abstracta, sed infusa, inferior Deo, quia in inferiori natura» etc. Cfr. etiam quae de scientia Christi dicit III. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. 2. In hoc sensu istum locum S. Augustini, a S. Bonav. hic laudatum, intelligit Fr. Eustachius, discipulus S. Bonav., Doctor Parisiensis saec. XIII., uti colligitur ex quadam quaestione anecdota ipsius proxime a nobis in libro supra memorato edenda.

IV. Hanc et sequentem quaestionem mire illustrat S. Bonav. in Itiner. mentis in Deum, et Hexaem. Serm. 5. 10. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 1. seqq. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 12. a. 12. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 15; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 13. m. 1. et q. 14. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 33. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 2. q. 9. et d. 3.

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English Translation

Single Article

On the knowability of God.

Question I

Whether God is knowable by a creature.

Concerning the first question, it is shown that God is not knowable by a creature:

1. By the authority of Dionysius in On the Divine Names1: «It is not possible either to speak of God or to understand Him».

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason through a fourfold presupposition that must obtain in any act of knowing — namely proportion, union or reception, judgment, and2 information. For the intellect does not understand anything except what is proportionable to it, and what is in some way united to it, and what it judges, and by which the sharpness of its understanding is informed.

From the first presupposition it is argued thus: there must be a proportion between the knower and the knowable3; but there is no proportion of God to the intellect, because God is infinite and the intellect finite: therefore, etc. Furthermore, if there is some proportion, it seems not to be sufficient, because the uncreated truth is more distant from the human intellect than any created intelligible is from sense. But sense, which is receptive of the sensible4, is never elevated to the knowledge of a created intelligible: therefore neither will the intellect ever be elevated to the knowledge of the uncreated intelligible.

3. Likewise, from the second presupposition: there must be a union of the knowable to the knower, such that one is in the other5; but the knower is not in the knowable, but the reverse; and it is impossible for the infinite to be grasped by the finite: therefore it is impossible for it to be in the other: therefore it is impossible for God to be in the intellect, since He is infinite.

4. Likewise, from the third presupposition: for knowledge there must be in the knower a judgment about what is known; but every one who judges has power over what is judged6; the finite, however, does not have power over the infinite: therefore it does not judge about it; but judgment is required for knowledge: therefore the finite intellect does not know the infinite God, over whom it has no power.

5. Likewise, from the fourth: the knowing intellect must be informed by what is known7; but whatever informs another either informs it through its essence or through a likeness; but God does not inform through His essence, because He is not united to any subject as a form, nor through an abstracted likeness, because an abstracted likeness is more spiritual than that from which it is abstracted — and nothing is or can be more spiritual than God: therefore, etc.

On the contrary:

1. The rational soul is in the image of God. But as Augustine says in the book On the Trinity — and it is in the text of the present distinction8: «The mind is the image of God precisely insofar as it is capable of God and can be a partaker of Him». But to be capable is not according to substance or essence, because in that way the case is the same in all creatures: therefore it is through knowledge and love: therefore God can be known by a creature.

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason thus: all spiritual knowledge occurs by virtue of light — indeed, by virtue of the uncreated light, as Augustine says in the Soliloquies9; but light is supremely knowable, and God is the supreme light: therefore He is supremely knowable to the soul itself: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, since there is10 a knowledge of some things by presence and of others by likeness, those things are more truly known which are known by presence, as Augustine says11; but God is united to the soul itself by presence: therefore God is more truly known than other things which are known by likeness.

4. Likewise, as supreme goodness stands to love, so supreme truth stands to knowledge; but supreme goodness is supremely lovable by the affection: therefore12 supreme truth is supremely knowable by the intellect.

5. Likewise, each thing can act more effectively upon that to which it is naturally ordered13; but our intellect is naturally ordered to the knowledge of the supreme light: therefore that light is most of all knowable by it.

Conclusion

God, supremely knowable in Himself, would also be supremely knowable by us, if there were no defect on the part of our intellect.

I respond: It must be said that God in Himself, as supreme light, is supremely knowable; and as a light that supremely fulfills our intellect14, He would be, so far as He Himself is concerned, supremely knowable even by us, unless there were some defect on the part of the knowing power — a defect that is not perfectly removed except by the God-likeness of glory. The arguments15 that God is knowable by creatures and even most clearly knowable, so far as He Himself is concerned, unless something impedes or is lacking on the part of the intellect, are therefore to be conceded — as will be shown afterward16.

1. To the objections raised on the contrary: it must be said that there is knowledge by comprehension and knowledge by apprehension. Knowledge by apprehension consists in the manifestation of the truth of the thing known; but knowledge by comprehension consists in the inclusion of totality17.

For the first kind of knowledge, a proportion of fittingness is required; and such proportion exists in the soul with respect to God, because «the soul is in some way all things»18 — through its assimilation to all things, since it is naturally suited to know all things, and is most capable of God through assimilation, because it is the image and likeness of God.

For the second kind of knowledge — knowledge by comprehension — a proportion of equality and equivalence is required; and this does not exist in the soul with respect to God, because the soul is finite while God is infinite; and therefore the soul does not have this proportion. It is of this second kind that Dionysius speaks, and the objection runs19 against it — but not against the other.

2. To the objection concerning the distance between the intelligible and the sensible: it must be said that distance can be measured according to the account of being and according to the account of the knowable. In the first way there is greater distance; in the second there is not, because both — namely God and the soul — are intelligible. This is not so in the case of intellect and sense, because the sense is a determined power21, but the intellect is not.

3. To the objection that the infinite cannot be grasped by the finite: some say that to grasp the infinite is twofold20 — namely with respect to essence, and in this way the infinite is grasped; and with respect to power22, and in this way it is not grasped — just as a point is entirely reached according to substance by a line, but not totally according to power. But this solution does not seem to resolve the difficulty, because in God essence and power are the same, and each is infinite.

Therefore it must be said that infinite is twofold: one kind that stands in opposition to the simple, and such an infinite is not grasped by the finite — this is infinite mass; another kind that has infinity together with simplicity, such as God23; and such an infinite, because it is simple, is wholly everywhere, and because it is infinite, is in no thing in such a way that it is not also outside that thing24. This is how the cognition of God must be understood. And therefore it does not follow that if He is known wholly, He is comprehended — because the intellect does not include His totality, just as no creature includes His immensity.

4. To the objection that one who judges has power, etc.: it must be said that to judge about something is twofold: in the first way, by discerning whether it is or is not — and in this way judgment belongs to every intellect that knows with respect to every object; in another way, by approving or disapproving whether it ought to be so — and in this way one does not judge about truth, but according to it judges about other things, as Augustine says in On True Religion25: «The judge does not judge about the law, but according to it judges about other things». And concerning this mode it is true what Augustine says, that "no one judges about that truth, yet no one judges without it." And it is of this second mode26 that what is objected holds true — that the one who judges has power over what is judged; but of the first mode it is not true that it has power over it — it can nonetheless be directed toward it as toward an object with the assistance of that truth.

5. To the last objection concerning information: it must be said that God is present to the soul itself and to every intellect through truth; therefore it is not necessary for a likeness to be abstracted from Him by which He may be known. Nevertheless27, when He is known by the intellect, the intellect is informed by a certain knowledge, which is as it were a likeness — not abstracted, but impressed — inferior to God, because it is in an inferior nature, yet superior to the soul, because it makes the soul better. And this is what Augustine says in the ninth book On the Trinity, chapter eleven28: «Just as when we learn bodies through the senses of the body, some likeness of them is formed in our mind: so when we know God, some likeness of God is formed; yet that knowledge is inferior, because it is in an inferior nature».

Scholion

I. The words of the holy Doctor in the 2nd sed contra — that all spiritual knowledge takes place by virtue of uncreated light — and below in the reply to 5 — that God is present to every intellect through truth — and many other similar statements (especially such as are read in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum and in the Hexaemeron) have been so understood by Malebranche and many others that they supposed St. Bonaventure to teach, along with them, that the human intellect sees intelligible things immediately, though obscurely, in the Word or in the eternal reasons. But this opinion, just as it cannot be reconciled with the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition (18 September 1861), by which is reprobated the proposition: «An immediate knowledge of God, at least habitual, is essential to the human intellect, such that without it it can know nothing, since it is itself the intellectual light» — so also it manifestly contradicts the tested doctrine of our Doctor. For he himself teaches that neither man in the state of innocence, nor the angels themselves by their own natural powers, can have any immediate vision or knowledge of God. For angels, see II Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, where among other things he says: «The divine light, because of its eminence, is inaccessible to the powers of every creature»; for men in the state of integrity see II Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, which passage is altogether peremptory. There, having rejected various opinions, it is taught at length that only in the state of glory is God seen immediately and in His very substance and without obscurity; «but in the state of innocence and of fallen nature God is seen by the mediation of a mirror, yet differently: in the state of innocence God was seen through a clear mirror, for there was no cloud of sin in the soul; but in the state of misery He is seen through a mirror darkened by the sin of the first man — and therefore now He is seen through a mirror and in an enigma». The opinion of those who held that a kind of «ecstasy» — some degree of seeing God immediately — is granted by God to contemplatives even in this life is also rejected there. He concludes with these very notable words: «Hence if any authorities are found that say God is seen and beheld in the present life by man, they are not to be understood as meaning that He is seen in His essence, but that He is known in some lower effect», etc. — The same is taught in III Sent. d. 14, a. 1, q. 3, and at the same time there is refuted the distinction which some make between God's brightness and His nature, since «the nature itself is the brightness and the brightness the nature», and «the essence of light and the act of shining do not differ». And in q. 2 it is said that God, if He is known immediately, «is now known not in part but wholly». Cf. also I Sent. d. 17, p. I, dub. 2, and other places passim. For more see Cardinal Zigliara, Della Luce intellettuale II, cc. 14–18; Lepidi, Examen philosophico-theologicum de Ontologismo, c. 17; and from our own order, P. Lodovico da Castroplanio, Il Dottore Serafico S. Bonaventura, Rome 1874, p. 61 ff.

The holy Doctor is likewise altogether opposed to the error of the Averroists, who held the unity of the Agent Intellect in all men. For he affirms that «this error destroys the whole order of living and acting» (Serm. de Dono intellectus, Bonelli's Supplementum, vol. III, col. 475), and teaches most clearly that in the human soul, which was created to the image of God, there is essentially an intellectual power which has its own proper and active virtue for eliciting diverse intellectual acts — whence it can aptly be called a kind of created light. He teaches this in II Sent. d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 4; and in p. II, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, where he says that «the higher reason not only has to judge according to the eternal laws, but also has to judge according to its own light and according to the light acquired to it from the lower». Cf. d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6; Hexaem. Serm. 12, and passim; cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 27, m. 1, a. 2, and p. II, q. 69, m. 2, a. 3.

Therefore although the immediate and proximate principle of intellectual acts is the soul's own power — or the created light naturally placed in the mind — nevertheless, according to the common opinion of the scholastics, the truth, certitude, and infallibility of human knowledge must be referred back to the first and uncreated truth, which is the first efficient, exemplar, and final cause of all things and of all intellects. Whence it is rightly said that the created intellect knows all truths in the eternal reasons — not as in an object first known, but as in a principle of knowledge; or, to use the words of Alexander of Hales (Summa p. I, q. 2, m. 3, a. 1, ad 1), not in the reasons but through them. So St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 84, a. 5; q. 88, a. 3, ad 1; q. 12, a. 11, ad 3; q. 16, a. 6, ad 1; IV Sent. d. 49, q. 2, a. 7, ad 9; Summa contra Gentes III, c. 47; De Veritate q. 1, a. 4; q. 10, a. 11, ad 12; Quodl. 10, q. 4, a. 7, and elsewhere. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 27, m. 1, a. 2, ad 1. — Scotus, I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, especially nn. 18–23. — Richard of Middleton, II Sent. d. 24, a. 2, q. 4; and many others.

The fundamental reason of this doctrine, commonly proposed by the old scholastics, is this: that the light of uncreated Truth shines by likeness in created truth — whether this be taken in an objective or in a subjective sense. Of created truth in the objective sense St. Bonaventure says (Hexaem. Serm. 12): «In every creature there is a refulgence of the divine exemplar, but mixed with darkness». In the subjective sense created truth is the very created light of the mind, which is a kind of impression of the first truth, whose likeness shines in our intellect, which, as the image of God, «bears in itself from its origin the light of the divine countenance» (St. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1; cf. St. Thomas, Expos. in Psal. 34; Summa I, q. 105, a. 3).

The second reason is that God not only creates and preserves the light of the intellect according to the divine exemplar, but also concurs with its acts, while He immediately moves and directs it. By this reason too — that intellectual acts depend on God and must in some way be referred back to Him — is the common opinion of the old scholastics; cf. St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 105, a. 3; I-II, q. 10, a. 4. — Scotus, in several places, collected by Girolamo da Montefortino in his Sum. Scoti, Rome 1728, p. I, q. 105, a. 3–5. — This divine concurrence can not improperly be called a kind of immediate illumination of God, as Cardinal Zigliara rightly teaches in the work Della Luce intellettuale IV, c. 12, and P. Kleutgen in the book Philosophie der Vorzeit vol. I, part 1, n. 60; cf. also St. Thomas, In Ioan. c. 1, lect. 3, n. 2; Summa III, q. 8, a. 4, ad 2; I, q. 79, a. 4; Quaest. unica de anima a. 5, ad 9; Opusc. 73 on Boethius, q. 1, a. 4, and elsewhere.

Both St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure greatly press this divine cooperation or illumination. The mind of the Seraphic Doctor on this matter, briefly expressed in countless places, is set out at length in a certain hitherto-unpublished disputed question, discovered by P. Fidele da Fanna and in its principal part published (Ratio novae collectionis etc., Turin 1874, p. 222). This question in its entirety, together with other unpublished documents both of Bonaventure himself and of three of his disciples — namely Matthew of Aquasparta, John Pecham, and a certain Eustace — we shall, God willing, soon bring to light in a separate volume, by which both the mind of the Holy Doctor will be thoroughly clarified, and it will be shown that Blessed Albert the Great and other ancients entirely agree with the Seraphic himself, and that St. Thomas in the principal point does not teach the contrary.

II. With these presuppositions in place, the words «God is present to every intellect through truth» cause no difficulty, especially since the ontologist interpretation is explicitly reprobated by the Holy Doctor himself (II Sent. d. 10, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1, and ibid. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3 and 4). He excellently explains his own genuine view below in d. 17, p. I, q. 4, in the body, where with St. Augustine he distinguishes knowledge through a species abstracted from material things from that knowledge which takes place through truth, that is, «through an infused or innate likeness»; and he adds: «Yet both things which are thus known are said by Augustine to be known in truth». On the innate likeness or habitus cf. II Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — Rightly the holy Doctor (in the reply to 5) denies that God is known through a likeness abstracted from Him, because of God we have no concept except an analogical one, and that formed from elsewhere. St. Thomas too (I Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3) teaches: «We are not said to know them (God and the angels) through abstraction, but through an impression on our intelligences». Blessed Albert (here a. 2, ad 2) and Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 1, ad 4) agree.

III. In the reply to 5 the words «Our intellect is informed by a certain knowledge, which is as it were a certain likeness, not abstracted but impressed» can be explained of the impressed or expressed species which the intellect forms from the created truth essentially impressed upon the soul, of which the Holy Doctor speaks below in d. 17, p. II, q. 4. It is not, however, excluded that under the word notitia there may also be understood that divine illumination of which we have spoken above. Other passages of St. Bonaventure seem to suggest this — especially II Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, ad 4, where, speaking of the knowledge of angels, he thus concludes: «There is yet a third mode of knowing, namely through visible effects and through spiritual substances and through the influence of a light connatural to the knowing power, which is a certain likeness of God, not abstracted but infused, inferior to God, because in an inferior nature», etc. Cf. also what he says concerning the knowledge of Christ in III Sent. d. 14, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1 and 2. In this sense that passage of St. Augustine, cited here by St. Bonaventure, is understood by Brother Eustace, a disciple of St. Bonaventure and a Parisian Doctor of the 13th century, as is gathered from a certain unpublished question of his, shortly to be edited by us in the book mentioned above.

IV. This question and the following one are remarkably illuminated by St. Bonaventure in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum and in the Hexaemeron Serm. 5 and 10. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 2, m. 1 ff. — Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 12, a. 12. — Blessed Albert, I Sent. d. 1, a. 15; Summa p. I, tr. 3, q. 13, m. 1, and q. 14, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 1 princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 33. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, I Sent. d. 2, q. 9, and d. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. De Div. Nom. cap. 1 circa medium: Quem neque intelligere possibile est neque dicere (ed. Migne iuxta transl. Scoti Erigenae).
    Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 1, near the middle: «Whom it is not possible either to understand or to speak of» (Migne's edition, following the translation of Scotus Eriugena).
  2. Omittitur contra codd. et ed. 1 in Vat. et.
    The Vatican ed. omits et, against the manuscripts and ed. 1.
  3. Aristot., VI Ethic. c. 1: Si quidem ex similitudine quadam et affinitate cognitio existit ipsis (scil. potentiis animae). — Paulo infra post intellectum subaudi creaturae sive humanum. Mox codd. et edd. inter se dissident; multi codd. ut A F G K M S T W X Z bb ee post infinitum omittunt minus bene et intellectus finitus; plures ut H Y ff cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ponunt sed pro et, cod. R vero; tandem cod. ee post intellectus addit noster; nihil duximus immutandum. — Aristot., I de Caelo, text. 82 (c. 6): Ratio autem nulla est infiniti ad finitum.
    Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, c. 1: «For knowledge arises in them (i.e., in the powers of the soul) from a certain likeness and affinity». — A little below, after intellectum, supply creaturae sive humanum («of a creature, i.e., a human intellect»). Next, the codices and editions disagree among themselves: many codd. (A F G K M S T W X Z bb ee) less well omit et intellectus finitus after infinitum; several (H Y ff, with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) put sed for et, and cod. R vero; finally cod. ee adds noster after intellectus. We have thought nothing should be changed. — Aristotle, On the Heavens I, text 82 (c. 6): «There is no ratio at all between the infinite and the finite».
  4. Ex mss. I X Z pro sensibili, quod Vat. cum plurimis mss. habet, substituimus sensu, quod contextui magis correspondet formamque argumenti completiorem reddit, ac confirmatur ex Richardo a Med., hic a. 1, q. 1, et Petro a Tar., hic q. 1, qui idem argumentum eodem modo proponunt. Paulo ante cod. K creato pro humano. — De propositione minore huius argumenti cfr. Boeth., V de Consol. Prosa 1.
    From mss. I X Z we have substituted sensu («by sense») for sensibili («to the sensible»), which the Vatican ed. with most mss. has. Sensu corresponds better to the context and renders the form of the argument more complete; it is confirmed by Richard of Middleton (here a. 1, q. 1) and Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1), who set forth the same argument in the same way. A little earlier, cod. K reads creato for humano. — On the minor premise of this argument see Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy V, prose 1.
  5. Colligitur ex eo, quod cognitio sit actio immanens, de qua vide Aristot., IX Metaph. text. 16 (VIII, 8); et supponitur ab Aristot., III de Anima, text. 6 et 37–39 (c. 4 et 8), ubi dicit, animam esse locum formarum, ipsam cognoscendo quodammodo esse omnia, in ipsa non esse ipsas res, sed formas earum intellectumque esse formam formarum.
    This is gathered from the fact that knowledge is an immanent action — on which see Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 16 (VIII.8); and it is presupposed by Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 6 and 37–39 (c. 4 and 8), where he says that the soul is the place of forms, that by knowing it is in some way all things, that the things themselves are not in it but the forms of them, and that the intellect is the form of forms.
  6. August., de Vera Relig. c. 29, n. 53: […] iam vero illud videre facillimum est, praestantiorem esse iudicantem, quam illa res est, de qua iudicatur. — Cod. X hic addit sicut dicit Augustinus.
    Augustine, On True Religion, c. 29, n. 53: «[…] it is now very easy to see that the one who judges is more excellent than the thing about which he judges». — Cod. X here adds sicut dicit Augustinus («as Augustine says»).
  7. Textus Aristot. de hac re vide supra in arg. ex secunda suppositione. — De duplici modo informationis, scil. per essentiam et per similitudinem, cfr. infra fundam. 3. — Mox post Deus non informat supple cum cod. R intellectum.
    For Aristotle's text on this matter see above, in the argument from the second presupposition. — On the twofold mode of information (through essence and through likeness), cf. below, foundation 3. — A little later, after Deus non informat, supply intellectum («the intellect») with cod. R.
  8. Cap. 2 circa initium. In ipso textu Augustini mss. cum ed. 1 habent et pro eiusque, quod habet Vat. cum originali. — Paulo infra post autem cod. 0 addit hic.
    [Augustine, de Trin. XIV,] c. 2 near the beginning. In the Augustinian text itself, the mss. with ed. 1 read et for eiusque, which the Vatican ed. has with the original. — A little below, after autem, cod. 0 adds hic.
  9. Sensus, non verba Augustini allegantur ex I Soliloq. c. 8, ubi sic habetur: Credendum est, ea (intelligibilia disciplinarum spectamina) non posse intelligi, nisi ab alio quasi suo sole illustrentur (qui sol, ut ex ibi sequentibus patet, ipse secretissimus Deus est). — Vat. hoc argumentum mutilate exhibet, omittendo scilicet in propositione maiore et ratione lucis, et in minore et Deus est summa lux; ergo maxime est cognoscibilis.
    The sense, not the words, of Augustine is alleged from Soliloquies I, c. 8, where we read: «It must be believed that these (the intelligible objects of the disciplines) cannot be understood except as they are illumined by another, as it were by their own sun» (which sun, as is plain from what follows, is the most hidden God himself). — The Vatican ed. presents this argument in a mutilated form, omitting et ratione lucis («and by virtue of light») in the major premise and et Deus est summa lux; ergo maxime est cognoscibilis («and God is supreme light; therefore He is maximally knowable») in the minor.
  10. Substituimus ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 sit pro fiat.
    On the authority of the mss. and edd. 1, 2, 3 we have substituted sit for fiat.
  11. Forte respiciuntur illa quae X de Trin. c. 8–11 habentur, ubi ostenditur, animam eo ipso, quod sibi sit praesens, certiorem cognitionem habere de se quam de rebus exterioribus, quas per imagines sive similitudines percipit; vel etiam haec VIII de Trin. c. 8, n. 12: Ecce iam potest notiorem Deum habere, quam fratrem; plane notiorem, quia praesentiorem, notiorem, quia interiorem, notiorem, quia certiorem. Quae verba S. Bonaventura infra d. 17, p. I, dub. 2 tali explicat modo, qui sensum huius argumenti illustrat. Cfr. etiam libr. de Magistro, c. 12, nn. 39–40, et de Videndo Deo, c. 16, n. 38, ubi et duplex cognoscendi modus, scilicet per praesentiam et per similitudinem, proponitur. — Plures antiquiorum mss. ut C I M S T V Y etc. post cognoscuntur, licet non falso, tamen propter argumenti formam minus bene per essentiam loco per praesentiam; melius codd. L O per essentiam vel praesentiam. Paulo post cod. Y illa pro alia.
    Perhaps reference is made to what is found in On the Trinity X, cc. 8–11, where it is shown that the soul, by the very fact that it is present to itself, has a more certain knowledge of itself than of external things, which it perceives through images or likenesses; or even to this, On the Trinity VIII, c. 8, n. 12: «Behold, one can now have God as more known than a brother — plainly more known, because more present; more known, because more interior; more known, because more certain». These words St. Bonaventure explains below at d. 17, p. I, dub. 2 in a way that illuminates the sense of this argument. Cf. also the book On the Teacher, c. 12, nn. 39–40, and On Seeing God, c. 16, n. 38, where the twofold mode of knowing — by presence and by likeness — is also set forth. — Several of the older mss. (C I M S T V Y etc.), though not falsely, yet less well for the form of the argument, read per essentiam instead of per praesentiam after cognoscuntur; better are codd. L O, per essentiam vel praesentiam. A little later cod. Y reads illa for alia.
  12. Ed. 1 satis bene addit particulam et.
    Ed. 1 adds the particle et quite suitably.
  13. Cfr. Boeth., III de Consol. Prosa 11. — Cod. C hanc propositionem ita exhibet: unumquodque est efficacius, quando potest in id. In fine argumenti cod. X addit ipsi animae; melius placeret intellectui nostro.
    Cf. Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy III, prose 11. — Cod. C presents this proposition thus: unumquodque est efficacius, quando potest in id («each thing is more efficacious when it can act upon that to which…»). At the end of the argument cod. X adds ipsi animae («to the soul itself»); intellectui nostro («to our intellect») would be preferable.
  14. Hoc est, illuminando perficiens. — Immediate post Vat., reluctantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omittit et, sed minus bene; et paulo post substituit deiformationem pro deiformitatem.
    That is, perfecting by illuminating. — Immediately after, the Vatican ed., against the manuscripts and the first six editions, omits et, though less well; and a little later substitutes deiformationem for deiformitatem.
  15. Supple cum codd. N V quae probant. Paulo infra Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 aliud loco aliquid, sed minus apte.
    Supply quae probant («which prove [this]») with codd. N V. A little below, the Vatican ed., against the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, reads aliud for aliquid, but less aptly.
  16. In duabus seqq. qq. et II Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3.
    [See further] in the two following questions, and in II Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3.
  17. August., de Videndo Deo, c. 9, n. 21, ait: Aliud est enim videre, aliud est totum videndo comprehendere. Quandoquidem id videtur, quod praesens utcumque sentitur: totum autem comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem, aut cuius fines circumspici possunt.
    Augustine, On Seeing God, c. 9, n. 21, says: «For to see is one thing, and to comprehend the whole by seeing is another. Indeed, that is seen which is in any way felt as present; but the whole is comprehended by seeing when it is so seen that nothing of it is hidden from the one who sees, or whose limits can be surveyed».
  18. Aristot., III de Anima, text. 37 (c. 8).
    Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 37 (c. 8).
  19. Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus currit pro certat.
    From the mss. and ed. 1 we have substituted currit («runs against») for certat («contends with»).
  20. Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit Vat. duplex.
    Against the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, the Vatican ed. here adds duplex («twofold»).
  21. Hoc est, propter alligationem ad organum seu propter materialitatem est ad unum obiectorum genus percipiendum limitata. De hac sensus et intellectus differentia vide Aristot., III de Anima, text. 3–6 (c. 4).
    That is, by reason of its binding to an organ — or because of its materiality — [sense] is limited to perceiving a single genus of objects. On this difference between sense and intellect, see Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 3–6 (c. 4).
  22. Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 virtuositatem.
    The Vatican ed., against the codices and ed. 1, reads virtuositatem.
  23. Cod. R hic addit eius.
    Cod. R here adds eius («His»).
  24. Ed. 1 uno. Mox cod. 0 post non sit addit et quod hoc sit.
    Ed. 1 reads uno («one»). Next, cod. 0 after non sit adds et quod hoc sit («and that this is so»).
  25. De Vera Relig. cap. 31, n. 58: Sicut in istis temporalibus legibus, quamquam de his homines iudicent, cum eas instituunt, tamen cum fuerint institutae atque firmatae, non licebit iudici de ipsis iudicare, sed secundum ipsas. — Loco citato inveniuntur etiam verba, quae immediate post S. Doctor ex Augustino affert: Ut enim nos et omnes animae rationales secundum veritatem de inferioribus recte iudicamus, sic de nobis, quando ei cohaeremus, sola ipsa veritas iudicat… ita etiam quantum potest lex ipsa, etiam ipse (homo spiritualis et Deo coniunctus) fit, secundum quam iudicat omnia, et de qua iudicare nullus potest. — Plures codd. ut H W Y, omissa particula de, legunt Et hoc modo.
    On True Religion, c. 31, n. 58: «Just as in these temporal laws, although men judge of them when they establish them, nevertheless, when they have been established and confirmed, it will not be lawful for a judge to judge about them, but only according to them». — In the same place there are found also the words which the Holy Doctor immediately after cites from Augustine: «For just as we and all rational souls rightly judge inferior things according to truth, so of ourselves — when we cleave to it — truth alone judges… and just so, in the measure it is possible, the spiritual man united to God himself becomes [that] according to which he judges all things, and about which no one can judge». — Several codd. (H W Y), omitting the particle de, read Et hoc modo.
  26. Posuimus in textu hoc secundo modo et paulo post de primo modo non est verum, licet alii codd. ut D G H Y etc. pro hoc secundo modo habeant de hoc primo modo, alii ut F T bb de primo modo, alii ut A cum Vat. de hoc modo et paulo post omnes codd. legant de secundo vero non est verum. Ex contextu siquidem constat, lectiones codicum esse erroneas; quod confirmatur etiam ex Augustino loc. cit. circa finem, ubi iisdem fere verbis eadem proponit ac S. Bonaventura. Scriptores in errorem videntur esse inducti ex eo, quod isti duo numeri ponendi sint ordine inverso. — Codd. aa bb satis bene posse habet loco potest. Circa finem huius responsionis post dirigi supplevimus ex mss. et sex primis edd. ut.
    We have set in the text hoc secundo modo («in this second way») and a little later de primo modo non est verum («of the first way it is not true»), although other codd. (D G H Y etc.) in place of hoc secundo modo have de hoc primo modo; others (F T bb) de primo modo; others (A with Vat.) de hoc modo; and a little later all codd. read de secundo vero non est verum. It is clear from the context, however, that the codex readings are erroneous; this is also confirmed by Augustine at the end of the passage cited, where he proposes the same things in nearly the same words as St. Bonaventure. The scribes seem to have been led into error because these two numbers should have been placed in inverse order. — Codd. aa bb quite well read posse for potest. Near the end of this response, after dirigi, we have supplied ut from the mss. and the first six editions.
  27. Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 adiecimus tamen.
    From the mss. and edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 we have added tamen («nevertheless»).
  28. [Augustine, de Trin. IX, c. 11,] n. 16; in quo textu plures codd. ut A G I T Y Z aa bb cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 discutimus, codd. F K X discernimus loco discimus; ac mox plurimi codd. ut A C F G H K L O R S T U V W Y aa ee ff similitudine pro similitudo Dei.
    [Augustine, On the Trinity IX, c. 11,] n. 16; in which text several codd. (A G I T Y Z aa bb, with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) read discutimus, and codd. F K X discernimus, in place of discimus. Next, most codd. (A C F G H K L O R S T U V W Y aa ee ff) read similitudine for similitudo Dei.
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