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Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II

Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis per creaturas.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis per creaturas. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia via ad errorem non est via ad cognitionem; sed cognitio per creaturam est via erroris: ergo etc. Probatio minoris: Sapientiae decimo quarto1: Creaturae Dei sunt in deceptionem et in odium et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium. Praeterea, Augustinus de Libero Arbitrio2 loquitur de his, qui occupantur in creaturis: «Dorsum ad Te vertentes, in corporali opere tanquam in umbra sua defiguntur».

2. Item, tenebra vel tenebrosum non est via ad cognoscendum luminosum sive lucem3; sed creatura est tenebra, Deus autem est lux: ergo Deus non est cognoscibilis per creaturam.

3. Item, medium, per quod cognoscitur aliquid vel probatur de extremo, debet communicare in aliquo cum eo ad quod cognoscendum est4; sed Creator et creatura nihil habent commune: ergo Deus non cognoscitur per creaturas.

4. Item, omne medium, per quod ascenditur ad extremum, distat ab illo gradibus finitis5; sed omnis creatura quantumcumque nobilis distat a Deo gradibus infinitis, quia quantumcumque duplicatur, nunquam perveniet ad eius nobilitatem: ergo per creaturam non ascenditur in cognitionem Dei.

Contra:

1. Sapientiae decimo tertio6: A magnitudine speciei et creaturae cognoscibiliter poterit Creator horum videri. Unde Isidorus de Summo bono7: «Ex pulcritudine circumscriptae creaturae pulcritudinem suam, quae circumscribi non potest, facit Deus intelligi».

2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: contingit non solum effectum cognosci per causam, sed etiam causam per effectum8: ergo si Deus agit tanquam causa secundum suam nobilitatem, et creatura est effectus, Deus potest cognosci per creaturas.

3. Item, sensibile est via cognoscendi intelligibile9; sed creatura sensibilis, Deus intelligibilis: ergo per creaturam est devenire in cognitionem Creatoris.

4. Item, contingit simile cognosci per simile10; sed omnis creatura est similis Deo vel sicut vestigium, vel sicut imago: ergo per omnem creaturam contingit cognosci Deum.

Quaeritur ergo, quae differentia sit inter vestigium et imaginem; et cum in omni creatura sit vestigium, quaeritur, quare non similiter imago, et secundum quid attendatur11 vestigium.

Conclusio

Deus per creaturas naturali rationis lumine cognosci potest.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, quia relucet causa in effectu, et sapientia artificis manifestatur in opere, ideo Deus, qui est artifex et causa creaturae, per ipsam cognoscitur.

Et ad hoc duplex est ratio, una est propter convenientiam, alia propter indigentiam: propter convenientiam, quia omnis creatura magis ducit in Deum quam in aliquod aliud; propter indigentiam, quia, cum Deus tanquam lux summe spiritualis non possit cognosci in sua spiritualitate ab intellectu quasi materiali, indiget anima cognoscere ipsum per creaturam12.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognitio creaturae est via in errorem; dicendum, quod dupliciter est cognoscere creaturam: vel quantum ad proprietates speciales13 et quae sunt imperfectionis, vel quantum ad conditiones generales, quae sunt completionis; si autem quantum ad speciales conditiones et imperfectionis: aut attribuendo Deo, aut removendo. Primo modo est via erroris, secundo modo via cognitionis; et sic cognoscitur Deus per ablationem.

Si autem cognoscatur quoad conditiones perfectionis, sic potest esse dupliciter, sicut pictura dupliciter cognoscitur: aut sicut pictura, aut sicut imago; unde aut sistitur in pulcritudine creaturae, aut per illam tenditur in aliud. Si primo modo, tunc est via deviationis; unde Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio14: «Vae his qui nutus tuos pro Te amant et oberrant in vestigiis tuis et derelinquunt Te ducem». Si secundo modo, prout est via in aliud, sic est ratio cognoscendi per superexcellentiam, quia omnis proprietas nobilis in creatura Deo est attribuenda in summo; et sic patet illud15.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tenebrosum medium non est via cognoscendi lucem; dicendum, quod est oculus bene dispositus et oculus lippus. De oculo bene disposito verum est, sed non de lippo, cui nubes obtegens vel terra suscipiens luminis claritatem est medium videndi solem; sic intellectui nostro, qui se habet sicut oculus noctuae ad manifestissima naturae16.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de defectu communitatis, dicendum, quod non est commune per univocationem, tamen est commune per analogiam, quae dicit habitudinem duorum ad duo, ut in nauta et doctore, vel unius ad unum, ut exemplaris ad exemplatum17.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod semper sunt infiniti gradus; dicendum, quod ascensus in Deum potest esse dupliciter: aut quantum ad aspectum praesentiae; et sic quaelibet creatura nata est ducere in Deum, nec sic sunt infiniti gradus; aut quantum ad aequalitatem aequiparantiae; et sic verum est, quod sunt infiniti, quia bonum creatum, quantumcumque duplicatum, nunquam aequiparatur increato.

Primus autem gradus quantum ad ascensum ad aspectum praesentiae est in consideratione visibilium; secundus in consideratione invisibilium, ut animae vel alterius substantiae spiritualis; tertius est ab anima in Deum, quia «imago ab ipsa veritate formatur et Deo immediate coniungitur»18.

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Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur de differentia vestigii et imaginis, quidam assignant19, quod vestigium est in sensibilibus, imago in spiritualibus. Sed ista distinctio et positio non valet, quia vestigium est etiam in spiritualibus. Nam unitas, veritas, bonitas, in quibus consistit vestigium, sunt conditiones maxime universales et intelligibiles.

Alii20 dicunt, quod vestigium dicitur, quia repraesentat secundum partem, sed imago secundum totum. Sed haec iterum differentia non valet, quia, cum Deus sit simplex, non habet repraesentans secundum partem; cum iterum sit infinitus, a nulla omnino creatura, etiam a toto mundo non potest repraesentari secundum totum.

Et ideo intelligendum, quod cum creatura ducat in cognitionem Dei per modum umbrae21, per modum vestigii et per modum imaginis, differentia eorum notior, a qua etiam denominatur, accipitur penes modum repraesentandi. Nam umbra dicitur, in quantum repraesentat in quadam elongatione22 et confusione; vestigium, in quantum in elongatione, sed distinctione; imago vero, in quantum in propinquitate et distinctione.

Ex hac differentia colligitur secunda, quae est penes conditiones, in quibus attenduntur haec. Nam creaturae dicuntur umbra quantum ad proprietates, quae respiciunt Deum in aliquo genere causae23 secundum rationem indeterminatam; vestigium quantum ad proprietatem, quae respicit Deum sub ratione triplicis causae, efficientis, formalis24 et finalis, sicut sunt unum, verum et bonum; imago quantum ad conditiones, quae respiciunt Deum non tantum in ratione causae, sed et obiecti, quae sunt memoria, intelligentia et voluntas25.

Ex his concluduntur aliae duae differentiae: quantum ad ea ad quae ducunt; nam creatura ut umbra ducit ad cognitionem communium, ut communia; vestigium in cognitionem communium, ut appropriata; imago ad cognitionem propriorum, ut propria.

Alia differentia est penes ea in quibus reperiuntur. Quoniam enim omnis creatura comparatur ad Deum et26 in ratione causae et in ratione triplicis causae, ideo omnis creatura est umbra vel vestigium. Sed quoniam sola rationalis creatura comparatur ad Deum ut obiectum, quia sola est capax Dei per cognitionem et amorem: ideo sola est imago.

Scholion

I. Deum non immediate in se nec a priori a viatoribus cognosci, sed per ea quae ab ipso facta sunt, post Concilium Vaticanum (de Fide can. 1. de Revelatione) in dubium vocari nequit. Hic canon: Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse, a. s., omnino convenit cum doctrina Seraphici Doctoris. — In fine conclusionis iuxta textum a nobis reformatum intellectus humanus vocatur quasi materialis, quod intelligendum est in comparatione ad puram spiritualitatem divinam. In hoc sensu S. Bonav. (I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.) dicit: Nam nihil est omnino spirituale, nisi solus Deus, sicut dicit Augustinus de Moribus Ecclesiae (vel potius Gennadius de Dogm. Eccles. c. 2.): Solus Deus est incorporeus, quia omnia replet.

II. Quod vestigium Trinitatis in omni creatura inveniatur, est sententia communis. Omnis enim creatura, quatenus habet in se unum esse, distinctum a quolibet alio, respicit Deum ut causam efficientem; quatenus habet verum esse, respicit ipsum ut causam exemplarem; quatenus habet bonum esse, respicit eundem ut causam finalem. — Differentiam inter imaginem et vestigium non omnes eodem modo assignant. S. Doctor, ut ex textu apparet, quadruplicem dat differentiam, cui S. Thomas aliam adiungit (S. I. q. 45. a. 7.). Scotus autem contra verba S. Thomae aliquas difficultates affert (hic q. 3.). De hac doctrina cfr. ipse S. Doctor, hic dub. 3; II. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1; Breviloq. p. II. c. 1. 12; Hexaem. Serm. 12. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 8. per totam et q. 7. m. 7; p. I. q. 18. m. I. S. — Scot., hic q. 5. 9. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. 3; S. I. q. 45. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 14. 18. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. 5. — Biel, hic q. 9.

III. Plura de hac quaestione: S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 3 p. II. a. 2. q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. 2. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. c. Gent. c. 13. — B. Albert., hic. a. 2. et 3; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., a. 24. q. 6. — Durand., hic 1. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., — Biel sicut in praec. quaest.

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English Translation

Question II

Whether God is knowable through creatures.

Second, it is asked whether God is knowable through creatures. And it seems He is not:

1. Because the way to error is not the way to knowledge; but knowledge through creatures is a way to error: therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: from Wisdom fourteen1: «The creatures of God are a snare and a trap and a stumbling block for the feet of the foolish». Furthermore, Augustine in On Free Will2 speaks of those who are occupied in creatures: «Turning their back to you, they are fixed in their bodily work as in their own shadow».

2. Likewise, darkness or a dark thing is not a way to knowing what is luminous or light3; but the creature is darkness, while God is light: therefore God is not knowable through creatures.

3. Likewise, the middle term through which something is known or proved of an extreme must share in something with that whose knowledge it serves4; but Creator and creature have nothing in common: therefore God is not known through creatures.

4. Likewise, every middle term through which one ascends to an extreme is distant from it by a finite number of degrees5; but every creature, however noble, is distant from God by infinite degrees — for however much it may be doubled, it will never arrive at His nobility: therefore through creatures one does not ascend to knowledge of God.

On the contrary:

1. From Wisdom thirteen6: «From the greatness of the beauty and of the creature the Creator of these things can be seen and known». Hence Isidore in On the Highest Good7: «From the beauty of the bounded creature, God causes His own beauty — which cannot be bounded — to be understood».

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason thus: it is possible to know not only the effect through the cause, but also the cause through the effect8: therefore if God acts as cause according to His own nobility, and the creature is the effect, God can be known through creatures.

3. Likewise, the sensible is a way of knowing the intelligible9; but the creature is sensible and God is intelligible: therefore through the creature one arrives at knowledge of the Creator.

4. Likewise, it is possible to know like through like10; but every creature is like God — either as a vestige or as an image: therefore through every creature it is possible to know God.

There is therefore a question as to what the difference is between vestige and image; and since the vestige is in every creature, it is asked why the image is not similarly in every creature, and in what respect the vestige is to be discerned11.

Conclusion

God can be known through creatures by the natural light of reason.

I respond: It must be said that, because the cause shines forth in the effect and the wisdom of the craftsman is manifested in his work, God — who is the craftsman and cause of creatures — is known through them.

And for this there are two reasons: one from fittingness and the other from need. From fittingness, because every creature leads more toward God than toward anything else; from need, because since God, as supremely spiritual light, cannot be known in His spirituality by the intellect, which is as it were material, the soul needs to know Him through creatures12.

1. To the objection that knowledge of creatures is a way to error: it must be said that knowing creatures is twofold — either with respect to their special properties13 and those that belong to imperfection, or with respect to their general conditions, which belong to completion. If with respect to the special properties of imperfection: either by attributing them to God, or by removing them. In the first way it is a way of error; in the second way it is a way of knowledge — and in this way God is known through removal.

But if creatures are known with respect to the conditions of perfection, this can happen in two ways — as a painting can be known in two ways: either as a painting, or as an image. Hence one either rests in the beauty of the creature, or through it one tends toward something else. In the first way it is a way of deviation; hence Augustine in On Free Will14: «Woe to those who love your signs instead of you, and wander in your vestiges and abandon you who are their guide». In the second way — insofar as it is a way toward something else — it is a principle of knowing through supereminence, because every noble property in a creature is to be attributed to God in the highest degree; and in this way that is clear15.

2. To the objection that a dark medium is not a way of knowing light: it must be said that there is a well-disposed eye and a bleary eye. For the well-disposed eye this is true, but not for the bleary one, for which a covering cloud or a reflecting earth serves as a medium for seeing the sun — so it is for our intellect, which is like the eye of an owl with respect to the most manifest things of nature16.

3. To the objection concerning the lack of community: it must be said that there is no community by univocation, yet there is community by analogy — which expresses a relation of two things to two things, as in the case of a sailor and a teacher, or of one thing to one, as in the case of an exemplar to what is patterned after it17.

4. To the objection that there are always infinite degrees: it must be said that the ascent to God can be twofold — either with respect to the aspect of presence, and in this way every creature is naturally suited to lead to God, and the degrees are not in this sense infinite; or with respect to the equality of equivalence, and in this way it is true that they are infinite, because a created good, however much it may be doubled, never becomes equivalent to the uncreated.

The first degree with respect to the ascent toward the aspect of presence is in the consideration of visible things; the second in the consideration of invisible things, such as the soul or another spiritual substance; the third is from the soul to God, because «the image is formed by truth itself and is immediately joined to God»18.

To the question raised last about the difference between vestige and image: some assign this difference19 by saying that the vestige is in sensible things and the image in spiritual things. But this distinction and position does not hold, because the vestige is also in spiritual things. For unity, truth, and goodness — in which the vestige consists — are the most universal and intelligible conditions.

Others20 say that it is called a vestige because it represents according to part, and an image because it represents according to the whole. But again this difference does not hold, because since God is simple He has nothing that represents Him according to part; and since He is infinite, He cannot be represented according to the whole by any creature whatsoever — not even by the whole world.

Therefore it must be understood that since a creature leads to the knowledge of God in the manner of a shadow21, in the manner of a vestige, and in the manner of an image, the difference among these — from which they also take their name — is more clearly taken according to the mode of representing. For something is called a shadow insofar as it represents in a certain remoteness22 and confusion; a vestige insofar as it represents in remoteness but with distinction; an image insofar as it represents in nearness and with distinction.

From this first difference a second is derived, which concerns the conditions in which these are found. For creatures are called a shadow with respect to properties that regard God in some genus of causation23 according to an indeterminate account; a vestige with respect to the property that regards God under the account of a threefold cause — efficient, formal24, and final — such as are unity, truth, and goodness; an image with respect to the conditions that regard God not only in the account of cause but also of object — which are memory, understanding, and will25.

From these two differences two others follow: the first regarding what they lead to — for a creature as shadow leads to the knowledge of common attributes as common; a vestige to the knowledge of common attributes as appropriated; an image to the knowledge of proper attributes as proper.

The other difference concerns the things in which they are found. For since every creature stands in relation to God both26 in the account of cause and in the account of threefold cause, every creature is therefore either a shadow or a vestige. But since only the rational creature stands in relation to God as to an object — because it alone is capable of God through knowledge and love — it alone is an image.

Scholion

I. That God is not known immediately in Himself nor a priori by wayfarers, but through those things which have been made by Him, cannot be called into doubt after the Vatican Council (de Fide, can. 1, de Revelatione). This canon — «If anyone shall have said that God, the one and true, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason through those things which have been made, let him be anathema» — is altogether in agreement with the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor. — At the end of the conclusion, according to the text as we have reformed it, the human intellect is called quasi materialis («as it were material»), which is to be understood by comparison with the pure divine spirituality. In this sense St. Bonaventure (I Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4) says: Nam nihil est omnino spirituale, nisi solus Deus («For nothing is altogether spiritual except God alone»), just as Augustine says in On the Morals of the Church — or rather Gennadius, de Dogm. Eccles. c. 2: Solus Deus est incorporeus, quia omnia replet («God alone is incorporeal, because He fills all things»).

II. That the vestige of the Trinity is found in every creature is the common opinion. For every creature — insofar as it has one being, distinct from any other — regards God as efficient cause; insofar as it has true being, regards Him as exemplar cause; insofar as it has good being, regards Him as final cause. — Not all assign the difference between image and vestige in the same way. The Holy Doctor, as appears from the text, gives a fourfold difference, to which St. Thomas adds another (Summa I, q. 45, a. 7). Scotus, however, raises certain difficulties against the words of St. Thomas (here q. 3). On this doctrine cf. the Holy Doctor himself, here dub. 3; II Sent. d. 38, a. 2, q. 1; Breviloquium p. II, c. 1 and 12; Hexaem. Serm. 12. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 8 throughout and q. 7, m. 7; p. I, q. 18, m. I, S. — Scotus, here q. 5 and 9. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, aa. 1, 2, 3; Summa I, q. 45, a. 7. — Blessed Albert, here a. 14 and 18. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3, q. 2. — Durandus, here p. I, q. 4. — Denys the Carthusian, here qq. 4 and 5. — Biel, here q. 9.

III. More on this question: St. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 2, m. 3, a. 1. — Scotus, here qq. 1, 2, 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; Summa contra Gentes c. 13. — Blessed Albert, here aa. 2 and 3; Summa p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, a. 24, q. 6. — Durandus, here 1, q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, and Biel, as in the preceding question.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 11, ubi contra mss. et ed. 1 legit Vulgata: Quoniam creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt et in tentationem animabus hominum et in muscipulam etc. Cum hac lectione convenit Vat. eo excepto, quod habet deceptionem loco tentationem.
    [Wisdom 14,] v. 11, where the Vulgate, against the mss. and ed. 1, reads: «Because the creatures of God have been made into hatred, and into a temptation to the souls of men, and into a snare» etc. The Vatican ed. agrees with this reading, except that it has deceptionem («deception») for tentationem («temptation»).
  2. Libr. II, c. 16, n. 43: Tanquam enim dorsum ad Te ponentes in carnali opere velut in umbra sua defiguntur.
    Augustine, On Free Will II, c. 16, n. 43: «For turning as it were their back to You, they are fixed in their carnal work as in their own shadow».
  3. Aristot., I Poster. c. 21 (c. 23): In privativa autem negativa propositio universalis, affirmativa autem negativa prior et notior (per affirmativam enim negativa nota) et prior affirmativa est, sicut esse prius est non esse. Et III de Anima, text. 25 (c. 6) docet, privationes non cognosci nisi per contraria, scil. per cognitionem habitus. Cfr. etiam II de Caelo, text. 18 (c. 3).
    Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 21 (c. 23): «In a privative matter, however, the universal proposition is negative, and the negative is prior and more known than the affirmative — for the negative is known through the affirmative — and the affirmative is prior, just as being is prior to non-being». And On the Soul III, text 25 (c. 6) teaches that privations are not known except through their contraries, that is, through knowledge of the habit. Cf. also On the Heavens II, text 18 (c. 3).
  4. Aristot., I Poster. c. 7: Nam ex eodem genere oportet esse extrema et media. Idem ait X Metaph. text. 22 (IX, c. 7). Et III de Part. Animal. c. 1: Nam et medium particeps utriusque extremi est. — Extremum est nomen logicale significans subiectum vel praedicatum conclusionis, pro quorum nexu cognoscendo medium adhibitum vocatur terminus medius. — Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 post cum eo minus bene omittit ad.
    Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 7: «For the extremes and the middle term must be of the same genus». He says the same in Metaphysics X, text 22 (IX, c. 7). And in On the Parts of Animals III, c. 1: «For the middle also partakes of each extreme». — Extremum is a logical term signifying the subject or predicate of the conclusion; the middle used to establish their connection is called the middle term. — The Vatican ed., against the codices and ed. 1, less well omits ad after cum eo.
  5. Cfr. Aristot., I Poster. c. 18 seqq. (c. 19 seqq.), ubi simile ostendit respectu ipsius demonstrationis. — Paulo infra ope mss. loco duplicetur, nunquam pervenitur substituimus duplicatur, nunquam perveniet; supple creatura. Cod. I propositionem maiorem formaliter melius exhibet: Item nullum medium… gradibus infinitis. In conclusione plures codd. ut K T etc. ad loco in.
    Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 18 ff. (c. 19 ff.), where he shows the like regarding demonstration itself. — A little later, on the authority of the mss., we have substituted duplicatur, nunquam perveniet for duplicetur, nunquam pervenitur; supply creatura. Cod. I better presents the major proposition formally: Likewise no middle term… by infinite degrees. In the conclusion several codd. (K T etc.) read ad for in.
  6. Vers. 5.
    [Wisdom 13,] v. 5.
  7. Sive Sentent. I, c. 4.
    Or rather Isidore, Sententiae I, c. 4.
  8. Vide Aristot., I Poster. c. 10 (c. 13), et II Poster. c. 17 (c. 11). — In hac propositione auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 addidimus etiam.
    See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 10 (c. 13), and II, c. 17 (c. 11). — In this proposition, on the authority of the mss. and ed. 1, we have added etiam («also»).
  9. Cfr. Aristot., III de Anima, text. 39 (c. 8): Formis sensibilibus innituntur intelligibilia… atque idcirco, qui nihil sentit, nihil discere vel comprehendere potest. — Mox post creatura et post Deus supple cum Vat. est.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 39 (c. 8): «Intelligibles rest upon sensible forms… and therefore, whoever senses nothing can learn or comprehend nothing». — A little later, after creatura and after Deus, supply est («is») with the Vatican ed.
  10. Aristot., VI Topic. c. 1 (c. 2) loquendo de metaphora ait: Nam metaphora quodammodo notum facit id quod significatur, propter (per) similitudinem. Ibidem et hanc definitionem imaginis, de qua S. Bonav. paulo infra agit, invenies: Nam imago id est, cuius generatio per imitationem est. Cfr. etiam II Prior. c. 27 et 28 (29 et 30), ubi Aristot. agit de icosibus (εἰκώς, i.e. simile, verisimile, consentaneum) et iisnis (σημεῖα, quae si certissima sint, ab ipso indicia, a Commentatoribus vestigia vel prodigia nominantur); et Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 1.
    Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 1 (c. 2), speaking of metaphor, says: «For metaphor in a certain way makes known what is signified, through likeness». In the same place you will find this definition of an image, which St. Bonaventure treats a little later: «For an image is that whose generation is by imitation». Cf. also Prior Analytics II, cc. 27–28 (29–30), where Aristotle treats of icones (εἰκώς, i.e. the like, the probable, the consistent) and signs (σημεῖα, which, if most certain, are called by Aristotle himself indicia, and by the commentators vestigia or prodigia); and Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 1.
  11. Vat. sibi non constans contra mss. et ed. 1 attenditur.
    The Vatican ed., inconsistent with itself, against the mss. and ed. 1, reads attenditur.
  12. Interpolatam et non aptam Vat. lectionem: quasi materiali luce indiget anima, ut cognoscat ipsum, scilicet per creaturam castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1. Cod. 0 pro materiali habet naturaliter.
    We have corrected from the mss. and ed. 1 the Vatican ed.'s interpolated and inept reading: «the soul needs as it were a material light in order to know Him, namely through the creature». Cod. 0 reads naturaliter («naturally») for materiali («material»).
  13. Ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 hic et paulo infra post speciales conditiones addidimus et, pro quo cod. T primo loco habet id est, secundo loco quae sunt. Dein codd. 0 Z quantum ad proprietates generales et quae sunt. Mox mss. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. post si adiiciunt autem et post imperfectionis omittunt hoc est dupliciter.
    From nearly all the mss. and ed. 1, here and a little below after speciales conditiones, we have added et, for which cod. T in the first place has id est, and in the second place quae sunt. Then codd. 0 Z read quantum ad proprietates generales et quae sunt. Next, the mss. with ed. 1, against the Vatican ed., after si add autem and after imperfectionis omit hoc est dupliciter.
  14. Lib. II, c. 16, n. 43.
    [Augustine, On Free Will] II, c. 16, n. 43.
  15. De triplici cognoscendi Deum via, scil. causalitatis, remotionis et superexcellentiae cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 6. et infra dub. 1.
    On the threefold way of knowing God — namely causality, remotion (negation), and supereminence — cf. Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 6, and below at dub. 1.
  16. Supple: tenebrosum (seu creatura) est medium cognoscendi lucem sive Deum. De comparatione intellectus cum oculo noctuae cfr. Aristot., II Metaph. text. 1 (I brevior, c. 1): Sicut enim nocticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et animae nostrae intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium naturae manifestissima (ed. Venet. 1489).
    Supply: «the dark thing (i.e., the creature) is a medium for knowing light or God». On the comparison of the intellect with the owl's eye, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics II, text 1 (brevior I, c. 1): «For just as the eyes of night-owls are related to the light of day, so is the intellect of our soul to those things which are of all things most manifest by nature» (Venetian ed. 1489).
  17. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit si. Paulo post pauci codd. ut X Y cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 non bene ductore pro doctore. Cfr. d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 in corp., ubi idem exemplum explicatur, et II Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1 in corp., ubi exemplum de nauta et auriga occurrit.
    The Vatican ed., against the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, adds si. A little later a few codd. (X Y) with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 less well read ductore («leader») for doctore («teacher»). Cf. d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 in corp., where the same example is explained, and II Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1 in corp., where the example of the sailor and the charioteer occurs.
  18. August., 83 QQ. q. 51, n. 2, dicit: Quare cum homo possit particeps esse secundum interiorem hominem, secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem, ut nulla natura interposita formetur, et ideo nihil sit Deo coniunctius. Et auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 11: Quae (mens) ita facta est ad imaginem Dei, ut nulla interposita natura ab ipsa veritate formetur.
    Augustine, Eighty-three Questions, q. 51, n. 2, says: «Wherefore, since man can be a partaker [of God] according to the inner man, according to that he is made to the image in such a way that no nature is interposed to form him, and therefore nothing is more closely joined to God». And the author of the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 11: «The mind is so made to the image of God, that with no nature interposed it is formed by truth itself».
  19. Addit Vat. claritatis gratia talem differentiam, quae tamen verba desunt in mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican ed. adds talem differentiam («such a difference») for the sake of clarity, though these words are lacking in the mss. and ed. 1.
  20. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 addit autem. Paulo post plures codd. ut S V X bb omittunt differentia, pro quo ed. 1 habet distinctio.
    The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, adds autem («however»). A little later several codd. (S V X bb) omit differentia, for which ed. 1 reads distinctio.
  21. Vat. addit et, quod deest in mss.
    The Vatican ed. adds et, which is absent from the mss.
  22. Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 hic et immediate post substituimus quantum in pro quadam. Mox cod. Q post sed addit cum.
    On the authority of the mss. and ed. 1, here and immediately after, we have substituted quantum in for quadam. Next, cod. Q after sed adds cum.
  23. Ope mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic a Vat. additum causae.
    With the help of the mss. and ed. 1, we have expunged causae, which the Vatican ed. added here.
  24. Intellige de causa formali extrinseca sive de exemplari, non de causa formali intrinseca. Cfr. infra d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.
    Understand this of extrinsic formal cause, or of the exemplar, not of intrinsic formal cause. Cf. below d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.
  25. Iuxta sententiam communem attributa divina distinguuntur in communia ut communia sive communia simpliciter, quae sunt essentialia, ut esse, vivere, intelligere; communia ut appropriata, quae sunt illa essentialia, quae nos uni personae prae alia tribuimus, ut potentiam Patri, sapientiam Filio, bonitatem Spiritui Sancto; propria sunt paternitas, filiatio et spiratio.
    According to the common opinion, the divine attributes are distinguished into: common as common, or common absolutely — which are essential, such as being, living, understanding; common as appropriated — which are those essential attributes that we attribute to one Person in preference to another, such as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit; and proper, which are paternity, filiation, and spiration.
  26. Supplevimus ex plurimis codd. et ed. 1 particulam et, qua distinctior redditur lectio. Paulo post cod. Z loco vel bene ponit et.
    From most of the codd. and ed. 1 we have supplied the particle et, by which the reading is rendered more distinct. A little later cod. Z suitably puts et in place of vel.
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