Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3
Quaestio III
Utrum homo in omni statu cognoscat Deum per creaturas.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum cognitio Dei per creaturas sit hominis quantum ad omnem statum. Quod sit hominis quantum ad primum statum, sic ostenditur:
1. Homo in statu innocentiae non cognoscebat Deum facie ad faciem: ergo si cognoscebat Deum, cognoscebat per effectum, ergo per vestigium, ergo per creaturam.
2. Item, in homine in statu innocentiae cognitio sensibilis non erat in impedimentum, sed in adminiculum cognitionis intellectivae; sed intellectiva cognitio, propter quam factus est homo, est cognitio Dei: ergo omnis cognitio sensibilis in primo homine ordinabatur ad hanc; sed cognitio Dei per adminiculum sensibilium est cognitio per creaturam: ergo etc.
Item, quod sit hominis quantum ad statum beatitudinis, videtur:
1. Quia Beati cognoscunt creaturam, sed non sistunt in illa, sed referunt ad Deum: ergo cognoscunt Deum per creaturam.
2. Item, beatae animae laudant Deum per creaturas; sed laudare Deum per creaturas est cognoscere per creaturas: ergo etc.
Sed contra, quod non sit hominis instituti, sic ostenditur:
1. Cognitio per vestigium est cognitio per medium; «sed mens, ut dicit Augustinus, immediate ab ipsa veritate formatur»: ergo talis cognitio non convenit humanae naturae quantum ad illum statum, nec etiam quantum ad alium.
2. Item, non est rectus ordo, quod propinquius perveniat in finem per medium magis distans; sed homo in statu primo erat propinquior Deo ceteris aliis creaturis: ergo non conveniebat ei pervenire in cognitionem Dei per alias creaturas.
Item, quod non sit hominis talis cognitio quantum ad statum beatitudinis, videtur:
1. Quia cognitio per vestigium est cognitio per manuductionem: ergo non est cognitio perfecta, ergo est ex parte: ergo non manet in Beatis, quia in ipsis evacuabitur quod est ex parte.
2. Item, vestigium sive creatura est sicut scala ad ascendendum vel sicut via ad perveniendum ad Deum; sed cum perventum est ad terminum, non est usus viae ulterius: ergo similiter, cum homo sit sursum, non indiget scala; sed cognitio Beatorum immediate est in Deum: ergo non est per creaturas.
Conclusio
Deus in creaturis cognoscitur a comprehensoribus perfecte, a viatoribus semiplene; sed per creaturas proprie cognoscitur a viatoribus, aliter autem ante, aliter post lapsum.
Respondeo: Ad intelligentiam praedictorum notandum, quod aliud est cognoscere Deum in creatura, aliud per creaturam. Cognoscere Deum in creatura est cognoscere ipsius praesentiam et influentiam in creatura. Et hoc quidem est viatorum semiplene, sed comprehensorum perfecte; unde dicit Augustinus in fine libri de Civitate Dei, quod tunc expresse Deus videbitur, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus. Cognoscere autem Deum per creaturam est elevari a cognitione creaturae ad cognitionem Dei quasi per scalam mediam. Et hoc est proprie viatorum, sicut dicit Bernardus ad Eugenium.
Aliter tamen convenit homini in statu naturae institutae, et naturae lapsae: quia in statu primo cognoscebat Deum per creaturam tanquam per speculum clarum; sed post lapsum cognovit tanquam per speculum et aenigma, sicut dicit Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio, propter obnubilationem intellectus et peiorationem rerum.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de statu beatitudinis; dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, beatorum non est cognoscere per creaturas, sed potius in creaturis. Et rationes, quae videntur probare contrarium, non probant, sed potius, quod cognoscatur ab eis in creaturis.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de statu innocentiae, quod mens immediate formatur etc.; dicendum, quod duplex est medium, scilicet efficiens et disponens. De primo medio debet intelligi quod dixit Augustinus, sed de secundo non; quoniam Deus est medium efficiens et obiectum ipsius mentis. Illud autem verbum dicit Augustinus contra philosophos, quorum opinio erat, quod mens non coniungeretur primo immediate, sed mediante aliqua intelligentia.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est rectus ordo; dicendum, quod dupliciter potest considerari homo: vel ens in se, vel extra. Primo modo non pervenit per creaturas a se in Deum, sed ens extra se per cognitionem creaturarum recolligitur in se et elevatur supra se.
Vel dicendum, quod aliae creaturae possunt considerari ut res, vel ut signa. Primo modo sunt inferiores homine, secundo modo sunt media in deveniendo sive in via, non in termino, quia illae non perveniunt, sed per illas pervenit homo ad Deum, illis post se relictis.
---
Question III
Whether the human being in every state knows God through creatures.
Third, it is asked whether knowledge of God through creatures belongs to the human being with respect to every state. That it belongs to the human being with respect to the first state is shown thus:
1. The human being in the state of innocence did not know God face to face: therefore if he knew God, he knew Him through the effect, therefore through the vestige, therefore through creatures.
2. Likewise, in the human being in the state of innocence, sensible cognition was not an impediment but an aid to intellectual cognition; but intellectual cognition — for the sake of which the human being was made — is knowledge of God: therefore every act of sensible cognition in the first human being was ordered toward this; but knowledge of God with the aid of sensible things is knowledge through creatures: therefore, etc.
Likewise, that it belongs to the human being with respect to the state of beatitude seems evident:
1. Because the Blessed know creatures but do not rest in them, but refer them to God: therefore they know God through creatures.
2. Likewise, the blessed souls praise God through creatures; but to praise God through creatures is to know Him through creatures: therefore, etc.
On the contrary — that it does not belong to the human being in the first state — is shown thus:
1. Knowledge through the vestige is knowledge through a medium; "but the mind, as Augustine says, is formed immediately by truth itself": therefore such knowledge does not belong to human nature with respect to that state — nor with respect to any other.
2. Likewise, it is not a proper order that what is nearer should arrive at its end through a more remote medium; but the human being in the first state was nearer to God than all other creatures: therefore it did not befit him to arrive at knowledge of God through other creatures.
Likewise, that such knowledge does not belong to the human being with respect to the state of beatitude seems evident:
1. Because knowledge through the vestige is knowledge through a guiding process: therefore it is not perfect knowledge — therefore it is partial: therefore it does not remain in the Blessed, because in them what is partial will be done away with.
2. Likewise, the vestige or creature is like a ladder for ascending or a road for arriving at God; but when one has arrived at the destination, the road is no longer of use: therefore similarly, when the human being is already above, he has no need of the ladder; but the knowledge of the Blessed is immediately directed toward God: therefore it is not through creatures.
Conclusion
God is known in creatures by those who comprehend — perfectly; by those who are on the way — partially; but God is properly known through creatures by those on the way, and differently before the fall than after.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that it is one thing to know God in creatures and another to know Him through creatures. To know God in creatures is to know His presence and influence in creatures. And this belongs to those on the way partially, but to those who comprehend — perfectly; hence Augustine says at the end of the City of God that then God will be seen expressly, when God will be all in all. But to know God through creatures is to be elevated from the knowledge of creatures to the knowledge of God as if by an intermediate ladder. And this belongs properly to those on the way, as Bernard says to Eugenius.
This belongs differently, however, to the human being in the state of established nature and in the state of fallen nature: for in the first state he knew God through creatures as through a clear mirror; but after the fall he knew Him as through a mirror and an enigma, as the Apostle says in the first letter to the Corinthians thirteen — on account of the clouding of the intellect and the deterioration of things.
To the objection concerning the state of beatitude: it must be said that, as has been stated, it does not belong to the Blessed to know God through creatures, but rather in creatures. And the arguments that seem to prove the contrary do not prove it, but rather prove that God is known by them in creatures.
1. To the objection concerning the state of innocence — that the mind is formed immediately, etc.: it must be said that medium is twofold, namely an efficient medium and a disposing medium. What Augustine said must be understood of the first kind of medium, but not of the second; for God is the efficient medium and the object of the mind itself. Augustine says this against the philosophers, whose opinion was that the mind is not joined immediately to the first principle, but through the mediation of some intelligence.
2. To the objection that the order is not proper: it must be said that the human being can be considered in two ways — either as a being in himself, or as a being outside himself. In the first way he does not arrive at God through creatures external to himself, but the being that is outside himself, through the knowledge of creatures, is gathered back into himself and elevated above himself.
Or it can be said, in another way, that other creatures can be considered either as things or as signs. In the first way they are inferior to the human being; in the second they are means on the way to the destination — not at the destination itself — because those creatures do not themselves arrive, but through them the human being arrives at God, leaving them behind.
---