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Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
p. 91

QUAESTIO III. Utrum trinitas imaginis, quae consistit in mente, notitia et amore, necessario ducat in cognitionem trium divinarum personarum.

Tertio et ultimo quaeritur, utrum haec trinitas imaginis, scilicet mentis, notitiae et amoris, ducat necessario in cognitionem Trinitatis quantum ad personas. Et videtur quod sic:

1. Quia in hac trinitate imaginis est relatio; non est relatio nisi quoad personas: ergo etc.

2. Item, in hac trinitate est distinctio, quia notitia non est amor; sed in Deo non est distinctio nisi personarum: ergo etc.

p. 92

3. Item, in hac trinitate est origo1 nascentis unius ab uno et tertii ab utroque: ergo cum ista sint propria personarum, patet etc.

4. Item, in hac trinitate est amor tertio2, qui est proprium Spiritus sancti et qui est ad alterum: ergo videtur, quod necessario3 ducat in Trinitatem personarum.

Sed contra.

1. Haec trinitas intelligitur in creatura sine distinctione personali: ergo potest intelligi et in Deo; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

2. Item, notitia et amor sunt in qualibet personarum; sed per ea quae sunt in omnibus, non venitur in cognitionem distinctionis personalis: ergo etc.

3. Item, intellecto quod una tantum esset persona, adhuc nosceret et amaret se: ergo etc.

4. Item, philosophi istam trinitatem cognoverunt, et tamen non cognoverunt Trinitatem personarum: ergo haec non necessario ducit in illam.

Conclusio.

Ratio sola ab hac trinitate mentis, notitiae et amoris non ascendit ad cognitionem Trinitatis.

Respondeo. Dicendum, quod per hanc trinitatem [devenitur in cognitionem Trinitatis] attribuendo ea quae in hac trinitate sunt illi summae Trinitati. Sed hoc potest esse dupliciter. Aut enim ista tria4 possunt Deo attribui secundum substantiam, ut per mentem intelligamus mentem in Deo, et per notitiam in anima notitiam in Deo, et sic de tertio; et sic non ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis nisi quantum ad appropriata; et sic intellexerunt philosophi.

Possunt etiam ista trahi ad Deum ratione proprietatum, quae sunt ordo et origo, distinctio et5 relatio; et sic ducunt in cognitionem Trinitatis quoad propria.

Sed ista ponere vel intelligere in Deo potest fides, sed non ratio; et ita perfecta cognitio imaginis non habetur nisi a fide. Unde bene concedendum est, quod imago, perfecte cognita ut imago, ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis, non autem simpliciter. Et per hoc patet utraque pars.

Ad 2–3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de amore6, dicendum, quod amor potest dicere complacentiam, et sic est commune; vel potest dicere connexionem sive communionem vel donum, et sic habet rationem personae.

Scholion

I. Hanc quaestionem alii antiquiores Scholastici praeter Ægid. (hic 3. princ. q. 2, a. 4) ex professo non tractant. Solutio eius pendet ab iisdem principiis, quae supra p. I, q. 1 posita sunt. De proprietatibus divinarum personarum, et quatenus important ordinem et originem, relationem et distinctionem, cfr. infra dd. 26 et 33. — S. Doctor primum et ultimum obiectum non solvit explicite, quia solutionis principia continentur clare in corp. quaestionis; secundum et tertium breviter solvit, loquendo expresse tantum de amore essentiali et personali, quod ad notitiam facile applicare potest.

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English Translation
p. 91

Question 3. Whether the trinity of the image, which consists in mind, knowledge, and love, necessarily leads to the knowledge of the three divine persons.

Third and finally, it is asked whether this trinity of the image — namely, of mind, knowledge, and love — necessarily leads to the knowledge of the Trinity as to [its] persons. And it seems that it does, thus:

1. Because in this trinity of the image there is relation; but relation [in God] obtains only with respect to persons: therefore etc.

2. Again, in this trinity there is distinction, because knowledge is not love; but in God there is no distinction except of persons: therefore etc.

p. 92

3. Again, in this trinity there is the origin1 of one as born from one, and of a third from both: therefore, since these are proper to the [divine] persons, the [point] is clear, etc.

4. Again, in this trinity love [stands] in the third place2, which is proper to the Holy Spirit and which is toward another: therefore it seems that [this trinity] necessarily3 leads into the Trinity of persons.

On the contrary.

1. This trinity is understood in a creature without personal distinction: therefore it can also be understood in God [without such distinction]; but that is false: therefore etc.

2. Again, knowledge and love are in each of the persons; but by things that are in all [persons], one does not arrive at the knowledge of personal distinction: therefore etc.

3. Again, granting that there were only one person, [that person] would still know and love itself: therefore etc.

4. Again, the philosophers knew this trinity, and yet they did not know the Trinity of persons: therefore this [trinity] does not necessarily lead into that one.

Conclusion.

Reason alone, from this trinity of mind, knowledge, and love, does not rise to the knowledge of the Trinity.

Reply. I answer that through this [created] trinity [we come to the knowledge of the Trinity] by attributing those things which are in this trinity to that highest Trinity. But this can happen in two ways. For either these three4 can be attributed to God according to substance — so that by mind we understand mind [as] in God, and by knowledge in the soul [we understand] knowledge [as] in God, and so of the third — and in that way [the trinity] does not lead to the knowledge of the Trinity except as to the appropriated [attributes]; and this is how the philosophers understood [it].

These three can also be drawn toward God by reason of the properties, which are order and origin, distinction and5 relation; and in this way they lead to the knowledge of the Trinity as to what is proper [to the persons].

But to posit or to understand such things in God is in the power of faith, not of reason; and so a perfect knowledge of the image is not had except from faith. Hence it should indeed be conceded that the image, when perfectly known as image, leads to the knowledge of the Trinity — but not without qualification. And by this both sides of the question are clear.

Reply to 2–3. To the objection concerning love6, it must be said that love can express complacence, and in this sense it is common [to the three]; or it can express connection, or communion, or gift, and in this sense it has the character of a person.

Scholion

I. Of the earlier Scholastics, none except Giles of Rome (here, 3rd principium, q. 2, a. 4) treats this question ex professo. Its solution depends on the same principles that were laid down above in pt. I, q. 1. On the properties of the divine persons, and how they import order and origin, relation and distinction, cf. below, dd. 26 and 33. — The Holy Doctor does not explicitly solve the first and last objections, because the principles of the solution are clearly contained in the body of the question; he briefly solves the second and third, speaking expressly only about essential and personal love — which can easily be applied to knowledge [notitia] as well.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Plurimi codd. omittunt ordinis; Vat. vero omittit nascentis, pro quo tamen omnes codd. possunt allegari, licet propter abbreviationem in tantum sint dubiae lectionis, in quantum legi potest vel nascentis vel nativitatis vel cum ed. 1 nascibilitatis. Iuxta regulam illam palaeographicam, secundum quam in similibus casibus, nisi sensus obstet, brevius vocabulum sit eligendum, posuimus nascentis, retinentes insuper cum codd. H I T et ed. 1 verbum unius. Cfr. infra d. 13, q. 3.
    Very many codices omit ordinis ("of order"); Vat. omits nascentis ("of [the one] being born"), for which, however, all the codices can be cited — though, because of abbreviation, they are of doubtful reading, in so far as one can read either nascentis, or nativitatis ("of birth"), or, with ed. 1, nascibilitatis ("of nascibility"). In accordance with the palaeographical rule that in such cases, unless the sense forbids it, the briefer word is to be preferred, we have printed nascentis, retaining furthermore, with codd. H, I, T and ed. 1, the word unius ("of one"). Cf. below, d. 13, q. 3.
  2. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 legit sic: tertio reperitur amor. Cod. X explicative post tertio addit loco. Ed. 1 tertius pro tertio. Cod. N post trinitate habet est notitia, quae appropriatur Filio, et amor, qui est.
    Vat., against the fidelity of the mss. and edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, reads thus: tertio reperitur amor ("in the third place love is found"). Cod. X, by way of explanation, after tertio adds loco ("place"). Ed. 1 reads tertius (nominative) in place of tertio (adverbial / ablative). Cod. N, after trinitate, has: est notitia, quae appropriatur Filio, et amor, qui est ("there is knowledge, which is appropriated to the Son, and love, which is [the Holy Spirit]").
  3. Ope mss. et ed. 1 restituimus indebite [expunctum] necessario.
    On the authority of the mss. and ed. 1, we have restored necessario ("necessarily"), [wrongly] struck out [by Vat.].
  4. Codd. M aa bb non inepte adiiciunt tria.
    Codd. M, aa, bb not unfittingly add tria ("three").
  5. Vat. et, sed obstant plurimi codd. cum ed. 1.
    Vat. reads et ("and") [in place of the alternative reading]; but very many codices with ed. 1 stand against [Vat.].
  6. Cod. Z addit quod non valet. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A G I T cc post solutio ponunt punctum, deinde cod. cc post obiicitur adiungit dicendum; nihil tamen immutandum duximus.
    Cod. Z adds quod non valet ("which does not hold"). A little earlier, several codices (A, G, I, T, cc) place a period after solutio ("solution"), and then cod. cc after obiicitur ("is objected") adds dicendum ("it must be said"); we have, however, judged that nothing ought to be changed. ---
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