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Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
p. 91

Quaestio II

Utrum mens, notitia et amor habeant ordinem, aequalitatem et consubstantialitatem.

Secundo quaeritur de istis in comparatione ad invicem, secundum triplicem comparationem, quam ponit Augustinus, videlicet ordinis, aequalitatis et consubstantialitatis, et Magister recitat in littera1. Ordo est inter haec, quia mens est parens, notitia est proles, tertius est amor ab utroque procedens. Aequalitas etiam est ibi, quia mens tantum se2 novit, quantum est, et tantum se diligit, quantum se novit. Consubstantialitas etiam; unde Augustinus nono de Trinitate3: «Admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, substantialiter haec in anima existere, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color in corpore, aut ulla qualitas aut quantitas4; quidquid enim tale est, non excedit substantiam, in qua est. Mens autem amore, quo se amat, potest amare etiam aliud»; et ita vult, quod amor sit consubstantialis menti.

1. Sed obiicitur contra hoc: Primo videtur, quod in his non sit ordo nec origo. Aut enim accipiuntur pro habitibus innatis, aut acquisitis. Si pro innatis, nullus est ordo, quia simul sunt cum ipsa anima; si pro acquisitis, sic amor praecedit notitiam; nullus enim acquirit vel studet aliquid addiscere, nisi amet scire. Unde Augustinus in fine noni de Trinitate5: «Partum mentis antecedit appetitus, quo id quod nosse volumus quaerendo et inveniendo, nascitur proles, quae est ipsa notitia». Aut ergo non est ordo, aut non est talis ordo.

2. Item, videtur quod non sit ibi aequalitas. Aut enim notitia et amor accipiuntur per comparationem6 ad res inferiores, aut ad animam. Si ad res inferiores, manifestum est, quod non est ibi aequalitas; multa enim novimus, quae non amamus; si in comparatione ad animam, aut est aequalitas quantum ad intensionem, aut quantum ad extensionem. Quantum ad extensionem, non; illud constat, quia unum tantum7 est ibi: ergo quantum ad intensionem8; sed quod hoc sit falsum, videtur, quia cum sciamus animam minorem Deo et maiorem corpore, contingit quandoque, quod eam amamus magis quam Deum, et minus quam corpus; et ita quantitas amoris non sequitur quantitatem notitiae.

3. Item, quod non sit ibi consubstantialitas, videtur, quia amor et notitia sunt habitus et sunt9 qualitates; ergo videtur, quod essentialiter differant ab ipsa mente.

4. Item, ratio Augustini10 est, quod non sint in anima sicut accidentia, quia se extendunt extra; sed hoc nihil est, quia accidentia se extendunt extra, ut calor calefaciendo et color immutando visum. Praeterea, homo cognoscit aliqua cognoscibilia scientia acquisita, quae est accidens, et ita se extendit extra.

p. 92

Conclusio

Mens, notitia et amor habent ordinem, aequalitatem et consubstantialitatem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus assignat, in his est ordo, aequalitas et consubstantialitas.

Ordo autem attenditur in his habitibus animae connaturalibus in comparatione ad actus, sicut ponitur ordo in11 fide, spe et caritate, licet simul infundantur.

1. Et sic patet quod obiicitur in contrarium, quia non est ordo in ipsis habitibus absolute consideratis, sed per relationem ad actus.

Similiter est ibi12 aequalitas secundum conversionem animae supra se et praedictorum habituum perfectionem. Unde dicit Augustinus in nono de Trinitate13: quantum enim est quis habilis vel facilis ad cognoscendum se, tantum ad se amandum; de habitibus vero acquisitis, malis vel bonis, non est verum; et de his non intelligitur.

Similiter est ibi tertium, scilicet consubstantialitas, quia, secundum quod dictum est supra, amor et notitia animae connaturales sunt, secundum quod supra se convertitur; et sic nihil omnino addunt super ipsas potentias. Per hoc enim, quod anima sibi praesens est, habet notitiam; per hoc, quod est unum sibi, habet habitum amoris: et ideo, sicut potentiae sunt consubstantiales animae, ut supra14 visum est, ita et huiusmodi habitus. Unde etsi videantur dicere modum habitus vel qualitatis, realiter tamen nihil supra potentias addunt.

3. Et sic patet responsio ad obiectum, quod non sunt qualitates isto modo.

p. 93

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ratione Augustini, dicendum, quod illa ratio non concludit principaliter, quod amor vel notitia sint substantialiter in anima; et hoc est15, quia tunc pari ratione posset dici et obiici de omni amore; sed concludit ex consequenti, quod patet sic. Cum enim amor extenditur extra suum subiectum alium amando, hoc est per virtutem substantiae, sicut per se non est, nisi16 per substantiam. Si ergo amor et notitia extenduntur per virtutem substantialem, et hae sunt intelligentia et voluntas; et amor, quo anima amat se, est idem cum ipsa voluntate; et similiter notitia, qua cognoscit, non est aliud quam intelligentia: restat ergo, quod amor et notitia respectu sui sunt ipsi menti consubstantiales.

Scholion

I. Pro faciliore intelligentia triplicis conclusionis notandum, quod ratio ordinis, quem habent mens, notitia et amor, non intelligitur, quatenus ista tria absolute et in se considerantur, sed in respectu ad suos actus. Similiter aequalitas non attenditur quoad aequalitatem in entitate, sed quoad actus super animam reflexos, dum anima intelligit se totam et se diligit, quantum se cognoscit. Quoad solutionem argumenti contra aequalitatem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. Denique consubstantialitas non intelligitur absoluta cum exclusione cuiusvis distinctionis, sed in sensu in praecedenti quaestione explicato. — Insuper notandum, quod consubstantialitas, quam notitia et amor habent cum mente, non accipitur proprie, quatenus sunt actus (quia actus secundi et accidentia non possunt esse realiter idem cum substantia animae), sed quatenus sunt habitus concreati. In hoc sensu dicit Scot. (hic q. 9.): «Ista tria ex parte animae, ut sunt sub tribus actibus suis, in istis, inquam, tribus est consubstantialitas».

II. In solutione ad 4. supponitur, quod nullum accidens se possit extendere ad extra virtute propria, sed tantum virtute alicuius substantialis, uti iam diximus in Scholio ad q. 3. articuli praecedentis. Hoc substantiale est ipsa duplex potentia intellectus et voluntatis; et hoc est verum de actu quocumque, sive tendat ad extra, sive super se reflectatur. Si autem actus harum potentiarum ad ipsam mentem ut cognitam et amatam referuntur, non sunt in anima sicut accidens in subiecto, sed substantialiter. — Eodem modo etiam S. Thomas hanc sententiam S. Augustini explicat, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 1. et ad 5.

III. Hanc quaestionem explicite tractant Alex. Hal., p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. — Scot., hic q. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 37. et seq.; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 11.

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English Translation

Question II

Whether mind, knowledge, and love have order, equality, and consubstantiality.

Second, a question is asked about these in comparison with one another, according to the threefold comparison which Augustine sets forth — namely of order, equality, and consubstantiality — and which the Master relates in the text1. There is order among these, because mind is the parent, knowledge is the offspring, and love is the third, proceeding from both. Equality is also there, because the mind knows itself2 as much as it is, and loves itself as much as it knows itself. Consubstantiality likewise — whence Augustine in the ninth book On the Trinity3: «We are admonished — if we can see it in any way — that these things exist substantially in the soul, not as in a subject (as color in a body, or any quality or quantity4; for whatever is of this sort does not exceed the substance in which it is). But the mind, by the love with which it loves itself, can also love another»; and so he means that love is consubstantial with the mind.

1. But against this it is objected: First, it seems that in these there is no order or origin. For they are taken either for innate habits or for acquired ones. If for innate ones, there is no order, because they are simultaneous with the soul itself; if for acquired ones, then love precedes knowledge — for no one acquires or strives to learn anything unless he loves to know. Hence Augustine at the end of the ninth book On the Trinity5: «The birth of the mind is preceded by appetite, by which — by our seeking and finding that which we wish to know — there is born an offspring, which is knowledge itself». Therefore either there is no order, or not such an order.

2. Likewise, it seems that there is no equality there. For knowledge and love are taken either by comparison6 to inferior things or by comparison to the soul. If to inferior things, it is manifest that there is no equality, for we know many things that we do not love; if by comparison to the soul, then either there is equality with respect to intension or with respect to extension. Not with respect to extension, which is evident because there is only one7 there; therefore with respect to intension8 — but that this is false is clear, because since we know the soul to be less than God and greater than body, it sometimes happens that we love it more than God and less than body; and thus the quantity of love does not follow the quantity of knowledge.

3. Likewise, that there is no consubstantiality there is clear, because love and knowledge are habits and are9 qualities; therefore it seems that they differ essentially from mind itself.

4. Likewise, Augustine's reason10 is that they are not in the soul like accidents, because they extend themselves outward; but this is nothing, because accidents extend themselves outward — as heat by heating, and color by altering sight. Furthermore, a human being knows certain knowable things by acquired knowledge — which is an accident and yet extends itself outward.

Conclusion

Mind, knowledge, and love have order, equality, and consubstantiality.

I respond: It must be said that, as Augustine assigns, there is among these order, equality, and consubstantiality.

Order, however, is observed in these connatural habits of the soul in comparison to their acts — just as order is placed in11 faith, hope, and charity, although they are infused simultaneously.

1. And from this is clear what is objected on the contrary: there is no order in the habits themselves absolutely considered, but by relation to their acts.

Likewise there is12 equality there, according to the conversion of the soul upon itself and according to the perfection of the aforesaid habits. Hence Augustine in the ninth book On the Trinity13 says: to the extent that one is apt or disposed toward knowing himself, to that same extent is he toward loving himself. Of acquired habits, however — bad or good — this is not true; and of these it is not understood.

Likewise, the third is there, namely consubstantiality — because, according to what was said above, love and knowledge are connatural to the soul, according as it is converted upon itself; and so they add nothing at all above the powers themselves. For because the soul is present to itself, it has knowledge; because it is one with itself, it has the habit of love. And therefore, just as the powers are consubstantial to the soul, as was seen above14, so too are habits of this kind. Hence although they may appear to denote the mode of a habit or quality, in reality they add nothing above the powers.

3. And from this is clear the response to the objection — that they are not qualities in that way.

4. To the objection drawn from Augustine's reasoning: it must be said that that reasoning does not principally conclude that love or knowledge are substantially in the soul — and this is so15, because then the same could be said and objected of every love. But it concludes consequentially, as is clear thus: When love extends itself beyond its subject by loving another, this is through the power of the substance — just as [an accident] is not by itself except16 through substance. If, therefore, love and knowledge extend themselves through a substantial power, and these are the understanding and the will; and the love with which the soul loves itself is the same as the will itself; and likewise the knowledge by which it knows itself is nothing other than the understanding: it remains, therefore, that love and knowledge, with respect to themselves, are consubstantial with the mind itself.

Scholion

I. For the easier understanding of the threefold conclusion, it should be noted that the account of order which mind, knowledge, and love have is not understood insofar as these three are considered absolutely and in themselves, but with respect to their acts. Likewise equality is not observed as to equality in entity, but as to the acts reflected upon the soul, when the soul understands itself entirely and loves itself as much as it knows itself. For the solution of the argument against equality, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 7. Finally, consubstantiality is not understood absolutely with the exclusion of every distinction, but in the sense explained in the preceding question. — Moreover, it should be noted that the consubstantiality which knowledge and love have with the mind is not taken properly insofar as they are acts (because second acts and accidents cannot really be the same as the substance of the soul), but insofar as they are concreated habits. In this sense Scotus (here q. 9) says: «These three on the part of the soul — as they are under their three acts — in these three, I say, there is consubstantiality».

II. In the reply to 4 it is presupposed that no accident can extend itself outward by its own power, but only by the power of some substantial [principle] — as we have already said in the Scholion to q. 3 of the preceding article. This substantial [principle] is the twofold power of the intellect and the will; and this is true of any act whatsoever, whether it tends outward or reflects upon itself. If, however, the acts of these powers are referred to the mind itself as known and loved, they are not in the soul as an accident in a subject, but substantially. — In the same way, St. Thomas too explains this view of St. Augustine, Summa I, q. 77, a. 1, ad 1 and ad 5.

III. This question is expressly treated by Alexander of Hales, p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 7. — Scotus, here q. 9. — Blessed Albert, here aa. 37 ff.; Summa p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, a. 2, q. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 6, a. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 3 princ. q. 2, a. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 11.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 3 circa finem. — Mox Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 post ordo addit autem, et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 ponit quod loco quia ac ultimus pro tertius.
    [Master of the Sentences,] c. 3 near the end. — Next, the Vatican ed., against most codd. and ed. 1, after ordo adds autem, and against the older codd. and ed. 1 puts quod for quia and ultimus («last») for tertius («third»).
  2. Fide codd. I aa adiecimus se certe supplendum.
    On the witness of codd. I aa we have added se, which certainly needed to be supplied.
  3. Cap. 4, n. 5: Simul etiam admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in anima existere et tanquam involuta evolvi, ut sentiantur et dinumerentur substantialiter, vel, ut ita dicam, essentialiter, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color aut figura in corpore aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas. Quidquid enim tale est, non excedit subiectum, in quo est. Non enim color iste aut figura huius corporis potest esse et alterius corporis. Mens autem amore, quo se amat, potest amare et aliud praeter se. — In quo textu plurimi codd. falso habent utrumque loco utcumque, et minus bene animo pro anima; Vat. autem ponit consistere loco existere.
    [Augustine, de Trin. IX,] c. 4, n. 5: «At the same time we are admonished, if in any way we can see it, that these things exist in the soul and are unfolded as it were from being folded up, so that they may be perceived and enumerated substantially or, so to speak, essentially — not as in a subject (as color or figure in a body, or any other quality or quantity). For whatever is of this sort does not exceed the subject in which it is. For this color or figure of this body cannot be also of another body. But the mind, by the love by which it loves itself, can love another besides itself». — In this text most codd. wrongly have utrumque for utcumque, and less well animo for anima; the Vatican ed., however, puts consistere for existere.
  4. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 incongrue vel pro nec.
    The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, incongruously reads vel for nec.
  5. Cap. 12, n. 18, in quo textu post appetitus originale addit quidam et in fine omittit verba quae est; Vat. autem post quo addit ad et ponit noscere loco nosse.
    [Augustine, de Trin. IX,] c. 12, n. 18. In which text after appetitus the original adds quidam and at the end omits the words quae est; the Vatican ed., however, after quo adds ad and puts noscere in place of nosse.
  6. Vat. per comparationem, sed contra mss. Mox codd. V X post animam addunt tunc, ed. 1 et tunc.
    The Vatican ed. reads per comparationem, but against the mss. Next, codd. V X after animam add tunc, ed. 1 et tunc.
  7. Multi codd. ut A F T V X Y etc. cum ed. 1 omittunt tantum.
    Many codd. (A F T V X Y etc.) with ed. 1 omit tantum.
  8. Plures codd. ut A C L R S U aa bb cum ed. 1 minus apte qualitas; agitur siquidem de gradu intensionis.
    Several codd. (A C L R S U aa bb) with ed. 1 less aptly read qualitas; the matter, however, concerns degree of intension.
  9. Ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus sunt.
    From the mss. and ed. 1 we have added sunt.
  10. Libr. IX de Trin. c. 4, n. 5; vide supra fundam. 1 huius q. — Paulo post Vat. praeter fidem mss. accidentia enim pro quia accidentia, et in fine argumenti extendunt loco extendit.
    [Augustine,] On the Trinity IX, c. 4, n. 5; see above, fundament 1 of this question. — A little later the Vatican ed., against the witness of the mss., reads accidentia enim for quia accidentia, and at the end of the argument extendunt for extendit.
  11. Libr. IX de Trin. c. 12, n. 18; vide in lit. Magistri, c. 3 circa finem.
    [Augustine,] On the Trinity IX, c. 12, n. 18; see in the Master's text, c. 3 near the end.
  12. Ope mss. et ed. 1 sustulimus hic additum et. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A C G K L S T bb cum ed. 1 crebro in loco ordo in.
    With the help of the mss. and ed. 1 we have removed et, which was added here. A little earlier, several codd. (A C G K L S T bb) with ed. 1 read crebro in («often in») in place of ordo in («order in»).
  13. Cap. 4, n. 4: Recte igitur diximus, haec tria, cum perfecta sunt, esse consequenter aequalia.
    [Augustine, de Trin. IX,] c. 4, n. 4: «We have rightly said, therefore, that these three, when they are perfect, are consequently equal».
  14. Hic a. 2, q. 1, ad 1.
    Here a. 2, q. 1, ad 1.
  15. Mendum Vat. ex hoc pro et hoc est, et paulo post conclusit pro concludit castigatur ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.
    The corrupt Vatican reading ex hoc for et hoc est, and a little later conclusit («concluded») for concludit («concludes»), is corrected from the mss. and edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.
  16. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 sed loco nisi.
    The Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, reads sed for nisi.
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