Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 5
Articulus II
De comparatione generationis ad essentiam in ratione termini.
Consequenter circa secundum articulum huius quaestionis, qui est per comparationem generationis ad essentiam in ratione termini, duo quaeruntur.
Primo quaeritur, utrum substantia sive essentia generetur.
Secundo, utrum per generationem communicetur.
Quaestio I
Utrum substantia sive essentia generetur.
Quod autem substantia generetur, sic obiicitur:
1. Generatio in inferioribus est motus ad substantiam; sed Filius in divinis vere generatur, et substantia non est accidens: ergo generatio in divinis terminatur ad substantiam: ergo substantia generatur.
2. Item, generatur Filius; sed Filius est substantia: ergo generatur substantia.
3. Item, generare et generari correspondent sibi invicem; sed Pater substantiam generat sive substantiam communicat: ergo Filius generatur et substantia generatur.
4. Item, generare tam in divinis quam in creaturis est simile sibi producere1; sed non est similitudo in persona, sed in substantia et in natura: ergo cum terminetur ad simile, in quantum est simile, ergo ad substantiam, secundum quam attenditur similitudo. Et praeterea quia universale habet idem esse cum singulari: ergo cum multo magis sit eadem substantia cum persona, et substantia sit in persona, si persona generatur, et substantia.
Contra:
1. Omne quod generatur ab alio generatur, quia nihil se ipsum gignit2; sed substantia divina non habet alium, nec aliud est in divinis: ergo non generatur.
2. Item, omne quod generatur habet principium a quo3; sed omne quod habet principium, est principiatum; sed principium et principiatum distinguuntur: si ergo substantia generatur, distinguitur: aut ergo a substantia, aut a persona; sed utrumque est impossibile: ergo etc.
3. Item, omne quod generatur est de substantia generantis; si ergo substantia generatur, substantia vel essentia est de substantia generantis; sed non est nisi una omnino substantia: ergo idem est de se ipso, quod est impossibile.
4. Item, generatio est productio; sed productio est quaedam actio, et omnis actio creaturae terminatur ad singularia4: ergo cum generatio sit quaedam actio, in divinis terminabitur ad singulare sive suppositum; sed tale non est substantia: ergo non terminabitur ad ipsam.
Conclusio
Cum in divinis generatio terminetur solum ad substantiam primam, quae est persona, non ad substantiam secundam sive essentiam, minime recipitur, quod substantia generetur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod generatio de sua communi ratione ad substantiam terminatur. Sed attendendum, quod substantia dicitur dupliciter5: prima, quae est individuum et hypostasis sive persona, et secunda, quae est commune. Dico ergo, quod est loqui de termino generationis dupliciter: aut quantum ad productionem, aut quantum ad intentionem.
Quantum ad productionem, cum sit circa singulare6, terminatur ad substantiam primam, id est personam. Quantum vero ad intentionem, terminatur ad similitudinem naturae, quae est substantia secunda; sed intentio non est productio ipsius naturae absolute, sed per modum communicationis ad personam.
Et ideo non dicitur proprie substantia generatur, sed substantia communicatur; persona vero generatur.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod generatio est motus ad substantiam; dicendum, quod in creaturis generatio est ad substantiam primam7 et induci in novam individualem naturam. In divinis non est nova natura producta, sed eadem natura communicata. Ideo generatio terminatur ad personam, non ad essentiam.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius est substantia, ergo substantia generatur; dicendum, quod substantia ibi praedicatur de Filio secundum rationem suppositi non rationem communis; et ideo ratione identitatis in supposito dicitur substantia generari, sed non proprie.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod generare et generari correspondent; dicendum, quod verum est, sed terminus generari stat pro persona, non pro essentia absolute.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de similitudine; dicendum, quod similitudo in divinis attenditur in natura communicata, non in natura generata; et ideo natura communicatur, sed persona generatur.
I. Haec conclusio est iterum contra abbatem Ioachim (cfr. Schol. hic a. 1, q. 1). Ut recte intelligatur conclusio, notandum, quod non est sermo de subiecto generationis, quod in generatione creaturarum est materia prima, quae praesupponitur generationi, sed de termino generationis, qui incipit esse.
Perfecta generatio terminatur ad substantiam, non ad accidens; sed S. Doctor cum communi sententia distinguit duplicem substantiam: altera dicitur substantia prima, quae est omne individuum in genere substantiae; altera vero secunda, quae est aliquid «commune» in genere substantiae. Substantia prima est terminus totalis generationis quantum ad productionem; substantia secunda est terminus formalis (at partialis) quantum ad intentionem. In creaturis uterque terminus incipit esse de novo, non vero in Deo. «Unde generatio divina terminatur ad primam substantiam, non ad essentiam, neque ad relationem, in quantum est relatio, sed in quantum est persona subsistens». Ita hic Richard. a Med.
II. In conclusione et principalibus argumentis doctores conveniunt. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1; p. IV, q. 10, m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 3; Summa I, q. 39, a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; Summa p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1 princ. q. 2 secundae quaest. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 59, q. 1, n. 4. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.
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Article II
On the comparison of generation to essence in the account of term.
Next, concerning the second article of this question — which is by the comparison of generation to essence in the account of term — two questions are asked.
First: whether substance or essence is begotten.
Second: whether through generation it is communicated.
Question I
Whether substance or essence is begotten.
That substance is begotten, it is objected thus:
1. Generation in inferior beings is a motion to substance; but the Son in God is truly begotten, and substance is not an accident: therefore generation in God is terminated at substance: therefore substance is begotten.
2. Likewise, the Son is begotten; but the Son is substance: therefore substance is begotten.
3. Likewise, to beget and to be begotten correspond to each other; but the Father begets substance — i.e. communicates substance — therefore the Son is begotten and substance is begotten.
4. Likewise, to beget, both in God and in creatures, is to produce a likeness of itself1; but the likeness is not in the person but in the substance and in the nature: therefore, since [generation] is terminated at the like insofar as it is like, therefore at the substance, according to which the likeness is observed. And further, since the universal has the same being as the singular: therefore, since substance is much more the same as the person — and substance is in the person — if the person is begotten, so also the substance.
On the contrary:
1. Whatever is begotten is begotten by another, because nothing begets itself2; but the divine substance does not have another, nor is there another in God: therefore it is not begotten.
2. Likewise, whatever is begotten has a principle from which3; but everything that has a principle is principled; and principle and principled are distinguished: if therefore substance is begotten, it is distinguished — either from substance, or from a person; but both are impossible: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, whatever is begotten is from the substance of the begetter; if therefore substance is begotten, the substance or essence is from the substance of the begetter; but there is altogether only one substance: therefore the same is from itself, which is impossible.
4. Likewise, generation is production; but production is a kind of action, and every action of a creature is terminated at singulars4: therefore, since generation is a kind of action, in God it will be terminated at the singular or supposit; but such is not substance: therefore it will not be terminated at it.
Conclusion
Since in God generation is terminated only at the first substance, which is a person, not at second substance or essence, it is by no means received that substance is begotten.
I respond: It must be said that generation, by its common account, is terminated at substance. But it should be noted that substance is said in two ways5: first substance, which is the individual and hypostasis or person; and second substance, which is the common. I say therefore that one can speak of the term of generation in two ways: either with respect to production, or with respect to intention.
With respect to production, since it is concerned with the singular6, it is terminated at first substance — i.e. the person. But with respect to intention, it is terminated at the likeness of nature, which is second substance; but the intention is not the production of the nature itself absolutely, but by way of communication to a person.
And therefore it is not properly said substance is begotten, but substance is communicated; the person, however, is begotten.
1. To the objection that generation is a motion to substance: it must be said that in creatures generation is to first substance7 and to be brought into a new individual nature. In God there is no new nature produced, but the same nature communicated. Therefore generation is terminated at the person, not at the essence.
2. To the objection that the Son is substance, therefore substance is begotten: it must be said that substance there is predicated of the Son according to the account of supposit, not the account of the common; and therefore by reason of identity in the supposit substance is said to be begotten, but not properly.
3. To the objection that to beget and to be begotten correspond: it must be said that this is true, but the term to be begotten stands for a person, not for the essence absolutely.
4. To the objection concerning likeness: it must be said that likeness in God is observed in the nature communicated, not in the nature begotten; and therefore the nature is communicated, but the person is begotten.
I. This conclusion is again against Abbot Joachim (cf. the Scholion here a. 1, q. 1). For the conclusion to be rightly understood, it should be noted that we are not speaking of the subject of generation, which in the generation of creatures is prime matter (which is presupposed to generation), but of the term of generation, which begins to be.
Perfect generation is terminated at substance, not at accident; but the Holy Doctor with the common opinion distinguishes a twofold substance: one is called first substance, which is every individual in the genus of substance; and the other second substance, which is something «common» in the genus of substance. First substance is the total term of generation as to production; second substance is the formal (but partial) term as to intention. In creatures both terms begin to be anew; in God, however, this is not so. «Hence divine generation is terminated at first substance, not at the essence, nor at the relation insofar as it is a relation, but insofar as it is a subsisting person». So Richard of Middleton here.
II. On the conclusion and the principal arguments the doctors agree. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1; p. IV, q. 10, m. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 3; Summa I, q. 39, a. 5. — Blessed Albert, here a. 2; Summa p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1 princ. q. 2 of the second question. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 59, q. 1, n. 4. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1.
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- Cfr. Aristot., II de Anima, text. 34 (c. 4), ubi dicit, quod naturalissimum operum viventium est facere quale ipsum, id est generare; et text. 49: Finis est generare quale ipsum, id est simile.Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 34 (c. 4), where he says that the most natural of the works of living things is to make what is like itself — that is, to generate; and text 49: «The end is to generate what is like itself» — that is, the like.
- Aristot., II de Anima, text. 47 (c. 4): Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum. Paulo infra post aliud aliqui codd. ut A T V Z cc omittunt est; cuius loco cod. X ponit a quo generetur.Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 47 (c. 4): «But nothing generates itself». A little later, after aliud, some codd. (A T V Z cc) omit est; in its place cod. X puts a quo generetur.
- Aristot., IV Metaph. text. 22 (ed. Venet. 1489): Et si generetur, necesse est, ut habeat esse illud ex quo generatur, illud quod ex eo generatur, et illud per quod generatur. Iuxta ed. Paris. (Firmin-Didot) III, c. 5: Si fit, necesse est esse, ex quo fit, et a quo generatur.Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 22 (Venice ed. 1489): «And if [something] is generated, it is necessary that there be that from which it is generated, that which is generated from it, and that through which it is generated». According to the Paris ed. (Firmin-Didot) III, c. 5: «If [something] comes to be, it is necessary that there be that from which it is made, and that by which it is generated».
- De termino actionis ait Aristot., I Metaph. c. 1: Actiones autem ac generationes omnes circa singulare sunt. — In fine argumenti aliqui codd. ut A I T cum ed. 1 terminatur loco terminabitur.On the term of an action Aristotle says, Metaphysics I, c. 1: «But all actions and generations are concerned with the singular». — At the end of the argument, some codd. (A I T) with ed. 1 read terminatur in place of terminabitur.
- Vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia. — De duplici substantia (prima et secunda) cfr. etiam Boeth., de Persona et duabus naturis c. 3.See Aristotle, Categories, c. On Substance. — On the twofold substance (first and second), cf. also Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures c. 3.
- Cfr. Aristot., VII Metaph. text. 28 (VI, c. 8): Actiones autem et generationes sunt circa singulare. — De termino generationis cfr. Aristot., VII Metaph. text. 26 seqq. (VI, c. 8).Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 28 (VI, c. 8): «Actions and generations are concerned with the singular». — On the term of generation, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 26 ff. (VI, c. 8).
- Hoc est, in individuo sive supposito. De quo cfr. Aristot., VII Metaph. loc. cit.That is, in the individual or supposit. On which cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, loc. cit.