Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 7
Quaestio III
Utrum potentia generandi et potentia creandi sint unica potentia.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum posse generare et posse creare sit unicum posse; et quod non sit unicum, videtur:
1. Augustinus1: «Alio est Pater, alio est Deus»: ergo alio est generans, alio creans: sed potentia generandi est generans, potentia creandi est creans: ergo etc.
2. Item, potentiae distinguuntur per actus et actus per obiecta2; ergo si generatio terminatur ad Deum et creatio ad creaturam, et haec sunt omnino diversa: ergo etc.
3. Item, potentiae plurificantur per subiecta, quoniam in pluribus potentibus plures sunt potentiae; sed potentia creandi est in Filio sive posse creare, in eo autem non est posse generare3: ergo non sunt unum posse.
4. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum potest intelligi, altero non intellecto, et e converso, illa non sunt unum; sed posse generare potest intelligi, circumscripta potentia creandi; et e converso posse creare, circumscripta potentia generandi: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Unius potentis omnino simplicis unicum tantum est posse4; sed Pater est potens omnino simplex: ergo unicum tantum habet posse; sed habet posse generare et posse creare: ergo illa duo sunt unicum posse.
2. Item, si posse est aliud et aliud, cum posse generare respiciat personam, posse creare naturam: ergo natura et persona sunt duo: ergo nec natura de persona, nec e converso dicitur, quod est omnino falsum.
3. Item, si est distinctio inter posse generare et posse creare: ergo est ibi ordo. Quaero igitur, quid sit prius secundum rationem intelligendi5. Et quod potentia generandi, videtur, quia est respectu aeterni, et aeternum ante temporale. Sed contra: intellectus communis est ante intellectum proprii; sed potentia creandi dicit commune tribus, potentia generandi proprium Patris: ergo etc.
Conclusio
Potentia generandi et potentia creandi non secundum rem, sed solummodo secundum rationem intelligendi differunt.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod posse generare et posse creare est posse unicum, tamen dupliciter dictum. Unum enim esse est in re esse Patrem et esse Deum, differens autem secundum rationem intelligendi; quia hoc est absolutum, cum dico esse Deum, illud relatum, cum dico esse Patrem. Similiter et in posse est intelligendum. Unde sicut essentia et persona unum sunt in re, tamen est differentia rationis in intelligendo et in dicendo; similiter dicendum est de potentia generandi et creandi.
Et sicut est ibi differentia non re, sed secundum rationem, ita est ibi ordo secundum rationem intelligendi. Unde secundum diversas comparationes habent alium et alium ordinem. Comparando enim posse creare et posse generare ad illud cuius sunt; cum posse creare sit naturae, posse generare sit personae, et intellectus communis ante intellectum proprii; sic absque calumnia prior est secundum rationem intelligendi potentia creandi. Comparando autem ad illud ad quod terminatur; cum potentia creandi respiciat temporale, potentia vero generandi aeternum; prior est secundum rationem intelligendi potentia generandi quam potentia creandi: et sic patent obiecta de ordine.
Concedendae sunt ergo rationes ostendentes, quod non differunt posse generare et posse creare differentia secundum rem sive secundum essentiam.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod alio est Pater, alio est Deus; patet responsio: differentia secundum rationem non est differentia secundum rem.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de distinctione per actus et obiecta; dicendum, quod verum est de potentiis creatis. In Deo autem, propter simplicitatem, eadem potentia potest respicere diversos actus et obiecta secundum rationem intelligendi.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentiae plurificantur per subiecta; dicendum, quod istud verum est de subiecto proprio; sed Filius non in quantum Filius est subiectum potentiae creandi, sed in quantum Deus. Et constat, quod natura divina non facit numerum cum Patre; ita nec potentia respiciens naturam cum potentia Patris.
4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod unum potest intelligi sine altero et e converso; dicendum, quod aut loqueris quantum ad significatum, aut quantum ad connotatum. Si quantum ad connotatum, verum dicis, quod creatura potest intelligi, non intellecta persona Filii, et e converso. Si quantum ad principale significatum, dicis falsum; impossibile est enim, intelligi potentiam generandi sine potentia creandi, sicut impossibile est intelligere personam sine essentia.
I. De differentia inter essentiam et personam cfr. infra d. 33. q. 2. et Scholion. Ad verba in solut. ad 3: «Verum est de subiecto proprio», notandum, quod distinguitur subiectum proximum et adaequatum alicuius potentiae et remotum. Subiectum proximum sive primarium potentiae divinae creativae est unicum, scil. essentia divina. Et axioma: potentiae plurificantur per subiecta, non oportet quod sit verum, quando agitur de subiecto remoto, quod est persona divina.
II. Hanc quaestionem alii antiqui Scholastici non nisi breviter tractant. Ipsam tangit S. Doctor infra d. 20. a. 1. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 1. et 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; de Potentia q. 2. a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
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Question III
Whether the power of begetting and the power of creating are one power.
Third it is asked whether to be able to beget and to be able to create are one being-able; and that they are not one, seems evident:
1. Augustine1: «He is Father by one [thing], God by another»: therefore by one He is generator, by another creator: but the power of begetting is generative, the power of creating is creative: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, powers are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their objects2; therefore if generation is terminated at God and creation at the creature, and these are altogether diverse: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, powers are pluralized by subjects, since in many having power there are many powers; but the power of creating is in the Son — that is, to be able to create — and yet to be able to beget is not in Him3: therefore they are not one being-able.
4. Likewise, whatever things are such that one can be understood without the other being understood, and conversely, those are not one; but to be able to beget can be understood when the power of creating is set aside, and conversely to be able to create when the power of begetting is set aside: therefore, etc.
On the contrary:
1. Of one altogether simple having-power there is only one being-able4; but the Father is altogether simple having-power: therefore He has only one being-able; but He has to be able to beget and to be able to create: therefore those two are one being-able.
2. Likewise, if being-able is one [thing] and another, since to be able to beget regards person and to be able to create regards nature: therefore nature and person are two: therefore neither is the nature said of the person, nor conversely — which is altogether false.
3. Likewise, if there is a distinction between to be able to beget and to be able to create: then there is order there. I ask, therefore, what is prior according to the account of understanding5. And that the power of begetting is, seems evident — because it is with respect to the eternal, and the eternal is prior to the temporal. But on the contrary: the understanding of the common is before the understanding of the proper; but the power of creating denotes what is common to the three, while the power of begetting denotes what is proper to the Father: therefore, etc.
Conclusion
The power of begetting and the power of creating differ not in reality but only according to the account of understanding.
I respond: It must be said that to be able to beget and to be able to create are one being-able, yet said in two ways. For to be Father and to be God are one being in reality, but differ according to the account of understanding — because when I say to be God it is absolute, when I say to be Father it is relative. Likewise it must be understood in being-able. Hence as essence and person are one in reality but there is a difference of account in understanding and in speaking, so it must be said of the power of begetting and creating.
And just as there is there a difference not in reality but according to account, so there is also order according to the account of understanding. Hence according to diverse comparisons they have one and another order. For comparing to be able to create and to be able to beget to that to which they belong — since the power of creating belongs to nature, and the power of begetting to person, and the understanding of the common is before the understanding of the proper — thus without dispute the power of creating is prior according to the account of understanding. But comparing them to that at which they are terminated — since the power of creating regards the temporal, while the power of begetting regards the eternal — the power of begetting is prior according to the account of understanding to the power of creating; and so the objections concerning order are clear.
The arguments showing that to be able to beget and to be able to create do not differ by a difference according to reality or essence are therefore to be conceded.
1. To the objection that He is Father by one, God by another: the response is clear: a difference according to account is not a difference according to reality.
2. To the objection from the distinction by acts and objects: it must be said that this is true of created powers. In God, however, on account of [His] simplicity, the same power can regard diverse acts and objects according to the account of understanding.
3. To the objection that powers are pluralized by subjects: it must be said that this is true of the proper subject; but the Son, insofar as He is Son, is not the subject of the power of creating, but insofar as He is God. And it is plain that the divine nature does not make number with the Father; thus neither does the power regarding the nature with the power of the Father.
4. To the last objection, that one can be understood without the other and conversely: it must be said that you speak either as to what is signified or as to what is connoted. If as to what is connoted, you speak truly — that the creature can be understood without the person of the Son being understood, and conversely. If as to the principal signified, you speak falsely: for it is impossible to understand the power of begetting without the power of creating, just as it is impossible to understand person without essence.
I. On the difference between essence and person, see below d. 33, q. 2, and the Scholion. To the words in the reply to 3, «this is true of the proper subject», it should be noted that we distinguish a proximate and adequate subject of some power from a remote one. The proximate or primary subject of the divine creative power is one — namely the divine essence. And the axiom powers are pluralized by subjects need not be true when the matter concerns the remote subject — which is the divine person.
II. Other older Scholastics treat this question only briefly. The Holy Doctor touches it below at d. 20, a. 1, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 20, mm. 1 and 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; de Potentia q. 2, a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 1 princ. q. 3. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 2.
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- August., de Trin. VII, c. 6, n. 11; vide etiam supra in d. 6, dub. 2.Augustine, On the Trinity VII, c. 6, n. 11; see also above at d. 6, dub. 2.
- Aristot., II de Anima, text. 33 (c. 4): Priores enim potentiis actus, et actibus obiecta.Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 33 (c. 4): «For acts are prior to powers, and objects to acts».
- Cfr. supra hic q. 2 in corp.: posse generare est in solo Patre, posse creare in tribus personis.Cf. above here q. 2 in corp.: to be able to beget is in the Father alone; to be able to create is in all three persons.
- Cfr. infra d. 20, a. 1, q. 1, ubi de unitate potentiae creandi in tribus personis fusius agitur.Cf. below d. 20, a. 1, q. 1, where the unity of the creative power in the three persons is treated more fully.
- De ordine intellectualis prioritatis in divinis cfr. infra d. 8 et d. 19; et ipse S. Thomas, Summa I, q. 27, a. 1, ad 2.On the order of intellectual priority in God, cf. below d. 8 and d. 19; and St. Thomas himself, Summa I, q. 27, a. 1, ad 2.