Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
Quaestio IV. Utrum Deus sit in aliquo determinato genere sive praedicamento.
Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit in aliquo determinato genere. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.
1. Quod distinguitur ab aliis entibus est aliqua natura determinata; sed Deus est huiusmodi, quia distinguitur a creaturis omnibus (quia nullum creatum est Deus): ergo est natura determinata; sed quod est natura determinata est in genere determinato1: ergo etc.
2. Item, quod habet superius univocum et essentiale, habet esse in genere determinato; sed Deus habet superius se ut substantiam, quae dicitur de Deo et creaturis et essentialiter et univoce — quia secundum istam rationem quae est res per se existens: ergo etc.
3. Item, quod [Deus] sit in quolibet genere, videtur. Quia omne quod est completionis in creatura, attribuendum est Deo; sed omne praedicamentum habet aliquid completionis: ergo res omnium praedicamentorum sunt in Deo; sed quidquid est in Deo est Deus, et e converso: ergo Deus essentialiter subiicitur rei omnis praedicamenti: ergo est in quolibet.
4. Item, summo bono nihil deficit de bonitate: ergo summo enti nihil [deficit] de entitate: ergo in Deo est omnis entitas et omnis differentia entitatis: ergo cum differentiae entium sint decem praedicamenta, omnia sunt in Deo.
Contra:
1. Augustinus in libro quinto de Trinitate2: «Deus est bonus sine qualitate, magnus sine quantitate»: ergo magnitudo Dei non est in genere quantitatis, nec bonitas in genere qualitatis: ergo nec substantia in genere substantiae: ergo in nullo est.
2. Item, videtur quod non est in genere determinato, quia omne quod est in genere determinato habet esse finitum et limitatum; Deus autem est infinitus: ergo etc.
3. Item, quod non in quolibet genere, videtur, quia quod habet in se res plurium generum est compositum; Deus autem est simplicissimus: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Deus nec est in aliquo determinato genere, nec in pluribus.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non convenit Deo esse in uno genere determinato, quia omne tale habet esse limitatum et arctatum et compositum.
In pluribus generibus non potest esse. Aut enim aliquid est in pluribus propter naturarum et proprietatum diversitatem — ut album, in quantum dicit subiectum aliquod sive rem albam, est in genere substantiae, sed in quantum dicit formam quae est albedo, est in praedicamento qualitatis; aut propter generalitatem, sicut unum et ens.
Propter naturarum multiformitatem non potest Deus esse in pluribus, quia omne tale compositum est et multiforme, Deus autem simplex.
Non propter generalitatem, quia ens tale nihil est habens distinctum a rebus creatis. Deus autem est habens in se ens distinctum a rebus, et habens esse simplex et infinitum; et ideo nec in uno genere nec in pluribus esse potest.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod distinguitur ab aliis est natura distincta etc.; dicendum, quod verum est si distinguatur per aliquid, quod ipsum contrahat et arctet — sicut per differentiam cadentem in genere; Deus autem non sic distinguitur, sed se ipso.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus habet superius univocum; dicendum, quod Deo non est superius — quia non est simplicius — nec univocum, quia illa ratio [substantiae] non convenit uniformiter creaturae et Creatori. Deus enim est ens per se quia nullo egens; creatura est ens per se quia non est in alio ut in subiecto, eget tamen alio ad sui conservationem.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod est perfectionis et bonitatis ponendum est in Deo; dicendum, quod hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel per diversitatem — et hoc facit esse in diversis generibus; vel secundum omnimodam unitatem — et hoc facit esse extra omne genus.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod Deo nihil deficit de bonitate; dicendum, quod Deus non dicitur non-deficiens a bonitate propter hoc, quod omnis differentia boni particularis sit in Deo per differentiam, sed quia est in eo per aequivalentiam. Quia enim est summum bonum, complectitur in se bonum omne; sic intelligendum est de entitate; et sic patet illud.
I. Genus determinatum, de quo est quaestio, est genus logicum seu praedicamentum, quod praedicatur de pluribus specie differentibus, v.g. substantia. — Aliqui Nominales, ut Gregorius Ariminensis, contra communem et veram sententiam affirmarunt Deum esse in genere substantiae. Quaestionem S. Doctor duplici conclusione solvit docendo, Deum nec esse in uno determinato genere, nec esse in pluribus simul. Quod non sit in pluribus probat per partes: cum enim duplici modo aliquid esse possit in pluribus praedicamentis, neuter modus Deo convenit. Primus modus patet ex littera; secundus modus est «propter generalitatem, sicut unum et ens». Quod ut intelligatur, sciendum, quod ens, unum, verum, bonum vocantur transcendentia, quia ita ponuntur in omnibus praedicamentis, ut praedicentur quidem de eis, sed non sint aliquod praedicamentum. Non enim haec transcendentia esse habent distinctum a praedicamentis, in quibus ponuntur — v.g. ens in praedicamento substantiae est substantia; in praedicamento quantitatis est quantitas. Unde hic modus minime convenit Deo, qui habet esse omnino determinatum et distinctum a rebus. Hac doctrina eliditur pantheismus.
II. Solutio ad 1 eruitur ex distinctione inter naturam determinatam per aliquam differentiam, et determinatam per se ipsam; in primo casu differentia contrahit genus ad aliquam speciem, quae est in aliquo praedicamento; tunc et ipsa natura sic determinata est in hoc praedicamento. Aliter dicendum de Deo, qui est actus purissimus, determinatus per se, et ideo extra omne praedicamentum. Cfr. Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.
III. Quoad rem principalem antiqui doctores consentiunt. De sententia S. Thomae, qui in Commentar. (hic q. 4, a. 2) paulo aliter loquitur quam in Summa (I, q. 3, aa. 5, 7), cfr. Caietanus ad ult. locum. — Scotus (hic q. 3, n. 20) non conclusionem, sed tantum eam rationem oppugnat, quae a S. Thom. ex hoc eruitur, quod Deus omnium generum perfectiones in se continet. Tamen Scotus (loc. cit. n. 16) putat rationem entis Deo et creaturis univoce convenire — quod quomodo cohaereat cum aliis doctrinis Scoti, varie a Scotistis explicatur. — Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 48, m. 4, aa. 2–3. — B. Albert, hic a. 32; Summa tr. 4, q. 20, m. 3 in fine. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5, a. 2. — Richard a Med., hic a. 4, q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 26. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 3, q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 1, 2.
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Question IV. Whether God is in any determinate genus or predicament.
Fourth and last it is asked, whether God is in any determinate genus. And that He is, is shown thus.
1. What is distinguished from other beings is some determinate nature; but God is of this kind, since He is distinguished from all creatures (for no created thing is God): therefore He is a determinate nature; but what is a determinate nature is in a determinate genus1: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, that which has a univocal and essential superior has being in a determinate genus; but God has above Him substance, which is said of God and of creatures both essentially and univocally — for according to its account that which is is "a thing existing per se": therefore etc.
3. Likewise, it seems that [God] is in every genus. For everything which is of completion in a creature is to be attributed to God; but every predicament has something of completion: therefore the things of all the predicaments are in God; but whatever is in God is God, and conversely: therefore God is essentially subject to the thing of every predicament: therefore He is in every one.
4. Likewise, to the highest good nothing is lacking of goodness: therefore to the highest being nothing [is lacking] of being: therefore in God is every entity and every difference of entity: therefore since the differences of beings are the ten predicaments, all are in God.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine in the fifth book On the Trinity2: "God is good without quality, great without quantity": therefore God's greatness is not in the genus of quantity, nor His goodness in the genus of quality: therefore not even His substance in the genus of substance: therefore in none is He.
2. Likewise, it seems He is not in a determinate genus, since everything that is in a determinate genus has finite and limited being; but God is infinite: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, [that He is] not in every genus, it seems — because what has in itself the things of several genera is composite; but God is most simple: therefore etc.
Conclusion. God is neither in any determinate genus, nor in several.
I respond: It must be said that it does not befit God to be in one determinate genus, since everything such has limited, constricted, and composite being.
In many genera He cannot be. For something is in many genera either on account of diversity of natures and properties — as white, inasmuch as it signifies some subject or white thing, is in the genus of substance; but inasmuch as it signifies the form, which is whiteness, is in the predicament of quality; or on account of generality, as one and being.
On account of multiformity of natures God cannot be in many, since everything such is composite and multiform, whereas God is simple.
Not on account of generality, since such a being has nothing distinct from created things. But God is having in Himself being distinct from things, and having simple and infinite being; and therefore He can be neither in one genus nor in many.
To the arguments:
To 1. As for the objection that what is distinguished from others is a distinct nature etc.; it must be said that this is true if it is distinguished by something that contracts and constricts it — as by a difference falling within a genus. But God is not so distinguished, but by Himself.
To 2. As for the objection that God has a univocal superior, it must be said that there is no superior to God — since nothing is simpler — and no univocal, because that account [of substance] does not befit creature and Creator uniformly. For God is a being per se because needing nothing; a creature is a being per se because it is not in another as in a subject, yet it needs another for its conservation.
To 3. As for the objection that everything which is of perfection and goodness is to be placed in God; it must be said that this can be in two ways: either through diversity — and this causes being in diverse genera; or according to complete unity — and this causes being outside every genus.
To 4. To the last objection, that nothing of goodness is lacking to God; it must be said that God is called not-lacking of goodness not because every difference of particular good is in God through difference, but because it is in Him through equivalence. For since He is the highest good, He embraces in Himself every good; so too must one understand about entity; and so that [objection] is plain.
I. A determinate genus, which is in question, is a logical genus or predicament, which is predicated of many things differing in species — e.g., substance. Some Nominalists, such as Gregory of Rimini, contrary to the common and true opinion, affirmed that God is in the genus of substance. The holy Doctor solves the question by two conclusions, teaching that God is neither in one determinate genus, nor in several at once. That He is not in several, he proves part by part: since something can be in many predicaments in two ways, and neither of these befits God. The first mode is clear from the text; the second is "on account of generality, as one and being." For understanding which, it should be known that being, one, true, good are called transcendentals — because they are so placed in all the predicaments that they are indeed predicated of them, but are no predicament. For these transcendentals do not have being distinct from the predicaments in which they are placed — e.g., being in the predicament of substance is substance, in the predicament of quantity is quantity. Hence this mode by no means befits God, who has being altogether determinate and distinct from things. By this doctrine pantheism is struck down.
II. The solution to 1 is drawn from the distinction between a nature determined by some difference and one determined by itself; in the first case, the difference contracts the genus to some species, which is in some predicament; then the nature itself, so determined, is also in this predicament. Differently must it be said of God, who is purest act, determined by Himself, and therefore outside every predicament. Cf. Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2.
III. On the principal matter, the older doctors agree. On the opinion of St. Thomas, who in the Commentary (here q. 4, a. 2) speaks a little differently from the Summa (I, q. 3, aa. 5, 7), cf. Cajetan on the latter place. Scotus (here q. 3, n. 20) attacks not the conclusion, but only that reason which St. Thomas draws from this — that God contains in Himself the perfections of all genera. Yet Scotus (loc. cit. n. 16) thinks that the notion of being belongs to God and to creatures univocally — which how it coheres with other doctrines of Scotus is variously explained by the Scotists. — Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 48, m. 4, aa. 2, 3. — B. Albert, here a. 32; Summa tr. 4, q. 20, m. 3 at the end. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 5, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 26. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 3, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6. — Biel, here q. 1, 2.
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- Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicamentis in princ., ubi quinque a Scholasticis communiter receptae conditiones pro eo quod aliquid ponatur in genere determinato assignantur — scil. quod sit univocum, quod sit ens incomplexum seu ens per se unum, quod sit ens reale, quod sit universale vel particulare, quod sit ens finitum seu quid determinabile ad specialem modum entis.Cf. Aristotle, On the Categories at the beginning, where the five conditions commonly received by the Scholastics for something to be placed in a determinate genus are assigned — namely, that it be univocal; that it be a non-complex being or a being one per se; that it be a real being; that it be universal or particular; that it be a finite being — i.e., something determinable to a special mode of being.
- August., V de Trin. c. 1, n. 2: Ut sic intelligamus Deum... sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum.Augustine, On the Trinity V, c. 1, n. 2: "That we may so understand God... good without quality, great without quantity."
- Hoc est, perfectionis. Cfr. Anselm., Monologion c. 15.That is, of perfection. Cf. Anselm, Monologion c. 15.
- Cfr. Boeth., de Trin. c. 4, et Alanus ab Insulis, Regulae theologicae, reg. 9.Cf. Boethius, On the Trinity c. 4, and Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, reg. 9.
- Unum, ens, et ceterae — scil. res, aliquid, verum, bonum — propter maximam universalitatem qua in omnibus generibus implicantur, vocantur transcendentalia.One, being, and the rest — namely thing, something, true, good — on account of the supreme universality with which they are involved in all genera, are called transcendentals.
- De aequivalentia in Deo cfr. Dionys., de Divinis Nominibus c. 5, n. 8, ubi docetur Deum omnes rerum perfectiones continere eminenter et per aequivalentiam.On equivalence in God, cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 5, n. 8, where it is taught that God contains all the perfections of things eminently and by equivalence.